huntigton

fordealingeffectivelywithonetypeofproblem,andifitis thenconfrontedwithanentirelydifferenttypeofproblemrequiringadifferent response,theorganizationmaywellbea victimofitspastsuccessesand beunabletoadjusttothenewchallengeIn. general,however,thefirst hurdleis thebiggestone.Successin adaptingtoone environmental challengepavesthewayforsuccessfuladaptationto subsequentenvironmentalchallengesIf,.forinstance,theprobabilityof successful adjustmenttothefirstchallengeis50percent,theprobabilityofsuccessfuladjustmentto thesecondchallengemightbe 75 percent,to thethirdchallenge87? percent,tothefourth933/4percent,andsoon. Somechangesinenvironment,moreover,suchaschangesinpersonnel, are inevitableforall organizationsOther.changesin environment maybeproducedbytheorganizationitself;if,forinstance,itsuccessfullycompletesthetaskwhichitwasoriginallycreatedtoaccomplish. So longas itis recognizedthatenvironmentscandifferin thechallengeswhichtheyposetoorganizations,theadaptabilityofan organizationcanin a roughsensebemeasuredbyitsage.Itsage,in turn, canbemeasuredinthreeways.

One is simplychronological:thelongeran organizationor procedurehasbeeninexistence,thehigherthelevelofinstitutionalization. Theolderanorganizationis,themorelikelyitistocontinuetoexist throughanyspecifiedfuturetimeperiodThe. probabilitythatan organizationwhichisonehundredyearsoldwillsurviveoneadditional year,itmightbe hypothesized,isperhapsonehundredtimesgreater thantheprobabilitythatan organizationone yearold will survive oneadditionalyearPolitical.institutionsarethusnotcreatedovernight. Politicaldevelopment,in thissense,is slow,particularlywhencomparedwiththeseeminglymuchmorerapidpaceofeconomicdevelopmentIn. someinstances,particulartypesofexperiencemaysubstitute fortime:fierceconflictorotherseriouschallengesmaytransformganizationsintoinstitutionsmuchmorerapidlythannormalcircumstancesBut.suchintensiveexperiencesarerare,and evenwithsuch experiencestimeis stillrequired"A. majorparty,"AshokaMehtahas observed,in commentingon whycommunism helplessin India, "cannotbecreatedina day.In Chinaa greatpartywasforgedbythe revolutionOther.majorpartiescanbe or arebornofrevolutionsin othercountriesBut.itissimplyimpossible,throughnormalchannels, toforgea greatparty,toreachandgalvanizemillionsofmeninhalf

a millionvillages."'18

18AshokaMehta,in RaymondAron,ed., WorldTechnologyand Human Destiny (Ann Arbori963), I33.

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A secondmeasureofadaptabilityisgenerationalage.So longas an organizationstillhasitsfirstsetofleaders,so longas a procedureis stillperformedbythosewhofirstperformedit,itsadaptabilityisstill indoubtThe.moreoftentheorganizationhassurmountedtheproblemofpeacefulsuccessionandreplacedonesetofleaderswithanother, themorehighlyinstitutionalizedis. In considerablemeasure,of course,generationalageis a functionofchronologicalage.Butpolitical partiesand governmentsmaycontinuefordecadesunderthe leadershipofonegenerationThe.foundersoforganizations-whether parties,governments,orbusinesscorporations-areoftenyoungHence. thegapbetweenchronologicalageandgenerationalageis apttobe greaterintheearlyhistoryofan organizationthanlaterinitscareer. Thisgapproducestensionsbetweenthefirstleadersoftheorganizationand thenextgenerationimmediatelybehindthem,whichcan lookforwardtoa lifetimeintheshadowofthefirstgenerationIn. the middleofthei960'stheChineseCommunistPartywasforty-fiveyears old,butinlargepartitwasstillledbyitsfirstgenerationofleaders.

An organizationmayalsochangeleadershipwithoutchanginggenerationsofleadershipOne. generationdiffersfromanotherin terms

ofitsformativeexperiencesSimple.replacementofonesetofleaders byanother,i.e.,surmountingasuccessioncrisis,countsforsomething in termsofinstitutionaladaptability,butit is notas significantas a shiftin leadershipgenerations,. .,thereplacementofone setof leadersbyanothersetwithsignificantlydifferentorganizationalexperiencesThe.shiftfromLenintoStalinwasan intra-generationsuc-

cession;theshiftfromStalintoKhrushchevwas an inter-generation

succession.

Thirdly,organizationaladaptabilitycanbe measuredin functional termsAn. organization'sfunctions,ofcourse,can be definedin an almostinfinitenumberofways.(Thisisa majorappealanda major limitationof thefunctionalapproachto organizationsUsually.)an organizationiscreatedtoperformoneparticularfunctionWhen.that functionis no longerneeded,theorganizationfacesa majorcrisis. It eitherfindsa newfunctionorreconcilesitselftoa lingeringdeath. An organizationwhichhasadapteditselfto changesin itsenvironmentandhassurvivedoneormorechangesinitsprincipalfunctions is morehighlyinstitutionalizedthanonewhichhas not.Notfunctionalspecificitybutfunctionaladaptabilityisthetruemeasureofa highlydevelopedorganizationInstitutionalization.makestheorganizationmorethansimplyan instrumenttoachievecertainpurposes.'9

19See the veryusefuldiscussionin Philip Selznick'ssmall classic,Leadershipin Administration(New York I957), 5ff.

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Insteaditsleadersandmemberscometovalueitforitsownsake,and itdevelopsa lifeof itsownquiteapartfromthespecificfunctions it mayperformat anygiventime.The organizationtriumphsover itsfunction.

Organizationsand individualsthusdiffersignificantlyin their cumulativecapacitytoadapttochangesIndividuals.usuallygrowup throughchildhoodand adolescencewithoutdeep commitmentsto highlyspecificfunctionsThe. processofcommitmentbeginsin late adolescenceAs. theindividualbecomesmoreand morecommitted

totheperformanceofcertainfunctions,hefindsitincreasinglydifficult tochangethosefunctionsandtounlearntheresponseswhichhehas

acquiredto meetenvironmentalchangesHis. personalityhas been formed;he has become"setin his ways."Organizations, the otherhand,are usuallycreatedto performveryspecificfunctions. Whentheorganizationconfrontsachangingenvironment,itmust, ifitistosurvive,weakenitscommitmenttoitsoriginalfunctionsAs. theorganizationmatures,itbecomes"unset"initsways.

Inpractice,organizationsvarygreatlyintheirfunctionaladaptability. TheYMCA,forinstance,wasfoundedinthemid-nineteenthcentury as an evangelicalorganizationtoconvertthesingleyoungmenwho, duringtheearlyyearsofindustrialization,weremigrating great numberstothecitiesWith.thedeclineinneedforthisfunction,the Y successfullyadjustedto theperformanceof manyother"general service"functionsbroadlyrelatedtothelegitimizinggoalof"character developmentConcurrently,."itbroadeneditsmembershipbasetoin- cludefirstnon-evangelicalProtestants,thenCatholics,thenJews,then oldmenas wellas young,andthenwomenas wellas men!2oAs a result,theorganizationhasprosperedalthoughitsoriginalfunctions disappearedwiththedarksatanicmills.Otherorganizations,suchas theWCTU andtheTownsendMovement,havehadgreaterdifficulty inadjustingtoa changingenvironmentThe.WCTU "isan organiza-

tioninretreatContrary.totheexpectationsoftheoriesofinstitutionalization,themovementhasnotactedtopreserveorganizationalvalues attheexpenseofpastdoctrine."'"TheTownsendMovementhasbeen tornbetweenthosewhowishtoremainloyaltotheoriginalfunction

20 See MayerN. Zald and PatriciaDenton,"FromEvangelismto GeneralService: The TransformationoftheYMCA,"AdministrativeScienceQuarterly,viii (September

i963), 214ff.

21 JosephR. Gusfield,"SocialStructureand MoralReform:A StudyoftheWoman's

ChristianTemperanceUnion,"AmericanJournalof Sociology,LXI (NovemberI955), 232; and Gusfield,"The Problemof Generationsin an OrganizationalStructure," SocialForces,xxxv(May I957), 323ff.

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andthosewhoputorganizationalimperativesfirstIf. thelatterare successful,"thedominatingorientationofleadersandmembersshifts

fromtheimplementationofthevaluestheorganizationis takento represent(byleaders,members,andpublicalike),tomaintainingthe organizationalstructureassuch,evenatthelossoftheorganization's centralmission."22Theconquestofpolioposeda similaracutecrisis fortheNationalFoundationforInfantileParalysisThe.originalgoals oftheorganizationwerehighlyspecificShould.theorganizationdissolvewhenthesegoalswereachieved?Thedominantopinionofthe volunteerswasthattheorganizationshouldcontinue"We.canfight polio,"saidonetownchairman,"ifwecanorganizepeopleIf.we canorganizepeoplelikethiswe canfightanythingAnother."felt that:"Wouldn'titbea wonderfulstorygetpoliolicked,andthen goontosomethingelseandgetthatlickedandthengoontosomethingelse?Itwouldbea challenge,career."23

Theproblemsoffunctionaladaptabilityarenotmuchdifferentfor politicalorganizationsApolitical.partygainsinfunctionalagewhen it shiftsitsfunctionfromtherepresentationofoneconstituencyto therepresentationofanother;italsogainsinfunctionalagewhenit shiftsfromoppositiontogovernmentAparty.whichis unableto changeconstituenciesortoacquirepowerislessofaninstitutionthan onewhichisabletomakethesechangesA. nationalistpartywhose functionhasbeenthepromotionofindependencefromcolonialrule faces majorcrisiswhenitachievesitsgoalandhastoadaptitselfto thesomewhatdifferentfunctionofgoverningacountryIt.mayfind thisfunctionaltransitionsodifficultthatitwill,evenafterindependence,continueto devotea largeportionofitseffortsto fighting colonialismA.partywhichactsthiswayislessofaninstitutionthan one,liketheCongressParty,whichafterachievingindependence dropsitsanti-colonialismandquiterapidlyadaptsitselftothetasks of governingIndustrialization.hasbeena majorfunctionof the CommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionA. majortestoftheinstitu-

tionalizationoftheCommunistPartywillbeitssuccessindeveloping newfunctionsnowthatthemajorindustrializingeffortisbehindit. A governmentalorganwhichcansuccessfullyadaptitselftochanged functions,suchastheBritishCrownintheeighteenthandnineteenth

22 Sheldon L. Messinger,"OrganizationalTransformation:A Case Study of a DecliningSocialMovement,"American Sociological Review, xx (FebruaryI955), IO;

italics in original.

23 David L. Sills,The Volunteers(Glencoe1957), p. 266.Chap.9 of thisbookis an excellentdiscussionof organizationalgoal replacementwithreferenceto theYMCA,

WCTU, TownsendMovement,Red Cross,and othercase studies.

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centuries,is moreof an institutionthanone whichcannot,suchas theFrenchmonarchyin the same period.

COMPLEXITY-SIMPLICITY

The more complicatedan organizationis, the morehighlyinstitutionalizedit is. Complexitymay involveboth multiplicationof organizationalsubunits,hierarchicallyand functionally,and differentiation of separatetypesof organizationalsubunits.The greaterthe numberand varietyofsubunits,thegreatertheabilityoftheorganizationto secureand maintaintheloyaltiesof itsmembersIn. addition, an organizationwhichhas manypurposesis betterable to adjustitselfto the lossof anyone purposethanan organizationwhichhas onlyone purpose.The diversifiedcorporationis obviouslylessvulnerable than that which producesone productforone market.The differentiationofsubunitswithinan organizationmayor maynotbe along functionallines.If it is functionalin character,the subunits

themselvesare lesshighlyinstitutionalizedthanthewhole of which theyare a part.Changesin thefunctionsof thewhole,however,are

fairlyeasilyreflectedbychangesin thepowerandrolesofitssubunits. If the subunitsare multifunctional,theyhave greaterinstitutional strength,buttheymayalso,forthatveryreason,contributelessflexibilityto theorganizationas a whole.Hence,a politicalsystemwith partiesof "social integration,"in Neumann'sterms,has less institutionalflexibilitythanone withpartiesof"individualrepresentation."24 Relativelyprimitiveand simple traditionalpoliticalsystemsare usuallyoverwhelmedanddestroyedinthemodernizationprocessMore. complextraditionalsystemsare more likelyto adapt to thesenew demands.Japan,forinstance,was able to adjustitstraditionalpolitical institutionsto the modernworldbecauseof theirrelativecomplexityFor. two and a halfcenturiesbeforei868, the emperorhad reignedand the Tokugawa shogunhad ruled.The stabilityof the politicalorder,however,did notdependsolelyon thestabilityof the shogunate.When the authorityof the shogunatedecayed,another traditionalinstitution,the emperor,was availableto becomethe instrumentof the modernizingsamurai.The collapseof the shogun involvednottheoverthrowofthepoliticalorderbutthe"restoration"

of the emperor.

The simplestpoliticalsystemis thatwhichdependson one individual. It is also,of course,theleaststable.Tyrannies,Aristotlepointed

24 SigmundNeumann, "Toward a ComparativeStudy of PoliticalParties,"in Neumnann,ed.,ModernPoliticalParties(Chicago I956), 403-5.

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out,are virtuallyall "quiteshort-lived.A"25politicalsystemwith

severaldifferentpoliticalinstitutions,theotherhand,ismuchmore likelytoadapt.Theneedsofoneagemaybemetbyonesetofinstitutions;theneedsofthenextbya differentset.The systempossesses withinitselfthemeansof itsownrenewaland adaptationIn. the Americansystem,forinstance,President,Senate,House of Repre-

sentatives,SupremeCourt,andstategovernmentshaveplayeddifferent rolesatdifferenttimesinhistoryAs.newproblemsarise,theinitiative in dealingwiththemmaybe takenfirstbyoneinstitution,thenby

anotherIn. contrast,theFrenchsystemoftheThirdandFourthRepublicscenteredauthorityintheNationalAssemblyandthenational

bureaucracyIf,.as was frequentlythecase,theAssemblywas too dividedto actand thebureaucracylackedtheauthorityto act,the systemwas unableto adaptto environmentalchangesand to deal

withnewpolicyproblemsWhen.in thei950's theAssemblywas unabletohandlethedissolutionoftheFrenchEmpire,therewasno

otherinstitution,suchas an independentexecutive,to stepintothe breachAs. a result,an extraconstitutionalforce,themilitary,inter-

venedin politics,andin duecoursea newinstitution,thede Gaulle

Presidency,was createdwhichwas ableto handletheproblem"A. statewithoutthemeansof somechange,"Burkeobservedof an earlierFrenchcrisis,"iswithoutthemeansofitsconservation.""

The classicalpoliticaltheorists,preoccupiedas theywerewiththe problemofstability,arrivedatsimilarconclusionsThe. simpleforms ofgovernmentweremostlikelytodegenerate;the"mixedstate"was morelikelytobe stableBoth.PlatoandAristotlesuggestedthatthe

mostpracticalstatewas the"polity"combiningtheinstitutionsof democracyand oligarchyA. "constitutionalsystembasedabsolutely, andatallpoints,"Aristotleargued,"oneithertheoligarchicalorthe democraticconceptionofequalityis a poorsortofthingThe. facts areevidenceenough:constitutionsofthissortneverendure.A" "constitutionisbetterwhenitis composedofmorenumerouselements."27 Sucha constitutionismorelikelytoheadoffseditionandrevolution. PolybiusandCiceroelaboratedthisideamoreexplicitlyEach.ofthe "good"simpleformsofgovernment-kingship,aristocracy,anddemoc- racy-islikelyto degenerateintoitspervertedcounterpart-tyranny, oligarchy,andmobocracyInstability.anddegenerationcanbeavoided onlybycombiningelementsfromall thegoodformsintoa mixed

25 Politics (ErnestBarkertrans.,London I946), 254.

26Reflectionson theRevolutionin France (Gatewayedn.,ChicagoI955), 37.-

27Politics,6o, :206

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state.Complexityproducesstability"The. simplegovernments,"Burke echoedtwothousandyearslater,"are fundamentallydefective,to say no worseofthem."28

AUTONOMY-SUBORDINATION

A thirdmeasureofinstitutionalizationistheextentto whichpolitical organizationsand proceduresexistindependentlyof othersocial groupingsand methodsofbehavior.How well is thepoliticalsphere differentiatedfromotherspheres?In a highlydevelopedpolitical system,politicalorganizationshave an integritywhichtheylack in lessdevelopedsystemsIn. somemeasure,theyare insulatedfromthe impactofnon-politicalgroupsand proceduresIn. lessdevelopedpolitical systems,theyarehighlyvulnerableto outsideinfluences.

At itsmostconcretelevel,autonomyinvolvestherelationsbetween social forces,on the one hand, and politicalorganizations,on the other.Social forcesincludethegroupingsof men forsocialand economicactivities:families,clans,work groups,churches,ethnicand linguisticgroupings.Political institutionalization, the sense of autonomy,meansthedevelopmentofpoliticalorganizationsand procedureswhicharenotsimplyexpressionsoftheinterestsofparticular socialgroups.A politicalorganizationwhichis theinstrumentof a social group-family,clan, class-lacks autonomyand institutionalization.If thestate,in thetraditionalMarxistclaim,is reallythe"executivecommitteeof the bourgeoisie,"then it is not much of an institutionA. judiciaryis independentto the extentthatit adheres todistinctlyjudicialnormsand to theextentthatitsperspectivesand behaviorare independentof thoseof otherpoliticalinstitutionsand social groupings.As with the judiciary,the autonomyof political institutionsis measuredby theextentto whichtheyhave theirown interestsand valuesdistinguishablefromthoseofothersocialforces. As withthejudiciary,theautonomyof politicalinstitutionsis likely to be theresultof competitionamongsocialforcesA. politicalparty, forinstance,whichexpressesthe interestsof onlyone groupin so- ciety-whetherlabor,business,or farmers-isless autonomousthan one which articulatesand aggregatesthe interestsof severalsocial groups.The lattertypeof partyhas a clearlydefinedexistenceapart fromparticularsocialforcesSo. also withlegislatures,executives,and bureaucraciesPolitical.procedures,like politicalorganizations,also have varyingdegreesof autonomyA. highlydevelopedpoliticalsystemhas proceduresto minimize,ifnotto eliminate,theroleof vio-

28 Reflectionson theRevolutionin France,92.

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lencein thesystemandto restrictto explicitlydefinedchannelsthe influenceofwealthinthesystemTo. theextentthatpoliticalofficials canbe toppledbya fewsoldiersor influencedbya fewdollars,the organizationsand procedureslackautonomyPolitical.organizations andprocedureswhichlackautonomyare,in commonparlance,said tobe corrupt.

Politicalorganizationsandprocedureswhicharevulnerabletononpoliticalinfluencesfromwithinthesocietyarealsousuallyvulnerable to influencesfromoutsidethesocietyThey.areeasilypenetratedby agents,groups,andideasfromotherpoliticalsystemsThus,.a coup d'tat in onepoliticalsystemmayeasily"trigger"a coupd'etatby similargroupsin otherless-developedpoliticalsystems.In29 some instances,apparently,regimecanbeoverthrownbysmugglinginto thecountryafewagentsanda handfulofweaponsIn. otherinstances, a regimemaybe overthrownbytheexchangeofa fewwordsanda fewthousanddollarsbetweena foreignambassadorand somedisaffectedcolonelsThe. SovietandAmericangovernmentspresumably spendsubstantialsumsattemptingtobribehighofficialslesswellinsulatedpoliticalsystemswhichtheywouldnotthinkof wasting inattemptingtoinfluencehighofficialsineachother'spoliticalsystem. In everysocietyaffectedbysocialchange,newgroupsarisetoparticipatein politicsWhere.thepoliticalsystemlacksautonomy,these groupsgainentryintopoliticswithoutbecomingidentifiedwiththe establishedpoliticalorganizations acquiescingin theestablished politicalproceduresThe. politicalorganizationsand proceduresare unabletostandupagainsttheimpactofa newsocialforceConversely,. in a developedpoliticalsystem,theautonomyof thesystemis protectedbymechanismswhichrestrictandmoderatetheimpactofnew groupsThese.mechanismseitherslowdowntheentryofnewgroups intopoliticsor,througha processof politicalsocialization,impel changesin theattitudesand behaviorofthemostpoliticallyactive membersof thenew group.In a highlyinstitutionalizedpolitical system,themostimportantpositionsof leadershipcan normallybe achievedonlybythosewhohaveservedan apprenticeshipinlessimportantpositionsThe. complexityofa politicalsystemcontributesto itsautonomybyprovidingavarietyoforganizationsandpositionsin

whichindividualsarepreparedforthehighestofficesIn. a sense,the toppositionsofleadershiparetheinnercoreofthepoliticalsystem;

thelesspowerfulpositions,theperipheralorganizations,andthesemi-

29See SamuelP. Huntington,"PatternsofViolencein WorldPolitics,"in Huntington,ed.,ChangingPatternsofMilitaryPolitics(New York i962), 44-47.

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politicalorganizationsarethefiltersthroughwhichindividualsdesiringaccessto thecoremustpass.ThusthepoliticalsystemassimilatesnewsocialforcesandnewpersonnelwithoutsacrificingitsinstitutionalintegrityIn. a politicalsystemwhichlackssuchdefenses, newmen,newviewpoints,newsocialgroupsmayreplaceeachother atthecoreofthesystemwithbewilderingrapidity.

COHERENCE-DISUNITY

The moreunifiedandcoherentanorganizationis,themorehighly institutionalizedis; thegreaterthedisunityof theorganization, thelessitsinstitutionalizationSome.measureofconsensus,ofcourse, is a prerequisiteforanysocialgroup.An effectiveorganizationrequires,ata minimum,substantialconsensusonthefunctionalboundariesof thegroupand on theproceduresforresolvingdisputeson issueswhichcomeup withinthoseboundariesThe. consensusmust extendto thoseactivein thesystemNon.-participantsorthoseonly sporadicallyand marginallyparticipantin thesystemdo nothave tosharetheconsensusandusually,infact,donotshareittothesame extentas theparticipantsIn.30theory,an organizationcanbe autonomouswithoutbeingcoherentand coherentwithoutbeingautonomous.In actuality,however,thetwoareoftencloselylinkedtogether. Autonomybecomesa meanstocoherence,enablingtheorganization todevelopan espritandstylewhichbecomedistinctivemarksofits behaviorAutonomy.alsopreventstheintrusionofdisruptiveexternal forces,although,ofcourse,itdoesnotprotectagainstdisruptionfrom internalsourcesRapid.or substantialexpansionsin themembership ofan organizationin theparticipantsina systemtendtoweaken coherenceThe. OttomanRulingInstitution,forinstance,retainedits vitalityandcoherenceas longas admissionwasrestrictedandrecruits were"putthroughan elaborateeducation,withselectionandspecializationat everystage."The Institutionperishedwhen"everybody pressedin toshareitsprivileges. . Numberswereincreased;disciplineandefficiencydeclined."'"

Unity,esprit,morale,anddisciplineareneededin governmentsas

wellasinregimentsNumbers,.weapons,andstrategyallcountinwar, butmajordeficienciesinanyoneofthosemaystillbecounterbalanced

bysuperiorcoherenceanddisciplineSo. alsoinpoliticsThe. problems

30See, e.g., HerbertMcCloskey,"Consensusand Ideologyin AmericanPolitics,"

American Political Science Review, xviii (June i964), 36iff.; Samuel Stouffer,Com-

munism,Conformity,and Civil Liberties (New York i955), passim.

31 ArnoldJ.Toynbee,A Studyof History(Abridgementof Vols. i-viby D. C. Somervell,New York I947),

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ofcreatingcoherentpoliticalorganizationsaremoredifficultbutnot fundamentallydifferentfromthoseinvolvedin thecreationof coherentmilitaryorganizations"The. sustainingsentimentof a militaryforce,"DavidRapoporthasargued,"hasmuchincommonwith

thatwhichcementsanygroupofmenengagedinpolitics-thewill- ingnessofmostindividualstobridleprivateorpersonalimpulsesfor

thesakeofgeneralsocialobjectivesComrades.musttrusteachother's abilitytoresisttheinnumerabletemptationsthatthreatenthegroup's solidarity;otherwise,in tryingsocialsituationsthedesiretofendfor oneselfbecomesoverwhelmingThe."32capacitiesforcoordinationand disciplinearecrucialtobothwarandpolitics,andhistoricallysocieties whichhavebeenskilledatorganizingtheonehavealsobeenadeptat organizingtheother"The.relationshipofefficientsocialorganization intheartsofpeaceandintheartsofgroupconflict,"oneanthropologisthas observed,"is almostabsolute,whetherone is speakingof civilizationorsubcivilizationSuccessful.wardependsuponteamwork andconsensus,bothofwhichrequirecommandanddisciplineCom.- mandand discipline,furthermore,can eventuallybe no morethan symbolsofsomethingdeeperandmorerealthantheythemselves."33 Societies,suchas Sparta,Rome,and Britain,whichhavebeenadmiredbytheircontemporariesfortheauthorityand justiceoftheir lawshavealsobeenadmiredforthecoherenceanddisciplineoftheir

armiesDiscipline.anddevelopmentgo handinhand.

Onemajoradvantageofstudyingdevelopmentin termsofmobilizationandparticipationisthattheyaremeasurableStatistics.areread-

ily availableforurbanization,literacy,massmediaexposure,and votingHence,.comparisonsare easilymadebetweencountriesand

betweendifferentstagesofthesamecountryWhat.aboutinstitutionalization?Arethecriteriaofadaptability,complexity,autonomy,and coherencealsomeasurable?Quiteobviouslythedifficultiesaregreater. TheUN hasnotconvenientlycollectedinitsStatisticalYearbookdata on thepoliticalinstitutionalizationofitsmembersNonetheless,.no reasonexistswhywitha littleimaginationand effortsufficientinformationcouldnotbe collectedto makemeaningfulcomparisons ofthelevelsofpoliticalinstitutionalizationofdifferentcountriesor ofthesamecountryat differenttimesAdaptability.canbe measured by chronologicalage, leadershipsuccessions,generationalchanges, andfunctionalchangesComplexity.canbe measuredbythenumber

32 David C. Rapoport,"A ComparativeTheoryof Militaryand PoliticalTypes,"in

Huntington,ed., Changing Patterns of MilitaryPolitics, 79.

33HarryHolbertTurney-High,Primitive War (Columbia,S.C., I949), 235-36.

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