Воробева Нуцлеар Реацтор Тыпес (Леарн то реад бы реадинг) 2010

Apart from safeguards, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is designed particularly to cap the production of weapons-grade fissile materials in both NPT Nuclear Weapons States and India, Pakistan and Israel. India has expressed support for a verifiable Cut-off Treaty, China, Pakistan and Iran are opposed to one. The USA is not keen on such a Treaty being verifiable.

1To date civil facilities have not been made subject to IAEA safeguards unless they are of value to IAEA, e.g. for training or experience. However, Angarsk international fuel cycle centre is to be made subject to IAEA safeguards, and an increasing number of civil facilities are expected to be made subject to IAEA safeguards in the future.

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Other IAEA developments

In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty agreed in 1996 and to codify commitments made by USA, UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification.

Another initiative relates to plutonium (Pu) and spent fuel. For uranium, safeguards take account of its nature: natural, depleted, lowenriched or high-enriched (above 20 % U-235) and the corresponding degree of concern regarding proliferation. A similarly differentiated approach is being considered for Pu. Two or three categories are possible: degraded Pu (eg in high-burnup fuel), low-grade Pu (eg separated from spent fuel of normal burnup) and high-grade Pu (eg from weapons or low-burnup fuel). The first two correspond to what is generally known as a reactor-grade Pu, sometimes defined as having more than 19 % non-fissile isotopes.

Additional arrangements

There are also several other treaties and arrangements designed to reduce the risk of civil nuclear power's contributing to weapons proliferation.

Implementation of IAEA safeguards in the non-nuclear weapon states of the EU is governed by a Verification Agreement between the country concerned, EURATOM and the IAEA. Safeguards activities are carried out jointly by the IAEA and EURATOM. A revision to earlier arrangements, the New Partnership Approach (NPA), was agreed in April 1992. The NPA enables the IAEA itself to deploy more of its resources in member states where independent regional safeguards systems are not in place.

Shortly after entry into force of the NPT, multilateral consultations on nuclear export controls led to the establishment of two separate mechanisms for dealing with nuclear exports: the Zangger Committee in 1971 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975.

The Zangger Committee, also known as the Non Proliferation Treaty Exporters Committee, was set up to consider how procedures for exports of nuclear material and equipment related to NPT commitments. In August 1974 the committee produced a trigger list of items which would require the application of IAEA safeguards if exported to a non Nuclear

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Weapons State which was not party to the NPT. The trigger list is regularly updated. The Zangger Committee now has 31 member states.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The NSG, also known as the London Group or London Suppliers Group, was set up in 1974 after India exploded its first nuclear device. The main reason for the group's formation was to bring in France, a major nuclear supplier nation which was not then party to the NPT. It included both members and non-members of the Zangger Committee. The group communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients.

The NSG Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weaponsusable materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The NSG began with seven members — the USA, the former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan — but now includes 47 countries.

Conclusion

Civil nuclear power has not been the cause of or route to nuclear weapons in any country that has nuclear weapons, and no uranium traded for electricity production has ever been diverted for military use. All nuclear weapons programmes have either preceded or risen independently of civil nuclear power, as shown most recently by North Korea. No country is without plenty of uranium in the small quantities needed for a few weapons.

Former US Vice-President Al Gore said (18/9/06) that "During my eight years in the White House, every nuclear weapons proliferation issue we dealt with was connected to a nuclear reactor program. Today, the dangerous weapons programs in both Iran and North Korea are linked to their civilian reactor programs." He is not correct. Iran has failed to convince anyone that its formerly clandestine enrichment program has anything to do with its nuclear power reactor under construction (which will be fuelled by Russia), and North Korea has no civil reactor program. In respect to India and Pakistan, which he may have had in mind, there is evidently a link between military and civil, but that is part of the reason they are outside the NPT.

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Perspective is relevant: As little as five tonnes of natural uranium is required to produce a nuclear weapon. Uranium is ubiquitous, and if cost is no object it could be recovered in such quantities from most granites, or from sea water — sources which would be quite uneconomic for commercial use. In contrast, world trade for electricity production is about 66 000 tonnes of uranium per year, all of which can be accounted for.

There is no chance that the resurgent problem of nuclear weapons proliferation will be solved by turning away from nuclear power or ceasing trade in the tens of thousands of tonnes each year needed for it.

Australian Safeguards Policy

Australia's uranium is sold for exclusively peaceful purposes, namely electric power generation and related research and development activities. The main components of Australia's safeguards policy are:

(1)Careful selection of those countries eligible for the supply of Australian uranium:

• In the case of non-nuclear-weapons States, sales are made only to countries which are parties to the NPT. These have renounced the nuclear weapons option and accept full-scope IAEA safeguards applying to all their nuclear-related activities;

• In the case of nuclear weapons States, which must also be parties to the NPT, sales require an assurance that uranium will not be diverted to military or explosive purposes and that it will be subject to IAEA safeguards.

(2)Countries wishing to import Australian uranium must conclude a bilateral safeguards agreement with Australia. Provisions include:

• prior Australian consent to any Australian obligated nuclear material being transferred to a third party, enriched beyond 20 % uranium235, or reprocessed. Transfers are permitted only within Australia's network of bilateral safeguards.

• fallback safeguards (contingency arrangements to ensure the continued safeguarding of material already present in an importing country in case safeguards under the NPT ever cease to apply);

(3)Strong support for the NPT and IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, with IAEA monitoring to apply.

When adopted in 1977, this was a more rigorous safeguards policy than that of any country supplying uranium to world markets. However, the approach is very similar to that of the USA and Canada.

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Australia has 21 bilateral safeguards agreements covering 46 countries (the Euratom agreement covering all 27 countries in the EU). It has always taken the position that rigorous bilateral safeguards are an important and effective complement to the international safeguards system.

Australia's position as a major uranium exporter is influential in the ongoing development of international safeguards and other nonproliferation measures, through membership of the IAEA Board of Governors, participation in international expert groups and its safeguards research program in support of the IAEA.

Australian Safeguards Office

The Australian Safeguards & Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) regulates the system of bilateral safeguards applying to Australian uranium exports based on customer countries being parties to the NPT. It also administers the domestic safeguards system required by Australia's own NPT agreement with the IAEA.

In addition, ASNO keeps account of nuclear material and associated items in Australia through its administration of the Nuclear NonProliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987. ASNO provides information to the IAEA on the small amount of nuclear material in Australia which is subject to safeguards, and on uranium exports. It also facilitates IAEA inspections, including those under the Additional Protocol.

Australia has in place an accounting system that follows uranium from the time it is produced and packed for export, to the time it is reprocessed or stored as nuclear waste, anywhere in the world. It also includes plutonium which is in the spent fuel or recovered from it. All documentation is carefully monitored and any apparent discrepancies are taken up with the country concerned. There have been no unreconciled differences in accounting for AONM. This system operates in addition to safeguards applied by the IAEA which keep track of the movement of nuclear materials through overseas facilities and verify inventories.

One aspect of the accounting system is the possibility of obligation exchanges involving equivalent nuclear material held by a single utility or between different utilities. Exchanges are permitted, to simplify accounting and surveillance, provided that they do not result in reducing either the quality or quantity of material subject to Australian safeguards obligations. In lowenriched uranium the focus is on U-235 content.

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Each year the ASNO reports to the Australian Parliament on its activities and its accounts of nuclear materials.

Nuclear materials

Uranium processed for electricity generation is not useable for weapons. The uranium used in power reactor fuel for electricity generation is typically enriched to about 3-4 % of the isotope U-235, compared with weapons-grade which is over 90 % U-235. For safeguards purposes uranium is deemed to be "highly enriched" when it reaches 20 % U-235. Few countries possess the technological knowledge or the facilities to produce weapons-grade uranium.

Plutonium is produced in the reactor core from a proportion of the uranium fuel. Plutonium contained in spent fuel elements is typically about 60 — 70 % Pu-239, compared with weapons-grade plutonium which is more than 93 % Pu-239. Weapons-grade plutonium is not produced in commercial power reactors but in a "production" reactor operated with frequent fuel changes to produce low-burnup material with a high proportion of Pu-239.

The only use for "reactor grade" plutonium is as a nuclear fuel, after it is separated from the high-level wastes by reprocessing. It is not and has never been used for weapons, due to the relatively high rate of spontaneous fission and radiation from the heavier isotopes such as Pu-240 making any such attempted use fraught with great uncertainties.

Australian Obligated Nuclear Material

A characteristic of the civil nuclear fuel cycle is the international interdependence of facility operators and power utilities. Apart from the nuclear-weapon States, it is unusual for a country to be entirely selfcontained in the processing of uranium for civil use — and even in the case of the nuclear-weapon States, power utilities will seek the most favorable financial terms, often going to processors in other countries. Thus it is not unusual, for example, for a Japanese utility buying Australian uranium to have the uranium converted to uranium hexafluoride in Canada, enriched in France, fabricated into fuel in Japan, and reprocessed in the United Kingdom. The international flow of nuclear material enhances safeguards accountability, through 'transit matching' of transfers at the different stages of the fuel cycle.

The international nature of nuclear material flows means that uranium from many sources is routinely mixed during processes such as

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conversion and enrichment. Uranium is termed a 'fungible' commodity, that is, at these processing stages uranium from any source is identical to uranium from any other — it is not possible physically to differentiate the origin of the uranium. This is not unique to uranium, but is also the case with a number of other commodities. The fungibility of uranium has led to the establishment of conventions used universally in the industry and in the application of safeguards, namely equivalence and proportionality. These are discussed below.

Because of the impossibility of physically identifying 'Australian atoms', and also because Australian obligations apply not just to uranium as it moves through the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, but also to material generated through the use of that uranium, e.g. plutonium produced through the irradiation of uranium fuel in a reactor, the obligations under Australia's various bilateral safeguards agreements are applied to Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM). 'AONM' is a shorthand way of describing the nuclear material which is subject to the provisions of the particular bilateral agreement.

This approach is also used by those other countries applying bilateral safeguards comparable to Australia's, principally the United States and Canada. These countries attach a safeguards 'obligation' to nuclear material which they upgrade, hence giving rise to the situation of 'multilabelling', for example, AONM enriched in the US will also become US obligated nuclear material (USONM), and its subsequent use will have to meet the requirements of both Australian and US agreements. This is a common situation, that is, a significant proportion of AONM is also characterised as USONM and is accounted for both to ASNO and its US counterpart (the US DOE).

The equivalence principle provides that where AONM loses its separate identity because of process characteristics (e.g. mixing), an equivalent quantity is designated AONM, based on the fact that atoms or molecules of the same substance are indistinguishable, any one atom or molecule being identical to any other of the same substance. In such circumstances, equivalent quantities of the products of such nuclear material may be derived by calculation or from operating plant parameters. It should be noted that the principle of equivalence does not permit substitution by a lower quality material, e.g. enriched uranium cannot be replaced by natural or depleted uranium.

The proportionality principle provides that where AONM is mixed with other nuclear material, and is processed or irradiated, a proportion

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of the resulting material will be regarded as AONM corresponding to the same proportion as was AONM initially.

Some people are concerned that the operation of the equivalence principle means there cannot be assurance that 'Australian atoms' do not enter military programs. This overlooks the realities of the situation, that uranium atoms are indistinguishable from one another and there is no practical way of attaching 'flags' to atoms. The objective of Australia's bilateral agreements is to ensure that AONM in no way materially contributes to or enhances any military purpose. Even if AONM were to be in a processing stream with nuclear material subsequently withdrawn for military use, the presence of the AONM would add nothing to the quantity or quality of the military material (NB as noted elsewhere in the Annual Report, those nuclear-weapon States eligible for the supply of Australian uranium have ceased production of fissile material for nuclear weapons).

Annex 11

Waste Management

•Like all industries, the thermal generation of electricity produces wastes. Whatever fuel is used, these wastes must be managed in ways which safeguard human health and minimise their impact on the environment.

•Nuclear power is the only energy industry which takes full responsibility for all its wastes, and costs this into the product.

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Radioactivity arises naturally from the decay of particular forms of some elements, called isotopes. Some isotopes are radioactive, most are not, though in this publication we concentrate on the former.

There are three kinds of radiation to consider: alpha, beta and gamma. A fourth kind, neutron radiation, generally only occurs inside a nuclear reactor.

Different types of radiation require different forms of protection:

•Alpha radiation cannot penetrate the skin and can be blocked out by a sheet of paper, but is dangerous in the lung.

•Beta radiation can penetrate into the body but can be blocked out by a sheet of aluminium foil.

•Gamma radiation can go right through the body and requires several centimetres of lead or concrete, or a metre or so of water, to block it.

All of these kinds of radiation are, at low levels, naturally part of our environment. Any or all of them may be present in any classification of waste.

Radioactive wastes comprise a variety of materials requiring different types of management to protect people and the environment. They are normally classified as low-level, medium-level or high-level wastes, according to the amount and types of radioactivity in them.

Another factor in managing wastes is the time that they are likely to remain hazardous. This depends on the kinds of radioactive isotopes in them, and particularly the half lives characteristic of each of those isotopes. The half life is the time it takes for a given radioactive isotope to

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lose half of its radioactivity. After four half lives the level of radioactivity is 1/16th of the original and after eight half lives 1/256th.

The various radioactive isotopes have half lives ranging from fractions of a second to minutes, hours or days, through to billions of years. Radioactivity decreases with time as these isotopes decay into stable, non-radioactive ones.

The rate of decay of an isotope is inversely proportional to its half life; a short half life means that it decays rapidly. Hence, for each kind of radiation, the higher the intensity of radioactivity in a given amount of material, the shorter the half lives involved.

Three general principles are employed in the management of radioactive wastes:

•concentrate-and-contain

•dilute-and-disperse

•delay-and-decay.

The first two are also used in the management of non-radioactive wastes. The waste is either concentrated or then isolated, or it is diluted to acceptable levels and then discharged to the environment. Delay-and- decay however is unique to radioactive waste management; it means that the waste is stored and its radioactivity is allowed to decrease naturally through decay of the radioisotopes in it.

Can you identify the application of these principles in the rest of this publication?

Types of radioactive waste (radwaste)

Low-level Waste is generated from hospitals, laboratories and industry, as well as the nuclear fuel cycle. It comprises paper, rags, tools, clothing, filters etc. which contain small amounts of mostly short-lived radioactivity. It is not dangerous to handle, but must be disposed of more carefully than normal garbage. Usually it is buried in shallow landfill sites. To reduce its volume, it is often compacted or incinerated (in a closed container) before disposal. Worldwide it comprises 90 % of the volume but only 1 % of the radioactivity of all radwaste.

Intermediate-level Waste contains higher amounts of radioactivity and may require special shielding. It typically comprises resins, chemical sludges and reactor components, as well as contaminated materials from reactor decommissioning. Worldwide it makes up 7 % of the volume and has 4 % of the radioactivity of all radwaste. It may be solidified in concrete or bitumen for disposal. Generally short-lived waste

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