Воробева Нуцлеар Реацтор Тыпес (Леарн то реад бы реадинг) 2010

'black rain' which fell in some areas, carrying down radioactive materials from within the rising cloud of fission products. The exposures due to these depositions are in general estimated to have been small, but some increased activity from the fission product radionuclide caesium-137 remained detectable for many years in soil and farm products in the Nishiyama district east of Nagasaki.

The second additional form of exposure resulted from the effect of neutrons in inducing radioactivity in various stable chemical elements such as in iron or concrete structures or roofing tiles. The total absorbed doses of radiation from these activities are estimated to be less than one per cent of that from the neutrons which induced them. They could however have caused a significant exposure of people who entered the city within a few days of the explosions.

Subsequent Atmospheric Weapons Tests

The atmospheric testing of some 500 nuclear weapons up to 1963 caused people to be exposed to radiation in a quite different way. The Japanese atomic bombs had caused lethal exposures locally from radiation at the time of the explosions, but very little radiation more than a few kilometres away. On the other hand, subsequent atmospheric tests did not cause any substantial direct exposures of people at the time of the tests. However, the fission products released into the atmosphere caused the whole world population to be exposed to very low but continuing annual doses from fallout. In at least two instances these fission products also caused substantial irradiation to small populations exposed to local fallout close to the site of testing.

The atomic bombs used in Japan in 1945, and the bombs or devices testing during the following seven years, depended on the fission of uranium235 or plutonium-239, mostly the latter. The explosive effect of each was equal to that of up to a few tens of thousand tonnes of the conventional explosive TNT. On this basis of comparison, the Hiroshima bomb was of about 15 kilotonnes - that is, of 15 thousand tonnes of TNT equivalent - and that at Nagasaki was of 25 kilotonnes. In addition, the total equivalent of all atmospheric weapon tests made by the end of 1951 was in the region of 600 kilotonnes.

After 1951, however, devices were being tested which had explosive effects about a thousand times greater, and by the end of 1962 the total of all atmospheric tests had risen from the 1951 value of 0.6 million tonnes of TNT equivalent, to about 500 million tonnes equivalent. This vast increase

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in scale was due to the testing of 'thermonuclear' weapons or 'hydrogen bombs', which depended, not on the fission of a critical mass of fissile material alone, but on a two or three-stage process initiated by this reaction.

In a thermonuclear bomb, an initial fission, such as occurred in the 'atomic' bomb, momentarily creates conditions of enormously high temperature and atomic disturbance that allows the fusion together of the nuclei of atoms of low atomic number, such as lithium and hydrogen. This fusion liberates further large amounts of energy explosively, such as occurs in the similar reactions in the sun and stars.

In some such bombs, the high energy neutrons released are used to set off a third stage, making it a fission-fusion-fission process. The third stage consists of the fission of a surrounding 'blanket' of uranium-238 isotope which is fissionable by neutrons of this high energy. This third stage provides about half of the yield of such a weapon.

The release of fission products is approximately proportional to the explosive power unleashed, although fusion as such does not give rise to them. From 1952 to 1962 therefore, the amounts of fission products discharged into the atmosphere were of the order of a thousand times greater than all discharged previously.

To complete this tally of the total fallout to date, all atmospheric tests since 1962 appear to have increased by rather less than 20 percent the total of fission products that had been deposited by previous tests, as judged by the measured deposition of strontium-90 in successive years.

Australian tests

Twelve atmospheric nuclear explosions comprised the main part of UK weapons testing in Australia. Three were at Monte Bello Islands (WA) in 1952 & 1956, two at Emu Field (SA) in 1953 and seven at Maralinga (SA) in 1956-57.

Underground Tests and the NPT

Since the 1963 atmospheric test ban treaty, weapons tests have been mostly underground, the exceptions being by France and China. The underground tests have had no immediate environmental effect and are generally seen as relatively benign compared with the atmospheric tests.

In 1970 the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed, and now has five weapons states: USA, UK, Russia, France and China. The basis of the NPT was that other states who were signatories eschewed the nuclear weapons option and in return were promised assistance in civil nuclear power development by the weapons states.

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Today, 187 states have signed the NPT. The only states with significant nuclear facilities that are not party to the NPT or equivalent safeguards agreements are India and Pakistan, which exploded several nuclear devices in 1998, and Israel, which is generally believed to have nuclear capability. South Africa developed some nuclear weapons but then dismantled them, under international scrutiny, and has joined the NPT. Iraq and North Korea sought to circumvent their obligations under the NPT and this was thwarted by international pressure, but North Korea has subsequently resigned from the NPT.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki since 1945

Both cities were rebuilt soon after the war and have become important industrial centres. The population of Hiroshima has grown to over one million and that of Nagasaki to 440 000. Major industries in Hiroshima today are machinery, automotive (Mazda) and food processing, those in Nagasaki are associated with its international port, particularly Mitubishi Heavy Industries.

Nuclear energy has come to be an important part of the life of each city in a totally new way: today one quarter of Hiroshima's electricity is from nuclear power and half of that for Nagasaki is nuclear. Both cities are testimony to the positive benefits of a technological society which applies available energy resources to the needs of urban populations and industry.

Annex 10

Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation

•Most countries participate in international initiatives designed to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

•The international safeguards system has since 1970 successfully prevented the diversion of fissile materials into weapons. Its scope has been widened to address undeclared nuclear activities.

•The IAEA undertakes regular inspections of civil nuclear facilities and audits the movement of nuclear materials through them.

•Safeguards are backed by diplomatic and economic meas-

ures.

The initial development of nuclear technology was military, during World War II. Two nuclear bombs made from uranium-235 and pluto-

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nium-239 were dropped on Japan's Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively in August 1945 and these brought the long war to a sudden end. The immense and previously unimaginable power of the atom had been demonstrated. Then attention turned to civil applications. In the course of half a century nuclear technology has enabled access to a virtually unlimited source of energy at a time when constraints are arising on the use of fossil fuels. The question which frames this paper is: To what extent and in what ways does nuclear power generation contribute to or alleviate the risk from nuclear weapons?

In the 1960s it was widely assumed at there would be 30-35 nuclear weapons states by the turn of the century. In fact there were eight — a tremendous testimony to the effectiveness of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) and its incentives both against weapons and for civil nuclear power, despite the baleful influence of the Cold War (1950s to 1980s) which saw a massive build-up of nuclear weapons particularly by the USA and the Soviet Union.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is much more than the NPT, although this is the pre-eminent international treaty on the subject. The regime includes treaties, conventions and common (multilateral and bilateral) arrangements covering security and physical protection, export controls, nuclear test-bans and, potentially, fissile material production cut-offs. The international community can apply pressure to states outside the NPT to make every possible effort to conform to the full range of international norms on nuclear non-proliferation that make up this regime.

The NPT Origins and Objectives

Over the past 35 years the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a conspicuous international success in curbing the diversion of civil uranium into military uses. It has involved cooperation in developing nuclear energy while ensuring that civil uranium, plutonium and associated plants are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely. Its scope is also being widened to include undeclared nuclear activities.

Most countries have renounced nuclear weapons, recognising that possession of them would threaten rather than enhance national security.

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They have therefore embraced the NPT as a public commitment to use nuclear materials and technology only for peaceful purposes.

The successful conclusion, in 1968, of negotiations on the NPT was a landmark in the history of non-proliferation. After coming into force in 1970, its indefinite extension in May 1995 was another. The NPT was essentially an agreement among the five nuclear weapons states and the other countries interested in nuclear technology. The deal was that assistance and cooperation would be traded for pledges, backed by international scrutiny, that no plant or material would be diverted to weapons' use. Those who refused to be part of the deal would be excluded from international cooperation or trade involving nuclear technology.

At present, 187 states are party to the NPT. These include all five declared Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) which had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon before 1967: China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA. The main countries remaining outside the NPT are Israel, India and Pakistan, though North Korea has moved to join them. These all have weapons programs which have come to maturity since 1970, so they cannot join without renouncing and dismantling those.

The NPT's main objectives are to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons, to provide security for non-nuclear weapon states which have given up the nuclear option, to encourage international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

The most important factor underpinning the safeguards regime is international political pressure and how particular nations perceive their long-term security interests in relation to their immediate neighbours. The solution to nuclear weapons proliferation is thus political more than technical, and it certainly goes beyond the question of uranium availability. International pressure not to acquire weapons is enough to deter most states from developing a weapons program. The major risk of nuclear weapons' proliferation will always lie with countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities, and those which have joined but disregard their treaty commitments.

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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The IAEA was set up by unanimous resolution of the United Nations in 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements. This provides assurance to the international community that individual countries are honouring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The IAEA therefore undertakes regular inspections of civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories and undertakes sampling and analysis of materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. They are backed up by the threat of international sanctions.

Scope of safeguards

Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.

It is important to understand that nuclear safeguards are a means of reassurance whereby non-nuclear weapons states demonstrate to others that they are abiding by their peaceful commitments. They prevent nuclear proliferation in the same way that auditing procedures build confidence in proper financial conduct and prevent embezzlement. Their specific objective is to verify whether declared (usually traded) nuclear material remains within the civil nuclear fuel cycle and is being used solely for peaceful purposes or not.

Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguards measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Almost 900 nuclear facilities and several hundred other locations in 57 non-nuclear-weapons countries are subject to regular inspection. Their records and the actual nuclear material are audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.

The aim of traditional IAEA safeguards is to deter the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use by maximizing the risk of early de-

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tection. At a broader level they provide assurance to the international community that countries are honoring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. In this way safeguards are a service both to the international community and to individual states, who recognize that it is in their own interest to demonstrate compliance with these commitments.

The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on;

•Material Accountability — tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, review and verification of operating records.

•Physical Security — restricting access to nuclear materials at the site of use.

•Containment and Surveillance — use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.

All NPT non-weapons states must accept these 'full-scope' safeguards, which apply to all nuclear facilities in the country. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), fa- cility-specific safeguards apply to relevant plants. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records.

The NPT is supplemented by other safeguards systems such as those among certain European nations (Euratom Safeguards) and between individual countries (bilateral agreements) such as Australia and customer countries for its uranium, or Japan and the USA.

The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iran and North Korea, safeguards are backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.

Iraq, Iran and North Korea illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of international safeguards. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq and Iran had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating

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reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.

The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the key nuclear facilities concerned were built by the countries themselves without being declared to the IAEA or placed safeguards arrangements. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nor, more recently, did Iran. In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement, using a Russian "research" reactor and clandestine reprocessing plant.

Nevertheless, the activities were detected and in Iraq and North Korea, brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process, but North Korea posed possibly the most intractable situation confronted by the IAEA. This has since been matched by Iran.

So, while traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared, outside the known materials flows and facilities.

Addressing undeclared nuclear activities — the Additional Protocol

Following discovery of Iraq's clandestine program, in 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997. This was to boost the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle.

Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have also agreed to accept the principles of the model Additional Protocol, though the function there is different.

Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:

• The IAEA is given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium

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and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded) and nuclear-related imports and exports.

•IAEA inspectors have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (eg. two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.

•States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.

All these elements focus on nuclear materials. They enhance the IAEA's ability to provide assurances that all nuclear activities and material in the country concerned has been declared for safeguards purposes. As of mid 2007, 82 countries plus Taiwan had Additional Protocols in force, 39 more had them approved and signed.

Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States.

Where non-weapons states have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and an Additional Protocol in force, the IAEA is able to say each year not only that declared nuclear material remains in peaceful activities, but also that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities.

For Nuclear Weapons States, the purpose of the Additional Protocol is different, namely to provide the IAEA with information on nuclear supply to, and cooperation with, non-weapons states. Such information assists the IAEA in its objective of detecting any undeclared activities in non-weapons states. (In this context India is understood to be effectively a Nuclear Weapons State.)

Limitations of safeguards

Apart from situations addressed by the Additional Protocol, the greatest risk of nuclear weapons proliferation lies with countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. India, Pakistan and Israel are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny.

A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and

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then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for sale of uranium address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions are then likely.

IAEA safeguards together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely.

The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.

By mid 2004 a total of 57 countries plus Taiwan had ratified the Additional Protocol. However, of 71 countries with significant nuclear activities, 25 have yet to bring it into force.

However, of 71 countries with significant nuclear activities, four NPT parties have not yet signed the Additional Protocol and another ten have not fully ratified it (another four of the 71 are outside the NPT).

Safeguards in countries with nuclear weapons

In Nuclear Weapons States IAEA safeguards apply under a "voluntary offer agreement". Where offered, facilities are eligible for safeguards and it is up to IAEA to decide which (if any) to inspect.

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