1.2.4.Security issues
One of the primary (not sole) concerns is over a potential invasion of privacy. Since data is transmitted by AMRs wirelessly (in some cases continuously), there is a potential for this to be sniffed. An empty house could easily be detected by its current power usage, and burgled. But there are wider concerns over what data is transmitted and how and by whom it is subsequently shared.
There are also concerns – not merely about the personal data that is transmitted outwards, but the outside control that could be let into the household. The Smartmeter website published a report that stating, “The communication hub located within smart meters have the potential to create a home area network (HAN) that acts as a gateway to future services in a connected home, such as remotely managing household appliances, heating systems, home security systems, and even eHealth services for managing chronic conditions. Analysts predict consumers will have anywhere from 15 to 30 appliances and devices connected to a home network in the smart home of the near future.”
While the purpose of this remotely controllable connected home will be to allow householders to come home to a pre-heated oven, it will also become a target for hackers. Security firm Tripwire wanted to gauge UK public awareness of smart meters and particularly smart meter privacy issues; and with the help of One Poll questioned 1000 UK residents. It found the public perception to be that smart meters will prove more of a benefit (61% believe it will encourage people to use less electricity), than a threat (only 11% believe they will capture ‘too much’ personal information). Even fewer (8.9%) believe that they will be vulnerable to cyber attack despite all the empirical evidence to the contrary; and only 12.2% think that smart meters need additional security and privacy protection.
EU countries and USA develop security requirements, for example: Germany Federal Office of Information Security (BSI) stated that the Gateway with security module shall offer a user interface to the HAN that allows CLS or consumers to connect to the Gateway in order to read relevant information (see Fig.1.9).
Figure 1.9. Requirements by Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) regarding Protection Profile Smart Meter Gateway
Where: HAN = Home Area Network; LMN = Local Metrological Network; CLS = Controllable Local System e.g. white goods, air con, solar plant.
BSI requirements states:
Separation of Critical Infrastructure Energy Domain and Customer Domain.
HAN access only via dedicated interfaces.
HAN may have access to the Internet.
Requirements regarding local unidirectional wireless meter readout between Smart Meter in Critical Infrastructure Energy Domain and HA Gateway in Customer Domain not yet defined by BSI
Germany Federal Office of Information Security offered such propositions on connectivity between Customer and Critical Infrastructure Energy domains:
Customer Domain
Customer has final control and responsibility
Guarantee on the delivery of the service dependent on SLA, if managed
Service dependant variable reliability level
High to very high reliability level
Direct customer access to infrastructure possible
Signature or authentication or encryption optional
Transfer time < 10 s for command & alarm signals, < 5 min for energy measuring, supply management
Connection/disconnection of single loads typically < 3 kW (max. consumption household appliance)
Critical Infrastructure Energy Domain
Responsibility for successful delivery, fixed SLAs, possible contractual penalties
Guarantee on undisturbed operation without danger of tampering, intrusion or service blocking
Secure actor contact to start and stop decentralized generation
Signature & authentication & encryption mandatory
Transfer time < 2 s for command control, load shedding, peak shaving
Connection/disconnection of single loads typically 100 kW (consumption of devices with net impact)