It in the hands of a notary in time for demand and payment, is liable for the neglect

of the notary to give notice, if it is the cause of actual damage. In some of the

cases, it has been held that the bank is not responsible for the negligence or miscon-

duct of the notary, if it used reasonable care and diligence in making the selection.

Such is said to be the general rule, wherever it is necessary for one agent to employ

a sub-agent to transact the business. Bellemire v. Bank of United States, 1 Miles,

1T3. Hyde & Goodrich V. Planters' Bank of Mississippi, 17 Louisiana Rep. 560.

Tiernan et al. v. Commercial Bank of Natchez, 7 How. Miss. 648. East Haddam Bank

V. Scovill, 12 Conn. Rep. 303. Dorchester <fe Milton Bank v. New England Bank, 1

Cush. 177. The same doctrine was held by the Chancellor and Supreme Court of

New York, in the case of Allen v. The Merchants' Bank, 22 Wend. 215. But the

Court for the Correction of Errors reversed the judgment below in the last case, and

declai'ed the law to be, that in the absence of any express contract, a bank in New

York receiving for collection a bill -of exchange drawn there upon a person in another

state, was liable for any neglect of duty occurring in its collection, whether arising

from the default of its oflicers at home, or its correspondents, and that the neglect

of a notar}', who was a commissioned public officer, did not vary the rule. He acted

pro hac vice, merely as the agent of his employers, and not in his official capacity.

In South Carolina the rule has been settled as in New York. Thompson v. The Banij

of the State of South Carolina, 3 Hill S. C. R 77

156 Mercantile persons.

Rights of Principal against Agent

if his principal subsequently recognize his departure from the letter

of his instructions, he is exonerated ; for omnis ratihibitio retroira-

hitur et mandato cequiparatur. And such a recognition may be in-

ferred from the employer's conduct ; thus, the receipt of interest on

a sum lent by the agent recognizes the loan, (a)^

It has been already said, in the chapter on Partnership, that

from a person standing in a situation of confidence with regard to

another, the strictest good faith is required. This maxim applies

in full force to agents, (b) of whose morals the law is so careful

that it will not suffer them even to incur temptation ; thus an agent

employed to sell is not allowed to be the purchaser, at least not

unless he make known that he intends to become such, and furnish

his employer with all the knowleclge he himself possesses, (c) or

unless the court, perceiving that the principal would lose by a

(a) Clarke v. Perry, 2 Freem. 48. Prince v. Clarke, 1 B. & C. 186.

(6) Huguenin v. Basely, 14 Vcs. 273.

(c) Lowther v. Lowther, 13 Ves. 103. Wren v. Kirton, 8 Ves. 502. Coles v. Tre*

cothick, 9 Ves. 234. Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. 355. Crow v. Ballard, 3 Bro. C. C. 119

Charter v. Trevelyan, 11 CI. <fc Fin. 714.

* The ratification of the acts of an unauthorized agent will not bind the principal,

unless he was fully informed at the time of all the circumstances of the transaction.

Owings V. Hull, 9 Peters, 60*7. Copeland v. Merchants' Insurance Co., 6 Pick. 202.

Fletcher v. Dysart, 9 B. Monr. 413, Mount v. Derick, 5 Hill, K Y. R. 455. The

general principle is affirmed in Bell v. Cunningham, 3 Peters, 81. Richmond Manu-

facturing Co. V. Stark, 4 Mason's Rep. 296. Delafield v. State of Illinois, 26 Wend.