It is sought to charge his principal (I/)

Our last inquiry under this head is, how the agent's power to

commit his principal to third parties may be determined. It will

be so of course by the revocation of his authority, which is, in

general, determinable at will, (2) unless coupled with an interest,

or given for valuable consideration, as in the case of a power of

attorney given by way of security to a creditor, (a) So likewise,

by his own renunciation of it, at all events if accepted by his prin-

cipal, {b) So by the marriage of the principal, if a feme sole, (c)

It will be revoked also by the death of the principal, (d) and that

even though coupled with an interest ; " for how," says Lord Ellen

borough, " can a valid act be done in the name of a dead man ?" (e)*

(y) Att. Gen. v. Siddon, 1 Tjrw. R. 41. 1 C. & J. 220. Att. G€.i. v. Riddell, 2

Tyrw. 523. 2 C. & J. 498. See also Att. Gen. v. Burges, Bunb. 223.

(2) Farmer v. Robinson, 2 Camp. 339, n. Warwick v. Slade, 3 Camp. 12Y. Bris-

tow V. Taylor, 2 Stark. 50.

(a) Walsh v. Whitcombe, 2 Esp. 563. Bromley v. Holland, 7 Ves. 28. Gaussen v.

Morton, 10 B. & C. 731. Walker v. Rostron, 9 M. & W. 411. Whether the authority

of a stakeholder be or be not countermandable, is not quite settled. The better

opinion, however, is, that it is not so. Marryat v. Broderick, 2 Mees. & W. 371. See

Eltham v. Kingsman, 1 B. <fe A. 682.

(6) Generally speaking, a power cannot be released unless coupled with an inter-

est in the party possessing it. Trippets v. Eyre, 2 Vent. 110. Digge's Case, 15 H.

VII. Fol. 11, b. But this case does not seem applicable to the case of a mercantile

agent, for he may be said to have an interest in the remuneration he is entitled to,

and, besides, his power being in its nature revocable by the principal, whom it would

be unfair in many cases to treat as free, while the agent was bound, probably it may

be considered that the creation of a mercantile agency contains an implied term,

that it shall be revocable at the will of either, if the contrary do not appear.

(c) Anon. Salk. 117.

(J) Bac. Abr. "Authority," E. Co. Litt. 52, b. See Whitehead v. Taylor, 10 A.

& E. 211. Shonian v. Allen, 1 M. & Gr. 96, n. Palmer v. Reiffenstein, ib. 94. Smout

V. Ilberry, 10 m. & w. 1.

(e) Watson v. King, 4 Camp. 272. See Lepard v. Vernon, 2 V. & B. 51. Har-

den V. Forsyth, 1 Q. B. 177.

* It may be doubted whether the text states the general rule with accuracy, even

as it prevails in England. See general discussion of the doctrine in the late case of

Smart v. Sandars, 5 C. B. 895, 917. Certain it is, that in the United States the autho

198 ^lERCANTILE PERSONS.

Rights of third Persons against Principal.

or bj his bankruptcy, (/) except in certain cases in wbicli the in-

terest of the creditors cannot be affected and the power is one

which in conscience ought to be exercised, as where the vendor of

(/) Parker v. Smith, 16 East, 382. Minett v. Forester, 4 Taunt. 541. Pearson v.

Graham, and Kynaston v. Crouch, post.

rity of an agent will survive the death of the principal, where it is coupled with an