Illustrated by Lord c. J, Holt, (m) who says, " If a man send

his servant with ready money to buy goods, and the servant buy

upon credit, the master is not chargeable. But if the servant usu-

ally buy for the master upon tick, and the servant buy some things

without the master's order, yet, if the master were trusted by the

trader, he is liable." The same principle is applied to cases re-

specting notes or bills, which, if drawn, indorsed or accepted by a

clerk who has been previously allowed to do so. bind the master,

(_;в– ) See Esdaile v. La Nause, 1 Y. & Coll. 394 ; whence it appears, that it requires

Tcry clear words to give the agent a power to make, accept, or indorse negotiable in-

struments. See also Attwood v. Munnings, 1 B. & C. 278.

{k) See Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38. Townsend v. Inglis, Holt, 2'78. "Wliite-

head v. Tuckett, 15 East, 400. Barker v. Gingell, 3 Esp. 60. Haughton v. Ewbank, 4

Camp. 88. Watkins v. Vince, 2 Stark. 368. See 10 Mod. Ill ; Moll. 282.

(l) ^quum prcetori visum est sicut commoda sentimus ex contractu institorum, ita

etiam oUigari nos ex contractibus eorum. Dig. lib. 14, tit. 3. Qui non prohibti pro se

Intervenire mandare creditur. Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17.

(m) Shower, 95 ; Weyland's case, 3 Salk. 234. Rusby v. Scarlett, 5 Esp. 7b.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. 171

Rights of third Persons against Principal.

though the money never come to his use ; (n) it is applied to sales

(o) and guarantees, (jp) in a word, to every species of mercantile

transaction, and whether the agent have or have not been dismissed

from his employer's service, provided that the third party had no

reason to be aware of the determination of his employment, (q)

which has occasioned a learned writer to suggest the propriety of

giving notice in the Gazette, and by circulars, whenever a mercan-

tile agent's employment is determined, as is the practice on the dis-

solution of a partnership. Nor can the principal relieve himself

by agreeing with his agent that the latter shall take the liability on

his own shoulders, for strangers not cognizant of such agreement

are not bound by it. (r)

The nature of the authority to be inferred, and the sufficiency

of the principal's acts to raise the inference, must of course depend

on the special circumstances of each case, and involve questions fit

for the consideration of a jury, (s) There is one instance in which

the recognition of a single purchase made by his servant upon

credit, was held to bind the principal to a succeeding one. (t) How-

ever, as the employment is the measure of the authority to be in-

ferred, if there were no previous employment, there can of course

\n) Frescott v. Flinn, 9 Bingh. 21. Boulton v. Arlesden, Sal. 234. Barber v. Gin-

gell, 3 Esp. 60. Houghton v. Ewbank, 4 Camp. 88. See 12 Mod. 346. Molloy, 107.

An authority to draw does not import authority to indorse ; but evidence of such

authority to draw is not to be withheld from the jury, who are to determine whether

such authoi'ity to indorse exists or not, and who may be justly satisfied with less

evidence thereof, where it is proved that the clerk is a confidential clerk, and

has undisputed authority to draw in the name of his principal. Prescott v. Flinn, 9

Bingh. 23. Vide Smith v. Topping, 5 B <fe Ad. 6Y4.

(o) Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38. Trueman v. Loder, 11 A. <fe E. 591.

(p) Watkins v. Vince, 2 Stark. 368.

(q) Trueman v. Loder, 11 A. & E. 591. 10 Mod. Ill ; 12 Mod. 346 ; Molloy, lOY,

282.

(r) Precious v. Abel, 1 Esp. 350. Rich v. Coe, Cowp. 636. Waring v. Favenck,