Ing payment, and informing him of his intention to sell ; for al-

though advances made by a factor create a lien on the goods in his

favor, and may perhaps render the authority to sell, -which he had

at the time of making them, irrevocable, yet they do not create a

pledge; neither by the failure of repayment of them within a rea-

sonable time after demand is the authority of the factor enlarged,

so that he has an absolute right to sell at any time for the best

wood, 1 Stark. K P. C. 251, et notas: unless indeed the guests were guilty of gross

negligence. Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. <t S. 306, or the thieves were his own compa-

nions or servants, Calye's case, 8 Co. 2. The innkeeper is liable for any loss or injury

arising "pro defectu hospitatoris, vel servientum suorum," and the loss or injury will be

presumptive evidence of negligence. Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164. But this pe-

culiar liability of the carrier and innkeeper is on account of the peculiar nature of

their respective employments. 2 Ld. Raym. 916, 917.

(2) Caffrey v. Darby, 6 Ves. 496.

(a) Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bingh. 723.

(6) Smith V. Lascelles, 2 T. R. 189. Smith v. Cadogan, 2 T. R. 188, in notis. Wal

lace V. Telfair, ibid. Delany v. Stoddart, 2 Ves. 239.

(c) Callendar v. Olerich, 5 Bingjh. N. C. 63.

PRINCIPAL AXD AGENT. 163

Rights of Principal against Agent.

price that can be obtained, -vvitliout regard to ttie interests of the

principal, (c/) If no price be limited, then he must sell for what

the goods are fairly worth ; and, if the property be of a description

commonly sold for ready money only, he must not sell upon credit;

for an agent employed generally to do any act, is authorized to do

It only in the usual way of business, (e) But if he be a factor in

a sort of dealing or trade where the usage is to sell upon credit,

then if he sell to a person of good credit at the time, he is dis-

charged, and will be entitled to his commission, though such ven-

dee may afterwards become insolvent, (/) provided that the credit

which he gave was reasonable and usual, and that his principal

was made acquainted with the transaction within a reasonable and

usual space of time. However, as some merchants do not choose

to run this risk, and to trust so implicitly to the discretion of their

factors, an agreement called del credere has been invemed, the name

of which is taken from an Italian mercantile phrase, signifying

guarantee ; and by which the factor, for additional premium beyond

the usual commission, when he sells goods on credit becomes bound

to warrant the solvency of the purchaser(гарантировать плтежеспособность), {g) It was at one time

thought, that an agent acting under a del credere commission was

not merely a surety, responsible only in case of the default of the

purchaser, but that he was liable to his principal in the first in-

stance ; (A) but that doctrine has been questioned, and at last over-

turned by subsequent authorities, {i) which have settled, that he is

but a surety.* If indeed the factor, after the sale, remit his own

{d) Smart v. Saunders, 5 Man. Grang. &, S. 895.

(e) Wiltshire v. Sims, 1 Camp. 258. Earl of Ferrers v. Robins, 5 Tj-rwh. ^05. 2

C. M. <fe R. 152. Sykes v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 645.

(/) Anon. 12 Mod. 514. Scott v Surnam, Willes, 406. See Russell v. Hankey, 6

T. R. 12. Knight v. Plymouth, 3 Atk. 480.

{g) See Mackenzie v. Scott, 6 Bro. P. C. 280, Tomlin's ed.

(/t) Grove v. Dubois, 1 T. R. 112. Bize v. Dickason, 1 T. R. 285. Weinolt v.

Roberts, 2 Camp. 586.