Intrusted with the particular document or not, was one of fact for the jury; and in

Bonzi V. Stewart, 4 M. & Gr, 295, the C. P. acted on the rule laid down in those cases.

See, however, the statute of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39, presently cited, and which appears to

have been passed partly with a view to the above decisions.

IgO mercantile persons.

Rights of third Persons against Principal.

shall be deemed to be the true owner of the goods described in the

said several documents, so far as to give validity to any contract or

agreement made by him for the sale or disposition (c) of the goods,

or any part thereof, or the deposit or pledge thereof, or any part

thereof, as a security for any money or negotiable instrument ad-

Vanced or given upon the faith of such document, {d) if the buyer,

disponee, or pawnee, has not notice by the document, or otherwise,

(e) that such person is not the actual and bona fide owner of the

goods.

{c) A disposition must be something in the nature of a sale. Taylor v. Kymer, S

B. & Ad. 337. Taylor v. Trueman, 1 M. & M. 457.

(c^ India warrants are not negotiable instruments within this section, ibid. See,

however, 5 <fe 6 Vict. c. 39. A party seeking to avail himself of the 2d section, must

produce the contract or agreement to which he wishes to give validity, if it be in

writing. Evans v. Trueman, 2 B. & Ad. 886; 1 M. & Rob. 10. As to the meaning of

advanced, &c., see Phillips v. Iluth, 6 M. & "W. 605. And Bonzi v. Stewart, 4 M. & Gr.

295 Where it was decided, that when the advance was made on documents, for wliich

others were afterwards substituted, the latter transaction was not protected.

(e) This word is said to have been introduced by Lord Eldon in committee. On

the question. What is such notice? vide Evans v. Trueman, 1 M. & Rob. 10, ubi per

Lord Tenterden, " A person may have knowledge of a fact either by direct commu-

nication, or by being aware of circumstances which must lead a reasonable man, ap-

plying his mind to them and judging from them, to the conclusion that the fact is so.

Knowledge acquired in either of these ways is, I think, enough to exclude a party

from the benefit of the provisions of this statute ; slight suspicion, I think, will

not."*

* The construction of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39, came before the Court of Chancery, in

Navulshaw v. Brownrigg, 13 E. L. <fe E. R. 261. The plaintiff had consigned pearls

to a Liverpool merchant for sale, and drew bills upon him to an amount greater than

the value of the pearls, which he accepted. The Liverpool merchant then handed

the pearls to his London agent to be sold, and drew bills upon him as an advance

upon account of the pearls. The London agent accepted the bills, having notice

that the pearls had been consigned by the plaintiff for sale. The Liverpool merchant

became insolvent, and the bills drawn upon him by the plaintiff were not paid. The

London agent sold the goods to recoup himself the bills drawn upon him by the

Liverpool merchant. Upon a bill filed by the consignor alleging fraud and collusion,

and praying that the London agent might be decreed to pay him the amount pro-

duced by the sale of the pearls, the Lord Chancellor, affirming the decree of the