V. Barton, 6 Mee. & Welsh. (12,) where it was held, that even in an English port the

master may, if it be a ease of necessity, borrow money for the use of the ship.

Accord. Weston v. Wright, 7 M. & W. 396. But this is on the supposition not

merely that the supply of money is necessary, but that the owner cannot be com-

municated with, and the rule is the same as to goods. Johns v. Simons, 2 Q. B. 425.

Stonehouse v. Gent, ibid. 431. He may in foreign в–  parts hypothecate the ship or

freight, if that be necessary, in order to raise money for her use ; he may for tho

same purpose hypothecate the cargo. The Gratitudine, 3 Rob. A. R. 240. Nay, if

money cannot otherwise be obtained for repairs, he may sell part of it, Abbott, p. 2,

c. 3, and may, in some cases of extremity, dispose even of the cargo or ship itself, for

the benefit of all concerned. Hunter v. Parker, 7 M. & W. 322. Vlierboom v. Chap-

man, 13 M. & W. 230. He has, moreover, authority over all persons in the ship, in

matters relating to her navigation and the preservation of good order on board, and

may, in case of disobedience or disorder, administer reasonable correction ; his au-

thority in this respect resembling that of a parent over his child, or a master over

his apprentice or scholar. But he must take care that there is a sufficient cause for

chastisement, and that the chastisement be reasonable, otherwise he will be punish-

able. Abbott, p. 2, c. 4.

[The authority of a master was very much discussed in the recent case of Grant

et als. V. Norway et als., 10 C. B. 665. (70 E. C. L. R.) It was there held that the

master of a ship, signing a bill of lading for goods which have never been shipped,

Is not to be considered as the agent of the owner in that behalf, so as to make the

latter responsible to one who has made advances on the faith of the bill of lading so

signed. The very nature of a bill of lading shows that it ought not to be signed until

goods are on board ; for it begins by describing them as shipped. It being generally

known from the usage of trade and the general practice of shipmasters, that the

master derives no authority from his position to give a bill of lading under such

circumstances, the case is the same as if the party taking the bill of lading had

notice of an express limitation on the master's authority. — A. E.]

{b) Whitehead v. Tuckett, 15 East, 400. Nicksonw. Brohan, 10 Mod. 109. Thorold

V. Smith, 11 Mod. 87. See Daniells V. Adams, AmbL 498. Petties V. Soame, 13 Vin.

Abr. 6. E. I. Compy. v. Hensle}', 1 Esp 11..

(c) Fenn v. Harrison, 4 T. R. 177. Waters v. Brogden, 1 T. <k J. 457. Daniells

V. Adams, Ambl. 498. Clinan V. Cooke, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22. Seton V. S'.Ade, 7 Ves. 276.

E. I. Compy. v. Hensley, 1 Esp. 111. Woodiu v. Burford, 2 C. & M, 391. Jordan v

174 Mercantile persons.

Rights of third Persons against Principal.

We have seen that a subsequent assent by tlie principal to his

agent's conduct exonerates the latter from the consequences of a

departure from his orders. In like manner it will render the prin-

cipal liable for contracts made in violation of such orders, or even

without any previous retainer or employment, for omnis ratihiUtio

retrotmhitur et mandato cequiparatur. (d) Such an assent may be in-

ferred from the conduct of the principal, (e) who cannot confirm a

transaction in part, and repudiate it as to the rest, but must either

adopt all or none. (/)

The general rule, however, is that the authoiity, of whatever

description, must he strictly imrsued ; otherwise the principal, if his

agent be a particular one, will not be bound ; and if he be a gen-

eral agent, will not be bound, save under the circumstances above

described, and not under any circumstances whatever, if the third

party, at the time of his contracting, was, or ought to have been,

aware of the limited extent of the agent's authority, which is con-

strued by the courts with a great deal of strictness : {g) thus, if given

to two, it cannot be executed -by one, though the other should die

or refuse ; and if given to three jointly and severally, it cannot be

executed by two, though it may either by all three, or by one

only. (/<) However, the courts are now disposed to relax from the

Norton, 4 M. & W. 155. Sykes v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 645. Rotton v. Inglis, 2 Q. B.