Vice Chancellor, held that the pledge was a valid one within the act of Victoria;

that notice to the pledgee of the fact that the goods were transmitted to the con-

signee with directionB to sell simply, would not vitiate the pledge, although it would

PRIXCIPAL AXD AGENT. 181

Rights of third Persons against Principal.

But if sucli person (/) deposit or pledge the goods as a security

for a pre-existing debt or demand., lie who so takes the deposit or

pledge, without notice, shall acquire such right, title, or interest, and

no further or other than was possessed by the person making the

deposit or pledge.

Any {g) person {li) may contract for the purchase of goods with

any agent intrusted loith the goods., or to whom they may be con-

signed, and receive and pay for the same to the agent, notwithstand-

Ing he shall have notice that the party with whom he contracts is a

factor or agent; if such contract and payment be made in the ordi-

nary and usual course of business, and he has not, at the time of

the contract or payment, notice that the agent is not authorized tc

sell or to receive the price.

(/) Sect 3.

(^r) Sect. 4. *

(A) In Monk v. Whitteubury, 2 B. & Ad. 484, the Cor:t said, "It is difficult to say

what is meant in this section by 'an agent intrusted with goods;' but we are clearly

of opinion that a wharfinger is not such a person." See as to the meaning of intrust-

ed, in the former section, page ante, 179 note (6).

have been otherwise if the pledgee had notice that the consignee was prohibited

from pledging. The Lord Chancellor supposed that the language of Lord Tenterden,

In Evans V. Trueman, 1 Moo. & Rob. 10, on the question of what notice would bind

the person aecepting the pledge, was too general. "If you are dealing with an agent

you must take it for granted that he has a power to sell in every case. The act says

It has become a usual course of business to pledge : not that it was legal ; on the con-

trary, it says that it was not legal, but had become the usual course of business, and

that it meant to give legal effect to that course of business. "When, therefore, you

are dealing for a pledge with an agent who has a consignment, the knowledge that

he has the power to sell, appears to me to amount to nothing; for every agent must

be supposed to have a power to sell who has the disposition of goods. Assuming,

then, that (the London agents') knew expressly, before they accepted the bills and

took the pledge, that (the Liverpool agent) had a power o-f sale only, even that

would not alter the right because if they had not been infoi--med of it, they would

have been considered to have known it, inasmuch as they were dealing witli an

agent in the possession of goods. But it wants something more than merely the

right positively to sell ; it wants a prohibition from the owner not to pledge." S. C.

"7 E. L. & E. R. 106. See the following autliorities on Factor's Act, in United States.

Covin V. Hill &, Sandford, 4 Denio, 323. Jennings v. Merrill, 20 Wend. 1. Stevens v.

Wilson, 6 Hill, 512. S. C. 3d Denio, 472. Zachristie v. Ashman, 2 Sand. Sup. Ct

R. 68.