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justify systems in part because these systems control important outcomes in their lives, it follows naturally that people should also justify the authority of those individuals who control those systems. Preliminary evidence suggests this may be the case. Willer (2004) noted that, as the terror alert in the United States increased (which can be viewed as a natural manipulation of system threat), so did support for the American president, George W. Bush.

In an attempt to bottle similar phenomena in the laboratory, Banfield and Kay (2008), in two separate studies, exposed participants to a manipulation of system threat—that is, an article describing the worsening state of the federal social and political system—or a control manipulation, and then measured levels of support for political leaders. In the first study, this manipulation was also crossed with a measure of chronic system satisfaction. Results indicated that participants do in fact respond to system threat by showing increased support for their political leaders: university participants who read a profile of the Minister of Education rated her as significantly more competent if that profile was preceded by a manipulation of system threat (which focused on the Canadian status quo, but said nothing about the educational system) rather than a control condition, despite the fact that participants in both conditions read the identical description of the relevant politician. Interestingly, though, this only occurred for those who were low in general satisfaction with the (Canadian) system. Those high in satisfaction with the system judged the politician very positively in both conditions and were therefore unmoved by our manipulation of system threat (Banfield & Kay, 2008).

The second study in this line of work sought to understand how citizens, especially in contexts that engage the system justification motive, cope with morally dubious behavior by their leaders. President Clinton’s approval ratings remained high throughout his impeachment proceedings and attained an all-time high after their conclusion (CNN, 1998). Given the questionable conduct that produced the media whirlwind before and after the impeachment proceedings, how did people maintain faith in their leader? And did the system justification motive play any role in this?

One argument commonly heard in defense of President Clinton was that his behavior in his personal life, however immoral, should not be used to judge his competence as a President. Without debating the merits of such an argument, we would like to propose that it represents an excellent tool for maintaining faith in one’s leader (and, by extension, one’s socio-political system). To this end, we examined the extent to which participants who read about a political leader who admitted to an ethically questionable personal event (i.e., an affair) would become more likely to view personal behavior as less relevant to political competence following a manipulation of system threat. Results indicated that, as expected, following system threat—which

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was manipulated via the same threat passages used in the previous study— participants who read about a leader (i.e., a provincial Minister) who was involved in an extramarital affair judged her personal behavior to be less relevant to her competence as a politician. Importantly, though, when the Minister was described as presiding over a province that was irrelevant to the participants (that is, in a low-dependence condition), the manipulation of system threat exerted no such effect. For this irrelevant leader (that is, a leader who controlled a system that the participants were not dependent upon), participants viewed her personal behavior as equally related to her professional competencies in both the threat and control conditions.

Summary

The system justification motive can have far-reaching effects on social psychological processes. As we have observed in this section, this also includes phenomena of interpersonal perception and judgment. In the context of social inequality, people tend to make interpersonal and intergroup attributions that either deflect blame away from the system and onto the individual (i.e., victim-derogation) and/or reaffirm the system’s ability to ensure balance (i.e., through victim-enhancement). In addition, those who control these systems (such as political leaders) tend to receive rather generous attributions, as well. It is crucial to note, however, that these phenomena do not always occur. Rather, in each of the experimental programs just described, we have demonstrated that such phenomena are highly context-dependent; only in those conditions of heightened system justification needs—for example, conditions of system threat, chronic system concern, system dependence, and system inevitability—did these biases in interpersonal judgment surface.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have presented an overview of theory and research describing the consequence of the system justification motive for the maintenance of inequality and general social psychological functioning. Throughout all of this, however, our focus remained exclusively on research demonstrating when such consequences are most likely to arise. Reflecting on the development of the scientific study of attitudes, Zanna and Fazio (1982) noted that programs of research, at least within the field of social psychology, tend to progress through two clear generations. In the first generation, a phenomenon or psychological process is identified. The purpose of this stage is to clearly demonstrate that a theoretically predicted psychological effect does in fact occur. SJT research has spent a good deal of its young life making this precise point: that the system justification motive does exist (for reviews, see

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Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Kay et al., 2007). As evidenced by the research presented here, the system justification motive does not merely exist, it holds important interpersonal and intergroup consequences.

In the second generation, according to Zanna and Fazio (1982), researchers move beyond this goal and begin to seek theoretical refinement. A key purpose of this stage is to demonstrate the boundary conditions surrounding the psychological phenomenon or process already identified: that is, when it occurs and when it does not (see also McGuire, 1983). Identifying the variables that strengthen an effect, or turn it “on and off,” so to speak, teaches us not only about the contexts in which we may be most likely to observe a given psychological phenomenon, but, just as importantly, about what causes it (cf. Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Beyond demonstrating the consequences of the system justification motive for the maintenance of inequality, the research we presented in this chapter also represents the initial wave of this generation of research: that is, the second generation of system justification research.

That is, we hoped to provide evidence for the nuance of SJT and system justifying effects—evidence of the contextual nature of system-justifying responses. System justification theorists do not argue that system justifying tendencies will always be engaged. One only has to look at George W. Bush’s second term approval ratings, the many anti-war protests, or the countless worker strikes to note that people will not always engage in processes of system justification. Indeed, rarely does the first author of this chapter escape a talk without having to address the occurrence of events such as these to a skeptical audience member. It is important to recall that the system justification motive is believed to exist to help people cope with specific existential and epistemic threats (see Jost & Hunyaday, 2002, 2005). When these threats are not salient or other psychological needs are more pressing, therefore, the system justification motive should fade into the background.

The system justification motive, therefore, like most other sources of motivation, will not always dictate an individual’s psychology. Chronic personality variables, learned values, personal experiences, other sources of motivation, various situational contexts, and even the objective performance of the system itself all hold the potential to affect an individual’s behavior. This does not mean, however, that the system justification motive will not often do so, too. The research presented in this chapter provides some initial insights into when we might expect system-justifying responses to be relatively more likely to occur. As second-generation research in this domain continues to advance, both in the field and in the laboratory, so, it is hoped, will our understanding of when the system justification motive will be most and least active.

To conclude, we would like to offer one final observation. In the studies we have presented here—and, indeed, in most studies demonstrating the

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consequences of the system justification motive—the focus has been on the justification of unequal and/or unfair norms, policies, and social arrangements. Theoretically, though, system justification needs should also facilitate the adoption of norms, policies, and social arrangements that uphold principles of fairness and equality, or that, in some way or another, improve upon the status quo (e.g., Blasi & Jost, 2006). Over the past century, we have seen several examples of the introduction of such policies and norms into soci- ety—women’s right to vote, affirmative action policies, increased tolerance of racial and ethnic diversity (for example, in universities), and the radically changing rules and norms regarding the acceptability of drinking and driving are but a few. As each of these was introduced, there were undoubtedly those who insisted that society would not accept these radical changes, and that they would never last.

For example, for years, governments resisted introducing bans on cigarette smoking in public venues for fear society would never comply (indeed, it was likely the case that most smokers themselves also assumed they would not stand for these bans); once these bans arrived, however, people were quick to adjust. Even in Ireland, where it was widely believed that such a ban could never alter behavior in the deep-rooted pub lifestyle, little resistance was encountered (Borland et al., 2006; Fong et al., 2006). Given the research we have presented here, it seems feasible that the system justification motive might have contributed in no small part to this seemingly overnight adjustment to the “new” (and, in the minds of all non-smokers, “better”) status quo (for a similar, and experimental, example in the context of a political election, see Kay et al., 2002).

Of course, in the case of imposed smoking bans, the absolute inevitability of this change (Laurin & Kay, 2008), coupled with the clear health benefits it held for literally everyone, may have been sufficient to trigger its adoption. But if a society’s goal is to promote something more abstract, less easily enforced, and less clearly beneficial to all, such as increased acceptance of women in traditionally male-dominated domains, the task is sure to be more complex.

Changing perceptions of the social landscape—whether through actual changes to social reality itself (e.g., affirmative action policies), changes in perceptions of social reality (e.g., media campaigns that portray considerable gender diversity), or even changes in perceptions of where social reality is inevitably heading—may represent a necessary condition for fostering increased acceptance of a more equal status quo. But, as we have hopefully made clear throughout this chapter, these changes, on their own, may not be enough. The psychological and societal contexts in which these changes are embedded are key determinants of how people will react to them.

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