1. What is the current stage of dda nama negotiations? Analyse key issues and main problems of negotiations.

*NAMA refers to all products not covered by the AOA: manufacturing products, fuels and mining products, fish and fish products, and forestry products. Over the past years, NAMA products have accounted for almost 90% of the world merchandise exports.

*Despite the significant improvements in market access for NAMA products that previous GATT rounds and the Uruguay Round produced, tariffs continue to be an important barrier to world trade, as tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation remain.

Aim for DDA: To reduce or eliminate tariffs, including high tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation as well as NTBs, in particular on products of export interest to developing countries.

Three crucial elements:

1. Cut tariffs according to general formula based on a coefficient. Around 40 countries, which include the world's largest traders, will apply the formula. All the others have different specific provisions. A formula approach provides transparency (every Member will know how the other will reduce its tariffs); efficiency (simpler process than request/offer approach), equity (tariff reduction depends on rules rather then “bargaining power”); predictability (easy to foresee the results of the negotiations).

2. Flexibilities for developing countries (that would allow them to make smaller or no cuts in tariffs for limited percentages of their most sensitive sectors + longer term for implementation).

3. Special treatment for small, vulnerable economies (31); LDCs (32); RAMs (16); members with low binding coverage (12); and others.

Latest negotiating text issued in December 2008, builds upon the previous 3 texts and provides further details and wider options for ministers to negotiate a balanced final package for the full modalities. The text is now almost complete.

The key elements of the document

Formula and flexibilities

Tariff reductions for industrial products would be made using a “simple Swiss” formula with separate coefficients for developed or for developing country members. But whereas the coefficient for developed members will be the same applicable to all of them, there will be a menu of options for developing members that will apply according to the scale of the flexibilities they choose to use. The lower the coefficient the higher the flexibilities and vice versa: 8 for developed members and 20, 22 and 25 for developing. *The use of the different coefficients would depend on the scale of cuts and the number of products subject to cuts. A member choosing to apply the highest coefficient, 25, will have to apply it on all its products without exceptions. The maximum tariff in developed countries would be below 8 %, their bound tariffs on average would be below 3 %, and tariff peaks below 8 % even on the most sensitive products.

In the developing countries applying the formula, bound tariffs would be at an average of between 11 to 12 %, and only a limited number of tariff lines would have levels above 15 %.*

The tariff reductions will be implemented gradually over a period of 5 years for developed members and 10 years for developing members.

Country-specific provisions

The text includes precisions for the possible treatment of:

• South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, members of the South African Customs Union (SACU). They would have additional flexibilities still to be negotiated

• Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, concerning the calculation of the value of trade limitation affected by the flexibilities.

• Oman. Because of its status of RAM and membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council, shall not be required to reduce any bound tariff below 5 % after applying modalities.

• Other possible country-specific provisions (Argentina and Venezuela) are still under negotiation

Sectors for deeper tariff reduction or elimination

"sectoral initiative", deeper tariff reductions in some non-agricultural sectors. There are 14 sectors currently under consideration: Automotive and related parts; Bicycles and related parts; Chemicals; Electronics/Electrical products; Fish and Fish products; Forestry products; Gems and Jewellery products; Raw materials; Sports equipment; Healthcare, pharmaceutical and medical devices; Hand tools; Toys; Textiles, clothing and footwear; and Industrial machinery.

As a result of a successful sector initiative, tariffs in that particular sector would be reduced or even brought down to zero. Voluntary nature of the participation in this initiative but some members want commitment by others as a way to balance the overall ambition.

Special treatment

RAMs:Albania, Armenia, Cape Verde, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Kyrgyz Republic Moldova, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Viet Nam and Ukraine shall not be required to undertake tariff reductions beyond their accession commitments.

RAMs such as China, Chinese Taipei, and Croatia subject to the formula would have an extended implementation period of three years to phase in their Doha commitments.

Developing members (around 75): 32 LDCs are exempt from tariff reductions; there are special provisions for approximately 31 SVEs and for 12 developing countries with low levels of binding. As a result, relatively weaker developing economies will retain higher average tariffs and greater flexibility on how they structure their tariff schedules. But they will contribute to the negotiations by significantly increasing the number of bindings and reducing "the water" (the difference between bound rates and those actually applied) and binding a high number of their tariffs. Bolivia, Fiji and Gabon are singled out as special cases.

Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)

Many NTBs are being resolved bilaterally, others are being addressed on a sectoral basis. Some are also part of other existing multilateral NTB Agreements. NTB outcomes will have multilateral effect and therefore benefit all Members.

Problems:

• no consensus on how and when to define the commitment of members to participate in sectorals without altering the non-mandatory character of these negotiations.

• Deep and sharp cuts for developed countries