прагматика и медиа дискурс / Teun A van Dijk - Communicating Racism
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The even more negative metaphor of invasion implies massive attack by a foreign enemy, and further supports the negative properties of the immigrants as perceived and presented by the responsible elites. Maybe the police used another expression, but for the newspaper this was obviously transformed into a more effective dramatic metaphor. That is, elite discourse, for instance, of the immigration authorities, may have subtly negative implications, which are picked up and dramatized by the press. Together with the well-known number game, such metaphors express the usual "moral panic" (Cohen, 1980). The message to the public comes across loud and clear: We are going to have big problems with these Tamils. Letters to the editor and our own interviews show that this is precisely how a majority of the public understands and accepts the official versions.
Illegality
To enhance the negative properties of the refugees, repeated mention was made of their "illegal" entry across the German border. The Tamils, of course, could not safely have applied for a visa in Colombo (which would probably have been refused), nor did they always have the requested travel documents, as is often the case with more or less spontaneous refuge seeking. Yet, in accordance with a widely accepted usage to denote "illegal" foreign workers, mostly from Turkey and Morocco, the Tamils were also routinely branded "illegal," as we may see, for instance, in the following quotation from NRCHandelsblad, a well-known quality newspaper, which uses the notion three times in one paragraph:
(5)The Department of Justice said to have no idea about the number of illegal Tamils residing in the country. Illegally residing Tamils enter the
country especially in the border area between Limburg [A Dutch province] and the Federal Republic. A West German TV news show of last Monday reported a number of fifty illegal border crossings per day, but Justice doubts whether this number is correct. (NRC-Handelsblad, 12-
6-84)
Real Versus "Economicf° Refugees
Soon the media discussion proceeded to its next predictable phase in the discussion: Do the Tamil refugees have the right to be here? Repeated claims were made by various officials that Tamils were not "real" refugees, but "economic" ones. Read—they are "welfare cheats" They only come here because they are poor, and want
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to live out of our pockets, taking advantage of the civil war in Sri Lanka:
(6)Both the Department of Justice and the police in Limburg have the opinion that most Tamils come to our country for economic reasons. (Vrije
Volk, 1-11-85)
This "opinion" has been formulated in many versions. And even when some newspapers published counteropinions by other "specialists," such as anthropologists, diplomats, or the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, who showed that Sri Lanka was not safe for (young, male) Tamils to go back to, the emerging opinion was clear: They might not even be real refugees. Note that this opinion was not just formulated by individual journalists, but that it was also being formulated explicitly by the prime minister, the secretary of foreign affairs, and other high state officials. A government mission was sent to Sri Lanka, which established after a week of interviewing that the south of Sri Lanka was "safe" to go back to. In other words, the consequences of the discussion were already being explored even before the refugee status of the Tamils was decided: If we send them back, where can we send them? In other words, the political decision was already made, and the doubts about the refugee status already resolved by the presupposed fact of their safety in Sri Lanka.
It has usually been considered a naive point of view to assume that the political and social authorities, as well as the media, conspire in such concerted actions. And indeed, it is not likely that the respective phases in the process of opinion formation have actually been planned and executed methodically and by common decision. On the other hand, the shared attitudes and the decisions based on them were so coherent that the impression of conscious and coherent planning could be inferred from the consequences. It is probable that some newspapers, together with groups of politicians, in an early phase found that there should be no place for Tamil refugees (or any other kind of poor, Black, Third World refugees) in this country, and manipulated their discourse and communication processes accordingly. Some of the media sent teams to Sri Lanka to do little more than "prove" what they wanted to find there anyway, namely, that there was no danger for "ordinary" ("nonterrorist") Tamils.
This example of the Tamil-panic in the Dutch press shows how various elite groups, notably conservative politicians, the police, the judiciary, and the social welfare institutions, both use the media and are unwittingly (and sometimes consciously) helped by the media to create a definition of the situation that, overall, establishes a negative attitude
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against a potential minority group. The public at large thus acquires a media-constructed set of beliefs that leaves little alternative than to conclude that the acceptance of refugees would be catastrophic for the country. In its respective phases of coverage, the media address the main categories of ethnic attitudes: origin, numbers, economic goals, and sociocultural and personal characteristics of the prospective minority group—they come from a Third World country, they are terrorists, they are Black and poor, they are illegal, they only come to profit from the welfare system, and they are associated with crime. In this way, existing ethnic prejudices can simply be copied to form new ones about the Tamils, even in the absence of direct contacts with Tamils.
We see that no everyday experiences or prejudice of the "people" are necessarily "reflected" by the authorities or the media: They are the ones who use routine procedures and discourse to preformulate such attitudes, and to prepare a decision strategically that can then be assumed to be supported by the public.
Most cynical of all was the fact that some politicians and media argued that Tamils could not be admitted because "popular opinion was against them," and the authorities did not want (a) "to provoke people in the poor neighborhoods where the Tamils would eventually come to live," and (b) "to subject Tamils to possible forms of prejudice and discrimination." In other words, as we have argued before, the elite tries to transfer its own racism to others who are socially weak, and uses the attributed racism of that group to make "popular" decisions.
In a fourth set of interviews, conducted in a poor, ethnically mixed neighborhood in Amsterdam during the spring of 1985 after months of media reporting about Tamils, we found that this strategy works (see van Dijk, 1987d, for details). People essentially reproduce both the preferred topics and the dominant opinions of the elite as they are expressed in the media. Especially the assumed support by social welfare and the protests of Tamils against their special "bread-and-bed" regime were very much resented by our interviewees. People who are helped, according to the dominant ideology, should apparently be "satisfied" with all they get "for free" This also implies that immigrants have no social rights.
We have reason to believe that the process of prejudice production for the actual minority groups that are most salient (Surinamese, Turks, Moroccans) has been similarly preformulated by the various elites and specifically transformed by the media to fit into the general ethnic attitudes of the public. In other words, everyday talk and persuasion about ethnic minorities is not an autonomous or closed circuit. It is essentially fed by many types of media(ted) stories that are initially formulated by various elite groups.
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Conclusion
Reviewing the major prejudice categories that we distinguished theoretically in Chapter 4, this section summarized the (complex) arguments that led us to assume that most of these prejudices are based on information derived from various elite discourse types and/or their reproduction through the mass media. If we want to explore the social "origins" or "formulation places" for consensual attitudes about ethnic groups, we must indeed look at those groups that have the power or the control over, and the access to, such discourse and reproduction types. We have identified a few of those groups, and informally indicated what kind of discourses form or reinforce what kind of stereotypes and racist attitudes. A brief analysis of the example of the "Tamil-panic" in the Dutch press has shown that such attitudes may be preformulated by the elite even when no concrete experiences with a minority group can explain existing prejudices among the public at large.
The complex cognitive and social-psychological processes that underlie the formation and persuasive communication of these types of beliefs and attitudes have been discussed before, and need not be reviewed here. We should, however, repeat the well-known fact that people do not passively repeat, nor precisely reproduce, what they hear or read. This also holds for the contents and the structures of mass-mediated elite text and talk. Depending on many economic, historical, social, and cultural factors, people may bias their interpretations in a negative or more positive way. Yet, we have reason to believe that much "neutral" information about ethnic groups will tend to be interpreted negatively in a racist society. We have argued that most media and elite discourses do not provide models, opinions, or knowledge that allow large groups in the public to develop counterarguments and strategies that lead to the demolition of racist attitudes.
On the other hand, it may well be the case that the converse may also happen: Antiracist opinions and discourse may also be preformulated primarily by specific elite groups, even when they are seldom a dominant majority. Evidence for this, however, is at most anecdotal (e.g., membership in antiracist parties, demonstrations, and publications) or requires much further research and analysis (e.g., measured or inferred lower prejudice of people with higher education). Our data have examples that suggest that antiracist people also justify their opinions on the basis of information derived from the mass media. This is no proof for the attitudinal impartiality or innocence of the media, however. On the contrary, these antiracist interpretations are not preferred readings, but counteropinions of implied consensus opinions. In other words, the rele-
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vant elites also provide the various countermovements against exploitation, prejudice, and racism, but they are a small, although active, minority among a dominant majority that either doesn't care or just performs its routine tasks of government, administration, bureaucracy, teaching, law enforcement, or social work.
These countermovements obviously have much less access to the dominant, consensus media and, therefore, their discourse may only be read or heard in small "radical" newspapers, radio, magazines, and especially books (with small publishing companies), which seldom reach the public at large. Only through the usual ploys of getting the attention of the consensus media (conflicts, original, or "violent" action, demonstrations, public trials, or mass meetings) are they able occasionally to get their message across. Their discourse, however, often presupposes an attitudinal framework that is so different from the dominant one that they are not even understood, or their talk heard as so ridiculous or "exaggerated" that their persuasive effects may be minimal.
The informal discussion in this section, which extends the topic of this book, is a necessary complement to the discourse analytical, cognitive, and social-psychological analyses given in the previous chapters. Without this broader framework, we would have represented everyday talk about ethnic minorities in a historical, socioeconomic, and political vacuum. We would have ignored the origins and production processes of ethnic attitudes and ideologies, and the roles and participation of various social groups in the reproduction process. We assume that in a racist society, prejudices are held and expressed at each level and within each subgroup. Yet, there are differences of content, style of expression, and enactment. Also, there are differences in social control and responsibility. Even the rather mitigated and occasional prejudice expressed by a powerful politician or academic, when mass reproduced by the media, may have vastly more negative consequences on public ethnic opinion than the possibly more blatant statements of individuals in scattered personal communications. In other words, if we do not understand how the agenda, the topics, the style, and even part of the opinions expressed in everyday text and talk are preformulated by various forms of elite discourse, we do not understand how racism is reproduced in society.
4.Social functions of prejudiced talk
Another important dimension of the social context of the conversational reproduction of ethnic attitudes is
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the various functions of such talk. We have occasionally mentioned such social functions, and analyzed some of them in particular, namely, the communicative and interactional functions, such as persuasion, selfpresentation or other-presentation. However, people talk about foreigners with several, implicit or explicit aims. In this section, we finally discuss the major social functions of "foreigner talk" and again try to relate these functions to the structures, strategies, and contents of such conversations by examining a few examples.
Sharing Social Cognitions
Closely related to the interpersonal and interactional functions, prejudiced talk also serves the obvious social purpose of expressing, sharing, and reproducing common cognitions of the in-group. We have assumed throughout this book that ethnic attitudes in general, and prejudice in particular, are not (merely) personal cognitions, but essentially cognitive properties of groups and intergroup relations. This mean that people talking about foreigners do so primarily as social members of such groups. Beliefs, opinions, and attitudes about ethnic minority groups are based on shared group experiences, norms, and values, and talk about them establishes and diffuses them in the ingroup through informal talk and the media. It is, therefore, crucial that what members learn from others or from the media be transmitted to others when it is relevant to other members of the group (Berger & Bradac, 1982; Roloff & Berger, 1982; Rommetveit, 1984). In this perspective, personal experiences and opinions are also presented as experiences and opinions "we," autochthonous Dutch people have regarding foreigners. Speakers thus display their knowledge about what others know, believe, and have experienced, and confirm or "ratify" these models and schemata by expressing their own as characteristic examples of a consensus and as results of—literally—"commonsense" reasoning. At the same time, they will appeal to hearers by asking for similar confirmation of the shared nature of their own opinions and experiences. It is important in that case that they are presented and understood not as purely individual cognitions, but as generally shared and, therefore, as legitimate opinions and experiences. The process of social cognition sharing is not limited to specific attitudes. It also involves testing and confirming more general norms and values of the group. Indeed, ethnic opinions are often formulated in explicit relation to such norms and values. Argumentatively, reference to shared norms and values may serve to justify ethnic opinions in talk, but socially such references have a broader function for in-group members.
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There are several discursive strategies that presuppose or aim at this social sharedness of ethnic opinions. Let us take some examples of interviews held in a high-contact neighborhood:
Presupposed knowledge:
(1)(RA2). A couple of Surinamese live here, and well you know how it is with Surinamese. Last week the police and the ambulance was here .. .
and you know how it is with Surinamese [takes deep breath] uhh temperamental kind of people, we know that.
(2)(Foreigners on the market). And then you see the women with the pram and two bags and the gentlemen they walk with their hands in their pock- ets before or after them, you know how, you know the pattern.
Providing "knowledge":
(3)(RA2). (No contact with foreign women.) You don't get finto contact with them. Are not allowed to have contact with Dutch people .... I have uhh I uhh read that once here or there, yes in the paper, that uhh well, a women should stay indoors, period.
Shared opinions:
(4)(RA2). (No personal experiences with foreigners.) But the antipathy is rising in the neighborhood, you know, against the foreigners. [I know this] from conversations with people ... It is the general opinion in the street.
(5)(PD5). But on average the people here hate the what shall we call it the foreigners like the pest, you know.
Knowledge appeal:
(6)(RA2). (Story about sheep slaughtering at home.) You are not allowed to slaughter sheep at home, you know that, don't you!
Social Self-Presentation and
Membership
It was observed many times in this study that talk about "delicate" social topics such as minorities takes place with strategies of impression management: People present a positive "face" or try to avoid a negative evaluation from the recipient. Aside from this interpersonal function, self-presentation also has a wider social function. People present themselves as competent social members of the in-group. Display of this competence can take many forms. For instance, speakers may want to exhibit their knowledge of and conformity to accepted norms, values, rules, and goals of the group as we have also seen in the examples just given (Asch, 1951; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Moscovici, 1976, 1984).
These functions of talk hold in particular when foreigners are discussed. In that case, it is particularly relevant that the speaker displays
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competence as an in-group member, which also involves respecting the general norm of tolerance and respect for other groups and, at the same time, defense of the goals and interests of his or her own group. Selfcategorization and self-evaluation as an in-group member and expressing solidarity with other in-group members are moves in the complex interactional strategies of talk that exhibit this social membership. A corollary of this function is the function of (negative) other-presentation, which shows not only knowledge and beliefs about this other group, but also involves strategies of comparison and other-categorization, such as by the emphasis on differences in the respective categories of group schemata (origin, socioeconomic goals, and cultural and personal properties of the minority group and its members). Some examples:
Social selfand other-presentation and norms:
(7)(PD5). (This neighborhood here is a mess compared to where I lived before.) But, excuse me, but there [in the other neighborhood] were not so many "minorities," they call it, because we are of course not allowed to say "foreigners."
(8)(RA2). Look madam, if those people adapt themselves to our uhh, our Dutch customs and habits, then I don't mind ... In these difficult economic times, Dutch women are being reminded that they uhh should have no more than one, two children, something like the pill and all that, and then you come outside and you see ... those old men [with young girls, and a lot of children], and look that is what essen- tially bothers us all.
Different norms and values, comparison:
(9)(MA6). (Many foreigners in the neighborhood, also the neighbors.) There has not been a sponge on their windows for years. And in the kitchen you see all these boxes with rubbish, all the time. Well, we are not used to that.
(10)(PD5.) But they want their own culture. But when I go to Turkey, then I have to adapt myself. Otherwise 1 shouldn't go. You know what 1 mean?
Social comparison and identity
(11)(RA2). (The neighborhood is decaying.) People have cometo live here who dídn't live here before.... there has been some, how shall I, how shall I put it [pause] yes, I should not say asocial, but yet people who are not like us...
(12)(LM2). Not only foreigners [bother us]. Because Whites are just like that ... It depends [who it is].
(13)(SM4). I find it terrib-... is is predominantly foreigner in this neighborhood. All Dutch people want to leave. Most are busy to try to get away. There are so many here on this square who want to leave.
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Explanation, Justification, and
Recommendation
In talk about ethnic groups, people not only express shared group cognitions or various forros of social categorization. They also tell about their own or others' experiences with foreigners. This may involve storytelling about actions, as well as explanations and justifications of such actions as part of the accepted goals of the in-group. Although thesejustifications also have a self-presentational function, they may also be interpreted as forms of in-group defense, as legitimation for the adequacy or effectiveness of specific courses of (discriminatory) action. In that sense, talk may also function as a forro of social recommendation for other in-group members on how to "deal" with "those foreigners:' Some examples:
Exemplary reaction:
(14)(SM2b). Because my brother he once was for instance threatened, there on K-square. But OK, he is not afraid and he thinks by himself if I, if you, if someone must be hit, you can have the first one. They probably saw that, and so they walked on. They thought, that is not a willing victim. But otherwise, he would've, then they would, his wife also said that, otherwise he would absolutely have been robbed, because that was of course what they had in mind.
(15)(AC3). (We don't know whether they are just having a normal conversation or whether they are fighting; for instance, once young foreigners were starting a fight in the community center, man intervenes.) I mean, we know of course when somebody is calling another names, and then you think, oh that is going wrong, then you have to act, you know. But with them, you knew, know beforehand, you have to see that they are taking a threatening posture and so on, and then 1 think, now it is going out of hand.
Rejection of the discrimination argument:
(16)(MA3). (Bike "borrowed" by Moroccan neighbor. Owner threatens to call the police.) Since that time he says "We are being discriminated against" I say: No I know what the matter is. We were not allowed to be angry about that [the stolen bike]. What would you say if I would uhh your car. You wouldn't like that either, would you. I say: We are not used to that kind of thing. I say: We are in our own country, and you have to adapt yourself, like we live, and not like you live. That is impossible. And that is how you get these conflicts.
Conclusion
Talk about foreigners has several important social functions. At the interpersonal leve!, people tell about
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their experiences and opinions about foreigners and thereby transmit socially relevant information, arguments, and "evidence" for others to form similar opinions. At the same time, the speaker confirms his or her membership in, and solidarity with, the White in-group, as well as distance or rejection of the target out-group. Personal experiences and attitudes can be compared to those of others. People thus test whether individual cognitions and interactions are valid instantiations of more generally social ones. Shared commonsense rules, norms, and principles are formulated in order to show that the speaker knows them (and belongs to the group), and in order to support evaluations about foreigners. Preferred explanations of the present social situation and its conflicts may be given, such as in terms of unemployment or the economic recession, as various lay versions of theories of discrimination. And finally, stories that have Resolution categories, and general normative statements, may be used to show how foreigners should be "treated," or to justify one's own actions. In other words, such talk combines the personal and practical problems of everyday "ethnic" situations with people, with the higher-level, social, and group-based issues, interests, and goals of speakers as social members of the dominant group. Al! these forms of social information processing are vital for the formation of beliefs and attitudes throughout the in-group. Together with the role of the media, discussed in the previous section, everyday talk about foreigners is the key to shared social cognitions, prejudices, discrimination, and racism. Justas there would be no discriminination or racism without ethnic prejudice, there would probably be no group prejudices without talk about ethnic out-groups.