прагматика и медиа дискурс / Teun A van Dijk - Communicating Racism
.pdf202 Communicating Racism
Social Functions
These last issues have reminded us again of a final constitutive component of ethnic prejudice—its very specific social functions and its role in the structural nature of racism in society. These social functions explain why personal prejudices against people who wear glasses are fundamentally different from in-gmup prejudices against social out-groups such as Blacks, women, the elderly, or squatters. The similarity, indeed, is only one between partially similar forms of social information processing (categorization, differentiation, and associated evaluations). It is essential to distinguish between individual prejudices of the first kind and the group-based, socially functional ones of the second kind (Gardner, Taylor, & Feenstra, 1970). According to our analysis of attitude, the first is not even an attitude and, hence, nota prejudice, but simply a set of personal opinions that are part of generalized personal models. These are not and need not be systematically formulated, expressed, tested, and persuasively conveyed in ingroup talk, neither do they lead to consistent and consensual interaction of people without glasses against people who do wear glasses. Indeed, prejudices against people with glasses are not needed to explain or justify the social status or power of people who don't wear glasses. Similar remarks hold for prejudices we may have about other categories of people. For instance, ethnic prejudice is also fundamentally different from opinions about occasionally stigmatizing properties of appearance, such as having red hair or being overweight. Only when group and societal processes are also at stake, such as (perceived) competition or conflict, differential access to social resources, and so on, group attitudes may be qualified as prejudices in our sense, because in that case they are systematically (and not incidentally) related to structural intergroup relationships such as power and domination (Levin & Levin, 1982).
We assume that, without the functional or structural role of ethnic prejudice, we are unable to explain both their organization and their strategic uses in information processing and interaction, as well as their complex relationships with other dimensions of racism in society. For our discussion this means, particularly, that we would be unable to explain why and how ethnic prejudice is formulated in conversational interaction and persuasive reproduction among in-group members.
2.2. THE ORGANIZATION OF
ETHNIC PREJUDICE
Ethnic group attitudes are not organized in an arbitrary way. Aside from the usual hierarchical and linear
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organization of opinions in attitudes that we have discussed before, it is plausible to assume that the acquisition, transformation, and application of ethnic attitudes is structured by strategically effective schematic principles. Part of these principies are general and define how social members form and use group schemata (Hastie, 1981; Wyer & Gordon, 1984). Each time in-group members are confronted with (information about) new, salient out-groups, they need not figure out again what properties of such a group are relevant and about which characteristics opinions should be formed. They have acquired an abstract group evaluation schema, which only needs to be specified with new data for a new group. With a minimum of information, group members are thus able to form relevant and effective belief and opinion systems about the out-group. Obviously, this process is a function of several social structures and processes, such as communication, interaction, goals, and real or imagined social relationships with the out-group. In other words, the organization of ethnic prejudice depends both on general cognitive principies of social information processing and on social (including historical, cultural, and economic) processes of group interaction and societal structure. In this section, we focus on cognitive principies, although we may use arguments derived from the set of social constraints, which we shall deal with in more detail in Chapter 6.
Group schemata may be defined by a number of relevant categories, which are developed as a result of the requirements of social comparison and of goal-dependent and interest-bound intraand intergroup interactions (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). We discuss these categories in an order that partly reflects their social relevance and application.
Appearance
Crucial for the primary identification and differentiation of out-groups is that their members can be recognized in observation and encounters. Appearance, defined as a set of socially salient, visible physical properties, plays an important role in this strategically "fast" process of identification and categorization. Once identified as "Black" and/or "female," further categorization and evaluation of out-group members may follow "automatically." Racial/ ethnic categorization is routinely based on this high-level category.
It may be assumed that in-group members often follow a general evaluation strategy that associates greater perceptual "distance" from the (assumed) properties of the in-group with more negative opinions in this category when the categorial dimension is gradual. A Black group, thus, will be evaluated more negatively by Whites—all other things being equal—than a group with lighter skin color, which is "closer" to
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the White group on this category dimension. At the structural level of analysis, this strategy may emerge in certain societies, of course, through systematic interactions at the micro level as well as through historical and cultural factors, in differential power and status along a color "hierarchy."
Note, though, that this is merely a general strategy holding only for the applicatíon of this category. People of very light skin color who for other reasons are categorized as "Black" (or simply as "non-White") are not always evaluated less negatively by Whites if the differentiation process is "all or none," and not gradual. We have seen, aboye, that group categorization tends to reduce differences among out-group members. Processes of exaggeration and polarization may take place in order to "see" people as Black, even when their skin color or other characteristics can hardly be distinguished from those of at least some of one's own group members. The same is true, of course, for appearance dimensions that are not primarily gradual but categorical in their own right (such as the male-female distinction).
Indeed, this group schema category, like the others to be discussed, is not a purely perceptual or cognitive one but rather a social one. People are assigned the appearance prototypically associated with their ethnic group. It is this sociocultural dimension of appearance features (such as skin color) that underlies the naive group "theoríes" of "race." Also, for this reason, the appearance category is very important in perception and categorization processes in first or public encounters: It provides directly available information about the probable group membership of other persons.
Appearance is an attitude category that also operates in many other group attitudes and prejudices—about women, the aged, the handicapped, and so on. Apart from race, gender is probably the most prominent subcategory of the appearance category and constitutes the basis of the most widespread and universal sets of group attitudes and prejudices (among males). We assume, then, that almost all group categorizations are at least tentatively paired with externa!, visible, markers—if not physically, then at least by dress, makeup, or other socioculturally defined features of this membership category, although we surmise that inherent or permanent properties are more powerful as category markers and may be used in more negative group attitudes.
Because appearance is an inherent property of ethnic groups, and discrimination based on such properties prohibited by the law as well as by general norms, much talk about foreigners avoids naming such properties directly. Indeed, our data show that very rarely are ethnic group members negatively qualified just because of, for instance, skin color. On the contrary, sometimes it is strategically emphasized that the speaker
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has nothing against Black people per se—but only resents their behavior. As we shall see in other cases, below, not all group attitude categories constitute equally "safe" topics of talk: Negative evaluation of people because of their different culture is more acceptable than such an evaluation that is explicitly based on skin color.
Origin
Whereas appearance defines the physiological boundaries of out-groups for in-groups, origin defines spatial or territorial boundaries, such as those of (one's own) world region, country, town, or neighborhood. In the Netherlands, for example, ethnic minority groups, even those with Dutch nationality, such as most people who immigrated from the former colonies (East Indies, Surinam), are called foreigners (buitenlanders). Generally, then, aliens are categorized as a literal "out-group" and, hence, as "outsiders" as far as territorial rights or privileges are concerned. As tourists they may be considered as guests, but as guests who should stick to the rules of the host country. As immigrants from other countries, foreigners are automatically assigned fewer rights and privileges than the autochthonous population "who has been here all the time." Racist propaganda in the Netherlands, for instance, plays on emotions and opinions of the White in-group that are categorized by this label: It is "our" country, and, therefore, "we" should have priority rights, and hence the power to send them "home. "
Everyday talk about ethnic minority groups is replete with references to the origin of the foreigners. We often find assertions such as "they do not belong here," "they should go back where they come from," or implicit reference to sociocultural differences defined by different origins ("we are not used to that here"). Note that categorization by origin is not only natíonalistic, but may also pertain to town, neighborhood, or street: In-group members feel especially threatened when new groups come to live in their own neighborhood (Elias & Scotson, 1965). As a general strategy for the application of this category, then, we may postulate that the farther they have come, and the closer they are, the more negative the evaluation—again, all other things being equal. The strategies applied here are well known from the application of ethnic opinions in the so-called social distance scale measurement of prejudice (Bogardus, 1925).
Also, this group evaluation category not only applies to ethnic or racial groups but may also be relevant in the development of opinions about other out-groups, such as in the attitutes of urbans about "provincials" (rurals) or in general interregional attitudes within a country. In
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other words, coming from elsewhere is another primary category in categorization, differentiation, and, hence, group attitude formation.
It should be noted, though, that the combínation of origin and appearance in ethnic categorization produces differentation that is not simply defined by geographical distance. In principie, other Europeans are more accepted in the Netherlands than people from Africa or Asia, but obviously this also holds for those "Europeans" who have emigrated to other continents such as the Americas or Australia. And, within Europe, people from Northwestern Europe are more accepted than immigrants from Southern (Mediterranean) Europe. Conversely, being a close neighbor does not always mean that attitudes are positive: Indeed, often nationals of small states develop negative attitudes about nationais of a dominant, large(r) neighbor, sometimes for historical and political reasons, as is the case between the Netherlands and Germany, between Belgium and the Netherlands, or between Poland and the Soviet Union, respectively.
Identification by geographical or national origin is, of course, less immediate than by appearance but is often marked by linguistic and other cultural differences, which, however, we analyze in a separate category below.
In many situations, origin may take prevalence over appearance, especially when territorial ríghts, such as space, housing, and social services, are concerned. Thus, along one dimension of analysis, for instance, inunigrant workers from other European countries, or from Mediterranean countries such as Turkey or Morocco, may be categorized just as negatively in the Netherlands as Black people from Surinam, even when they pass as "Whites" or "nearly White." Here, origin is combined with social and cultural differences that, relative to Dutch culture, are greater for Turks or Moroccans than for Surinamese. The same holds for Blacks and Latinos in the United States.
Socioeconomic Position
The next major category for the organization of group attitudes is socioeconomic position. It is this category that accounts for the widespread group attitudes among "classes," such as the dominant, middle-class attitude about working-class groups. Some of the prejudices we have found in our empirical work seem to be similar to those that used to, and still do, exist among ruling classes about "lower" classes or castes: lack of education, intelligence, manners, speech, hygíene, and so on, on the one hand, and presence of laziness, aggression, violence or crime, on the other.
For ethnic group attitude formation, this category may organize opinions about the socioeconomic status, goals, and interests of the outgroup (Banton, 1983; Turner & Brown, 1978). For relatively small
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out-groups, such an evaluation is mostly less relevant, so that, generally, attitudes about very small ethnic minority groups are much less developed and pronounced. Thus, in the Netherlands, prejudice is much more developed against Surinamese (about 185,000) than against the (for White Dutch people, indistinguishable) small group from the Caribbean Dutch Antilles (43,000). The same holds for prejudices against Turks or Moroccans (together about 270,000), when compared to those from, for example, Yugoslavia (14,000) or Tunisia (2,700).
Apart from frequency of encounter, topic frequency in talk and media discourse, or other dimensions of visibility or salíence, the socioeconomic position of larger groups is especially relevant in prejudice formation. Large immigrant groups are perceived as more competitive for space, housing, work, and social services. Many of the generalized prejudices formulated in our interviews pertain to the perceived "unfair" claims of minority groups to an equal share in society and the economy:
"They take our jobs," "they take our houses," or "they profit from the social welfare systems" In general, then, this category organizes all opinions about socioeconomic threats perceived by the dominant majority. For those in-group members for whom socioeconomic interests are most relevant and most unstable, it is this attitude category particularly that has become very salient. This does not simply mean that the "poor" particularly will topicalize this category in talk. Political and intellectual elites often "preformulate" attitudes based on this category, and spread these through the media in ways that appeal to the economically less privileged (see Chapter 6 for details). Thus, ethnic prejudice tends to be located, if not "transferred," by these same elites from the middle classes to the working classes and the poor inner-city ateas.
It hardly needs to be emphasized that it is not the real but only the assumed socioeconomic position of minorities that influences the formation of prejudiced opinions in this category. Socioeconomic "competition" is often mentioned as a "realistic" conflict between majorities and minorities (Banton, 1983; Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971). This means that negative opinions can be easily legitimated, as is indeed the case in our data. The quasi-objectivity attributed to (unfair) competition is an important premise that may be used indefensible argumentation. For the elite, such as for academics who study prejudice, thus, scapegoating of minorities by poor majority group members is, therefore, a preferred explanation. Through this strategy, prejudice can be easily transferred to the socioeconomically oppressed. At least for the Netherlands, with only a small percentage of minorities, there is no real competition for scarce resources such as work and housing. Moreover, it has also been established that the minorities often occupy houses orjobs that majority group members wouldn't want to occupy anyway.
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Together with the cultural category to be discussed shortly, the opinions in this category appear to be the most safe in public talk about foreigners. A striking example of this could be witnessed in early 1985, when a few thousand Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka fled to the Netherlands (see Chapter 6 for details). The political (Centre-Right) majority as well as a number of newspapers initiated the major topic about these refugees—whether they were "real" (political) refugees or merely "economic" refugees. This discussion, of course, appealed to existing negative attitudes about foreigners in general, so that in taik and letters to the editor, there were soon widespread negative opinions against a potential minority group even when hardly anybody had ever met a Tamil. Similar categorizations have taken place in the United States with immigrants coming from, for instance, Haiti or Central America. Such examples show, (a) the relevance of the socioeconomic category for attitude and prejudice formation, (b) that it is a safe topic for prejudiced talk, (c) that the formation of negative ethnic attitudes may be programed by the elite and those who control the media, and (d) that negative attitudes may be formed, by prejudice schema transfer, about ethnic groups that are practically unknown.
Socioeconomic status as a category of group categorization meshes class concepts with ethnic ones. The negative attitudes about Turkish and Moroccan workers in Western Europe, thus, are notjust defined by Origin or Appearance, but also by their prototypically "lower" class position. They are not expected to be doctors, lawyers, or professors, and our data suggest that less negative attitudes exist about (upper-)middle- class members of such salient groups.
Sociocultural Properties
The next major category people use when organizing beliefs and opinions about other groups may be called the sociocultural one. Under this category, in-groups typically store beliefs about assumed norms, values, rules, and habits of the out-group, as well as opinions about language, religion, and other cultural or ethnic information assumed to differentiate the out-group from the in-group.
Our interview data suggest that this is a salient category, especially for in-group members who live in everyday contact with ethnic minority group members. The obvious reason is that, apart from physical appearance, sociocultural properties of out-groups seem to be most "visible." They determine behavior of and, hence, interaction with out-group members. Routine complaints about strange dress, religious habits, family structure and relationships, cooking, child rearing, or communication account for large parts of the interviews with prejudiced in-group mem-
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bers. Everyday differences, thus, seem to be most conspicuous in this category and, at the same time, associated with much affect.
The overall conclusion drawn from the opinions about such cultural differences, therefore, is standard: If they want to live here, they must adapt to our culture; they should at least speak our language, behave as we do, and further arrange their lives so that they don't bother us. Differences in basic norms and values, indeed, are perceived as cultural threats, because they are seen as a possible infringement on the very core of the cultural identity of the dominant in-group. Cultural differences associated with Islam particularly are routinely noted for their disturbing if not "dominant" nature. Assumed cultural threats are also a recurrent theme in racist propaganda, even when only a small percentage of the total population is Muslim.
As with the other categories, cultural differences tend to be exaggerated and polarized in ethnic attitude schemata. Selective attention is paid to sometimes marginal differences, such as dress, cooking, or behavior, and these are then magnified and taken as "typical" (and unacceptable) of the other group as a whole. In the Netherlands, for instance, there is much resentment against use of their own language by Turks and Moroccans, the purported "home slaughtering" of sheep or goats, or the treatment of women according to (assuméd) Islamic rule. Norms of religious tolerance, which have a long tradition in the Netherlands, are not usually applied to Muslims. And the fact that women in the Netherlands, until recently, had a hardly less subservient role, is conveniently forgotten in such cultural stereotypes. Indeed, it is interesting to note that these stereotypes about the treatment of women in the out-group culture often do not seem to be inconsistent with quite conservative attitudes about women's liberation in the in-group. Tentatively, one might even assume that it is especially those sociocultural properties of the out-group that are barely superseded within the in-group itself that are resented. Many of the focal opinions against immigrant workers, indeed, were until not too long ago applied against the autochthonous working class as well ("asocial behavior," language use, lack of hygiene, inferior position of women, noise, unemployment, and so on). This suggests that sociocultural prejudices may also be formed as a cognitive defense against negative self-judgments. This phenomenon requires more detailed analysis, but it shows how complex the categorization of ethnic opinions may be.
The sociocultural category of group prejudices also holds for other social groups. Prejudice against various youth groups (from the Mods, Rockers, Hippies, and so on of the 1960s, to the Punks, squatters, football hooligans, and so on of the 1980s) is mostly organized around this category, for example, they dress differently, they have different norms and values, behave differently, and have their own language code or styles.
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Personal Characteristics
Finally, ethnic group differences are often associated with "personal" or "personality" characteristics, assumed to be "racially" inherent or closely linked to cultural properties. That is, unlike the behavior attributions that are part of the perception and interpretation of in-group members, such personal properties are not taken to vary across individuals. Rather, they are assumed to hold for the members of the out-group as a whole. This dimension of ethnic prejudice is sometimes seen as its most racist core, because it is along these dimensions that in-group members feel superior to outgroup members and, hence, entitled to the priorities, privileges, and power that underlie the other prejudice categories. Thus, out-group members generally tend to be seen as less intelligent, diligent, clean, effective, modern, or law-abiding. Typical, for instance, is the routine assumption of aggressiveness and criminal involvement. Outsiders cannot be trusted, they steal or cheat, abuse social services, are dirty and noisy, and generally are not only different from "us" but are also "lower" than us, both socially and personally. The well-known "attribution error" operates through this category: Negative action of outgroup members tends to be attributed to such (inherent) personality characteristics and not to properties of the situation (Pettigrew, 1979, 1981; Stephan, 1977).
Dominant group members know implicitly that attributing negative personality characteristics is typical of racist opinions. In our interviews, therefore, this does not occur very often in its most explicit and overt form. Rather, negative behavior is described and the personality attribution in that case may remain implicit. Standard prejudices such as "they do not work" imply that "they are lazy," and the many "they do not know how to . . ." stories often imply that "they are stupid." Most frequent, both in talk and in the media, however, are the many stories about aggression and crime, which also directly suggest negative personality characteristics. We have seen, aboye, that for general negative opinions, it is interactionally and normatively safer for speakers to use the permitted opinions about unfair competition and intolerable lack of cultural adaptation to the host country. Apart from the clear, implicit meanings of our own interviews, research among minority group members themselves in particular has shown that the negative personality attributions against minorities systematically appear in the many forms of verbal or nonverbal actions against minority group members (Essed, 1984).
Recall that many of these prejudices are similar to the traditional stereotypes about working-class members: Aggressiveness, crime, or drug
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(alcohol) abuse, were also the standard conceptions of the poor. This means that, at this point, ethnic and class prejudice may be combined, especially when immigrant groups are predominantly working class and living in poor neighborhoods.
Conclusions
In this section, we have taken the schematic notion of group attitude as a starting point for the theoretical analysis of ethnic prejudice. We emphasized that prejudice is not personal, but group based, and organized by high-level negative opinions that are inferred from biased modeling of out-groups, their members, and their actions. Such prejudices are acquired, shared, and communicated within the in-group in various social (historical, cultural) contexts. Apart from their more general functions in effective social information processing about (other) groups, ethnic prejudices function mainly as cognitive programs for the planning, execution, and justification of negative actions against minority groups by a dominant majority and within a racist social structure.
It was also suggested that, at several points, we do not follow the classical approaches to ethnic prejudice. We do not define prejudice in tercos of individual biases in social information processing or personal bigotry. We have argued that prejudices do not imply irrationality and rigidity but, on the contrary, require flexible social information processes. They are not merely cognitive errors but strategic ways of establishing a negative attitude about an out-group. General properties of effective social information processing, for example, heuristics such as overgeneralization (Grant & Holmes, 1981), instantiation, or wrong attributions, are insufficient to explain the forms, contents, and uses of ethnic prejudices. And the "wrongness" of ethnic prejudice cannot simply be established by the observing scientist appealing to universal norms of humanity, but may even be assessed descriptively by concluding that in-group members do not follow the judgmental norms and values they apply to members of the out-group.
The group schemata that form the framework for the storage of beliefs and opinions about ethnic minority groups appears to feature a few basic categories: Appearance, Origin, Socioeconomic, Sociocultural, and Personality characteristics. These categories are not merely effective ways of organizing social cognitions, they have been derived from and are functional in perception, interaction, and evaluation of out-groups. They define physiological, territorial, class, culture, and character differences and, hence, boundaries between in-group and out-group members. They enable everyday identification, categorization, differ-