прагматика и медиа дискурс / Teun A van Dijk - Communicating Racism

222 Communicating Racism

sociocultural and economic interests. Such a cognitive structure not only allows and favors majority group members in perceiving their social environment and possibly threatening groups as such, but also provides the data that may be used in goal setting, planning, and (inter)action execution, that is, in possibly discriminatory acts and their moral justification. We shall return to these interactional and social functions of ethnic prejudice in later chapters, but it should be stressed here that such social functions are preprogrammed cognitively (here we find the classical "conative" dimension of attitudes). In this sense, ethnic prejudice is the mental program of racism. This also means that the contents and structures of ethnic prejudice cannot be fully understood without an analysis of this wider context of their acquisition and application. This also holds for the analysis of prejudiced talk, which is one of the fundamental social expressions and functions of negative ethnic attitudes.

4. Ethnic prejudice in other countries

Our theoretical analysis predicts that similar historical, political, economic, and social circumstances, combined with the same cognitive strategies of social information processing, would result in similar attitudes against ethnic minority groups in other countries. For the countries of Northwestern Europe and those elsewhere where European groups dominate (North America, Australia, and South Africa), called, in brief, the Northwest, the (colonial) history, culture, and socioeconomic context is rather similar. Therefore, we may expect that ethnic prejudices in these countries will resemble each other in several respects. Before we continue our discussion of prejudice with an analysis of its cognitive strategies, let us briefly examine how widespread such prejudices are in different countries.

Reliable empirical data, however, are scarce. Available are only the results of the usual questionnaire type of survey research or laboratory research about national or ethnic stereotypes. Little systematic analysis has been made on the basis of informal talk, in-depth free interviewing, or the analysis of other types of discourse. A real survey and analysis of dominant ethnic attitudes in the Northwest, then, would require an entirely different setup and another book or series of books (see also Castles, 1984, for a more general, and especially socioeconomic, account of minority groups in Western Europe). Therefore, we only consider a few studies that actually yield some insight into the ethnic opinions as expressed in questionnaires and interviews.

Before we start that brief discussion about a few selected countries, a more general observation is in order. Social psychological research that we refer to in this chapter suggests that ethnic prejudice results from spe-

cific properties of social information processing about out-groups. This might imply that negative group stereotyping is a very general, if not universal, phenomenon (see also Brewer & Campbell,1976; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). To a certain extent, this is indeed the case. Anywhere where ethnically different groups live together, there will be forros of mutual out-group stereotyping. Economic, historical, and sociocultural factors may further support this process, often in such a way that dominant groups develop stereotypes that may be functional in the maintenance of power and privileges (Levin & Levin, 1982). Yet, these same factors have engendered rather specific ethnic prejudice in the Northwest, especially against racial or ethnic minority groups in these countries. Here, ethnic categorization has long been associated with explicit or more implicit beliefs about White superiority, which appeared to be most functional in the contexts of colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism (Robinson, 1983).

Current prejudices about minority groups still embody part of this historical and cultural legacy and are further specified by the actual socioeconomic position of (White) dominant groups and minority groups of color. The ethnic prejudices in such a context, then, are rather different from those in, for instance, many Third World countries where there are conflicts and prejudices among different ethnic groups (e.g., also based on caste, class, religious, or linguistic differences). Such ethnic conflicts are usually local or regional, whereas White racism is a more global problem, related to the equally problematic military, economic, and cultural dominance of a majority of color by a White minority. The point of this admittedly too brief statement is also to emphasize that White prejudice and racism in the Northwest cannot simply be "excused," as is the case in some racist discourse referring to the "universal," if not "natural" character of racism, ethnicism, or ethnocentrism (see, e.g., the critical analysis in Seidel, 1985, of such discourse of the British far right).

The same is true for possible stereotypes in minority groups about the majority. The socioeconomic and historical basis of such stereotypes is fundamentally different. Majority prejudices in the Northwest are associated with political, economic, and social power, and it is their embeddedness in the social structure that engenders the specific forro of racism and domination in these countries. Also, for purely socialpsychological reasons, minority group beliefs about the dominant group tend to be less prejudiced, simply because minority group members interact with majority group members frequently and in a variety of social contexts. Also, such prejudices are not supported by a general consensus, such as through the (dominant) media. That is, many general beliefs about the dominant group may have the forro of correct judgments. For resistance and survival, indeed, minority group attitudes about majorities in this case better be correct.

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The United States

Despite the vast number of studies about prejudice and racism in the United States, there are few qualitative studies that enable us to analyze the contents and structures of ethnic or racial attitudes in that country (see, e. g., Wellman, 1977, for an in-depth discussion of a few cases selected from a large number of interviews). Most data about "racial attitudes" have been collected in surveys that use (preformulated) questionnaires, as used by, for example, Gallup, The National Opinion Research Center (NORC), and the Institute for Social Research (ISR). Moreover, in order to study trends and developments, these organizations also tend to use the same questions throughout the approximately four decades of research into racial attitudes, such as about (de)segregation or federal intervention for schools, jobs or neighborhoods, intermarriage, busing, and civil rights.

Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo (1985) recently summarized these surveys of White and Black racial attitudes in the United States. They first conclude that over the last 40 years, attitudes about general principles of racial equality and integration have steadily improved. Thus, in the 1980s, the vast majority (more than 90 %) of Americans think that Black and White people should be able to go to the same school, compete for the same jobs, or use the same public facilities, whereas such opinions were held by less than 50% of the (White) Americans until the 1950s. Similarly, most (White) Americans, namely, about 70%, disagree with the opinion that Whites are allowed to keep Blacks out of their neighborhood. Of course, this leaves millions of White Americans who actually do think that they should be allowed to keep Black people out of their neighborhoods. While I was writing this section, indeed, this was illustrated most concretely by a mob of hundreds of White youths that threatened a Black and White mixed couple that had come to live in a White poor neighborhood of Philadelphia.

This incident, which is characteristic of several U.S. cities (most compellingly described in Lukas' novel [1985] about the recent history of racial integration in Boston), also points to the second general conclusion drawn by Schuman et al. Whereas adherence to general principles of racial equality has grown over the years, there has been much less support for the actual implementation of the policies that have developed from these principles, such as affirmative action programs, busing, and neighborhood desegregation, except for government action in public accommodations. Indeed, most people rejected such forms of government intervention, and the authors surmise that part of this rejection should be understood as a more general reluctance to accept government "interference with private matters" (see also Jackman, 1978).

These general tendencies in U.S. race relations, however, require explanations that go beyond superficial observations in terms of opposition against federal policies. Apparently, conflicts between official norms and their "implementation" in actual ethnic attitudes are involved. One explanation is embodied in the notion of symbolic racísm introduced by Sears and his associates (e.g., Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Allen, 1984; Sears, Hensier, & Speer, 1979). This symbolic racism is no longer expressed in explicit statements favoring segregation or discrimination, mostly because such statements are no longer culturally acceptable, but surfaces in opinions that oppose affirmative action or busing (whether or not people have personal interest in such issues). Shuman et al. especially take issue with the implication that if 90% of (White) people are against busing, the vast majority of the (White) population would be (symbolically) racist.

This is a crucial point. Given their own conclusions regarding the undoubtedly clear trends toward more racial tolerance, they have difficulty in accepting the little-flattering assumption that this might only be sociocultural veneer. As soon as real interests are concerned (whether those of your own family or of your own group—a distinction that, unfortunately, is not given enough stress by Sears and associates), people will show their actual feelings and attitudes (see also Wellman, 1977, for a similar conclusion drawn from qualitative interviews). In several studies about the ethnic situation, both in the United States and in the Netherlands, we have found similar academic, and generally elite, reluctance in accepting that, despite undeniable but superficial changes in the racial status quo, social structure and consensus is still racist or prejudiced when principies or policies are tranformed into the "real thing" of actually having Black neighbors, colleagues, superiors, or in-laws (see, e.g., Bovenkerk et al., 1985). Of course, even when in the United States many people (or corporations) reject federal intervention in many domains, they do so mostly for those areas where they feel threatened in their interests (taxes, EPA regulations, and so on), and not for those actions that might protect them (such as federal crime or terrorism prevention or health programs). We, therefore, find confirmation in the survey research summarized by Schuman et al. for the assumption, supported by much qualitative evidence and analysis, that social norms have changed toward more racial tolerance, but that actual opinions, attitudes, and feelings may still be prejudiced. Indeed, this prejudice has a functional role in a society that still has important racist structures underlying its White group dominance in all fields. It should also be borne in mind that questionnaire statements about the implementation of racial equality and integration may well be more positive than people's actual actions. Shuman et al. do not examine the studies conducted by

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ethnic minority scholars that show the actual extent of racism in education, employment, housing, culture, and so on, experienced by minority groups, both individually and collectively. We have reason to assume, therefore, that their study implies a subtle academic denial of racism, which we also found in our interviews and especially among (White) academics.

California

There are also some survey data more specifically about California. Several of our interviewees stressed that racial as well as other social attitudes in California are more tolerant than in the rest of the United States (taken as a whole). Therefore, we briefly examine some results of a recent study by Apostle, Glock, Piazza, and Suelte (1983), who surveyed people in the Bay Area. These authors are particularly interested in the explanations people give for racial "facts" and assumptions, assuming that such explanations tap underlying beliefs and opinions about other ethnic groups. Thus, if Black unemployment is high, a question about the causes may reveal prejudices among White respondents about the perceived lack of intelligence or the laziness of Black people. The authors distinguish several explanatory modes, such as radical, supernatural, individualistic, environmental, genetic, and cultural (or combinations of these), which are labels that summarize the kind of explanations typically given for the disadvantaged status of Blacks. The radical mode would typically attribute causes to White dominance, the supernaturals would invoke God, the individualists would blaim the victim by attributing lack of success to lack of individual endeavor, and the other modes would similarly attribute causes to the genetic makeup of the other group (the classical case of racist ideologies), orto the social environment or the (minority) culture. In our interviews, both in Amsterdam and in San Diego, we have found most of these explanatory modes in the, sometimes implicit, arguments people use to explain the ethnic situation in the neighborhood. Indeed, among blatantly racist people and liberals alike, we consistently find the explanatory opinion that (many) Blacks and minorities don't try hard enough. In the Apostle et al. study, to a hypothetical question about a case in which a Black man became successful, most (60% or more in each mode) answers are in the environmental mode (less discrimination in the United States), cultural mode (family and friends different from other Blacks), or individualistic mode (people with ambition in the United States can make it).

One result of the Bay Area survey, however, was that Californians in the early 1970s are generally more in favor of government-induced actions

to promote racial equality. Thus, 38 % of the respondents are in favor of a more strict enforcement of existing discrimination laws, whereas 18% are in favor of stricter laws, and 21 % of t ^ ie people think that enough or too much is being done already. A surprisingly high percentage, 33%, appears to accept busing, whereas more than 40% would be willing to pay more taxes and nearly 70% would sign a petition urging passage of strong laws to prevent discrimination in housing. Note, though, that 62 % of the respondents would disapprove of or object to their child marrying a Black person.

Another typical finding of the Bay Area study was that traditional stereotypes of Blacks are rejected by the majority of the respondents, but that most people also think that most other Americans still have such prejudices, a phenomenon that we analyzed as a move of transfer in a positive self-presentation strategy. Thus, 24% of the people think that Blacks are more likely to steal or cheat, but 70% think that most Americans have that opinion. On the other hand, although 47% of respondents find Blacks and Whites equally ambitious, 40% think Whites are more ambitious and 2% that Blacks are more ambitious. So, although the "no difference" answer to stereotypical descriptions usually obtains a majority of the responses, the percentages are in the 50% to lower-60% range only, whereas the stereotypes that are negative for Blacks may reach 24% (or even 58% when asked about the value of owning a big car) and those positive for Whites, 40%.

On the whole, thus, it may be concluded from the Bay Area study that, especially as far as implementation of racial policies of equality are concerned, Californians appear more tolerant than most other Americans. On the other hand, among substantial segments of the population (about 25 %), such as those espousing genetic, supernatural, or individualistic explanations for the disadvantages of Blacks, negative stereotypes remain prominent. In agreement with our own California interviews, even more people think that Blacks, fbr whatever reason, do not take sufficient advantage of the (assumed) opportunities, do not value education or ambition highly enough, and, therefore, should partly be blamed themselves. The "radical" explanation, which on the whole explains the status of Blacks in terms of racism of the White minority, is given by only a small group (about 6%) of respondents, much less than the well-known attribution to, for instance, an assumed "Black culture." Thus, blatantly racist stereotypes have become less prevalent, but remnants of such opinions may still be detected in more indirect forms of perception and explanation, such as a lack of ambition, a lack of educational or entrepreneurial values, or other personal and cultural characteristics of Blacks that explain their current socioeconomic position.

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Great Britain

In a brief report of the Community Relations Commission, aptly entitled "Some of my Best Friends" (CRC, 1976), we find some survey data about the ethnic opinions expressed by different ethnic groups in Britain about "race relations" As usual in such surveys, there is a tendency for people to give the socially expected, normative answers, which also explains the marked absence of differences between White and Black people interviewed, on a number of points. About half of the White Britons, in fact, found race relations good or very good, especially outside of Greater London, whereas the other half of each group didn't know or had no answer. Even more Black ("colored") people told the (White?) interviewers that race relations were good or very good (up to 70%), and even less than 10% that they were bad or very bad. For this survey research, the comments made in the preliminary, informal interviews were perhaps most interesting. A major topic in White talk about Blacks was "cultural differences" as was also the case in our interviews. Comments were made about appearance (dress) and language. About half of the Whites, especially the older ones, agreed with the statement that wearing Western dress makes Black people more accepted by Whites, and even more thought so about speaking good English. Young White people, who also have much more contact with their Black peers, are more skeptical about this condition of acceptance.

Qualitatively more satisfactory field research was undertaken by Phizacklea and Miles (1979, 1980) in a working-class area in Northwest London. They extensively interviewed both Black and White workers about for instance, issues of class and "race" consciousness, political action, the unions, and racism. Contrary to other sociological work on racism, this study provides frequent quotations from interview statements, which allow us to compare ethnic or racial opinions with those we have found in similar areas in Amsterdam. One of the main theses of the author is that racism in this area cannot be fully grasped only in terms of a historically and culturally transmitted expression of superiority inherent in the colonial past of the British Empire (Rex & Tomlinson, 1979). Rather, ethnic attitudes should (also) be embedded in the present socioeconomic context of White (and Black) British labor and the decline of the area. In this context, racism is also the result of perceived competition for scarce resources, especially housing and work. That is, the authors assume an independent, socioeconomically rooted, racism of the working class, and reject the thesis that this racism is (fully) fed to the working class by the racism of the state or the elite. This does not mean, however, that the authors deny or belittle the racism of the state, but only that the working class through its experiences pro-

vides its own contributions to the pervasiveness of racism.

Although partly in agreement with this assumption, we show in Chapter 6 that the role of the elite and the media, also in the preformulation of typical scapegoating beliefs, should not be underestimated. Whereas unemployment and the general decline of urban areas is most certainly a fertile soil for the development of socioeconomic ethnic prejudices, "real" circumstances, such as actual percentages of jobs or houses for which there is competition, do not explain the racial resentment in such areas. This is most clearly illustrated by the pervasiveness of prejudice in Southern California, where unemployment is low and housing problems far less serious than elsewhere. That is, consensual models are in part also preformulated elsewhere (in state or city politics, in the media), and then easily adopted by people in the area to blame their socioeconomic predicament on the minorities. Without such preformulations and reproductions through the media, the prejudiced opinions would probably not be as widespread and homogeneous, nor would they be so similar to those expressed in areas where the ethnic and socioeconomic situation are very different.

That ethnic affairs are important in the area studied by Phizacklea and Miles may be inferred first from the fact that, of all social and economic changes the (White) respondents desired for Great Britain, stopping immigration scored highest (36%), much higher than having more houses or more jobs. A typical statement:

I don't like all these immigrants coming over. There are just too many. I don't mind a few ... I'm not prejudiced at all. 1 like them but they are in my country taking something from me. (Phizacklea & Miles, 1980, p. 156)

The general feeling that there are "too many coloreds" (Phizacklea & Miles, 1980, p. 167) is also repeatedly formulated in the working-class inner-city areas in Amsterdam in which part of our interviews were held.

Phizacklea and Miles estimate that about 75 % of the respondents formulate at least some sorts of racist beliefs (in a similar area in Amsterdam we found a somewhat lower percentage of 63 %). And 38 % of the people in Northwest London blamed Blacks for the local problems in their area. More specific are the frequent complaints, endorsed by 42 % of the White respondents, that Black people (West Indíans, Asians) got preferential treatment in housing by the authorities, a form of prejudice we also encounter in Amsterdam (in London there is a waiting list for council housing like in Amsterdam). Accordingly, 24% of the respondents attributed the local housing problem to Blacks (Phizacklea & Miles, 1979, p. 109). Blaming minorities for unemployment, both

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locally and nationally, was much less widespread, however (17%, but see the 1979 study, where a percentage of 22% is reported), whereas both Whites and Blacks partly attributed unemployment to laziness or the ease of getting social benefits. Similarly, the authors found few explicit statements expressing the traditional racial stereotypes that could have been attributed to a long sociocultural past, such as inferiority and lack of civilization, whereas "only" 11 % of the respondents expressed negative opinions about Blacks' life-styles.

We also found that, in their most direct form, such prejudices are not often formulated, for obvious reasons of face-keeping (note in the example just quoted that in Britain also speakers are well aware of the antiracist norm, and use similar quasi-denials as moves: "I'm not prejudiced, but..."). However, our interview technique focused less on "official" politics, class consciousness, or similar topics, but let people speak more about everyday experiences with foreigners, so that we recorded more stories that imply cultural differences, including the assumed cultural inferiority of minorities.

Finally, another topic that also comes up both in Britain and in the Netherlands is that the authorities "don't do anything about it." The concept of "priority" we have met earlier is explicitly formulated by the following speaker:

They [i.e., the government] ought to think about their own people first and then the coloured people next. (Phizacklea & Miles, 1979, p. 116).

We tentatively conclude from this brief discussion that despite the ethnic differences between the two countries, prejudices in similar social contexts are surprisingly similar. Whether people of Southern Asia, East Africa, or the West Indies are involved in Britain, or Mediterranean immigrant workers and Surinamese in the Netherlands, the dominant prejudices, as well as their strategic formulation in talk, are sometimes literally identical in the different countries.

West Germany

The immigration of workers from Turkey especially makes the ethnic situation in the Federal Republic of Germany similar to that in the Netherlands (where on the other hand, the presence of "West Indian," i.e., Surinamese Blacks, and "East Indian" people from Indonesia, is reminiscent of the English situation). The discussion in Germany about the role of racism should in part be understood against the background of Nazi racism against Jews and other groups. Perhaps even more than in the Netherlands, this explains why

the notion of racism is taboo in Germany. Most studies that deal with prejudice and discrimination against immigrant workers (Gastarbeiter), especially those from Turkey, are, therefore, using the more specific term Ausliinderfeindlichkeit, that is, hostility against foreigners (Hoffmann & Even, 1984; Meinhardt, 1982, 1984; Tsiakalos, 1983). The use of the term foreigners is similar to that in the Netherlands, in this case. Most of these studies are again sociological, or documentaries, and few deal explicitly with ethnic prejudices in everyday talk. There is, however, one brief report of (ethnographic) field research that is similar to our own study about "foreigner talk" (Keim, 1984), in fact, this is the only study we have been able to find in the literature.

Keim (1984) first signals that a great deal of foreigner talk features stereotypical utterances that we have analyzed as moves of impression management, such as "They're people too," and "I don't really have anything against foreigners, but ...." People interviewed focused, just like in Amsterdam, on the differences in the area now that the foreigners have moved in: "In those days, you always walked on the street, you didn't have to be afraid, you knew everybody. But today the foreigners live everywhere" (p. 266). And just like in the Netherlands, the autochthonous people have difficulty distinguishing various ethnic groups, although in Germany this categorization leads to overall inclusion within the Turkish group. Finally, the overall stereotypes used to describe Turks are also similar to those in the Netherlands: they are dirty, loud (in the Netherlands, this is especially attributed to the Surinamese), and come in crowds. They dress differently, their children make a lot of noise, and they may take over our houses if not the whole neighborhood. And finally, just as in England and in the Netherlands, the govermnent is blamed for not taking action against this kind of immigration.

For our discussion, it is most striking that the statements made about these topics are sometimes literally identical with those we have found in our interviews. This suggests that in Western Europe, ethnic attitudes as well as communication about them have become stereotypical in their own right. In line with the thesis of Phizacklea and Miles (1980), we may explain part of this striking similarity in terms of similar socioeconomic contexts. But on the other hand, the different political and historical contexts in these countries, as well as the differences between ethnic groups (Mediterraneans versus West Indians versus Asians), are such that these contexts can hardly explain all facets of these similarities. At the same time, more deep-rooted historical and cultural attitude schemata and evaluation criteria must be involved that explain part of the pervasiveness of ethnic prejudices in Western Europe. These also suggest which topics tend to be attended to in talk, whereas a combination of cognitive and social constraints on conversational interaction about such topics