прагматика и медиа дискурс / Teun A van Dijk - Communicating Racism

ions represented in the media. Yet, when ethnic information is involved, few other sources of information are available. Dominant topics in the media also appear to be dominant topics of talk. This also holds for the overall structure of ethnic attitudes, which is also acquired, during socialization, education, and communication processes, through discourse about (ethnically) different groups. This, of course, leaves open the possibility that people may vary in the acceptance of more concrete opinions. We have seen in the previous chapter, however, that this is rather difficult in the absence or scarcity of alternative forms of discourse and information, antiracist models, and positive information. In other words, the dominant structures, strategies, and even the contents (information, opinions) of the dominant media have the highest chance of being adopted by most people. They define the "ethnic consensus." Feedback, for example, in letters to the editor or interviews, is preferred for those who speak within the boundaries of this consensus and, therefore, generally confirms the consensus (re)produced by and through the media themselves.

(6) Elite (discourse) on ethnic affairs.

Analyses of ethnic news and other media discourses have shown which elite groups are preferably (self-)selected as the primary definers of "ethnic situations." First, these are White elite groups. Ethnic minority elites have little access to the media, and practically no access if they represent nonconsensual ("radical") views (Wilson & Gutiérrez, 1985). Second, the national and local governments provide and control most political and economic, as well as much social information, as news source discourses such as about immigration, socioeconomic policies, and social problems (unemployment, housing, welfare, crime, and so on). Debates, decisions, laws and regulations, reports, and other discourse types of the government or legislative bodies regarding ethnic minorities, thus get routine coverage and reformulations in the media. Third, the same is true for most state or public institutions and their representatives, such as the police, the courts, education, research, health authorities, and all other institutions with which ethnic minorities are confronted. They also provide the discursive presentation and legitimation for their policies, decisions, and actions taken with respect to ethnic groups, such as reports, documents, studies, public statements, or interviews. Again, many of these become public, in summarized form, through media stories and background articles. Hence, it may safely be concluded that most of our daily media information about ethnic minority groups has been preformulated by these various elite groups or institutions.

(7) Absence and censorship of the alter - native voice. Alternative voices, if represented at all, are either within

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the boundaries of the ethnic consensus (e. g., in critical statements about details of official policies and action), or are heard through the representation of "political action," preferably violent or otherwise negative. Dissensus, thus, is represented a priori through negative frameworks such as "riots," "terrorism," demonstrations, conflicts, threats, or other "street" action. Minority groups or majority subgroups that have solidarity with them, have no power or facilities (press agents, press conferences, contacts, and so on) that provide access to news workers and news-gathering contexts (Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972). So, if they are represented at all, then this representation tends to be negatively framed in terms of problems, deviance, or crime.

(8) Prejudice categories and their elite preformulations. It is not difficult to show that any cluster of negative opinions or biased information that constitute widespread ethnic prejudice is ultimately derived from corresponding information provided by elite groups, whether or not media users transform this information in a more negative or more positive direction. A few examples:

(a) Immigration. Prejudices that imply that immigrants or refugees "flood" our country, that our country is "full," or that most immigrants are "illegal," are largely inferred from media stories about (the predominantly negative) reactions of the authorities to various immigration events. If the government wants to "keep them out," this is a legitimation to keep them out of our city or neighborhood. And if they live in our neighborhood, this means that the government has not done enough to keep them out: Thus the action values of the authorities will be used against them in their hesitation to take more extreme decisions.

(b) Crime and aggression. Prejudices about aggression and crime of ethnic groups largely derive from biased media stories that mention the ethnic backgrounds of suspects, which are again based on police reports or court trials, as well as on media articles about crime statistics or crime "waves" that are also partly derived from information supplied by the authorities. This is one of the most socially destructive ethnic prejudices, and there is much empirical evidence that the law and the media together help construct public attitudes about crime, deviance, or similar negative properties attributed to ethnic minority groups. People who express fear of ethnic crime often refer to the media as their major source of information.

(c) Unfair competition. Similar remarks hold for prejudices about (favorable treatment in) housing, welfare, health, education, and other social and economic areas. Here, the communication process is somewhat more complex, though. The authorities do not directly preformulate prejudices about favorable treatment,

which would be inconsistent with their policies and actions. Rather, in these domains there is systematic emphasis on the "problems" ethnic minorities create, either by their very presence, or by their actions (protests, demands, criticism), combined with a focus on the positive "help" the authorities want to provide despite the "difficult" economic circumstances.

The attitudinal inferences, however, are easy to make, if dominant group people perceive themselves as real or potential beneficiaries of such resources, whether scarce or not. Politicians, professionals, or civil servants, thus, may represent the attribution of social resources to minorities as a favor, as a positive actíon, and not as a right. Other (often much larger) groups are much less focused on in this case (e.g., the vast sums that are expended to support businesses "in trouble"). By representing minorities as special problem cases, as outsiders, and as particular targets for state interventions, the framework of a "competition" is created, in which the out-group can easily be attributed the "unfair" role. For new immigrant groups, indeed, the major arguments formulated by the authorities is the "fear" that they will burden the socioeconomic resources too much. Emphasis is seldom placed on the potential socioeconomic contributions of the immigrants or minority groups. We have not found (Dutch) government reports, nor media stories, about the net gain for the economy of having employed hundreds of thousands of "guest workers" in low-paid jobs and with an initial minimum of social resources (housing, education, health, and so on). In fall 1985, a Rand Report was published that showed that contrary to widespread prejudices, "illegal aliens" (mostly from Mexico), were probably beneficia) for Southern California (as may be expected, some of the media covered such results with skepticism). Neither is there much official discourse that contradicts dominant stereotypes with statistícs that could prove otherwise. This mean, indeed, that there is no systematic body of information that may yield counterarguments and reasons that may be used against the dominant stereotypes in this field.

For people in high-contact areas, and later for all those who read about them in the paper or see them on TV, these media-induced prejudices may be further sustained by biased inferences from observations of foreigners who do get a house, a job, welfare, or other forms of "favorable" treatment. That is, through the media, the elite provides the general interpretive framework, and the people can fill in and "confirm" this schema by its own (biased) observations.

(d) Cultural conflicts. Prejudices about cultural differences and conflicts only partly derive from immediate observations in a few large city neighborhoods. Rather, portrayal of, for example, Islam, the position of women, family structure, food habits, lan-

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guage use, are predominantly based on media stories inspired by the (cultural) elites and institutíons, academic research reports, and other (practically always White) "specialists." It has been shown that much of the "ethnic research" carried out by these specialists is itself often prejudiced against the minority groups studied (Essed, 1986). It often represents these groups, benevolently or patronizingly, as inferior, strange, deviant, different, pathological, and perhaps in need of "help" The public at large adopts lay versions of this dominant "analysis" of sociocultural properties of the minority groups.

At this point, we may even ignore the (legally and politically permitted) overt racist publications of academics (social scientists, biologists, and so on) that still aim to "prove" anything that states or implies the superiority in many domains of their own (White) race, cultural threats of other groups, the impossibility of a multiethnic society, and so on. The same holds for the persuasive uses of these academic "arguments" in racist propaganda of right-wing groups and parties (Seidel, 1985). And yet, although such openly and blatantly racist publications come from small elite groups, mitigated reformulations have been shown to appear in discourse by less extreme, but more influential, political and academic elites, through which they become more respectable and reach the mass media and the public (Reeves, 1983). Indeed, the very "democratic" tolerance for racist groups and parties, despite constitutional and legal prohibition of discrimination and racism, shows that for the dominant ethnic consensus, racism is at most an impropriety, and nota crime. Political terrorism, especially left-wing, for instance, is treated much differently from racist terrorism, especially from the right.

(e) Personal characteristics: Inferiority.

Finally, information about personal characteristics of ethnic minorities could in principle only be acquired through social interaction, which is practically nonexistant for most people. Hence, prejudices again must be inferred from various media representations. These will be seldom direct and explicit in news stories, although they are implied in many stories on the topics mentioned aboye. The same holds for advertising, fiction, film, children's books, and so on, in which various minority group members may still be pictured as stupid, lazy, dependant, treacherous, cheating, uneducated, backward, unreliable, childish, and the like. From research on discourse content, it may be concluded that negative stereotypes about the attributed characteristics of minorities mainly derive from explicit or implied descriptions of their "typical" actions in such media discourses (written by special elite groups). The same holds for the personal attributions derived from other discourse types, such as crime news, reports about educational "disadvantage," unemployment, and any other domain that allows inferences about the capacities of people.

Which Elites?

In the previous paragraphs, we have repeatedly used the notion of "elites" without explicit theoretical analysis. Our definition of the term was merely enumerative: We gave examples of the kind of elites involved in the reproduction of ethnic attitudes, and of the types of discourse they produce. This single section can hardly be the appropriate location for a complete socíological discussion of the notion of elites and their political or social power (see, e.g., Bottomore, 1964; Gouldner, 1979; Lukes, 1974; Mills, 1956). A few further observations will do for our purposes.

From our analysis of their role in attitude reproduction, it may first be inferred that elites are social (minority) groups that have various types of power and control, whether political, economic, social, cultural, or personal. Within the framework of the reproduction of racism in general, the sociopolitical elites are in control of the decisions that directly affect the daily lives of ethnic minority groups and their members, such as in the domains of immigration, residence, work, housing, welfare, health, or education. Their elite power is that of legitimate(d) authority. Yet, for our discussion of the discursive reproduction of ethnic attitudes, other elite groups and other forms of power are relevant as well.

The sociopolitical elite, including members of the national and local governments, legislative bodies, and state or city institutions (education, courts, police, welfare agencies, health institutions, and so on), also routinely formulate and justify their policies and decision making, namely, in many discourse forms, such as policy statements, reports, interviews, or propaganda. Here, the execution of power may also be persuasive: Reasons are formulated for the acceptance of policy and action. Such reasons will, among other things, involve "analyses of the problem situation." This is particularly relevant for the persuasive communication of the dominant interpretations of the ethnic situation. In this discourse, then, professional arguments, such as in statistical terms, may be given in favor of severe limitation of immigration (especially of non-Whites), of reducing child allowances to foreign immigrant workers, or of abolishing special school services for immigrant children. The main (overt) premise in such arguments is economic: lack of money and resources within a (semipermanent) economic crisis. Other arguments are, more tacitly, based on assumptions of social fairness, and derive their acceptability from the very prejudices they induce among the public at large: One group should not be favored over others, and immigrant groups especially have not the same rights as autochthonous ones. We have seen that through media reproduction, such arguments or other discursive strategies may reach and be adopted by the public.

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Economic elites, such as corporation directors and managers, have only indirect control over the reproduction mechanisms of ethnic attitudes. Apart from their direct control over investments, hiring practices, and work environment, for minority group members also, and, therefore, over discrimination on thejob, they monitor the government's policies on public spending, including the budgets for ethnic group relations.

Finally, the various cultural elites, partially coinciding with the sociopolitical ones, such as in education and state cultural affairs, play a key role in the formulation of justifications, analyses, or other discursive structures that support both the political elite and the ethnic consensus. Media workers, teachers, researchers, writers, and many others are engaged directly in the production and reproduction of knowledge, beliefs, interpretive frameworks, fictional representations, and their persuasive effects. Whether or not they support the political elite in power, they have control over much of the mass-mediated agenda, the dominant topics and interpretations, the public discussion of moral values, and the setting of public goals in society. Even without political power, they may exert control by institutional or personal status, prestige, or celebrity. They exert direct control over the contents and style of nearly all massmediated messages, and do so with ethnic media news, advertising, or film, in the ways suggested earlier. As the experts in matters of "formulation," they are the ones who produce the dominant discourse environment of a racist society. Their power, thus, is predominantly symbolic (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). If their discourse plays such an eminent role in the preformulation of ethnic attitudes, we witness the interesting group contradiction that consists in the fact that the same elite also recruits those who are the most prominent formulators of antiracism (Gouldner, 1979).

Sears and his associates (see, e.g., Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979) also used the terco symbolic to refer to the "new" racism of the elite or the liberals, for instance, to explain the general opposition to busing we also found in our own California data. This research argues that such opinions and actions are not so much based on selfinterest (people who do not have children also oppose busing), and does not have the traditional blatant forms of color-based racism. Yet, as may be clear from this chapter and other data in this book, as well as from the frequently cited results of Essed (1984) about everyday racism, we have both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to believe that "symbolic" (or "new") racism, is also racism, maybe of a more subtle form, especially in its expression and public communication, but nevertheless a functional part of racism and its reproduction. This chapter intends to show at least some of the ways these kinds of indirect, more subtle, more

"tolerant" ethnic opinions are communicated and interpreted.

This brief description and identification of elite groups derives from analysis of their decision power, and their (sometimes indirect) control over the actions and attitudes of (many) others. The instrument of that power is often discursive (which does not deny the important dimension of physical or legal coercion, for instance, by the police). The effects of their power—the degree of control—then, are defined also in tercos of the effects of their discourses. It has become plausible that this effect is both epistemic and attitudinal: They control most knowledge and beliefs, and thus indirectly the information the public has at its disposal to form ethnic opinions and attitudes. Their own decisions and signals for preferred readings suggest that the dominant consensus attitude should be negative, at least in the sense that "minorities/immigrants do not belong here and/or they are a problem." The public still has the freedom to reject (some of) their decisions, policies, and justifications, and will do so if its own interests are at stake or information is available to feed such rejection. In the communication of ethnic knowledge and beliefs, this freedom is highly constrained, however. Counterarguments are only sparsely supported by available information, or must rely on everyday, informal talk and rumors, in which again ethnic prejudices prevail.

On the other hand, elite control is not complete, fully coherent, or one way. The elites do not only express and formulate their own beliefs, opinions, and attitudes, nor do they simply legitimate their own interests. In order to keep control, at least in a more or less democratic social structure, there must at least be an illusion of bottom-up monitoring, and this will also be done—partly—through the media, and mostly by the elite who purport to speak "for the people." Because ethnic prejudices are already, historically and culturally, widespread in society, and the negative consensus well known, the sociopolitical elite also knows what discriminatory actions or opinions are not likely to be met with massive opposition of the (White) dominant group. In other words, part of their discourse may simply presuppose existing prejudices, and thus will be more persuasive in the defense or justification of opinions and actions based on them. Only the law, some dominant norms (e.g., those of apparent antiracism), and the possible reactions of the minority groups themselves, will keep their decisions and discourse within previously set, but expandable boundaries. Indeed, the political elite will constantly check "how far it can go," also when ethnic affairs are involved. It follows that the role of preformulators of ethnic attitudes played by several elites leaves considerable freedom in the control of the style and contents of (mass-mediated) ethnic discourse, but that there is implicit bottom-up feedback through occasional mass-mediated "voices of the people." In general, this feedback has a negative orientation, however, and may thus

be used to legitimate discriminatory policies. Only occasionally, wellorganized action or pressure, especially by large ethnic minority groups, may have some positive feedback control on such policies or at least on the discursive strategies of their public presentation. Therefore, the sociopolitical elite will make sure that its policy discourses will appear nondiscriminatory. This may be done by presenting policies as having general application, even when their actual (negative) consequences particularly affect minority groups. At the same time, these policies must be presented to the (White) majority group as being "fair" (for the majority), which allows various forms of implicit discrimination.

It should be added finally that the various elite groups mentioned aboye are not always unified, nor do they always pursue the same goals or interests. Their ideology and practices are not sustained by intentional policies and close collaboration. Indeed, there is no "conspiracy;' and there may also be difference and variation. There are also smaller elites who actively oppose more conservative and racist elites. However, they may, on each side, be located at the fringes of, or outside the consensual spectrum, of which the reception can be defined in tercos of a "latitude of acceptance" The shared nature of the policies and discourses of the various elites within this broad consensus, thus, is not planned but derives from a shared system of general norms, values, and the attitudes and ideologies based on them. Such a common basis allows substantial variation in more specific opinions, and at the same time guarantees their overall coherence. For instance, the dominant elite consensus in our societies is that (overt, blatant) racist talk, opinions, and action are unacceptable. Yet, on the other hand, the subtle racist nature of this consensus shows in its focused rejection of clearly antiracist positions, and by its lack of concerted policies and legal action against prejudice and discrimination. Racism in that case is reduced to its radical, extreme, and incidental (personal) forms, whereas structural racism is systematically denied, especially when it is also attributed to the elites themselves.

An Example: The Tamil "Invasion"

To give a concrete example of the role of the elites in the preformulation of ethnic prejudice, we may briefly examine the case of a group of Tamils seeking refuge in the Netherlands in the spring of 1985. This case is particularly enlightening because the Dutch population at large untiL+he end of 1984 had practically no knowledge about the Tamil minority u Sri Lanka. Hence, although there is a generalized negative attitude against (Black) people from Third World

countries, especially when they immigrate as a group, there were no specific prejudiced opinions against this group in particular. Also, the group of about 3000 young men was too small to be known through everyday observation and interaction. In other words, what people knew about Tamils was almost entirely derived from media discourse. This is confirmed by interviews we conducted in the spring of that same year, in which Tamils were brought up spontaneously by several interviewees. Media discourse was in turn only based on various forms of official discourse, and later on independent investigative reporting. In other words, what became publicly known about Tamils in early 1985 was exclusively derived from elite discourses (and) through media reproduction.

Our analysis of the coverage in the Dutch national press of the immigration of Tamils shows that both contents and style were conducive to the formation of a cognitive "Tamil"-model that rather closely exemplifies more general prejudices against minorities in the Netherlands. Politicians, the judiciary, the police, the welfare organizations, city councils, diplomats, academics, and, of course, journalists thernselves actively participated in coverage and a "public discussion" that negatively influenced a wider consensus from the outset. This enabled the sociopolitical elites to use this same consensus to legitimate their negative policies against the Tamils and their refugee status. Some of the first Tamils were sent back to Sri Lanka, or to West Germany, through which they had reached the Netherlands. Others are waiting anxiously on a simple bed-and-breakfast scheme (instead of the normal welfare allowance) for the political and legal decisions that will grant or refuse them refugee status. In the summer of 1985, the first (negative) decisions about the applications for refugee status were made for some 100 Tamils. Let us summarize some of the major tenets of the mass-mediated discourses that, sometimes intentionally, helped construct this negative consensus and its concrete discriminatory consequences.

Our observations are based on initial analyses of some 250 newspaper articles published in the vine newspapers of the Dutch national press during the first four months of 1985. Further analysis of these data will be reported elsewhere (van Dijk, 1987b, Ch. 4). Here we focus on the specific role of the elite in the discursive production of ethnic beliefs and attitudes.

Numbers

The first news reports about the immigration of Tamils focused on the numbers of the immigrants. For a new ethnic or immigrant group to become publicly and politically salient, it is important that we know "how many" there are. Although at first only a few carne across the easy crossings of the German border (after hay-

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ing flown into East Berlin, and crossed to West Berlin), the newspapers began to "count." As is well known from news analysis, such numbers have specific functions. They are seldom correct (or later corrected), as the large variation among newspapers shows, but function as rhetorical signals for professional objectivity and precision. They are the symbols of truth. At the same time, the repeated strategy of giving "per day" or "per week" estimates suggests a strongly cumulative effect, which has negative implications, especially when minority immigration is involved. This allows—and did result in—conclusions about the number of immigrants who would come "if this trend would continue." Although the absolute numbers were small, headlines that soon mentíoned "thousands" thus also signaled "massive" immigration of poor, Black, Third World people. This information nicely fits the prejudice schema category, which also organizes opinions such as "Our country is overpopulated," or "We cannot have more people from abroad," which also applies to extant groups of "foreigners." Instead of playing down the seriousness of the absolute numbers, for instance, by comparing them to numbers of other groups who were accepted more easily (Polish and Vietnamese refugees, coming from communist countries), the press emphasized these numbers and by this strategy alone could trigger a well-practiced and simple inference schema: Many immigrants cause many problems.

The "Flood" Metaphors

An even more effective and stereotypical way to emphasize numbers or masses are the frequently used "flood" metaphors. Especially in the headlines and leads, the Tamils are said to come in streams or waves, they flood or even invade the country:

(1)During the past few weeks Western Europe is flooded by thousands of Tamil refugees (Vrije Volk, 12-5-84).

(2)Stream of Tamils can hardly be absorbed (Volkskrant, 1-22-85).

(3)State police investigates Tamil invasion (Telegraaf, 3-2-85).

(4)Emergency after Tamil tide (Vrije Volk, 3-20-85).

The negative connotations of such metaphors hardly need comment. Obviously, the immigration is categorized as a natural disaster, and the Tamils are thus dehumanized. Also, tidal waves are a threat to the country and its population, which might "drown." The suggested inference, especially in the Netherlands (with its long tradition of fights against the sea, and its continuous attention for dams and dykes being built against it), is that policies should be enacted that should "stop" such a flood.