прагматика и медиа дискурс / Teun A van Dijk - Ideology

others. It is here that consent and consensus play a fundamental role in the exercise of power and the reproduction of ideologies that support such power. Obviously, those who have persuasive, ideological or discursive power, also usually have the coercive powers to take care of those who woñ t comply with the directions of symbolic power. Economic and physical means may then be applied where less blatant power means fail.

Although the notions of power and domination seem to be used as synonyms aboye, I use them in a different sense. Since domination implies involuntary inequality, I reserve it as a shorthand for abuse ofpower. This also implies that I doñ t use power only in a negative sense: power may be consensual and beneficial, as is the case in situations where groups elect their leaders and temporarily accord special power to them. Domination, then, presupposes power and deviance from general or universal ethical principies, that defines abuse, for instance the exercise of social power in oné s personal interest, hurting other people, and so on. Both power and domination, as relations between groups, need to be based on ideologies in order for such relations to be reproduced in everyday life and the mundane practices of group members.

This may of course involve all kinds of variation, gradual differences between power and counter-power, and the more or less harsh or soft exercise of power, or the more or less tough resistance or compliance by the dominated. It is in this more contextualized way that power is sometimes said to be 'everywheré . 4 There would be no dominant groups if power were not exercised, sometimes very subtly, through everyday practices. Moreover, there are (members of) dominated groups who comply, and dissident dominant group members who show solidarity with the underdog. Despite these variations and the uneven exercise or distribution of domination and resistance, we may assume that, at a higher level of analysis, relations of domination between whole groups exist, and that ideologies control these relations and their everyday implementation.

Within this framework, then, we first need to examine the role of ideologies in the reproduction of power and dominance. Indeed, one of the core notions of classical ideology analysis and critique has always been that ideologies are developed and applied as legitimation for the abuse of power (domination) and its resulting social inequality.

In my analysis I have started from the assumption that ideologies are systems of basic principies that are socially shared by groups. Such ideologies have a number of cognitive and social functions, including the maintenance of group cohesion and solidarity, as well as the protection (or acquisition) of scarce social resources. In sum, socially, ideologies are developed in order to make sure that group members think, believe and act in such a way that their actions are in the interests of themselves and the group as a whole. Such a 'co-ordinative' social function is in the interest of the group in its relationships with other groups.

If a group is in a dominant relationship with respect to other groups, for instance on account of its privileged access to social resources, ideologies

have the double function of maintaining or confirming the status quo, and at the same time of providing the basic cognitive framework for argumenta to persuade its own members as well as others that this situation is Juñ ,

natural', God-given, or otherwise legitimate.

Thus, priority in employment and housing for 'our own' people may thus be legitimated by the racist principie of ethnic or racial superiority, by the commonsensé nationalist principie that 'our people' should of course have priority over newcomers, or by the opportunistic socio-economic reason that there is a shortage of houses and jobs, and that 'objective' criteria must be applied for 'fair' decisions, and that those who come last have fewer rights

than those who were already

Thus, we see how power and domination, as a specific form of inter-group relation and societal structure, may be reproduced by various ideologies (at the socio-cognitive level) and by the social practices (at the microsocial level of situations) that'implement' such ideologies. Whether these social practices already existed before they were legitimated by an ideology, or whether they only can be thus organized because of an ideology, may be a moot point in practice, asking the proverbial chicken and egg question. Rather, we would say that the dynamics of the interplay of cognition and social practice shows that they mutually constitute each other in a 'dialectical' process.

Here power abuse is sometimes ideologically justified afterwards, but at the same time (socially or historically acquired) negative attitudes against others may already exist in order for power abuse to be exercised in the first place.

The primacy of ideology over action

Theoretically and historically, the question of the primacy of ideology over action (or vice versa) is less frivolous. It has for instance been asked in relation to the system of slavery, and its abolition: were racist ideologies (e.g. about the attributed inferiority of Africans) invented to legitimate slavery and colonialism, or could Africans be enslaved in the first place only because they were already seen as inferior to Europeans?

Although this is not the place to answer such questions, a socio-cognitive theory of ideology would opt for the latter suggestion — enslavement presupposes knowledge and opinions about peoples that may be legitimately (ethically, etc.) enslaved: for instance non-Christians, people from a different continent or country, people with a different appearance, or simply people that were conquered by 'lis', as the history of slavery (also of others than Africans) has shown. These criteria of difference were generally associated with negative opinions about the others, or at least with feelings of superiority of the own group. Hence, engaging in enslavement already presupposes some kind of negative attitude about the outgroup, which allowed slave-traders and slave-owners to legitimately do what they did, for example without being sanctioned by the state or the Church. If not, they

could simply — and probably more cheaply — have enslaved people of their own group, namely, the poor, as was the system of capitalistic exploitation that followed the slave system or as happened with indentured whites. However, precisely because of increasing ethical (and at the same time economic) argumenta against slavery, it became necessary to farther develop the ideological system that legitimated slavery. Various pseudo-scientific reasons, for example, about the differences between the 'mes' were adduced as foundations for such ideologies, thus giving rise to more specific and explicit racist ideologies, where earlier, at least until the eighteenth century, the inferiority and hence 'enslavability' of the others was simply taken for granted — and hence ideologically presupposed. 5

My point here is merely that systems of social practices of groups (and not incidental actions of individuals) tend to be oriented towards the interests of these groups, and such a co-ordination problem can only be solved if the group shares specific knowledge, attitudes, norms, values and ideologies in the first place. These may be very simple and elementary in the beginning, but without them social practices would be more or less haphazard and individual. Concerted action in favour of the group and at the same time for its members, thus, primarily presupposes shared social cognitions, and not the other way around.

Legitirnation based on such ideologies only becomes relevant when needed, that is, in contexts of opposition, critique and social struggle. They are social (discursive) social practices in their own right, and their absence does not imply absence of ideology, but only that in such a case the ideology may simply have been taken for granted.

Pure power abuse, thus, does not always need social (discursive) practices of legitirnation, but it always does need belief systems in order to coordinate the social practices that keep the system of domination intact. In the case of slavery and exploitation, thus, negative actitudes and ideologies about relevant outgroups are needed to subject outgroup members to the social practices of domination. As is the case with most complex social actions of groups, ideologies are also necessary as fundamental guidelines for the management of domination.

Of course, once systems of power and domination are already existing, the relationships between social practices, social relations of domination and inequality on the one hand, and attitudes, norms, values and ideologies on the other hand, will mutually sustain each other. Thus, slavery was abolished precisely for this double-edged reason: it did not pay (enough) anymore, while at the same time the ideological justification was successfully challenged by abolitionists and their supporters. In such complex social situations, causes and consequences, actions and minds, are difficult to keep separated. Yet, for purely 'psycho-logical' reasons, I assume that people cannot act rationally and purposefully withoút the appropriate social cognitions. At the level of the maintenance of groups, group interests and group relations, such cognitive conditions require the development of attitudes and ideologies.

These ideologies may themselves be sustained by (successful) social practices, but they are not only 'invented' as a consequence of such actions, for example as forms of post hoc justification. They may be acquired simply by discourse, communication or perception, much in the same way as the Europeans of over five hundred years ago 'knew' about Africans through tales, myths, histories, travelogues, and later through 'scientific' discourse. It is that complex, but essentially 'biased' — and later constantly updated — image that was at the basis of the social practices that led to the slave system, even if these were not the only social cognitions that informed such decisions: Of course also socio-economic, geographic, and other belief systems and conditions were involved in these decisions. Many other examples of dominance systems in society and their historical growth, change and demise may thus be explained also as a consequence (ánd not the cause) of developing or changing ideologies.

As I have shown aboye, even 'objective' socio-economic circumstances, as such, do not influence social actions directly, but only through their (mental) interpretation and representation. Thus, there are most certainly also powerful social and economic conditions that allowed or favoured the growing feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s, but it seems historically more correct to maintain that the major'causes' of that movement were ideological, and brought about by politicians, writers, academics, artists and other women (and some men) who advocated equal rights for women. This happened in a period in which also other forms of ideological change took place, such as the civil rights movement, decolonialization, and challenges to the authoritarian state.

This suggests that the relationships between power, dominance and ideologies need to be analysed carefully, and 1 already assumed that ideologies may not always (or even seldom) be Invented' post hoc to legitimate patterns of inequality and the social practices that constitute such inequality. Legitimation is usually discursive and often argumentative, and we saw that it may be especially required in specific social contexts, for example of opposition and struggle. However, such opposition itself logically follows the existence of domination, and domination is possible only with at least a minimum of shared social cognition, and hence by ideologies of dominant groups about dominated groups. That ideologies may change as a result of such opposition, and indeed as a consequence of the ideological debate that accompanies such resistance, is obvious, but again suggests that ideologies are more or less autonomous, and may be changing as a consequence of other ideologies and their manifestations in public discourse, and not (always) as a consequence of changing social practices.

Indeed, traditional systems of power were usually coercive, that is, based in physical action control, violence, military power, or the practices of the secret police or strongmen. On the other hand much 'modem' power is persuasive, discursive and (hence) ideological. Dominant groups no longer maintain their position only by force or even threats of force (the latter already being forms of discourse), but by complex systems of discourse and

ideologies that make (most members of) dominated groups believe or accept that domination is justified (as in democratic systems), natural (as in gender and racial domination) or inevitable (as is the case for the socio-economic grounds and the logic' of the market).

As soon as some and especially many members of dominated groups no longer accept such ideological grounds, and have acquired the symbolic means to propagate counter-ideologies and the material conditions to act upon such counter-ideologies, ideological change will be inevitable, and changes in social practices will (sometimes very slowly) follow. Indeed, many men will today accept at least some basic tenets of feminist ideologies according to which women and men are equal and should be treated equally, but it is well known that their social practices do not yet always meet the precepts of this new gender ideology. That men are aware of such changing ideologies is frequently apparent from their discourses, for example in disclaimers such as 'We do not discriminate against women, but.. or have tried to find a woman, but. .'. That is, disclaimers of this nature, to which we shall be coming back in the next part of this study, are typical expressions of the contradictions, if not the moral dilemmas, between official or dominant ideologies and actual practices, talk and text. At the same time, the disclaimers obviously function as moves in face-keeping strategies of positive self-presentation.

In sum, despite the complexities of the (sometimes mutual) relations between ideologies, power and domination, the theoretical framework assumes that, historically and theoretically, ideas precede actions, and (at least simple) ideologies precede the systems of social practices that define domination. But, once the system of domination is in place, and especially when it is being challenged, then ideologies may well be further developed to provide for the legitimation of the system. This does not imply, however, that ideologies only serve as systems for discursive legitimation, which would suggest a post hoc role of ideologies. More relevantly, ideologies monitor and organize group knowledge and attitudes and hence the beliefs that members need in order to construct the models controlling the actions that implement domination.

Practices of power abuse, domination and oppression can be effective only when co-ordinated, when relevant model structures are socially shared

— and ideologies precisely serve that 'practical' goal. As soon as ingroup members need to be recruited and persuaded to share in the actions, against outgroup members, which they would not undertake against ingroup members (which by itself presupposes social norms and attitudes about what should or should not be done), these underlying ideologies may need to be discursively expressed and detailed even for 'internar use and the intragroup reproduction of power and dominance.

Dominance thus requires a fair amount of consensus as well as practical co-ordination, and ideologies are needed both for the maintenance of the relations of power with respect to the others, as well as for the maintenance of ingroup representations that allow such consensus to be reproduced in

everyday life — and to marginalize or punish deviants and dissidents that may threaten, as the 'enemy-within', the dominance of the ingroup. The anti-communist scare of Joe McCarthy was precisely designed to protect and maintain the anti-communist consensus and coherence of a country that represented itself as besieged by World Communism.

This suggests that pattems of power and domination and their underlying ideologies also apply within the group itself, namely, between the elites and the rest, between the leaders and the led, between the thinkers and the doers, a point that needs to be discussed separately later. This will also allow us to reflect about who actually 'invents' the ideologies shared by groups, and whether ideologies are spontaneous popular constructions, or rather those of ideologues or intellectuals who conceive of them first.

Another point to be dealt with (again) in this framework is the wellknown question whether ideologies are essentially associated with domination and dominant groups, or whether we need a more general notion of ideology for any kind of social group in a specific social position, including that of resistance.

Conflict and struggle

Domination usually leads to resistance and struggle to overcome inequality and oppression. It is common practice in the study of ideology to associate ideologies with domination and its legitimation. I proposed that also resistance needs a socio-cognitive basis in terms of group-relevant values, principies, ideologies and its more specific knowledge and attitudes. In the same way as the exercise and co-ordination of power abuse needs an ideológical basis, also group-intemal solidarity and inter-group resistance needs to be ideologically organized. Whereas it may be in the interests of a dominant group to conceal their power abuse and to hide the forms of

quafity that are its consequences, dissidents and opponents may be specifically interested in uncovering and exposing domination and inequality, and to manifest and legitímate as 'juse their own, counter, ideologies. Indeed, that was the point of the communist 'manifestó , as it was for many other manifestos and declarations (like that of the various declarations of human

rights) in the first place.

From a critical point of view, this may well imply that dominant groups favour falsehood, deceit and manipulation, and that dominated groups advocate truth, openness and rational or emotional persuasion, that is, goals with which also scholars may want to show agreement. Since also most scholars define themselves (ideologically) as people who want to describe objectively' the real social relations involved, their interest may in this respect sometimes be consistent with the subjective, self-serving truths of oppositional groups. However, since their ideologies of class and profession may at the same time be inconsistent with the interests and the demands of the poor, the left, the women, or the minorities, most (middle-class, white,

male, etc.) scholars at the same time prefer to ignore such demands and to strategically look elsewhere and do their 'objective' research on lessthreatening topics.

Hence the insistente on (scientific) truth in much oppositional ideologies and critical studies of ideology. We also know, however, that in many social, economic, political and ideological conflicts, the distinction between truth and falsity is not that clearcut. This and many other theoretical reasons suggest that it is more adequate to adopt a general concept of ideology, and to assume that ideologies by definition represent the interests of a specific social group, whether or not (in our view as observers, critics or participants) the group's beliefs are based on true social analysis, justified claims or legitimate action.

If ideologies represent group interests, and if conflicting interests also imply social conflict of various kinds, it seems logical to assume that ideologies by definition imply conflict. For fundamental group relations such as those of class, gender and ethnicity, this seems hardly controversial: the empirical facts of the international class struggle, the womeñ s movement and the civil rights movements, hardly allow an other conclusion. Conflicts of interests here are so fundamental that open social conflict is a matter of everyday life, and much of this conflict is not only about socio-economic interests, but also about symbolic, ideological ones.

But in the same way as I asked before whether all social groups have ideologies, I should now ask whether all social conflicts between groups are ideological, and whether all ideological differences always lead to social conflict. Theoretically, groups may have different and even conflicting ideologies, but have learned to live with these in relative social peace. Indeed, there may be higher-order goals and interests that prevent social conflict between two groups. This is not merely a question of principle, but also an empirical matter.

Thus, whereas in some societies or cultures, religious differences may be the basis of acrimonious, open conflict (as in Northern Ireland or India), in others mutual religious tolerance may be prevalent. Similar examples may be given about linguistic or other cultural conflicts. Of course, such an empirical question may hinge on the definition of the very notion of conflict. If conflict also includes mere differences of opinion and debate, then virtually all ideological differences will be conflictual. However, if we limit conflicts to any form of dominante, to one-sided or mutual discrimination or other social practices in which ingroup members are favoured over outgroup members in social interaction, then we have a more specific notion of conflict that may be relevant for a more selective use of the combination of ideology and conflict.

It is in this more restricted sense, then, that we might maintain that ideological differences do not necessarily lead to open social conflict. Professors and students, doctors and patients, lawyers and clients, different political groups or parties, non-governmental organizations and action groups may all have different and inconsistent or even conflicting interests

1

and ideologies without therefore exhibiting such conflict in forms of discriminatory or oppressive practices directed against outgroup members. In other words, whereas most social conflicts and struggle presuppose ideological conflicts (especially over scarce resources), the opposite is not trae — not all ideological conflicts imply struggle and social conflict. Ideologies may incite to self-serving group actions, but laves, norms, agreements or other, non-ideological self-interests, may prohibit open conflict. Sometimes social peace and co-operation may be the prevailing, also self-serving criterion over sectarian or ideologically based open conflict. In that case, the ideological struggle may be transferred to the level of mutual discursive persuasion, negotiation and consensus policies.

Competition

Indeed, one form of ideological conflict that need not imply social conflict may be based on inter-group competition. Different groups may have the same goal, but want to realize it with different means. Peace, equality, human rights, the equal distribution of wealth, and so on, may be ultimate goals that countless groups and movements, with different ideologies, may want to achieve in different ways. Such groups, trying to realize the same goals, or vying for the same social resources, may just be competitive and not be in open conflict with each other. Indeed, this is the very ideal (idealistic and ideological) principle of liberal market philosophies.

The question may then be raised again: does social competition require ideological foundations, given the differences of goals or interests, and vice versa, do all ideological differences at least imply some forro of competition? I think the first question should be answered negatively. First, because competition is not necessarily social and group-based, but may also be interpersonal, and, second, because competition may also exist between groups with the same ideology, as would typically be the case for different companies in the same social domain vying for the same customers. Differences here need not be 'deeply' ideological, but rather practical and strategic, that is, different ways of reaching the same goal and following the same principies.

On the other hand, competition between different political parties during an election, or between two different ecological groups, may well be based on ideological conflicts. This suggests that the second question may well be answered positively: ideological differences between groups usually imply competition, if only when vying for membership and the recruitment of new members, or the persuasion of outsiders. More common is of course the competition for scarce social resources, such as residence, income, housing and welfare on the other hand, and non-material resources such as knowledge, education, esteem and status, on the other. Thus, struggle and open conflict, while based on conflicting interests, usually implies competition, but not vice versa.

Co-operation

We may make a foral theoretical step and ask whether also inter-group relations of co-operation may be ideologically based. This certainly seems to be the case. Two groups or organizations may have different ideologies (e.g. Catholics and Muslims), but may well co-operate to realize a common goal, and jointly acquire or defend shared interests (e.g. support for religious activities and freedoms, or the prohibition of abortion). Ideological opponents may thus become allies in pursuing the realization of the same goals. But whereas open conflict and struggle may need ideological foundation as such, especially in categorizing the beliefs about own group position and the relations with other groups, co-operation as such does not need ideological support. One common goal or one important attitude or opinion may be enough to organize the joint accomplishment of social action.

Conclusion

From this discussion it may be concluded that inter-group relations are generally fundamental in the development and support of ideologies, and conversely that ideologies are at the basis of the social practices that implement such group relations. Conflicts of class,'racé and gender thus pitch dominant groups against (usually) minority groups or groups with less power. These conflicts are usually about access and control over material or symbolic resources. Other conflicts, as well as competition and co-operation between groups, exist but do not seem to be ideological, but rather practical, for example when groups engage in different ways to separately or jointly realize a common or a related goal. Conversely, although ideologies often imply struggle and conflict, this implication does not always hold: ideologies that are in conflict do not necessarily lead to, or emerge from, social struggle and conflict, but may also be needed to manage diversity.

Who 'invents' ideologies?

In order to complete the picture of the social basis and dimensions of ideologies, we should now ask where ideologies 'come from' in the first place. Who, indeed, Invents' ideologies? Or do they arise and develop spontaneously in a group, as a form of jointly produced social cognition that has no specific authorship, as would be the case for a natural language?

Many ideologies seem to emerge from large groups of people, if not from the 'masses'. Ecologist, feminist, socialist, nationalist or capitalist ideologies are examples of ideologies that are shared and carried by many people, often across national boundaries and continente. That these should be 'invented' by specific individuals, or by a small group of Ideologues', thus seems to be counter to the basic conception of ideologies as shared, social belief systems.

One question, often formulated in political psychology, is that it remains to be seen whether such large groups of people do indeed have a more or less explicit or articulated ideology in the first place. They may share a few general principles and goals, but not a 'complete' ideology. Such more detailed and explicit ideologies are then typically attributed to the leaders, the intellectuals, the elites or indeed the 'ideologues' of such groups.'

As is the case for social and personal differences of knowledge, we may expect variations of attitudes and ideologies within the same group. Experts have access to more and more varied forms of discourse, 2 may communicate more often and more explicitly about the ideologies of their group, and may therefore develop more detailed and more 'articulate' ideological systems. They may be more familiar with ideological arguments against their ideological opinions, and may therefore become more proficient in ideological counter-arguments, which again may contribute to more detailed attitudes and ideologies. In other words, explicit ideological practices as well as ideological discourses are systematically related to ideologies, which mutually may facilitate each other. Leaders, intellectuals and other'ideologues' of a group typically may be expected to play such roles, especially because of their privileged access to public discourse, and because of their tasks to lead a group, co-ordinate its actions, and make sure that its goals are realized and its interests protected.

At the same time, there is no clear-cut distinction between such 'ideologues' and the other members of a group. Any member who is more or less