прагматика и медиа дискурс / Teun A van Dijk - Ideology

courts, autonomy of the universities, as well as freedom of information and science, are well-known elements of the basic ideological beliefs that reflect such interests. Also for these reasons, membership is rather strictly regulated; the number of people having access to these resources should be kept fairly small, so as to maintain the economic value of professional services and expertise. Most professionals oppose lowering standards' or 'mass universities' and insist on a self-regulated threshold of access, such as special exams, in-house training or specialization. Successful reproduction of the group through the protection of these special interests thus also needs to be articulated in various professional ideologies, for instance about the importance, relevance or the functions of these professions (serving justice, health care, knowledge and education, or informing the public). Similarly, in order to protect such interests, the activities of the professional may also internally be judged on the basis of ideological values (justice, truth, reliability, fairness, etc.)."

Groups and their membership may be constituted also on the basis of their social goals, usually in relation to their norms and values, as is typically the case for various social movements. Feminists thus form a group typically on the basis of their goal to end male domination and gender inequality. The essential values involved in their activities for the realization of that goal are, for example equality, independence and autonomy. The same is true for socialists, environmentalists, human rights activists and similar action or advocacy groups, on the one hand, and for nationalists, racists, and antiabortionists, on the other hand. Membership criteria in Chis case will therefore be personal choice, ideological alignment and recognized activities that contribute to the realization of the common goal. As is the case for other groups, ideologies of these goal-defined groups reflect their main interests, such as gender equality or ethnic autonomy. At a higher level of abstraction, the same membership criteria and ideological development apply to ideological groups, such as conservatives and liberals. In Chis case, the main membership criterion is precisely the ideology itself. 13

Although most groups and their identity are defined in terms of their relations to other groups (outgroups), some groups are specifically defined in terms of the social position of their members within the group. This is the case for leaders, managers, chiefs and in general the elites, in relation to subordinates, underlings, ordinary people, the masses, citizens, the 'people' and so on. That is, apart from hierarchical position, their main resource is power. Membership conditions and criteria may in this case be appointment, election and self-selection. Ideologies of such groups should be primarily articulated in the interest of the reproduction and the legitimation of their crucial resource, namelr, power, as is typically the case for leading politicians and managers!

Although not complete, this categorization of various groups and their membership criteria shows that there is a close interplay between ideological categories and the essential dimensions of social access, membership,

activities, goals and resources of groups. Ideological structures have precisely been postulated as the cognitive reconstruction of the main social conditions for the existence and reproduction of various social groups. In other words, the essential conditions of existence, organization, reproduction and the social practices of groups and their members have both social dimensions and mental ones. Here, ideologies and groups mutually constitute each other. No group can socially exist and act without a group identity and shared ideological behefs of its members. Conversely, no group ideology will develop unless collectivities of people start to act, co-ordinate and organize as a group. Indeed, a large part of the social practices of many groups, and especially of teaching, communication and discourse, is precisely geared towards the development of a common ideology.

In sum, in rather general terms, social groups and their members may be distinguished by

•who they are, as defined by more or less permanent characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity, caste, class, age, religion, language or origin;

•what they do, as is the case for professionals;

•what they want, as is typically the case for advocacy groups;

•what they believe, as is true for advocacy groups, as well as for religious and ideological groups such as conservatives and progressives;

•where they stand, as for all groups defined in tercos of social position and their relations to other groups;

•what they have or don 't have, as for all groups whose identity is based primarily on the special access or lack of access to social (material or symbolic) resources, as is the case for the rich and the poor, the employed and the unemployed, the homeless and the home-owners the famous and the infamous, the educated and the non-educated, the intellectuals and the non-intellectuals, and so on.

The categories that define this typology of groups are intentionally the same as those that form ideological schemata (see Chapter 5). That is, our approach precisely emphasizes the mutual constitution of the social and the cognitive dimensions of groups. Most social criteria discussed aboye for the constitution of social groups can thus be articulated in terms of categories that also organize the social cognitions shared by group members.

Ideologies without groups?

The assumption of the mutual constitution of groups and their ideologies raises an important final question: are groups necessary as the 'social basis' of ideologies, or would it be more appropriate, at least in some cases, to allow ideologies to 'exist' more independently? There can be litde doubt that there are collectivities of social actors that can be defined in terms of nonideological social conditions, as is the case for socio-economically defined groups (classes) or professions. That such groups also need to share social

beliefs and ideologies in order to co-ordinate the actions of their members and to reproduce thernselves, has been shown aboye.

But what about groups of which membership is much more fuzzy and primarily ideological, such as the feminist movement or the peace movement? Can we simply say that afi 'members' of the feminist movements are feminists, and that those who are not members are not feminists? What about women who share some tenets of feminism, but not others, or those wornen who do share many ferninist propositions, but do not consider themselves feminists? Is the feminist movement a well-defined group in the first place? Or should it be defined in tercos of a fuzzy set, in which some wornen may be 'more or less' members, depending on the amount of their ferninist beliefs, or their degree of identification? Or should we use some version of prototype theory and distinguish between more or less prototypical feminists? ' S

In other words, especially for social movements that have a more individualistic orientation, it might not be an already existing group which has' an ideology, or an ideology that requires a group, but individual social members who adopt, to a greater or les ser degree, ideas of an ideology. Such an ideology would then rather have the status of any other system of ideas, such as a philosophy or a theory, and could have been developed by one or more individuals, whether or not it is being shared or adopted by many people or a collectivity of social actors.

Such a more individualist approach to certain ideologies would at least avoid the theoretical problems associated with the definition of ideological groups as indicated aboye. It would account, by definition, for the vast individual differences in the adherence to certain ideological propositions, and for a more dynamic process of ideological change and renewal. It would emphasize peoplé s individual decisions in adopting ideology fragments, and explain the personal variation in the enactment of ideologies in everyday social practices. We would not peed to worry whether a conservative ideology, for instance, is shared by a group, but may simply say that given such an ideology as a socio-historical phenomenon individual social members may espouse one or more of its tenets, but may reject others.

In this framework, people do not become all-or-none members of, for example, the 'club of conservatives', but simply use (fragments of) a set of beliefs as a resource in the organization of their own knowledge and opinions and the social practices based on these. Ideologies of this kind would be like 'personal organizers' rather than social (group) organizers. Indeed, this approach would also account for the seemingly curious situation, signalled aboye, that we may have ideologies that have no 'members', or rather adherents, at all, as we also have abolished religions or theories. Ontologically, ideologies like this would only exist as a form of (possibly specialized) historical knowledge, or expressed historical documents or treatises, but no one would still lelieve in' them.

These argumenta for a more individualistic approach to (at least some types of) ideology are quite persuasive. They again suggest that an exclusively sociological definition of ideologies is incomplete. The processes as

described are fully accounted for in the cognitive theories presented in Part I. Indeed, personal beliefs, experiences and practices have been shown to be associated with specific or general mental models, as well as by other representations in episodic memory. Individual social actors may thus flexibly adopt and personally integrate whatever 'ideas' there are available in the public domain They may for the same reason more or less identify with one or more ideologies or social movements, or may recombine elements from several ideologies. Women may experience and thus interpret male practices as women, and bring to bear shared social representations of women as a category, but not necessarily identify with feminism as a social movement or interpret their experiences in tercos of a feminist ideology. The same is probably true for many religions, political convictions, lifestyle conceptions, and on any other system of attitudes (e.g. about abortion, nuclear energy, or the environment).

Paying due allowance to this individual dimension of ideology, or rather of the 'uses' of ideology, however, does not mean that the social, collective dimension can be simply dispensed with, for the many reasons given throughout this book. Thus, the feminist and the peace movement do not merely consist of sets of like-minded individuals. First of all, at the social side, there is social interaction between such individuals, and some of there interactions are engaged in as a consequence of, or precisely as a condition of, sharing specific beliefs, that is, by social actors as lelievers'. Second, social movements are also defined in tercos of collective actions, such as demonstrations or strikes. Third, they have many forros of organization and institutionalization; they have leaders, programrnes, socio-economic resources, and so on. That is, they may have all the characteristics that define a group.

What a theory of ideology needs to explain, then, is precisely the dynamics that relate social members to ideologies and to the collectivities that are constituted by shared experiences, beliefs and ideologies. We need to know how individual membership, identification, allegiance, solidarity and active participation are being defined in relation to such a collectivity and its organization. It should be examined how groups may grow and decay as a result of the actions and participation of individuals. That ideological 'groups' may be quite loose or fuzzy in their definition, and their membership or adherence flexibly defined in tercos of the interplay between personal beliefs and socially shared beliefs, does not mean that we can dispense with the social dimension of ideologies in terms of groups or similar collectivities. It is this interface between the individual and the group that is one of the theoretical problems that need to be examined in a theory of ideology.

Racist groups

This dilemma about ideologies and their relationships to groups and individuals is particular clear in the study of racism. Indeed, which 'group' has a

racist ideology? It would be easiest call this group the 'racists'. However, the delimitation of that group would require the definition that racists are all people who share a racist ideology, but, if not circular, this would be rather trivial. Moreover, as we have seen aboye, many people may share some social opinions (prejudices) based on racist ideologies, but need not share a fully fledged racist ideology.

One could also define 'racists' in terms of their organizations, for example by identifying them as members of racist organizations, but the circularity or triviality would in that case also hold for the definition of such organizations. Moreover, it is obvious that there are more 'racist people' than people who are members of racist parties or organizations.

Another possibility would be to identify the group with all white (European) people. But that is obviously inadequate if we assume that racism is not an inherent or essential property of white Europeans. Indeed, some whites share an explicitly anti-racist ideology, whereas some members of minority groups may support racist. ideologies.

Moreover, we have already seen that it is pointless to distinguish sharply between those (whites) who are racists and those who are not. Rather, we must assume that elements of racist ideologies and attitudes are distributed unevenly over the white group: sorne people will only share sorne or moderate racist beliefs, whereas others have many and blatant racist beliefs. Indeed, the same is true for anti-racist ideologies.

Instead of distinguishing between racists, non-racists or anti-racists, therefore, it is much more adequate to speak of racistpractices. Practices may then be called 'racist' if they contribute, more or less directly, to ethnic or racial inequality. Racist practices (and not just any unethical or unacceptable activity) are such also because of underlying opinions, attitudes and ideologies, for instance those that imply any forro of non-egalitarian relationships between dominant and dominated ethnic groups.

The example of racism shows that the association of ideologies with social groups is not a straightforward matter. We might say that managers, joumalists or other more or less easily definable groups share a professional, occupational or other ideology. But other categories and groups are much less well defined, even if they share an ideology, or especially if all that defines them is their ideology and the social practices derived from them. The same is true for feminists, environmentalists, and more generally for ideological groups, such as progressives, liberals or conservatives. They forro 'groups' of a very different nature than for instance a specific action group or profession, and are much more distributed over other groups, both socially, regionally and internationally. Sometimes they are órganized, as in liberal or conservative political parties, sometimes they forro sects or churches, and sometimes also an international movement, as is true for antiabortionists or environmentalists.

Most people who have racist beliefs and act and speak accordingly, will vehemently deny that they are racists. That label is officially sanctioned as a negative qualification, as is that of being a bigot or intolerant in societies

where lolerance', 'equality' and 'democracy' are dominant official (ideological) values.' Hence racism is a typical example of an ideology applying to a group as it is defined by others.

The provisional conclusion from this brief analysis must be that the notion of group needs to be taken in a broad sense in order to be able to associate ideologies with groups. Crucial, as we have seen, are

1 the development and sharing of social representations;

2 identification of members with the group;

3 the defence of specific resources (such as citizenship or equal rights in all domains);

4 relations to other groups (e.g. resentment against immigrants);

5 specific activities (such as discrimination) and at least a vaguely shared goal (segregation, immigration restriction, etc.).

Social members who identify with these criteria are, by definition, group members, but the boundaries of the group are ill-defined. As is true for cognitive category theories of prototypes, thus, we may have more or less prototypical 'racists' and 'anti-racists'. Skinheads who beat up Turkish women only because they are Turkish are more typical for the commonsense notion of racists than are cabinet ministers advocating immigration restrictions or professors who have less confidence in black female PhD candidates than in white male ones.

These examples again show that ideologies as well as social groups and social relations (and their selfand other-perception) are all social constructs, which both have cognitive and social (societal) conditions and consequences. The distinction between 'cognition' and 'society' in this case becomes purely analytical and theoretical. In the everyday life of group members who participate in a group and its ideology, these cognitive and social conditions and criteria are inextricably interwoven — one may (socially) 'be' a Christian simply by 'defining' oneself as such.

Very often actions and interactions are required if one is to socially display or prove oné s membership. However, in that case the sociocognitive definition or construction also applies to these actions themselves. Doing or saying something also needs to be (mentally) planned or interpreted'as' feminist, and will not 'inherently' be so. As we have seen already in the chapter on identity (Chapter 12), while acting'as a group member' it is not merely the action itself that identifies a member, but rather the specific meaning attached to that action. Hitting someone over the head may simply be categorized as an aggressive, norm-violating action. However, it becomes interpreted as a racist act only when the participants in this event are members of specific groups, and if the aggressor is assumed to act on the basis of such group membership, for example as sharing specific racist attitudes.

Against cognitivist or interactionist reduction, these arguments further emphasize the fact that one cannot escape either the cognitive or the social dimensions of ideologies, groups and social reality. Both dimensions or

levels are analytically needed to adequately describe and explain the social 'facts' or rather the socio-cognitive constructs of society, groups and their members.

Inclusion and exclusion

The example of racism shows another important feature of the relations between ideology and group membership, namely, the social and cognitive principies and strategies of inclusion and exclusion. Racist ideologies and practices basically aim at keeping Others down and especially out: out of our' country, 'our' city, 'our' neighbourhood, 'our' street, 'our' family, our' jobs and 'our' houses. If some limited forro of admission is accepted, then only in a lower position: in another (worse) part of town, in worse housing, worse jobs and so on. Superiority may be denied as the leading value involved, for example because of official democratic and egalitarian values. But the implication is always that We, Our Group are self-assigned a better or higher position and that such a position is deserved and can hence be justified (Ye were here first', etc.). These ideological principies of superiority and inferiority may of course be combined with others, such as those that regulate competition over scarce resources, so that racism typically gets worse in times of an economic recession or other social and

economic pressures on the ingroup.

As we have seen for the discussion of membership, groups thus share beliefs and practices that regulate inclusion and exclusion. Inclusion may be made difficult, as is the case for complex initiation rites, or it may be made easy, as long as the new members identify with the group. Other groups eagerly go out to recruit new members, as is typically the case for religious groups and advocacy groups. Overall, we may assume that if groups have special privileges, that is, preferential access to highly desirable or even necessary resources (freedom, housing, food, income, employment, etc.) also the strategies of exclusion will be more forceful. In this case, the stakes (the interests) being vied for are highest. Typical examples include political oppression, the forceful exclusion of 'illegar immigrants, or the discrimination of minorities on the labour market. The same is true when the poor are kept from virtually all resources of society, both the material ones (income, jobs) as well as the symbolic ones (education, status, respect, culture).

Inclusion and exclusion may also function in a more positive way, for instance in situations where ingroup solidarity is relevant in the resistance against domination. Blacks may have black-only organizations in order to organize against racism, and wornen may have women-only bars in order to have a place where they need not confront men. Being among 'one' s owñ in such situations may have a benevolent effect on self-consciousness, the organization of resistance or simply the reproduction of group beliefs through conversation. But, as is true for dominant groups and their ideologies, also in this case group formation and identity are closely linked to the sharing of common beliefs. Exclusion here may foster the development of an

ideology that allows group members to evaluate the beliefs and actions of others, both of the own group, as well as of one or various outgroups.

This informal discussion shows that the notion of group, and the principies and practices of identity and identification, inclusion and exclusion, access and acceptance, and many other social practices and processes are intimately linked to fundamental group ideologies. They involve representations of identity, about who We are and what They are, and especially about what is good for Us and what is not good for Us. Sharing exclusive or preferential access to scarce resources with others will generally not appear to be good for Us, unless people can be convinced that marginalization, discrimination and oppression of Them may eventually also be bad for Us. It may be bad for business (because good candidates or good business are excluded), bad for our moral standing (few people want to be called a sexist or a racist) and eventually bad for our self-esteem if we become convinced that our values, ideologies, morals or practices are inherently wrong. Group membership and its ideological basis, after all, are not only about power and domination, and not only to protect interests, but may also be a source of pride and pleasure. In the pages that follow, I examine some other features of these social dimensions of ideologies.

16

Group Relations

Position

Throughout the earlier chapters of this study, ideologies not only appear to be tied to more or less well-defined groups or movements, but also to various aspects of relationships between groups. One of the fundamental categories of the ideological schema therefore also focused on the position of the group in relation to other groups. Racist ideologies, as we have seen, are fundamentally based on distinctions being established by ingroups that simply 'prefer their own' or that feel themselves superior to outgroups, and manifest themselves in all social forms of problematization, marginalization or exclusion of the others.

Journalists, as a group, develop professional ideologies primarily in relation to other elites and other power groups. Thus, they may emphasize the freedom of the press, oppose censorship, while on the other hand they will see themselves as the watchdogs of society in the service of the 'public' at large. Similarly, professors also define themselves as such in relation to their students, and doctors and lawyers with respect to their patients and clients. Sometimes these relationships will be more or less egalitarian, but competitive, in other situations the relationship may be hierarchical and dominant.

In many cases, various interests of our group may have to be defended or legitimated against others. And sine conflicts over scarce social resources may be the very core and function of the development of ideologies, group position and relations are the most direct social counterpart of ideological structures, as is most obvious in the well-krtown polarization between ingroups and outgroups. Indeed, some groups exist by virtue of their hierarchical or more powerful position, as is the case for superiors and subordinates, elites and the 'masses' or majorities and minorities. As discussed in the previous chapter, identification, access and inclusion of (new) members, may be intimately linked to the exclusion of others, thus defining power abuse and domination. Let us therefore examine some of these group relations in somewhat more detall, and see how ideologies are functionally related to (the reproduction of) these relationships.'

Power and domination

This is not the place to present a new or better theory of power, which has already filled many studies. 2 In the framework of this chapter I simply take

162 Society

(social) power as a specific type of social relation between groups. Of all the possible dimensions of this complex notion, I focus on that of control: a group A has or exercises power over another group B when the members of A are usually able to control the members of B. This may typically involve the control of the actions of the other group and its members, in the sense that the others are not only not (or less) free to do what they want, but may be brought to act in accordance with the wishes or the interests of the more powerful group, and against their own best interests (and usually also against their will). Power relations of age, class, gender, ethnicity, origin, social position or profession, are typical examples.

Thus, the possession and exercise of (more) power of one group usually implies the loss or limitation of freedom for the other group. Ideological claims for freedom, as in freedom of the press, and freedom of the market, are thus usually claims for power. The same is true, though from a different perspective, for the claims for freedom — as empowerment — by dominated groups.

Making others act as one prefers requires resources. Thus, in the most elementary form of power exercise, namely, that of coercion, the resource may be bodily (typically male) or institutional (police, military) force. More sophisticated is the exclusive control over necessary resources (food, housing, jobs or money) by which others may be forced to comply with the wishes or follow the directives of the powerful. Non-compliance will in that case lead to undesired consequences (loss of necessary resources), so that the dominated will have to choose between being dominated but surviving, on the one hand, or resisting and perishing, on the other. Colonialist and capitalist oppression and exploitation, as well as traditional socio-economic oppression, male chauvinism and racism are of this kind.

For my approach to ideology and discourse, a more 'sophisticated' form of power needs to be dealt with, one that is usually called 'persuasive' and which is traditionally associated with ideology and hegemony. In this case, control does not take place (primarily) through physical or socio-economic coercion, but by more subtle and indirect control of the minds of the dominated. By controlling the access to public discourse, only specific forms of knowledge and opinions may be expressed and widely circulated, and these may persuasively lead to mental models and social representations that are in the interest of the powerful. Once these mental representations are in place, the dominated group and its members will tend to act in the interest of the dominant group 'out of their own free will'. The dominated group may lack the knowledge or the education to provide alternatives, or it may accept that the dominance of the dominant roup is natural or inevitable, and resistance pointless or even unthinkable.

In this study it is this type of discursive and ideological control that will be taken as the main example of power and dominance, one that seems prevalent in contemporary'information and communicatioñ societies, in which knowledge and the access to the media and public discourse are the crucial resources to control the minds, and hence indirectly the actions, of