прагматика и медиа дискурс / Teun A van Dijk - Ideology

resources are not just material, but also symbolic, (knowledge, information, education, status, etc.), as is the case for politicians, professors and joumalists, among many others. Since such symbolic resources are defined in tercos of socially shared representations that actually define their social value, we again are back at the socio-cognitive level in order to define groups. Moreover, many groups are primarily defined in terms of these social representations (e.g. opinions, ideologies) themselves, as is the case for Christians, socialists, feminists, anti-racists or peace activists and many other social movements.

And finally, even for groups that seem to be constituted also or primarily in terms of material resources (like the poor and the rich, the homeless and the unemployed), we have seen that socio-economic conditions are relevant for the group only if their experience is shared, and hence framed in tercos of shared knowledge or beliefs, that is, if group members actually feel and represent themselves as members of such a group; or conversely, if they are represented by members of other groups as such, and are treated accordingly. And finally, for most groups continuity and reproduction presupposes either individual acts of social actors as group members, or collective action, which in both cases presupposes shared social representations of the members.

Note that this does not mean that being poor or homeless is 'all in the mind' , and that socio-economic conditions are thus reduced to their mental representations. Of course not. But for someone who is poor or homeless to feel and represent him/herself as a member of a group, and not just out-of- luck as an individual poor or homeless person, such economic conditions still need to be interpreted and especially also represented as being shared by others.

Nor does this argument imply that groups are only constituted by social representations. They are also characterized of course by their (lack of) access to material or symbolic resources,.by collective action, discourse and other social practices. However, whatever the 'objectivé socio-economic base of a collectivity of people, they can only constitute a group if they share social representations that give collective meaning to these social circumstances. It is also in this sense that groups are not merely a societal construct, but also constituted mentally through shared representation. Groups are also constituted by their members, as well as members of other groups, by feelings of belongingness, shared memories of collective experiences, and more generally by social representations, or precisely by the fact that others do not share these representations or challenge them. And if groups should be defined by the social practices of their members, the same necessary precondition obtains, as we have seen — social actors can only act as group members if they develop and share such social representations in the first place.

If groups are constituted by the shared social representations of their members, but not all groups have ideologies, we must later formulate farther

conditions on'which groups under what conditions actually develop ideologies. Thus, whereas a group of vacationers, as such, may not (need to) do so, battered women, managers, or peace activists are more likely to develop some forro of ideology. These conditions might be socio-cognitive, for example when the specific social representations of a group need further organization and foundation, or when group members need to co-ordinate their actions or engage in collective action. And they may be socio-cultural or political, namely, for example for effective group reproduction, organization, sanctions of norms, domination of other groups, conflict resolution, and more generally the effective realization of its goals. Below I shall return to these further conditions on the development of ideologies.

Social categories versus social groups

The criteria of group continuity and social identification typically apply to of people, defined in terms of more or less permanent properties, such as age, gender, ethnicity, origin, class, language,

religion, sexual orientation or profession. Hence, women and men, white and black, young and old, and poor and rich may well develop ideologies that are related to the position and the interests of the members of this category in society.

However, general social categories are again too broad to form groups as defined aboye. After all, it is not likely that all women, or all rich people, share the same overall ideology, even when they share similar social experiences or act similarly in certain social situations. Taking the example of class struggle, feminism, or the civil rights movement, we see that these apply to groups of people who belong to a social category, but also share specific goals, norms, values, and in general some forro of awareness about these. And this awareness or group feeling was defined as social identity and hence as a form of shared social (selprepresentation. Social movements may defend the interests of all workers, women or blacks, but as groups they have more specific goals and interests that need not be shared by all members of their respective social categories. 5

Equally general are those collectivities of people that are precisely defined by their ideologies, such as liberals and conservatives. Again, the question may be raised whether these are 'groups' in a more narrow sense — do all conservative people in the world form a group? Should their ideological stance be taken as a more or less permanent property, as is the case for gender, age or ethnicity? It may be assumed that members of such 'groups' identify more or less strongly with them, precisely for ideological reasons. If shared social identity is a sufficient criterion for the definition of groups, then this collectivity of people would constitute a group. They may even have some overall goals. On the other hand, unlike demonstrators or members of social movements, members of such ideological categories do not, as such, participate in joint activities, but at most in similar activities,

as voting and engaging in liberal or conservative actions and discourse. is why the analysis in Chapter 28 of a concrete example suggests that servativism' be considered as a 'meta-ideology' that controls dimen- s of the ideologies (e.g. those of neo-liberalism, sexism or racism), r than as a proper group ideology.

iother general type of group is based on profession. Doctors, nurses,

^ssors, journalists or carpenters thus may form a professional group, h obviously has similar activities, goals and interests, and with which i or most members may identify. Such groups have professional values lorms, and opinions and attitudes about professional practices, as well oup-specific expert knowledge. Though possibly universal (specialized

^ssions exist in virtually all societies and cultures), this type of group is like a plausible candidate for the development of group ideologies,

. Y cially given the relevance of conflicting interests between differein professions. But again, members of the same profession across the globe only rarely engage in joint activities, although some do, for instance at international conferences.

Between these very general (if not universal) categories of social actors on the one hand, and the fleeting group membership of a demonstration or a team, we have the groups of people that constitute organizations and institutions, such as political parties, parliaments, universities, unions and corporate businesses. Again, identification with such organizations defined as 'groups' is plausible, and there are shared (and even joint) activities, goals and values, as well as similar interests. Note, though, that there is a problem here: As individual institutions or organizations they may no more have their own specific ideologies than their members. We do not speak of 'the' ideology of a specific union, but rather about a union ideology in general. Similarly, in business corporations we may find more general corporate ideologies (or variations of them), and not so much the ideology of one specific business corporation. If such corporations are large, as is the case for multinationals like IBM, however, a common 'culture' may develop, and such a culture of shared norms, values and goals might in a way be identified as the corporate 'ideology' . 6

Another criterion, maybe a decisive one, for the definition of the social group basis of ideologies, is social conflict, struggle or any other kind of interest-based opposition between groups, wheiher over material or over symbolic resources. This is traditionally the case for classes and class struggle, and in Marxism, obviously, ideologies were primarily related to groups such as workers and 'capitalists'. The same is true for feminists versus male chauvinista, or anti-racists against racists, and so on. In such cases the dominant groups will tend to develop an ideology that serves the reproduction of its domination, and the dominated groups may develop an ideology as a basis for its attitudes, opinions, practices and discourses of resistance or opposition. Membership, activities, goals, social position, values and group resources are al rather easily identifiable here, and given

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these as basic categories for the definition of ideological schemata, these could be the prototypical ideological groups. Other groups (say, a category like 'women', or a profession like 'doctors', or a party like the ChristianDemocrats) would generally be defined by only one or a few of diese categories . -

If we define ideologies in tercos of their social functions (see below), then sharing beliefs, the co-ordination of social action and interaction, providing identification, common goals, organization and in general defending group interests, are major conditions for the constitution of ideological groups. Collectivities of people as defined by one or more properties (such as age, profession, goals, income level, political orientation, etc.) thus will tend to be more like ideological groups if these ideological functions apply to them.

We need a detailed sociological theory of social groups in order to be able to make such criteria explicit.

One such criterion may also be the degree of institutionalization. This first of all excludes all ephemeral groups, such as plane passengers and participants in a demonstration. It also eliminates general social categories, such as socio-biological ones like men and women, blacks and whites, old and young, or socio-economic ones like rich and poor, or the unemployed. As suggested, these general categories may well be the broader collectivities from which more specific ideological groups are recruited, however, as is the case for feminists as members of the category of women. Many ideological groups, such as feminists, socialista, environmentalists, anti-abortionists and so on, are not merely defined by shared identities, goals, positions or resources, but also by the fact that they tend to organize in institutions, such as parties, non-governmental organizations, Churches, sects, and so on. They often have explicit, self-styled or elected leaders or officers, headquarters, membership fees, publications, meetings and so on. Such institutionalization may play a prominent role in recruiting new members, setting goals, formulating norms and principles (and indeed ideologies), securing resources, and especially the co-ordination and effective execution of actions that realize the goal of the organized group.

We may conclude this discussion by assuming that there cannot be a clear and explicit boundary between social groups in the more specific sense and any other collective of people defined by one or more shared characteristics. Generally, however, I shall assume that a social group must be more or less permanent, more or less organized or institutionalized, and reproduced by recruiting members on the basis of identification on a specific, more or less permanent set of properties (like gender or income), shared activities and/or goals, norms and values, resources, and a specific position (often of competition or conflict) in relation to other social groups. Groups that satisfy most of diese conditions will then be assumed to be most likely to develop shared ideologies that will serve as the basis for organization of the actions and cognitions of their members in such a way that the aims of the group are optimally realized.

Groups versus members

There is one thorny theoretical problem we need to address here, and that is the specific, emergent nature of a group as being distinct from the set constituted by its members. Throughout this study many observations are made about the ideologies and other mental or social properties shared by a group. We have assumed, for instante, that journalists as a group develop a professional ideology and that other collectivities of people may do likewise in specific social circumstances.

However, the problem is that we would like this also to be true when one or a few individual journalists do not share such an ideology. Indeed, many groups may have ideological 'deviants' or 'dissidents'. If this is the case, the notion of group may at least sornetirnes be distinct from the set of its individual members. Maybe 'groupness' only requires that most or many -of the members share some property. However, such fuzzy criteria also make groups 'rather like fuzzy sets rather than strict sets of members. Indeed, as with sets, groups may theoretically exist if they do not (as yet, or any longer) have any members at all!

Apart from the set theoretical and quantitative dimensions of groups, we may also ask whether groups have emergent properties that (sets of) members do not necessarily have. Indeed, are there mental representations (like knowledge and ideology), collective actions or group relations that do apply to the group, but not necessarily to (all of) its members? Obviously, this is the case. As we shall see in the next chapter, social group relations such as power and dominance are defined for the group as a whole, and do not necessarily apply to all members. Indeed, despite male dominance in society, not all men are dominant with respect to all women they interact with, flor do most men act dominantly against women all the time. Groups may similarly have a collective past, history and experiences that not all members personally have, as is typically the case for the Holocaust for the Jews. From this example it is but one step to collective memories and hence to shared social representations: Jews as a group have social representations about the Holocaust and anti-semitism, although there may be individual Jews who doñ t. These few examples suggest that indeed groups may have attributes that are not necessarily those of (all) their members.

It is likely that the same is true for ideologies. That is, because of their history, collective experiences, social position, and social relations with other groups, groups may develop and reproduce a specific ideology. Like 'having a language', thus, 'sharing an ideology' is such a property that should be defined at the societal level, that is, for the group as a whole. In the same way as a social group is an abstraction, or an ideal type, also ideologies may thus be seen as an abstract property, much like languages such as English or Chinese are abstract systems, at least at one level of analysis. Such a system is not simply the same as the actual language use of all speakers of English or Chinese. Indeed, there are languages that, as linguistic systems, have survived their users. Similarly, socialism as an

ideology will still be an ideology even when the last socialist has switched off the light.

The macro—micro problem

These observations, however, require a further analysis of the relations between social abstractions, systems, collective properties, and groups on the one hand, and group members as actual people — as well as their minds and actions — on the other hand. This is an example of the well-known macro—micro problem in the social sciences. 8 In the same way as the system of the Chinese language must at least be partially known in order to be 'used' by concrete speakers, we may assume that a similar condition holds for the role of ideology in the monitoring of social practices in general, and of discourse in particular. That is, if ideologies are defined only for groups, if groupness presupposes shared social representations (or a social identity), if social representations are mental, and if groups as such doñ t have minds, then we must assume that groups can only 'have' an ideology if at least a qualified number of their members share at least part of such an ideology. Now, what exactly does that mean?

One trivial answer already formulated aboye is simply quantitative. That is, a group an ideology if most of its members share most of the propositions that define such an ideology, where the fuzzy quantifier 'most' may be assigned any value between, say, seventy-five per cent and 100 per cent.

Somewhat less trivial would be to replace the quantifier for the number of propositions by the set of'essential' or 'core' ideological propositions, namely, those that are the specific, defining or prototypical fundamental beliefs of a group. For instance, people would not qualify as neo-liberals if they did not share the core ideological propositions based on the freedom of the market. This is relatively straightforward of course for groups defined primarily by their ideologies.

But what about journalists? Does a journalist who does not believe in the core propositions based on the value of the freedom of the press, exclude hicoor herself from the journalistic ideology, and hence from group identification? Would such a journalist not be like a prototypical journalist, and hence be defined (or define himself or herself) as a relative outsider, and actually be marginalized, as we may indeed observe in journalistic (or other professional) practice?

Are the well-known forces of conformity, including socialization, schooling, the media, sanctions, marginalization and other social practices to enforce ideological alignment of members, a social manifestation of the necessity to defend at least the adherence to a core of ideological propositions by all members? Such seems indeed to be the case. Again, the comparison with language (grammar) may be instructive: use is not merely regulated by mutual intelligibility but also by socially enforced standards of minimal correctness for many social situations, such as schooling and

or keeping a job. Personal variation is possible, but some normative animar needs to be respected in specific social situations.

least a minimal ideological core should be respected 'in' the group, e still need to qualify by how many or which members this needs to case. Again, we may use a qualitative criterion, namely, the 'core ;rs', such as leaders, the elites, all people with responsibilities, and in 1, thus, the 'ideologues' of any group. This is socially necessary for >up, in the first place, in order to ideologically reproduce itself. At eme members need to teach the ideology to newcomers or new ions. Second, at least some members need to monitor social practices rice the applications of the ideology by current members. Third, at )me members need to be able to reformulate and adapt the group ,y to new social developments, circumstances or changed relations to roups. Fourth, at least some members need to be able to formulate tributé (fragments of the) ideology throughout the group. These and deological core activities need to be adequately carried out for any to reproduce its ideology and the social practices and social position

basen on it. In other words, we may conclude again, and again rather vaguely, that ideological reproduction presupposes at least a core of elites or ideologues to perform these functions.

Of course, for different groups or institutions such ideological activities may vary considerably: the Catholic Church does this in a different way from the feminist movement or the peace movement. Also, the conditions on either the number of ideological members or the number of ideological propositions to be shared by them, may be very different for different groups. Traditionally, in the Catholic Church one might be excommunicated for adhering to a specific heresy. Something similar might happen for a strictly ideological political party or specific social movements. In some (extreme) cases all members need to ascribe to all ideological propositions, whereas in others only to a core of basic ideological principies, or again, only a core group of people need to kiiow all or most or only the core principies. But if only a small group knows and shares only a fragment of the (original) ideology of a group, so that full ideological reproduction becomes impossible among newcomers, we may expect ideological decline, or ideological change, or indeed the resolution of a group. Since, however, ideologies may often be written down in explicit textbooks, Bibles, catechisms, histories of movements, party programmes, corporate 'rnission statements', organizational statutes, and similar ideological writings by ideologues, there is always a possibility that at least some group members are able to keep the ideological Eire burning for a long time.

What is sharing?

Finally, there is another aspect that needs to be examined when we study the relations between the ideological group and its members, namely, the precise social and cognitive status of sharing. Aboye we have seen what kind of

this actual 'sharing' means — identical'copies' of propositions in the minds of the relevant members, as when computers run copies of the same program, even when different personal uses of the program are made? Again, the comparison with grammars may be instructive. In order to use the language more or less grammatically, we may assume that language users need to acquire more or less the same rules of a grammar. Of course there may be personal variation, for example due to schooling and other forms of learning, in the amount of mies acquired or how the rules are applied. That is, despite such variation, most speakers of the language must have more or less similar copies of the core rules of the same grammar.

The same, we assume, should be true for the basic social representations of a group, that is, its ideology. On many occasions, such ideological principies may actually be formulated, for example in contexts of admission, inclusion, socialization, initiation, teaching, jurisprudence, sanctioning, marginalization and exclusion. Of course, such formulation takes places in variable discourses, and not directly in tercos of (abstract) ideological propositions, so that acquisition, even in ideal cases, is often less strict than acquiring the rules of grammar. However, as with other social principies, such as norms and values, there are many social practices and discourses expressing or enacting the underlying ideological principies, so that by continuous repetition and experience, some fairly similar ideology fragments will be acquired. Again, this will be highly variable for different ideological groups. Also, it need not be emphasized that the knowledge that group members have of such ideological propositions need not always be explicit or even conscious (as is also the case for the rules of grammar), if only they are able to apply them more or less adequately.

In sum, for the moment, we have no theoretical alternative but to assume that a group an ideology if at least some (or most, depending on the group) members share at least some core (or most) ideological propositions. Sharing, in this case, means that these members have fairly similar propositions stored in their social memory. In other words, if an ideology is taken as an abstract system of the group as a whole, it is concretely (mentally) 'distributed' over its members. That such members will make (sometimes vastly) different uses of this ideological system in different social contexts, is obvious, and defines the large variation in ideological discourses and other social practices. We shall come back to such personal and contextual variation later.

Multiple identities and conflicting ideologies

As has been suggested several times aboye, individual social actors may be members of various social groups, each of which may have its own ideology. This is one of the fundamental reasons why the expression of ideologies by such actors in specific situations may appear incoherent or

oven inconsistent. The point here is that since different groups may have different interests (membership devices, activities, goals, norms or resources), also their ideologies, which cognitively represent such basic interests, may be in conflict in the decision 'how to speak or act' in a specific situation. Depending on the situation, one identity and hence one ideology may be more relevant or more important, so that strategic choices can be made in the management of conflicting beliefs and interests. We already encountered the prototype of a middle-class female black journalist, who will probably let her journalistic ideologies and practices prevail over those suggested by the other group ideologies, at least if she wants to keep her lob.

Only sometimes can such group ideologies and practices be combined. Middle-class ideology will often combine well with the middle-class bias of the media, most sources, most news actors and most of the public. No conflict of interest will be very likely here. As a woman, the black journalist may be partly accepted (or even forced) to 'behave' as a joumalist, although she may get story assignments with a womeñ s perspective (but seldom a radical feminist one). This will be even less the case for her as a black person, although in times of ethnic or racial conflict and crises, 'ethnic' stories may be assigned to her. But in general the social rule is: believe and act like most of us in 'our' group. Transgressions of the rule, and outright deviance and dissidence will be sanctioned by marginalization, exclusion or elimination, whether physical, economic, social or cultural.'

Group categories and membership

Ideologies have been assumed to be organized by a group schema consisting of a number of fundamental categories that codify the ways people define themselves and others as group members. These categories have mental aspects, but also social ones. Thus, whereas membership may be construed as the mental representation of the relations individuals have with social groups or categories, it also needs to be accounted for in more sociological terms. Thus, it may not be sufflcient that group members consider themselves to be members of a group. It is also important how others perceive them as such. Indeed, individuals may 'naturally' belong to, and be considered and accepted, as members of groups or categories, as is the case for women, children, or whites and blacks, but in many other groups, the process of admission and recognition follows a more complex social process. This also affects the role of membership in the reproduction of ideology.

Besides the 'natural' categories just mentioned (which obviously are social constructions in their own right), membership should first be examined for those social groups people may be 'born into', and to which they thus have more or less involuntary access. Class and caste are the most prominent example of such groups, and at the same time the classical

152 Society

example for the development of ideologies. Although in later life people may well 'change' class or caste, they are assumed to be class members as long as they are unable or unwilling to change such membership.

Class membership is as complex as the very notion of class and socially constructed in terms of much more than just socio-economic parameters, such as family income, occupation or position. Various types of nonmaterial, symbolic 'capital' may be indicative of oné s class, such as status, respect, accent and language use, knowledge of the arts, and so on for the upper and upper middle class, or precisely the relative (real or attributed) lack of such symbolic resources for the lower classes. Changing class, especially upwardly, therefore also requires more than just a change of material resources, as is shown by the negative categorization of nouveaux riches as not really belonging to the upper classes. Indeed, specific upper classes (e.g. of nobility) cannot be entered otherwise than by birth. For others, both material and symbolic capital, such as a good education, a good school, and acquired 'culture' may be needed to access the higher class if they did not acquire such resources as lorñ class members. 11

Both for established members as well as for new members, class member: ship is also associated with ideologies. Indeed, the very reproduction of the socio-economic interests of the class, including both its material and symbolic resources, is one of the main functions of class ideologies. That is, when matched with the structure of ideologies, class provides a 'membership device' that is essentially resource-based: people define themselves and are categorized, recognized or admitted by other members primarily in terms of a specific set of (socio-economic and cultural) resources. For the successful reproduction of the class, therefore, group members learn either from birth, or as newcomers, the ideology that aliows the protection of these resourcebased interests. Economically, this may mean opposition against various forms of wealth and income distribution, high taxes for the rich, and so 9n. Symbolically, this may mean exclusive or preferential access to special schools, clubs, professions and forms of culture. Ideologically, such privileges will tend to be legitimated by claims of natural or social 'rights' (birth, marriage, heritage) and/or merit (hand work, learning).

For professional groups, membership and access are usually well defined in terms of legal or traditional membership criteria, such as education, degrees, diplomas and expertise. Lawyers, doctors and professors can become such only when being officially evaluated and qualified, whereas for journalists less strict qualifications may be needed. Membership of such groups is usually based primarily on type of activity and expertise (advising clients, healing patients or teaching students). The interests of such groups are also tied to specific, symbolic resources such as legal, medical or scientific knowledge and expertise, as well as status and respect accorded the professions in a particular society.

Given their nature, we may expect that professional groups develop ideologies especially as a function of the interests tied to their activities and their special resources. Thus, freedom of the press, independence of the