Public Choice In a Representative Democracy

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

e) Cabinet stability

Number of parties

Ethnic, religious and ideological diversity

Public Choice

Number of issue dimensions

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

f) Strategic voting

Why do the Free Democrats in Germany always stay in the Bundestag, but regularly miss to meet the 5 per cent threshold in the state parliaments?

S C F

The voters of the Christian Democratic Party have regularly voted strategically (mainly before the appearance of the Green Party) to ensure a victory of the conservative spectrum over the Social Democratic Party.

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

IV. The paradox of voting

“…Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the spheres of his real interest. He becomes a primitive again…” Joseph Schumpeter, quoted after Mueller (2003, p. 303).

Schumpeter concludes that human beings would relax their moral standards and give in to prejudices in the political arena.

Is Schumpeter right?

How rational is the voter?

And why does she vote anyway?

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

a) The rational voter hypotheses

A rational voter will vote for the party (candidate) according to the own expected utility derived from this candidate’s victory (difference B between the expected utilities of both parties victories).

It is unlikely that an individual voter’s vote is decisive

(from an individual perspective).

The formula 4.1 shows the probability that an individual voter decides the election.

© Freytag 2013

2 2π ( N −1)

44

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Given that the probability to be run over by a car while going to or coming back from the election, is higher than P, one wonders why people do vote.

Three explanations can be thought of:

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

Empirical evidence for the rational voter hypothesis

One votes, if PB + D – C > 0,

with D being the benefit from the act of voting and C being the cost of voting.

For an empirical estimation of the hypothesis we define

R = PB + D – C, to answer the question “Did you vote?” The literature uses 5 groups of variables:

• personal characteristics,

• cost variables (C),

• strategic value of voting (P and B),

• interest in campaign (D),

• obligation to vote (D).

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

Table 4.1: Summary of studies testing the Downsian model (with extensions) using survey data

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

© Freytag 2013

P,B,D,C are proxies for main components of Downsian model;

R = PB + D – C; E stands for education level and Y for the income of the voter.

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

b) The expressive voter hypothesis

Relaxing the rationality assumption, leads to the expressive voter hypothesis.

Instead of aiming at a certain result, the voter wants to express an opinion of how the outcome of the election should be;

the outcome of the election is the same as in Downsian model.

The motivation is different. However, the result then can also be changing:

irresponsible voting.

The hypothesis stands in contrast to strategic voting.

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

c) The ethical voter hypothesis

Relaxing the self interest assumption, leads to the ethical voter hypothesis.

The voter is seen as both ethical and selfish (Jekyll-and Hyde view):

Oi = Ui + θ Σ Uk with k ≠ i and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.

d) Voting as duty

Voting is seen as a sense of duty no theoretical explanation. Behavioural psychology offers an explanation for θ > 0 . Individuals learn that voting is sensible. Therefore, ethical voting is indeed selfish.

Tautology?