Biomedical Nanotechnology - Neelina H. Malsch

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biomolecules, subcellular structures, or entire cells), (4) the opportunity to design architectures that will emplace large numbers and multiple types of detectors in a single small system, and (5) the introduction of novel types of detectors including those that can be closely integrated with functions other than sensing, e.g., computational components intended to evaluate the environment and alert users when specific hazards are recognized. The total system package must provide a reliable capability for connecting the miniature components and subsystems with the macroscopic environment and ultimately control by the user. This will sometimes include the need to develop unique displays to accommodate rapid interaction requirements, for example, in telemedicine.

Many applications exist for the variety of sensors under development and also for materials tailored at the nanoscale. Clothing and fabrics with embedded nanoscale materials can introduce barriers and provide for neutralization of toxic agents. Medical sensors in conjunction with substrates placed inside the body can lead to rapid diagnosis and therapeutic opportunities. Structures can be designed to be multifunctional. “Smart” materials that combine the functions of sensors with unique material properties provide examples of the power of integration of nanocomponents.

The implementation of nanotechnologies must accommodate many practical considerations. Disadvantages include the needs to (1) interconnect large numbers of disparate parts, (2) provide a cost-effective mass manufacturing technique for unique nanocomponents, (3) attend to the special needs of living organisms or biological materials, (4) assure redundant designs to compensate for errors in very small and unique components, and (5) provide a path from operating under laboratory conditions to simple and reliable use in the field by nonspecialists. Large-scale production methods for nanomaterials and the subsequent use of the products must not contribute to environmental damage or introduce health problems (e.g., a recent controversy relates to the potential risk of invasion of the body by very small particles). International cooperation is seen in many research efforts, and as products become widely available, decisions will have to be made to assure that mutually acceptable uses and industrial procedures are in place where applicable. Additionally, such cooperation is required to facilitate the employment of biodefenses throughout the world whenever a need may arise. The future development of nanotechnologybased biodefenses will take place along many technological routes, and some of these may require unique guidelines.

Figure 5.3 highlights the application of nanotechnology to biodefense and against various classes of threats amenable to similar technological fixes. A major challenge is to identify and develop a suite of potential nanobiosensors suitable for detection, classification, and alert. In some cases this can be done with samples brought to a laboratory. Important classes of threats — pathogenic organisms introduced naturally or deliberately, certain types of biotoxins, chemical agents intended to directly affect people, and hazardous toxic materials found in the environment or even in food supplies — often require that this challenge be met rapidly by the user in situ. This provides an important motivation to search for instruments that are portable, can withstand a range of environmental conditions including moisture, temperature and dirt, and deliver results without additional off-site laboratory analysis. It is also important to increase our understanding of materials and delivery methods that could

biological and chemical agents cause harm when individuals or areas are exposed to their effects. The potential scale of an event increases as an agent spreads, whether via a chemical, biotoxin, or other noncontagious bioagent (such as anthrax) release, or whether an attack or natural outbreak involves a contagious disease. Real-time information about (1) the initial occurrence, (2) the nature of the agent or agents involved, (3) the individuals exposed, (4) the geographic spread, and (5) the source of the agent or agents can allow military or response organizations to act quickly to both treat the initial victims and minimize the overall effect on the local area, region, or nation.

Similarly, real-time information is also critical in protecting individuals — responders or soldiers — involved in biodefense activities. Because of their roles in responding to events, all types of responders are at much greater risk of exposure to harmful agents than the general public. Beyond the need to protect responders for their own sakes, it is also critical to preserve the abilities of responders and their organizations to act as an event evolves. If the force protection needs of individuals involved in countering such events are not considered, the early phases of a biological or chemical attack may seriously damage the response capabilities of an entire nation.

Individuals need information about their own environments and exposures to guide protective actions and support effective operational and tactical decision making. Complete and timely information will also allow the responders not to overrespond. Protective suits and other equipment are burdensome. Improved sensors may prevent responders from needlessly donning disruptive protective gear. Also, improved information may prevent unnecessary treatment of uninfected individuals. Treatments can have deleterious side effects so the elimination of unneeded treatment may also save lives.

The design of sensor and information gathering systems to provide the information needed to support biodefense activities involves five key technological considerations:

Speed — Depending on the threat involved, biological and chemical agents have the potential to act or spread rapidly. The faster information is made available, the more valuable it is.

Accuracy — Because of the potential stakes involved, the accuracy of biodefense sensor systems is critical. Missing the release of a biological or chemical agent could result in casualties and costs that would be preventable with accurate information. Conversely, false alarms have significant costs as well. Triggering false response actions imposes financial costs and can seriously jeopardize trust in detection systems and in the public officials who use the information.

Ease of deployment — In order to provide the protection needed for individuals, sensor systems that can provide information in the field are superior to those that cannot. Many techniques can identify biological and chemical agents when samples are brought into a laboratory setting. In addition to slowing the availability of needed data, the intermediate steps of laboratory testing also make information less accessible for operational decision making in responding to these events.

Affordability — Ideally, sensor systems should be broadly available and deployed to provide information about wide areas and to large numbers of individuals in the field. Because of practical resource constraints, reducing the costs of individual sensor and detection systems can greatly facilitate this goal.