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One interesting result of this way of thinking reflects itself in the ‘accusation’ and ‘guilt’ problem. I would like to give some examples of how this way of thinking is a big obstacle in today’s Turkish–Armenian relations. Atom Egoyan’s 2002 film Ararat was strongly criticized in Turkey as being full of violence even if the violent scenes take up very little of the general flow of the movie. This critique indicates a major psychological problem within the Turkish community. I think the real reason why the violent scenes are perceived as so prevalent in the film, and why many Turks feel offended, is because they view these scenes as directed towards them personally. A friend of mine, whom I consider liberal-minded, wrote me the following after viewing the film with an Armenian friend.

I was very upset by the content of the film. It had me up all night. After seeing the film...we joined some Armenian friends for drinks. For the first time that I can remember I didn’t even enjoy drinking Ouzo. After a film like this, I don’t care what your thoughts are, being introduced as a Turk is not easy.

After seeing the film, my friend felt that it was not the historical actors involved but rather he that was being accused of the cruel acts depicted. I know that generally in Turkey, this is how ‘genocide accusations’ are perceived. The present generation, perceiving itself accused of murder, has reverted to a position of psychological self-defense and has attempted to distance itself from such accusations.

This moral issue makes sense only if we create ‘sameness’ between past and present and imagine the collective as an ahistorical entity with individual characteristics. This just goes to show how little psychological distance there is between the past and present. For people in Turkey to so personally identify with the perpetrators of the Genocide in the film is an indication of where the problem lies. It is the problem of glossing over the differences between individuals and collectives, of sameness, and of equating past and present.

Again, because of this collapse of the past into the present, the representative of the victim group sees the representative of the perpetrator group as an embodiment of the past. Messages intended for the perpetrator are addressed to his current stand-in. In the case of Turkey, official denial makes the situation even worse. I regard this way of thinking as problematic. Instead, we must try to develop a discourse that regards past and present as different entities. We have to know that history is a construction. Not only is there a difference between past and present, but there is also a difference between past and history. ‘History’ does not equal that which was actually experienced in the past; it is a present-day construction, a narrative interpretation of the past. In other words, the only reality is today,

and history ends up being a representation of present-day perceptions of the past. ‘History’ is not an independent fixed entity that awaits discovery. Rather, it exists only within the context of today and gains meaning only in the space it occupies in the relations between people today. Its importance lies not in what actually occurred, but in how that is perceived by people today.7

To sum up, discussing history actually means mostly using the past as a communication tool for discussion with each other today. We think, when we are talking with each other, that we are discussing history, but what we are actually doing, more often than not, is discussing our present. We are discussing our present-day selves, and history is simply a means for this discourse. We have to see history as having meaning only in our present context. Unless we distinguish between our past and our present, communication will remain an obstacle.

In order to overcome this impediment, Turks and Armenians should stop hiding behind historical actors when speaking to each other. It is current-day Turks and Armenians speaking to each other, not their ancestors, and it is as their present selves that they should address each other. Doing so would definitely promote better understanding between the two communities.

Constructing the ‘Other’

In constructing the other as an ahistorical, abstract entity, an ‘Other’, each side has developed a very negative picture of the other, to which they constantly refer. There is a simple mechanism for constructing collective identities. In order to define ourselves mostly in positive terms, we define the other as our opposite. We are wiser, fairer, kinder, more capable, more attractive, and generally better than the other party. The ‘other side’ is deceitful, aggressive, heartless and incapable of change for the better. Such labels as ‘barbaric Turks’ or ‘Armenian traitors’ are frequent and unequivocal. Military terminology is also employed. Some Armenians speak of a ‘war’ with the ‘Turks.’ Meanwhile, in the ‘enemy camp,’ Turkish columnists such as Gündüz Aktan (a former ambassador to the UN and member of the Turkish–Armenian Reconciliation Committee) write of ‘psychological war’ and develop strategies for conducting it.

There are, of course, many reasons for constructing monolithic, stereotypical images of the other side. Social psychology offers us a general explanation for this attitude: development of the sense of self is strongly related to its separation from the identity of others for its protection and regulation.8 ‘People use and ‘need’ enemies as external stabilizers of their sense of identity and inner control’9

Beyond this general theory, we can give some particular explanations for the Armenian–Turkish case. One very important and obvious one is the denial policy of the Turkish state. Furthermore, some parties may have a vested interest in perpetuating rather than resolving the problem. In particular, nationalistic circles in both camps have formed their narratives and identities in opposition to an imagined enemy. In fact, Turkish ruling elites employ an anti-Armenian attitude to rally the Turkish public around a common national identity. If Turkey were to alter its official stand on the Genocide, its entire national history would have to be rewritten. As for some of the Armenian circles, they too benefit from the existence of an image of the Turk as barbaric and savage; they use these images to explain the Genocide as a natural outcome of the Turkish character.

In general, dehumanized images of the other side are deeply rooted in the mentality of opposing ethnic or religious groups. In addition, all parties, especially in a conflict, have a differentiated view of themselves while maintaining an undifferentiated, stereotypical view of the other. Dehumanization or stereotyping

may be viewed as a defensive maneuver against painful or unacceptable inner emotional positions. The overwhelming feelings of shame that are the unbearable consequence of historical violation of one’s sense of self may easily give rise to the process of dehumanization. Perhaps the easiest way for us to deal psychologically with the cruel attacks of another is to attribute an evil and subhuman nature to that other.10

Such deeply ingrained belief systems are extremely resistant to change, especially if they are reinforced by an intense victimhood psychology. Until these attitudes, feelings, behaviors, and mentality are changed, no solution is possible.

The first step in getting Turkish–Armenian relations back on track is to replace negative stereotypes with new and accurate information about each group. Transforming public consciousness is the starting point in every effort at conflict resolution.

Dialogue and Reconciliation

I take the existence of the Turkish state policy of genocide denial as a constant, unchangeable given; it is a policy that has been made consciously and will not change for a considerable period of time. The basic problem is that this policy determines how Turks and Armenians speak about the Genocide, and how they relate to each other. It is not an exaggeration to say that the existence of this policy is the epicenter for all thinking on the issue of the Genocide. Both groups are fixated on the Turkish state policy. The

discourse, the language is mostly determined by the paradigm created by the policy of denial.

Without downplaying the importance and crucial character of this policy, I would argue that there is something hypocritical in this fixation. It seems to me that both Turks and Armenians, at least in critical circles, are hiding behind this policy. They are sequestering themselves in order to avoid making themselves active participants in the process of debate on the Genocide. Both societies tend to see each other through the prism of this policy of denial. The relationship between the two communities is chained to the Turkish state policy. Both societies are essentially prisoners of this paradigm. The basic question here is how they can break free from this prison, because therein lies the basic obstacle to the reconciliation.

One important consequence of such hypocrisy is the lack of selfreflection. Neither group is capable of viewing itself critically. The denial policy is the beginning and the end of every explanation for the problems we encounter in Turkish–Armenian relations, but this is not the whole story. In the knowledge that policy change is unlikely in the foreseeable future, I ask, is there any possibility of interaction between the two parties?

We have to put both societies under the microscope in order to create another paradigm, another way of intercommunicating. How can we set aside the practice of seeing each other through this paradigm and instead create a new space in which we can communicate openly with each other? It is a general rule that conflict can only be resolved through direct interaction between both communities. In order to achieve this interaction, both groups have to concentrate their energies on mobilizing their political, cultural, social, and religious resources.

A paradigm shift is necessary that includes new aspects of the conflict, aspects that have never previously been considered. We must reconceptualize the problem and put both societies at the center of our analysis. This paradigm shift should focus on the creation of a new cultural space that encompasses both societies, a space in which people from both sides have the opportunity to learn about each other. In this new sphere of communication we can set our own rules without taking into account the Turkish denial policy.

From conflict resolution theory we know that the reconciliation process embodies the four concepts of truth, mercy, justice, and peace, which lead to reconciliation.11 Without acknowledging the truth, that is, articulating the events of the past, conflict will never be resolved. We can describe this step as a journey through history to disclose unknown facts. Yet truth alone is insufficient for reconciliation. Truth must be paired with compassion and forgiveness, which would lead to acknowledgement of past injustices and to a new beginning of relating to each other. Without compassion and

forgiveness, healing and restoration would be impossible. Yet, mercy alone is insufficient, if it is not combined with justice. Justice, which in this case would mean the search for social restructuring and restitution, would heal wounds, would establish equality, and would rectify the past. Peace is the last step, and would bring respect, mutual understanding and security. The process of reconciliation is the forum in which these four factors are brought together.

The theoretical formulation of this political question is very simple: every kind of discourse, as well as the language we use, is the product of power relations. There are no ‘objective’ or ‘impartial’ terms. The words we use are a reflection of certain hegemonic relations or certain mindsets. It is not difficult to see that the existing discourse between the two communities is determined mostly by the Turkish state’s policy of denial of the Armenian Genocide. For that reason, if we really want to create a new approach to Armenian–Turkish relations, we have to acknowledge that we should start by creating our own language, our own terms, which would be a product of this new mindset of being willing to reach reconciliation. For example, if we start to think about how we use the terms ‘Turks’ and ‘Armenians,’ it would be a great first step. We should avoid using abstract terms and define exactly what we mean. Do we mean the ruling elite, certain social groups, organizations, movements? If we called the subject by name and not simply a ‘Turk’ or ‘Armenian’ it would be a huge step towards creating a new language. The languages we use, the narratives that are an important part of our collective identities are products of and produce certain mindsets. We have to consider a new way of thinking. We have to create a different cultural space in which this new approach can develop. One way of doing this is to encourage direct interaction between the two communities, so that each party can develop a realistic image of the other.

NOTES

1.Johan Galtung, ‘After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Resolution: Coping with Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence,’ in Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed.,

Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence, Theory and Practice (New York, Oxford 2001), p. 4.

2.Norbert, Elias, Die Gesellschaft der Individuen (Frankfurt a.M.,1987), p. 246.

3.Vamik D. Volkan, ‘An Overview of Psychological Concept Pertinent to Interethnic and/or International Relationship,’ in Vamik Volkan, Demetrios A. Julius, Joseph V. Montville, eds, The Psychodynamic of International Relationships: Concept and Theories

(Lexington, Massachusetts/Toronto, 1990), p. 32.

4.Volkan, p. 36.

5.Norbert, Elias, Studien über die Deutschen (Frankfurt a.M., 1990), pp. 196–7.

6.My arguments here are based on some points raised by Michel-Rolph Trouillot, ‘Abortive

Rituals, Historical Apologies in the Global Era,’ Interventions 2, no. 2 (2000): 171–86.

7.Objectivity in history and the relation between the past and history is a widely debated topic. For further discussion see, Thomas L. Haskell, Objectivity is Not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998; Keith Jenkins, On ‘What is History?’ From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White (New York, 1995); Beverly Southgate, History: What and Why? Ancient, Modern and Postmodern Perspectives (London and New York, 1996) and Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History (London and New York, 1997). For a general overview of these different approaches to history see, Christopher Kent, ‘Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History’ (book review), Canadian Journal of History (December 1999), p. 385.

8.Vamik Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies (Northvale, New Jersey, London, 1988), p. 261.

9.Joseph V. Montville, Foreword, in Volkan, p. xi.

10.Demetrious A. Julius, ‘The Genesis and Perpetuation of Aggression in International Conflicts,’ in Volkan, p. 101.

11.For more information see John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, 1997), Chapters 3 and 4.

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