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During the night when general mobilization was announced (August 2), there was an important meeting at the Central Committee of the CUP, and at this meeting a far-reaching decision was taken to be acted upon in the near future. The decision aimed at founding a special organization, Tes¸kilât-ı Mahsusa, in order to improve the capability of movement of our armies on enemy soil, whether we would enter the general war or not.1

Although there is differing information on the exact day of the founding of the Special Organization, we know that following the decision of August 2, 1914, the Special Organization was organized under the command of the Department of Defense and it gained official status.2 In the military tribunal —referred to as the Main Trial from now on—that was conducted in Istanbul against the officials of the CUP and the Special Organization,3 the defendants stated that the Special Organization was organized within the Department of Defense, and that the decision for that was taken at the August 2 meeting of the Central Committee.4 Accordingly, a central coordination office of the Special Organization was established within the Department of Defense. This committee included members from the Departments of Defense and Interior, and the Central Committee of the CUP. The indictment and the defendants’ testimonies listed names of participants and their affiliations. According to the testimony of Atif Bey, who was one of the general coordinators of the ‘tes¸kilat,’ the institution was comprised of at least four different units.5

The committee was given great authority. A network was established between various state departments, units of the army, the Central Committee of the CUP, and branches of the party in different provinces. Atif stated in his testimony, ‘The Department of Defense had authorized us and we were in communication with the quartermaster corps, national security, the CUP and all federal departments and national institutions.’6 In all the correspondence between local administrators, such as governors, branches of the CUP, and the local authorities of the Special Organization, the ciphers of the Department of the Interior were used. In the fifth session of the Main Trial, the presiding judge asked Atif Bey why the ciphers of the Department of the Interior were used by an institution under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense and the army, but did not get a satisfactory reply.7

The main task of the committee was to organize the paramilitary units (çetes) that would carry out their activities under the command of the army. The units would conduct operations mainly in Eastern Anatolia, ‘to serve the purpose of unifying Islam and promote Turkism through uniting the Turks outside the Turkish border.’8 The activities were to be implemented in two arenas: inside and outside the country. Outside the country, the aim was to organize uprisings in Egypt, Caucasia, Iran and India. Inside the

country, the activities were described in the correspondence: ‘As much as there is an aim to be pursued abroad, there are, however, also persons to be liquidated at home. This is the path we are following.’9 These statements were made by the Erzurum party secretary Hilmi in a telegram responding to Bahaettin S¸akir. The ‘persons’ to be liquidated in the country were the Armenians.

The gangs were established through the coordinated efforts of official institutions mentioned above. Throughout the hearings in the Main Trial, telegrams and letters between local administrators (governors and kaimakams), local CUP representatives, the Central Committee of the CUP in Istanbul, and the Special Organization were read. The letter of the Department of the Special Organization to the Central Committee of the CUP on forming the gangs, the letter of the Special Organization to the Governor of Izmit, and the letter of the CUP branch in Smyrna addressed directly to the Special Organization may serve as examples.10

The Gangs of the Special Organization

The practical task of organizing the gangs in eastern Anatolia to carry out missions in Russia and provoke that counrty to enter the war was given to Bahaettin S¸akir.11 A group of secretaries of the CUP from Istanbul were to go to the region as well, and this was to be kept utterly secret.12 Erzurum was taken as the central base for action. To this end, a separate General HQ (headquarters) for the Special Organization was formed in Erzurum. During the fifth session of the Main Trial, a telegram from Süleyman Askeri, the first coordinator of the Special Organization, to Bahaettin S¸akir was read. The telegram, addressed to the province of Erzurum, revealed that ‘Riza Bey of Trabzon was appointed as a member of the HQ in Erzurum.’ In a telegram to Talât Pas¸a in Istanbul, which was read during the same hearing, Bahaettin S¸akir informed Talât about his activities as the person in charge of the HQ in Erzurum.13 In the memoirs of Ali Ihsan Sabis, one of the army commanders in Eastern Anatolia, it is reported that Enver Pas¸a talked about Bahaettin S¸akir as ‘the head of Special Organization from the HQ.’14

After Bahaettin S¸akir left for Erzurum, Kara Kemal, a member of the CUP Central Committee, came to the region accompanied by another delegation, among which there were some German officials. The Germans were to carry out activities in Russia in connection with Georgians. In August, Bahaettin S¸akir and Kara Kemal drew up a general plan of activities in the region and, in order to protect the government and the CUP from responsibility, they founded an organization called the ‘Caucasian Revolutionary Association.’

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Following deliberations that lasted for a number of days...a directive was written that defined in detail how to proceed...This directive had to be kept top secret and required utmost attention for it not to fall into the hands of foreigners...it was distributed to people who were involved and the local offices of the Special Organization.15

One of the most important tasks of the Caucasian Revolutionary Association was ‘to form gangs in and outside the country.’ Therefore, the ‘necessary order was sent to the surrounding regions.’ In this order, it was quite openly stated that the gangs would be established under the command of the Third Army. For instance, a telegram sent to the ‘Governor of Erzincan and Kaimakam of Bayburt, Tercan and Kigi,’ indicates that ‘with the permission of the commanding Pas¸a of the Third Army and the leadership of Dr Bahaettin S¸akir...an Islamic militia troop is being set up.16 Either officers or secretaries of the CUP were appointed to lead the gangs. A report sent to Istanbul from the Third Army noted that the local authorities were instructed to form paramilitary organizations.17 In September 1914, the Third Army prepared a set of regulations for the paramilitary units formed under its command and distributed it to ‘the relevant places.’ The order was written to provide information for the gang leaders and to those who needed it. It was quite important to uphold the secrecy of this order.18

It was decided in Istanbul that the gangs would be under the command of the army. In the Main Trial, Cevat Bey explained that the voluntary units (gangs) ‘carried out their duty under the army commanders.’ To the question of the presiding judge whether ‘the units of the Special Organization were completely bound by the orders of the army commanders,’ Cevat Bey, replied ‘Without a doubt, sir. They were parts of the army troops.’19 The organizing of the gangs was not limited to the Third Army. A document dated November 17, 1330 (1914) that was read in the Second hearing of the same trial, cited an earlier communication sent to the Army Corps 1,2,3,4 and 5, Army HQ in the Izmir region, and the other army commanders about organizing paramilitary units.20

Three Sources for Recruitment of the Gangs

The formation of the Special Organization in the region started in the second half of August. Three important sources were used for recruitment: Kurdish tribes, convicted prisoners, and immigrants from Caucasia and the Balkans. The task of organizing the gangs in the eastern region was given to Hilmi, a CUP inspector (müfettis) in the Erzurum region. A letter he sent to the leader of a Kurdish tribe, contains the following: ‘The time is about to come to deal with the problem we talked about in Erzincan...I want 50

brave [men] from you…I shall prepare everything for their convenience here…never mind if they are young or middle-aged men, as long as they are strong and determined and willing to sacrifice their lives for their country and nation…Upon first notice from us put them on their way… Only be prepared and keep Bahaettin S¸akir Beyefendi informed. For now, I submit my wishes and kiss your eyes. My brother Bahaettin Beyefendi also sends his regards.’21

The release of the prisoners who were to be the second source of the Special Organization was planned in August. The secretaries of the CUP who came to the region wrote in a report: ‘[It is necessary] to benefit from the prisoners in Trabzon Prison, to release them from prison, to form gangs with them under the command of officers, and assign the more notorious ones gang leadership.’22 The answer from Istanbul stated that, if necessary, the release of prisoners would be allowed.23 But even before the answer from Istanbul arrived, the release of prisoners began. The decision for this was taken at the beginning of September by the HQ of the Special Organization in Erzurum. The center in Erzurum, through intervention with official departments, secured the release of prisoners. Then the prisoners and the Kurdish leaders were recruited as gang members.24

The release of prisoners that started in Eastern Anatolia was later to be conducted throughout the whole country. It created a problem within the government that prisons were emptied without any such legislation having been issued, and the ministers in question were informed of the practice only after the fact. Thereupon, the Minister of Justice enacted a special amnesty.25 The Department of the Interior sent a message to all the regions. From a document belonging to the Bursa CUP that was read during the sixth session of the Main Trial, we understand that the relevant ministerial letter was sent on September 15.26

The third source of gang recruits was immigrants to Anatolia from the Balkans and Caucasia. In the Main Trial many telegrams were read to verify this. Telegrams sent by party secretary Musa Beg in Balikesir and the local CUP office in Bursa disclosed that on October 15, the Central Committee of the CUP issued a ‘secret order to the regions stating that one should take advantage of the immigrants when setting up the gangs.’27 A correspondence dated November 13 between the Special Organization and Mithat Sükrü, the Secretary General of the CUP, reveals that the gangs were established in different regions.28 The examples of telegrams read during the fifth and sixth sessions of the Tribunal were about correspondence directed to Secretary General Mithat Sükrü who, in turn, forwarded them to the Special Organization. 29

As we see, the gangs of the Special Organization were basically organized through Istanbul, and decisions as to where the gangs had to go

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were taken there. The HQ of the Special Organization and the Central Committee of the CUP did this in a coordinated manner. Locally, the formation of the gangs was the direct responsibility of the party secretaries (katibi mesul). In the telegram mentioned above, dated November 13 and originating from the Special Organization, it is demanded ‘that the people clandestinely recruited by the party secretaries in Izmit, Bursa, Bandirma, Balikesir and other relevant regions should be summoned and moved [to Istanbul] within a week.’30

This kind of correspondence and the testimonies of the defendants also reveal that the gangs either got their equipment and training in Istanbul or were sent directly to the regions. The CUP party secretary of Samsun, Rüstü, provides the information that the fifth gang that was formed in his region was sent by a motorized unit to its destination on November 16.31 The Austrian Consulate in Trabzon reported on November 8, 1914 that various gangs were being trained along the coast.32 In the fifth session of the Main Trial, Cevat testified that a special office was set up within the Department of Defense to deal with the equipment and training of those who came to Istanbul. During the same hearing, a telegram by Ismet Inönü, who at the time was working for the Department of Defense, was read. He had written it in the name of the Minister of Defense. The telegram mentions that those responsible for the recruitment and transport of the voluntary gangs formed by the immigrants from Macedonia and Thrace were acting under the orders of the army.33

First Actions of the Gangs

In August, soon after the formation of the gangs, military action in the interior of Russia started. According to the principle, ‘like the aim pursued abroad, there are people at home that also need to be liquidated,’ not only Russian troops were attacked but Armenian villages were raided. Looting and massacres counted as normal actions of the gangs. In a report Bahaettin S¸akir sent to Talât Pas¸a in September, he quite openly expresses the view that looting is taking place: ‘I’m inspecting our organization…I am quite confident. We gained experience and destroyed the Russian troops everywhere. So far we captured more than 1,000 sheep and up to 400 cows.’34 The actions of the gangs were not limited only to actions beyond the borders. Armenian villages in Eastern Anatolia were also subjected to looting and attacks. Some Turkish officers reported in their memoirs that they witnessed the raids, looting, and destruction of Armenian villages by the gangs which were organized by Bahaettin S¸akir for deployment in Russia.35

The actions were not restricted to attacks against villages. Armenian intellectuals and political and religious leaders were also among the targets

of attacks. One example is the action planned against the leading members of the Tashnak congress, which met in Erzurum in August 1914. The importance of this event is that Turkish and Armenian sources alike report that some leaders of the CUP, such as Bahaettin S¸akir, came to Erzurum to try to persuade the Tashnaks to carry out joint actions against the Russians. However, as the information above shows, the real intention of the trip to Erzurum by Bahaettin S¸akir and other leaders of the CUP, was to form the units of the Special Organization. In addition, the documents indicate that there was a plan to liquidate the Tashnak leaders. Bahaettin S¸akir informs Hilmi Bey, one of those responsible for the Special Organization in Erzurum, when the Tashnak leaders will depart from Erzurum. In his answer Hilmi states, ‘We have taken the necessary steps to deal with the persons whose departure date from Erzurum you informed us in a coded message…I have given the necessary instructions to seize them.’36

Arif Cemil, one of the responsible secretaries for this region, disclosed the contents of the telegram in his memoirs, adding that Bahaettin S¸akir wanted the leaders to be captured, or even better, to be liquidated en route. But the Armenians misled them and succeeded in escaping from the gangs.37 This example shows that the leaders of the CUP, already before the war, acted with the idea that ‘there are…also persons to be liquidated at home. In the memoirs, as well as in the reports of foreigners, one can find ample information on attacks against the Armenian population inside and outside the borders of the Ottoman Empire. The reports of German officers who served in the Special Organization gangs have a special importance.38

It was not only the Armenians who were subjected to attacks, looting, and massacres. Even if they did not reach the same level, Muslim villages were also subjected to attacks. These irresponsible and arbitrary actions were seen by the army as a serious problem. Thus, the relationship between the army and the Special Organization in the area deteriorated. The military success of the gangs in their actions between September and December 1914 partially overshadowed this problem. The gangs occupied Ardahan and went as far as Batum. But starting in December, defeats took the place of victories. The fact that Armenian volunteers helped the Russian units contributed heavily to the defeats in Caucasia and near Van.

Making the Decision for Genocide

Following the fiasco of the Special Organization’s operations in Caucasia and near Lake Van, there was another defeat at Sarikamis¸. This led the leaders of the CUP to review seriously the situation. The consecutive defeats destroyed their Pan-Turanist dreams and led to the loss of territory. One of the important problems that emerged during the implementation of

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the plan, was the power struggle between the Special Organization and the army. Actually, the question of who was to command operations in the regions was unresolved from the very beginning. This problem grew bigger with the defeats and irresponsible actions by the gangs, who attacked Muslims, as well as Christians, without distinguishing one from the other.

Arif Cemil said that ‘the fact that some commanders were in disagreement with the Special Organization stemmed from the lack of official notification about the structure of this organization.’39 The army believed that law and order in the region deteriorated because of the actions of the gangs. Erzurum’s Inspector Hilmi reported in a letter he sent to Bahaettin S¸akir on September 3 that near clashes arose between the guarding units of the army, augmented for security reasons, and the Special Organization.40 The German officer in the area, Colonel Stange, reported continuous friction between the gangs and the army due to lack of discipline and the actions of the gangs.41

The issue was not limited to the problems created by gang members who deserted. It was observed that in some regions the gangs operating as part of the army executed Muslim villagers or shot them in groups without questioning them, only because they had appeared ‘suspicious.’42 Based on this, the army argued that the gangs had to be either abolished completely or integrated into the regular army units. The wing of the Special Organization loyal to the CUP was absolutely opposed to this. They did not want to bring the gangs under the army’s command, saying ‘we have struggled and strived for such a long time. Now they want to take possession of the Special Organization.43

Before returning to Istanbul to report on the negative situation in the region, Bahaettin S¸akir attended a meeting where it was decided to release the Special Organization from control of the army, to put the gangs (‘individuals and groups’) directly under the control of the Erzurum HQ of the Special Organization, and to authorize them to operate autonomously. ‘Drafting of the programs should be left up to the local authorities. In particular local delegations should possess the necessary devices.’44

Hilmi, whom S¸akir had left as his second-in-command, sent telegrams to Istanbul on a daily basis demanding that ‘as long as there is no order to release the Special Organization from the control of the army, there is no sense in returning to the Caucasian front.’ These events occurred in February. Bahaettin S¸akir most likely went to Istanbul either at the end of that month or in March.45 The subject of discussion in Istanbul was not only the practical dimension of the relations between the army and the Special Organization; there would be basic changes in the duties of the Special Organization. ‘[Bahaettin S¸akir] was convinced that because of the Armenians’ attitude towards Turkey and the support they had given to the

Russian army, one had to be afraid of the internal enemy as much as of the enemy abroad.’46 The doctor, who came to possess some documents on the activities of the Armenians in the region, was trying to persuade his friends in Istanbul that it was necessary to eliminate this danger.47

There is a high probability that the actual decision for Genocide was taken during this set of meetings in Istanbul at the end of March. The leaders of the CUP reviewed the situation in the light of the new information they had received. As a result of these discussions ‘it was decided that Bahaettin S¸akir Bey should stay away from the responsibilities of the Special Organization’s activities concerning the enemies abroad and should deal only with the internal enemies.’48 Arif Cemil stated: ‘finally the deliberations resulted in the passage of the law on deportation.’ He continued: ‘By the time Dr Bahaettin S¸akir returned to the Caucasian front his assignment was completely clear.’49

All these documents indicate that in March a clandestine decision was made against the Armenians. Bahaettin S¸akir was tasked with the implementation of the decision. Ottoman-Turkish sources verify also that two decisions were taken during these deliberations, one on liquidation and one on deportation.

The Decision Was Made After Long Deliberations

There is ample evidence that the decision for a Genocide of the Armenians was made by the Central Committee of the CUP following intense discussions and deliberations. In the indictment of the Main Trial, the following information is provided: ‘The massacre and liquidation of Armenians were the result of decisions by the Central Committee of the CUP.’ These decisions were made as a result ‘of broad and deep discussions.’ In the indictment Dr Nazım is quoted as having said the following on the Armenian problem: ‘The Central Committee had intense deliberations to make a decision,’ and ‘this undertaking would solve the Eastern Question.’50

In the memoirs of Celal, the Governor of Halep (Aleppo), it is reported that the same words were transmitted to him by a deputy from Konya with ‘regards from a person of the Central Committee.’ The deputy who transmitted these words to Celal added that ‘in case he disagreed with their stance on this subject, they would do away with him.’51 The private secretary of the Department of the Interior, Ihsan Bey, testified that when he was the Kaimakam of Kilis, Abdu’lahad Nuri Bey, who was sent from Dersaadet (Istanbul) to Halep, admitted to him that the aim of the deportations was liquidation. Nuri said: ‘I was in touch with Talât Bey and received the orders for liquidation directly from him. Salvation of the

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country depends on it.’ With these words Nuri tried to persuade Ihsan Bey.52 In December 1918, in written testimony to the special Commission Investigating Sordid Affairs (established in 1918 in the Department of the Interior for investigating genocide) Vehip Pas¸a, the commander of the Third Army since February 1916, stated, ‘The massacre and annihilation of the Armenians and the looting and plunder of their properties were the result of

a decision of the Central Committee.’ According to the Pas¸a, the atrocities

were carried out under a program that was [specifically] determined upon and represented a definite case of premeditation... They [the atrocities] were made possible primarily through the involvement of Ittihat’s representatives and provincial central bodies [of the Party], and secondarily through higher governmental officials who, abandoning their conscience and discarding the law, allowed themselves to be co-opted by the Party and issued the necessary order.53

The Pas¸a added that state officials did not take any preventive measures, even though they saw and heard of these crimes. Furthermore, they incited further killings, which was one of the most important proofs that this operation was planned.54

In the reports of foreign consulates and embassies, particularly those of German officers, one can find statements indicating that the order for the deportation of Armenians by the CUP leaders was a well-thought-out plan to liquidate them.55 Clearly, the most definite statement on this subject was made by Talât Pas¸a to the Istanbul consul Mordtmann. Mordtmann quoted Talât in a report to Berlin: ‘The subject of the matter is…the liquidation of the Armenians.’56

It is further possible to conclude that the decision for deportation directly aimed at liquidation when one looks at the dismissals and even killings of officials who thought that the ‘deportation’ should merely involve resettlement. In addition, telegrams, which clearly point to this fact, were read during various hearings in the Istanbul trials, but mostly during the Yozgat trial, where, during the ninth session (February 22, 1919) 12 telegrams were read which made clear that the deportations meant liquidation and massacre.

For instance, in a telegram sent by Mustafa, commander of the Bogazliyan gendarmes detachment, to the Deputy Commander of Ankara’s Fifth Army Corps, Halil Recyai, on July 22 (August 5) 1915, it is reported that a group ‘of harmful Armenians gathered from the towns and countryside were sent on to their destination.’57 In his reply on the same day, Halil Recyai asked for the exact meaning of the word ‘destination.’58 In response, the commander of the gendarmerie stated that ‘the aforementioned Armenians were massacred because they are malicious.’59 In the same trial,