segregation_and_apartheid_in_twentieth_century

SEGREGATION AND APARTHEID

because of its political sensitivity) amply illustrates this point with reference to the Ciskei. One of the more unlikely of the independent homelands, based on a spurious geographical division of Xhosa-speakers between itself and Transkei, Ciskei’s nominated leaders lacked popular support in an area with a strong tradition of African nationalist politics. Attempts by the Ciskeian government to appropriate the symbols and historical sites of the old Xhosa chiefdoms largely failed and, after being granted independence in 1981, it increasingly resorted to naked repression (with the active assistance of the South African state).

Nevertheless, even if the idea of Ciskeian nationhood failed to take root at a popular level, this does not mean that ethnicity can simply be wished away. Murray’s comments on the tense politics of ethnicity on the peripheries of the Bophuthatswana homeland is a case in point. Above all, the growth of Chief Buthelezi’s Inkatha movement and the attractiveness of ethnic consciousness to many Zulu-speakers has demanded reconsideration of the explosive potential of local nationalisms and fragmented identities.32 Buthelezi initially presented himself as a leading opponent of apartheid and refused to take independent status for KwaZulu. But from the early 1980s he increasingly distanced himself from the mass nationalist opposition movements. Buthelezi looked instead to a more conservative black constituency and sought to secure a strong form of autonomy for a Zulu-dominated region. Whatever his popular support, the power of Inkatha’s local war-lords and its capacity to mobilize large groups of men placed chiefs and ethnicity firmly on the political and academic agenda.

Many recent analyses accept that apartheid was not a static system of racial division. Government commitment to white supremacy was sustained but the precise form of racial ideology and policy shifted significantly through the years. From the mid1970s a number of interrelated processes began to force more rapid reform. Soon after P.W.Botha came to power in 1978 he warned whites to ‘adapt or die’. The government sought to strengthen its links with the business community and black trade unions were legalized. Attempts were made to stabilize parts of the urban black population and to encourage the development of a black urban middle class. Botha introduced constitutional reforms in an effort to grant a limited political voice to the coloured and Asian communities and thereby to win their support.

18

INTRODUCTION

The reform era (1978–84) has been extensively analysed as a period when many basic tenets of apartheid were defended while the more extreme manifestations of social deprivation began to be addressed. The Afrikaner-controlled government made important symbolic concessions in the direction of deracialization, but it refused to relinquish political power. Undoubtedly, the changing international context contributed to reform. Up to the mid-1970s white rule was cushioned by the circle of settler and colonial states around it. In 1974, when a coup in Portugal—prompted not least by the costs of its colonial wars— displaced the Caetano dictatorship, decolonization in Angola and Mozambique followed rapidly. From the mid-1970s the war in Zimbabwe intensified and despite South African assistance, settler rule succumbed in 1979. International sanctions, though unevenly applied, began to bite.

In general, scholars have concentrated on domestic rather than external causes of reform. Consideration of these forces has to some degree contributed to a narrowing of the analytical divide between radicals and liberals, though some important differences remained, for example, over the desirability of external economic sanctions in the 1980s. Economic setbacks after the oil crisis of the mid-1970s played an important role in dissolving the certainties of apartheid. Merle Lipton’s sectoral analysis of the South African economy—a sophisticated development of liberal positions—led her to argue that new economic demands in themselves, and a greater realization by business and commercial interests of the costs of apartheid, were major instigators of change.33 The necessity of change was also stressed by a rising class of technocrats who readily absorbed Thatcherite and Reaganite ideology and developed their own variant of free-market anticommunism. Reformers eagerly adopted this combination of liberal economic policy and conservative social philosophy. But it soon became apparent that free-market approaches to labour, land and ownership could have explosive implications in a racially constituted economy like South Africa.

Radical scholars in the 1980s moved beyond the discussion of purely economic imperatives to reform and paid increasing attention to the crisis of political legitimacy following the renaissance of mass black opposition. The political scientist Sam Nolutshungu attempted to integrate these interrelated explanatory elements, examining changes in white society as well

19

SEGREGATION AND APARTHEID

as the powerful new forces unleashed by the black consciouness movement, industrial militancy and the independent trade unions.34 Economic growth over previous decades had also strengthened the position of urban black ‘insiders’, entrepreneurs and professionals. After the Soweto rebellion of 1976 it became increasingly difficult for the state to contain protest and insurrection. The deference which whites expected in the high apartheid years—and to some degree received—gradually gave way to a distinct culture of opposition, shaped in particular by the emergence of the black consciousness movement and the inspiring leadership of figures like Steve Biko. The reform era could thus be seen in most radical analyses as in large measure a response to black protest and the threat this posed to white political hegemony.

Further cycles of popular anger were provoked by the many acts of brutal oppression which accompanied Botha’s reforms. It was not least the violent reaction by the urban youth against those who looked to benefit from reform that eventually forced further compromise. The state mostly failed in its quest to find black urban allies who would take their place alongside homeland leaders. F.W.de Klerk’s dramatic release of Nelson Mandela from prison in February 1990, together with the unbanning of the ANC and other liberation movements, amounted to a recognition of the political stalemate. Nevertheless, it took more than four years of tortured negotiations and heightened levels of violence before a non-racial election could be held in April 1994 and power formally transferred.

Despite allegations of ballot-rigging in some regions, the overall results of South Africa’s first democratic election broadly reflected the spread of popular feeling. Contrary to expectations, the dramatic process engendered a remarkable sense of euphoria throughout South African society and its cathartic influence led to a significant decrease in levels of violence. The majority of African people supported the African National Congress, which won over 60 per cent of the total votes cast; most whites remained loyal to a reformed National Party which polled 20 per cent of votes overall. Coloured people in the Western Cape voted in sufficient numbers for the Nationalists to ensure their victory in that region. Inkatha secured about 10 per cent overall although the scale of their victory in KwaZulu/Natal region has led to suspicions of systematic electoral malpractice. Far right groupings, the liberal

20

INTRODUCTION

Democratic Party and the radical Pan-Africanists were all marginalized.

The demise of white rule is unlikely to signal the end of racial division, ethnic identity or economic inequality in South Africa. Although African people voted overwhelmingly for a party which sought to unite them and the country under a common non-racial nationalism, voting followed the lines of colour to a significant degree and Inkatha survived as a specifically Zulu force. The academic debate on these issues must remain central to historical writing on the country because the troubled conflicts which it addresses are by no means resolved; discussion helps to frame appropriate questions about political and ethical decisionmaking in the future as well as the past. Historical analysis of South Africa can also contribute to comparative understanding of colonial societies and racial division.

As a new majoritarian system of rule takes root, and nine regions replace the four provinces and ten homelands, both the locus of political power and the nature of social identities will be modified. New emphases in the explanation of segregation and apartheid are also likely to emerge. As this volume illustrates, the recent historiography of segregation and apartheid incorporates a variety of intellectual traditions. While there is by no means intellectual consensus, it may be possible to develop an overview that is sensitive to a number of approaches. It is clear that segregation and apartheid primarily served white interests. However, monocausal explanations elevating the Afrikaner heritage or the imperatives of a cheap labour supply are clearly inadequate in themselves, although both are of critical importance in clarifying the particular form taken by segregation and racial ideology in South Africa. To understand segregation and apartheid more fully, a wider range of historical and ideological reference points are required. These include the impact of modernity, the influence of social Darwinism and the metaphors, symbols and everyday assumptions that help to sustain notions of racial difference and political entitlement.

As important, any analysis of segregation must recognize that African societies in the region were conquered but never entirely dominated. Many fought to defend themselves from full incorporation into colonial and capitalist society. The balance of power in South African society, the nature of African responses, and the salience of ethnicity among blacks as well as whites must

21

SEGREGATION AND APARTHEID

be taken into account if the longevity and starkness of racial domination in South Africa is to be captured analytically.

NOTES

1We are grateful to Professor Shula Marks for her careful reading of a draft version of this introduction.

2For detail on this period, see R.Elphick and H.Giliomee (eds), The Shaping of South African Society, 1652–1840 (Longman, 1989). General histories of South Africa include: P.Maylam, A History of the African People of South Africa (Cape Town, 1986); The Reader’s Digest Illustrated History of South Africa (Cape Town, 1989); L.Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven, CT, 1990). B.Bozzoli and P.Delius (eds),

History from South Africa (New York, 1990), vol. 46/47 of the Radical History Review includes interesting historiographical surveys. See also W.Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (Oxford, 1994).

3A.Crosby, Ecological Imperialism (Cambridge, 1986), 139.

4G.M.Theal, The Yellow and Dark-Skinned People of Africa South of the Zambesi (London, 1910), 175, 174, 340–52.

5For example, C.F.J.Muller, 500 Years: A History of South Africa (Pretoria, 1969).

6For stimulating works looking comparatively at segregation in the United States and South Africa: S.Greenberg, Race and State in Capitalist Development (New Haven, CT, 1980); G.M.Fredrickson,

White Supremacy: A Comparative Study on American and South African History (New York, 1981); J.Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South

(Cambridge, 1982).

7C.W.de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, Social and Economic

(London, 1941), ch. 3; M.Legassick, ‘The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography’, in S.Marks and A.Atmore (eds), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa (London, 1980).

8S.Trapido, ‘“The Friends of the Natives”: Merchants, Peasants and the Political and Ideological Structure of Liberalism in the Cape, 1854–1910’, in Marks and Atmore (eds) Pre-Industrial South Africa.

9D.Welsh, The Roots of Segregation (Cape Town, 1971).

10S.Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa (Baltimore, MD, 1986), 5. See also Marks, Reluctant Rebellion (Oxford, 1970) and Chapter 4 in this volume.

11Legassick, ‘The Frontier Tradition’.

12See P.Delius, ‘Migrant Labour and the Pedi, 1840–80’, in Marks and Atmore (eds), Economy and Society; and P.Harries, ‘Kinship, Ideology and the Nature of Pre-Colonial Labour Migration’, in S.Marks and R.Rathbone (eds), Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture and Consciousness 1870–1930

(London, 1982).

13H.Bradford, A Taste of Freedom (New Haven, CT, 1987); W.Beinart and C.Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa (London, 1987).

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INTRODUCTION

14For a more extended analysis, see Marks, Ambiguities of Dependence;

W.Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860–1930 (Cambridge, 1982); Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles.

15R.H.Davies, Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa, 1900–1960

(Brighton, 1979); H.Wolpe, ‘Industrialism and Race in South Africa’, in S.Zubaida (ed.), Race and Racialism (London, 1970).

16For a fascinating fictional representation of this position, see Peter Abrahams, Mine Boy (London, 1946).

17P.Rich, White Power and the Liberal Conscience (Johannesburg, 1984); Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy; S.Dubow, Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36 (London, 1989).

18See C.van Onselen, ‘Race and Class in the South African Countryside: Cultural Osmosis and Social Relations in the Sharecropping Economy of the South-Western Transvaal, 1900– 1950’, American Historical Review, 95, 1 (1990), 99–123; C.Murray, Black Mountain (Edinburgh, 1992); T.J.Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa (Johannesburg, 1986).

19J.Cock, Maids and Madams (Johannesburg, 1980); C.van Onselen,

Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886– 1914, 2 vols (London, 1982).

20N.Etherington, ‘Natal’s Black Rape Scare of the 1870s’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 15, 1 (1988), 36–53; J.Krikler, ‘Social Neurosis and Hysterical Pre-Cognition: A Case-Study and Reflection’, South African Historical Journal, 28 (1993), 63–97.

21B.Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Harmondsworth, 1969).

22P.Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika (Middletown, CT, 1991).

23F.A.Johnstone, ‘White Prosperity and White Supremacy in South Africa Today’, African Affairs, vol. 69, issue 275 (1970), 124–40.

24S.Trapido, ‘South Africa in a Comparative Study of Industrialisation’, Journal of Development Studies, 7, 3 (1971), 309–20.

25R.Horwitz, Expand or Explode: Apartheid’s Threat to South African Industry (Cape Town, 1957); M.Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa 1910–1986 (Aldershot, 1985).

26T.Moll, ‘Did the South African Economy “Fail”?’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 17, 2 (1991), 271–91.

27D.Hindson, Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1987); D.Posel, The Making of Apartheid 1948– 1961 (Oxford, 1991).

28This argument was developed at the same time by John Lazar, whose work on the development of apartheid has only recently been published. See his ‘Verwoerd Versus the “Visionaries”: The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948– 1961’, in P.Bonner et al. (eds), Apartheid’s Genesis 1935–1962

(Johannesburg, 1993).

29See also Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Policy (Berkeley, CA, 1971).

30C.Desmond, The Discarded People: An Account of African Resettlement in South Africa (Harmondsworth, 1971); L.Platzky and C.Walker, The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1985).

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SEGREGATION AND APARTHEID

31See also Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles; Marks, Ambiguities of Dependence; L.Vail (ed.), The Creation of Tribalism in South Africa

(London, 1989).

32G.Maré and G.Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and South Africa (Johannesburg, 1987).

33Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid.

34Sam C.Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa (Manchester, 1982). See also John S.Saul and Stephen Gelb, The Crisis in South Africa, rev. edn (London, 1986); Stanley B.Greenberg, Legitimating the Illegitimate (Berkeley, CA, 1987).

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1

THE SANITATION

SYNDROME:

Bubonic plague and urban native policy in the Cape Colony, 1900–091

Maynard W.Swanson

Maynard Swanson, a historian based at Miami University, wrote this highly original article on the ‘sanitation syndrome’ in 1977. Drawing on a wide comparative international and Africanist historical literature, Swanson was concerned to show that public fears of epidemic disease were utilized by authorities in the early twentieth century to justify residential racial segregation in two of the Cape Colony’s chief cities, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. White colonial officials in these cities were deeply concerned about chaotic social and sanitary conditions in the urban areas, identifying Africans, ‘coloureds’ and ‘Malays’ as a threat to public health. Influenced by the rise of social Darwinist thought in Europe, they used fashionable biological and bodily imagery to justify class and racial separation in the social context and to rationalize white race prejudice. Underlying these fears was the imperative to manage a newly industrializing society and to maintain social control in the burgeoning cities. In this closely argued extract, Swanson therefore demonstrates how political and material interests interacted with ideological concerns in the construction of segregationist policy. He indicates, too, that the origins of modern segregation have to be sought in the context of the planning initiatives of the English-speaking (and socalled ‘liberal’) Cape Colony.

* * *

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MAYNARD W.SWANSON

The public health is the foundation on which repose the happiness of the people and the power of a country. The care of the public health is the first duty of a statesman.

Benjamin Disraeli In debate on Public Health Act, 1875

The thesis of this article is that medical officials and other public authorities in South Africa at the turn of this century were imbued with the imagery of infectious disease as a societal metaphor, and that this metaphor powerfully interacted with British and South African racial attitudes to influence the policies and shape the institutions of segregation. In previous articles this writer has suggested that urban public health administration was of considerable importance in accounting for the ‘racial ecology’ of South Africa and of colonial societies generally.2 Overcrowding, slums, public health and safety, often seen in the light of class and ethnic differences in industrial societies, were in the colonial context perceived largely in terms of colour differences. Conversely, urban race relations came to be widely conceived and dealt with in the imagery of infection and epidemic disease. This ‘sanitation syndrome’ can be traced as a major strand in the creation of urban apartheid. As disease and epidemiology became a widespread societal metaphor during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, other historical changes taking place in South Africa as elsewhere were leading to the evolution of segregationist ideology. In this context the accident of epidemic plague became a dramatic and compelling opportunity for those who were promoting segregationist solutions to social problems.

In a recent bibliographical essay, ‘Disease and Medicine in African History’, K.David Patterson has suggested that ‘studies of colonial medical efforts could tell us much about the attitudes, objectives, and priorities of European rulers’,3 but he does not discuss urban development. Some writers have touched upon the medical theme but almost no systematic urban history has been written from this perspective. The sanitation syndrome in the Cape Colony finds parallels in the broader context of new trends in social and cultural history outside Africa. In his presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1957, William L.Langer pointed out the possibilities of applying the insights of psychology to history and urged consideration of epidemic catastrophe as a trauma of historical significance.4 Similar themes

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THE SANITATION SYNDROME

are developed by Gareth Stedman Jones in his superb study Outcast London. Jones shows how London became after the 1850s a focal point for the deepening fears and anxieties of the Victorian élite about the endemic poverty and potential violence of the ‘casual labourer’. These twin phenomena were viewed in the image of contagion as a threat to Victorian expectations of progress and social order. Theorists eventually concluded that urbanism had developed a pathology which endangered society in Darwinist terms. Their prescriptions for social policy were influenced by epidemiology and sanitary science, but were also developed as an exercise in moral philosophy. The early approaches employed sanitary legislation to attack overcrowding and slums, which were identified as the ‘rookeries’ or haunts of a criminal class and the ‘hot beds’ of social decay, ‘cholera, crime, and chartism’. The general failure of urban renewal policies to eliminate the social problem led to later proposals—which were never realized in law—for reclaiming the ‘respectable’ working classes for progressive society while segregating the ‘residuum’ of ‘unregenerate poor’. The latter would be removed, by compulsion if necessary, to labour colonies outside the imperial metropolis. There social discipline might be instilled and the ‘imperial race’ be saved from contamination.5

That the responses to outcast London were not identical in origin or conception nor directly linked with the question of racial segregation in South Africa should not obscure their interest as analogues to the subject of the present article. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that the European background formed a major source of inspiration for the white response to social problems in Africa. In South Africa, especially in Natal and Transvaal, fear of epidemic cholera, smallpox and plague both roused and rationalized efforts to segregate Indians and Africans in municipal locations from the 1870s onward. The municipality of Durban, for example, attempted in the 1870s to establish an Indian location to remove the ‘breeding haunts and nursery grounds of disease, misery and discomfort’ with which Indian settlement was believed to menace the town. In the early 1890s Durban leaders tried again to impose municipal locations upon Indians in order to achieve, in the words of its Mayor, ‘the isolation with better hopes of cure of this our social leprosy’.6 In short, the metaphoric equation of ‘coolies’ with urban poverty and disease became a steady refrain of white opinion and a

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