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mole lacks good sight.
This is not the case in female animals. In fact,
Galen immediately follows with an extensive discussion of how the
internal reproductive system – which is supposed to be falling short – is
of great usefulness,
especially because a colder constitution can retain
nutriment better, which enables gestation. Galen’s exposition of the excel-
lence in the design of the female reproductive system has an odd result.
The female reproductive system does not fail in any way qua a reproduct-
ive system, and in this way, it is nothing like the eyes of moles. It exhibits
functional excellence, just like all the other systems. The only respect in
which the female reproductive system fails is by not being male. This is a
normative failure, not a functional one. It has been pointed out by Rebecca
Flemming that Galen’s (mis)treatments of women as epistemic agents is
not necessarily a result of making judgements about the gender but rather
a reference to the dominant cultural norms.
Presumably, cultural
assumptions about gender roles can explain the somewhat incoherent
approach to reproduction too.
Despite not being an outstanding example of Galen’s analytical prowess,
this argument proves to be revealing when put against the background of
his theoretical understanding of parthood. A female animal, according to
him, lacks a part normatively. At the same time, the lack of this part not
only does not interrupt activities but, in fact, aids them. The gestation
could not take place successfully if the female constitution were not
imperfectly cold. When this point is combined with the claims in thera-
peutic treatises – much less culturally and politically charged – Galen
appears to acknowledge the normative failure while warning very explicitly
against prioritising it above activity or function. This sentiment is echoed
in other treatises too. He writes about the shape of the organ as the
structure that enables the activity of that organ numerous times.
In On
the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, for example, Galen prioritises
functionality over shape, writing that the essence is not tissues and
Aristotle de An. . (a–); Metaph. . (b). It is also surprising not to find Galen
adding that the construction of the eyes in moles is, in fact, a greatly beneficial design for an animal
that lives underground. This argumentative strategy is so consistently reiterated throughout the
treatise, that its absence is noticeable. Perhaps the distinctly anthropocentric focus could account for
that; UP . (. Helmreich¼.K) is a notable example of Galen portraying the constitution
of apes as inferior in principle.
UP . (.– Helmreich¼.–K).
Flemming (: –).
Although it is worth bearing in mind that, as Flemming (: ) notes, ‘in none of these cases,
however, is the concern to naturalise the conventions of the Roman sexual order, but rather to bring
these conventions to bear on nature’.
For example, UP . (. Helmreich¼.–K), see esp. the conclusion in lines –; Loc. Aff.
.. Gärtner (.K); see also the case of the brain in Cur. Rat. Ven. Sect. (.–K).
Galen on Parts
arrangements, but actions and uses; in effect, he emphasises the functional
aspect over the normative.
Thus, Galen fully commits to the view that nature’s design is nothing
but excellent, and even when it seems to fall short, it is, in fact, accom-
plishing significant tasks. His commitment to design theory has been
thoroughly explored in the scholarship,
and his views on the imperfect
reproductive system are a reflection of those beliefs. However, the strong
emphasis on the functional excellence could also be influenced by his
immediate medical context. As Soranus reports in his Gynaecology, the
claim that women have different natures (e.g., colder kraseis) became
contested by various fashionable doctors in the Hellenistic period.
Herophilus, for instance, claimed that the only women-specific medical
facts are the ones concerning the reproductive system. Asclepiades of
Bithynia appears to reject any difference as well, and Soranus explicitly
contrasts their position with the Aristotelian view.
It is significant that
Soranus mentions Herophilus and Asclepiades specifically. These two
doctors have hardly anything in common otherwise,
so naming these
two figures shows that the view was held by a wide range of doctors, not
just members of one specific school.
It seems likely that, by the time Galen was active, Aristotle was,
deservedly or not, associated with the view that the female gender necessi-
tates a certain physiological constitution, inferior to the male one. This
view was, furthermore, understood to contrast with the views of celebrated
Hellenistic doctors. Galen is polemically engaged with both Aristotle and
some of these doctors. In fact, On the Usefulness of Parts not only presents a
criticism of Aristotle’s understanding of the reproductive system but also
critiques of such figures as Anaxagoras and Asclepiades.
However, it is
PHP ..– de Lacy (.–K). There is a similar concept of ‘functional’ parthood in modern
mereology. However, given that modern mereology is committed to principles and methods that
are very different from ancient preoccupations, my use of this term only refers to Galen’s
conceptualisation.
See, for example, van der Eijk () and Hankinson ().
Soranus Gyn. .. Ilberg.
Asclepiades notoriously denied the existence of the hēgemonikon, see Sextus Empiricus M ..;
Caelius Aurelianus ... See Tertullian, De anim. . (Waszink) for the anatomically
motivated argument against its existence that clearly targets both the cardiocentrists and the
encephalocentrists, Herophilus being the most prominent of them (as discussed in the chapter on
the nervous system). For Herophilus’ encephalocentrism, see von Staden (: –). The most
substantial work on Asclepiades is Vallance (), although see also Leith () and Polito
().
Anaxagoras (UP . (., Helmreich¼.K)), Asclepiades and the Epicureans (UP . (.,
– Helmreich¼.K)) are all mentioned in the very first book of the UP. See also Galen’s
attack of Asclepiades regarding the explanation of why the vein is arterial, and the artery is veinous
discussed in Chapter .
. The Imperfection of Parts
quite clear that the two positions are not equally faulty: the former is much
less so than the latter. Galen positions himself against the atomistic
understanding of the body and often assigns a respectable Peripatetic
pedigree to his own views. The treatise itself, after all, is dedicated to a
Peripatetic Boethius.
At the same time, the ‘traditional’ view associated
with Aristotle comes with a possible risk of being perceived as too old-
fashioned, given the progress of medical tradition in the Hellenistic period.
Galen’s strong emphasis on the high functional value of the female
reproductive system allows him to navigate this rhetorical Scylla and
Charybdis. He commits to the Peripatetic view on the female constitution
(female animals do have different mixtures) but adds a claim about its high
functionality, which puts him in more direct conversation with the doctors
knowledgeable of and invested in the Hellenistic medical discoveries and
theoretical preoccupations. Galen both distances himself from certain
Aristotelian views (most notably, regarding the existence of the female
seed) and reinvents others (the female krasis) for his own purposes in his
contemporary debates. The interesting consequences of such polemic
manoeuvring is that Galen is no less influenced by the Hellenistic doctors,
including such figures as Asclepiades, than by Aristotle.
. Functional and Normative Parthood
There is a notable consistency between Galen’s approach to the imper-
fections of the body, whether they are imperfections of the innate consti-
tution or imperfections of shape. Neither the sixth finger nor the
inherently cold mixture of the female body is something that needs to be
fixed; they are not ‘against nature’ per se and, therefore, not a concern to
medicine. What medicine does concern itself with is activity, and imper-
fections are only important when they affect the functioning of the body.
Therefore, the Galenic understanding of human nature puts a strong
emphasis on functionality of the activities.
This point helps to explain why certain parts are expendable while
others are not. The chapter started with the curious claim that the loss
of bone is, effectively, more disruptive to the body than the loss of the
stomach, because it destroys the activity. Key to explaining this
Lib. Prop. . (, –, Boudon–Millot¼.–K), for further discussion, see
Hankinson (b).
Galen’s inspiration here could very well be Aristotelian. The activity bears ontological significance
in the works of the latter too, for example, in de An. . (b–), which famously argues that
the eye that no longer sees is an eye only homonymously, not properly.
Galen on Parts
surprising claim is Galen’s prioritisation of functional over normative
parthood. The key question in determining the results of a loss of a part
is whether the part has a unique activity or if it shares the type of activity it
performs with another part. The difference can now be explained by the
roles each of these parts play in their respective anatomical location, and
the four-fold division of body parts in the Art of Medicine is useful for
clarification. Some discrete parts are self-sufficient in their activities, while
others are not. The bone belongs to the group that Galen describes as the
organs with innate capacities that are neither governed by nor govern any
other parts. This means that it functions by virtue of properties that are
entirely self-contained. The stomach, meanwhile, is a structured organ.
It means that its activity relies both on its homoeomerous tissues and on
the veins, nerves and arteries.
Veins especially are c rucial, as they connect the stomach to the liver, which
is the actual overseer of nutrition. The nutr itive system, as Galen notes in On
the Natural Capacities, is comprised of many organs because food has to be
converted into blood by stages. The stomach, th us is not simply a part of the
bodylikeaboneis;itisalsoasub-partofthe nutritive activity. As nutrition is
takencareofbymultipleorgans,thelossofastomachcanbecompensated
by the fact that the other organs keep on performing related activities.
Whereas the ‘activity’ of a bone is lost when that bone is damaged, the
activity of nutrition can be compensated by other parts.
The compensation mechanism can also take place via the doubling of
the parts, as Galen notes in Book of On the Usefulness of Parts, when
discussing the head anatomy. Having noted that it is better that there are
two lateral ventricles because there are two downwards-leading channels
and sense instruments are paired, he explains that the main usefulness of
paired instruments is the possibility to maintain activity through one if
another one if injured.
The first priority of the design of the human
body is, after all, the maintenance of the activity, and the significance of
parts is determined in reference to the activity.
Consequently, by identifying an organ with one of the four categories of
parts, it is possible to calculate how much damage to life and health the
loss of that organ will cause. The principles are most important when it
As long as the liver is active; but the liver has a special status as the seat of one of the principles, so
qua a body part, it is different from simple structured organs such as the stomach.
UP . (., – Helmreich¼.–K), esp.: ἀλλ’ ἥ γε πρώτη τε καὶ κοινοτάτη πάντων
τῶν διφυῶν ὀργάνων ἥδ’ ἐστίν, ἵν’, εἰ καὶ θάτερον αὐτῶν πάθοι, τὸ λοιπὸν ὑπηρετοῖ.
. Functional and Normative Parthood
comes to vitality.
The loss of them will undercut any functioning of all
the other parts.
The capacities of the self-sufficient tissues, although
simple, are irreplaceable. The structured organs (the ones that are not
principles), meanwhile, are somewhat replaceable, to the extent that simi-
lar organs in the same system can compensate for their activity. Finally,
there are body parts that have no capacities, only reproduction. As these do
not perform any action as such, they are quite expendable. The regular loss
of hair and nails illustrated this well.
Galen’s four-fold division of parts, thus, illuminates an interesting
equilibrium. The systematic constitution of human animals renders them,
on the one hand fragile, because a loss of one part can be highly dangerous,
(and they have very many parts that can be damaged). On the other hand,
human animals are also reasonably sturdy, because the systematicity of
some of their organs allows the activities of that system to continue while a
part is lost. This means that, although human beings have a multitude of
parts, it is only in a few cases that damage to a part results in the loss of life.
. Concluding Remarks: The Problem of Unity
The emerging picture shows Galen’s interest in approaching the human
body not just as a static combination of parts but also as a hierarchy of
activities carried out by those parts. In Galenic physiology, it is important
to know not only that certain parts make up certain organs but also how
those parts are connected both to each other and to other organs, as well as
how these connections enable them to fulfil their activities. The notion of
governance plays a key role in determining the relationship that one part
has with another. Whether a part only self-manages, both self-manages
and is governed or governs determines how irreplaceable its activity is. The
application of these notions is wide-ranging, and they will continue
In yet another kind of division of parts, Galen explains that while some parts are crucial for life
itself (the brain, the heart and the liver), others are created simply for improving life; see UP .
(.–, Helmreich¼.K); . (., Helmreich¼.K); see also AA . (
Garofalo¼.K). He classifies all the organs into three categories according to their purpose:
those for the sake of living, those for the sake of living well and those for the sake of reproduction.
Galen takes the sensory organs (the eyes, the ears and the nostrils, to be precise) to be a condition
for living well, not just living.
The notion of a vital part (in the sense that damage to it results in death) is also present in the
Hippocratic corpus, but the lists of vital parts are different, see Morb. . (., – Littré) for
the list that includes the brain, the spinal medulla, the cavity, the liver, the diaphragm, the blood
vessel, the heart; and Aph. . (.– Littré) for the bladder, the brain, the heart, the
diaphragm, intestines, the cavity, the liver. See Singer () for a study of Galen’s dubious
claim in PHP that the notion of the three governing parts is Hippocratic.
Galen on Parts
reappearing in the remainder of this study. The importance of this division
of parts can hardly be overstressed: it explains how life can continue when
some parts of a body are damaged (or missing altogether) and why the loss
of some parts is much more harmful than the loss of others. Ultimately, it
is a very helpful tool for understanding what makes a body one.
There is a strong emphasis on the activities of parts in reference to
vitality in particular. The case of (im)perfect parts and constitutions
illustrates this point well: the normative imperfection does not necessarily
need to be fixed, as long as it does not threaten life, and other types of
imperfections, such as the constitution of the female reproductive system,
is even desirable, as its flaws are in fact useful features, enabling
reproduction.
Understanding how Galen theorises human nature, it follows, requires
centring the discussion around the question of how parts come together to
perform vital functions, such as nutrition or respiration. These functions
are underpinned by the activities not of single parts but of the entire
physiological systems ruled by their respective governing parts: the liver,
the heart and the brain. The following three chapters are dedicated to the
systems that these organs govern: the parts that they consist of, the
activities they carry out and their overall significance. Special attention
will be paid to the question of how each system renders a living being
unified and how the two animal-only systems (the nervous and the cardiac)
built on the vegetative system, with profound mutual effects. In Chapter ,
the discussion turns to the question of how these three governing parts and
their respective systems that seemingly have an equal status form a single
coherent physiological system. In other words, having discussed how
Galen ‘takes the body apart’ by dividing it conceptually into various parts,
the rest of the work is the study of how he puts it back together, one vital
process at a time, with the emerging Galenic account of human nature
and vitality.
. Concluding Remarks: The Problem of Unity
Nutrition, Growth and Vegetative Capacities
In most contexts, the distinction between living and non-living things is
easily made and so obvious that it hardly bears thinking about it. However,
there are cases that blur the line, for example, very complex automata or
single-cell living organisms. In antiquity, it is not the latter but ordinary
plants that are taken to be the simplest entities that pass the threshold of
vitality. At the beginning of On the Natural Capacities, Galen states that
sensation and voluntary motion are specific to animals, while growth and
nutrition are also observable in plants. The former are the effects of the
soul, while the latter are the effects of nature.
He goes on to claim that
animals are governed both by nature and the soul.
This treatise focuses on
the effects of nature, examining how growth and nutrition take place.
In Galenic physiology, these activities are treated as fundamentally vital,
and they represent the distinguishing features of living beings.
These processes, common to humans, animals and plants, are
governed by the vegetative soul.
In this respect, Galen adopts elements
of the prominent philosophical traditions without making very nuanced
Nat. Fac. . (, – Helmreich¼.K); see also Loc. Aff. ..–.. Gärtner (.–K),
spelling out the difference between the natural capacities as being innate to the organs and the
psychic capacity as flowing from elsewhere, like sunlight; see Hankinson (: –). This passage,
as well as the other texts discussed in this section, might pose a problem for the interpretation of
Galen as a Stoically leaning physicalist, discussed in the Introduction. The similarity between the
Stoics and Galen lies in Galen’s ‘belief that matter can be analysed, ultimately, in terms of a complete
fusion or mixture of elements and that this mixture provides the basis for the inbuilt vitality of
natural entities. This postulate of inbuilt vitality underlies, in turn, Galen’s conception of living
things as coherent complexes of natural faculties or capacities’ (Gill : ). While Gill’s
emphasis on the connection between natural capacities and vitality must be correct (the discussion
in Chapters and will also lead to similar conclusions), this passage shows Galen distinguishes
between the natural capacities and the soul capacities, so the former do not account for all the
capacities a human body has. The so-called higher-order capacities of the brain cannot be accounted
for by the natural capacities, as I later argue.
Nat. Fac. . (, – Helmreich¼.K).
See Holmes (: –).
It also could be called ‘nutritive soul’ and ‘nature’; for the sake of clarity and consistency, I mostly use
this term.
differentiations, and his tendency to present certain differences in ter-
minology (and even concepts) as merely verbal disagreement is well-
known, even if puzzling.
For example, he often conflates the Platonic
notions of the desiderative soul and the Aristotelian nutritive soul with-
out referring to the crucial difference, viz. the acts of desire.
Similarly, at
the beginning of On the Natural Capacities,hewritesthatitdoesnot
matter whether one calls the entity in question ‘nature’ (φύσις)or
‘nutritive soul’ (θρεπτική ψυχή) because neither of the terms is revealing
enough of what is at stake, which reduces the difference between the
Stoics and Peripatetics to a verbal dispute.
Despiteaconvoluted
approach to the preceding tradition, Galen ’sownfocusisclearenough:
the two fundamental activities that separate the living from the non-
living are nutrition and growth.
In highlighting nutrition and growth as the threshold for vitality, Galen
is in line with Aristotle’s account of lower and higher soul-activities. In
Book of On the Soul, Aristotle clearly delineates nutrition as the basic
capacity of living things, noting that it can be separated from more
advanced capacities, such as thinking, perception, movement, rest and so
on, but the latter cannot be separated from it. It indicates that these
capacities are common and necessary for something to be considered
living; but for an entity to be considered a living animal, it must possess
the capacity for sensation too.
Furthermore, nutrition also allows plants to
grow, that is, to expand spatially.
Galen names these two activities as basic
attributes of the vegetative life too, presumably following Aristotle’ s analy-
sis of the basic vitality.
See Hankinson (b).
see Holmes (:n).
UP . (., – Helmreich¼.K). The ones identifying this entity with nature are the
Stoics, PHP .. de Lacy (.K); Form. Foet. , Nickel (.K). See also Ps. Galen Int. .
(, – Petit¼.K¼SVF .¼LS N). The nutritive soul is an Aristotelian term (de
An. . (a)). Hankinson (a:n) points out that Galen sides with the Stoics in allocating
the vegetative capacities to nature rather than the soul, as Peripatetics do. See also von Staden (:
): ‘it is historically plausible that Chrysippus’ radical distinction between nature and soul,
between physis and psyche, was prompted by Herophilus’ distinction between “physic and
natural” capacities within a living being’; Galen may have known this distinction from
Herophilus too. However, see Leith () for the argument that Herophilus most likely posited
four capacities of the body. Regardless of the provenance of nomenclature, I argue later in this
chapter that the conceptual apparatus that Galen employs to account for the generative power of
these capacities is, predominantly, Peripatetic.
de An. . (a–b).
de An. . (a–).
Although Plato Ti. A is probably a relevant background too. Furthermore, Galen also takes it that
sense perception and voluntary motion are higher, animal-level activities. The exact nature of this
distinction as made by Galen is a matter of debate in the scholarship; see note .
Nutrition, Growth and Vegetative Capacities
However, Aristotle also takes reproduction and nutrition to originate
from the same psychic power.
Galen does not identify reproduction as an
activity of the vegetative soul at the beginning of On the Natural
Capacities, although the vegetative soul does oversee the regeneration of
tissues and the generation of an embryo.
On one occasion, he even
claims the vegetative soul, not the pneuma in the seed, is the demiurge of
an embryo.
Section . will address the problem of the generative power
of the vegetative soul by outlining the cases in which it manifests itself and
in which it does not arguing that, ultimately, Galen assigns a minor
generative role to these capacities. Before turning to this problem, the
chapter will discuss another divergence from Aristotle: the very Platonic
emphasis on the liver as the seat of the vegetative soul. A careful outline of
its activities as a governing part, as well as the parts that it governs, shows
that Galen reflects on vitality in a coherent and nuanced way, even if he
does not always provide all the answers one might wish. This chapter starts
with the anatomy that underpins the physiological domain of the vegeta-
tive soul and its activity, nutrition. Then the discussion delves into a more
minute analysis of natural capacities that enable these activities on both
self-managing parts and the governing principal part, before turning to the
discussion of generative aspects of these capacities and the Galenic notion
of nature as a demiurge. The conclusion draws the insights together,
explaining how the presence of the vegetative capacities unifies a living
being in a fundamental way.
. The Seat of the Vegetative Soul and Its Anatomy
Chapter covered the odd case of Galen arguing that the loss of a bone is
more damaging than the loss of a stomach. The explanation for this claim
turned out to be the fact that the stomach is subordinate to the liver. The
liver, furthermore, is one of the principal organs with the capacity to
govern (ἅρχειν) other parts, according to the four-fold division of parts
discussed in Chapter . He assigns a Platonic pedigree to this understand-
ing of the liver’s significance, although Plato’s Timaeus is, in fact, more
vague and only talks about the region in which the vegetative soul is
de An. . (a).
See, for example, Sem. ..– de Lacy (.–K), which will be discussed later.
Sem. .. de Lacy (.K) and .. de Lacy (.–K).
Nutrition, Growth and Vegetative Capacities
located.
Galen’s main argument that it is the liver specifically can be
found in Book of On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. At the
beginning of this book, he states that, having proven that the spirited soul
is located in the heart and the rational one in the brain, he is setting out to
prove the location of the third, the vegetative soul. It is much harder,
however, to demonstrate this point than the previous two. This proof
follows not from the nature of the things investigated but from the
properties peculiar to them. He illustrates the difficulty by reminding his
readers that when the nerves are cut, the parts connected to the brain
retain their capacities (dunameis), while the parts below the ligature lose
them. The same is the case with arteries. They lose pulse once they are
separated from the heart by ligature.
It is not possible, however, to
perform the same type of demonstration by cutting veins, the offshoots
of the liver. This governing part is not a source of clearly perceivable
motion, and its injury produces harm very slowly, as it takes time to affect
nutrition and colouring.
Galen’s project also has a polemical aspect: he is attacking the accounts
that attribute the activities of the liver, such as blood production, to the
heart. In order to show that the liver is the hēgemon, he develops a multi-
step argumentative strategy, with the key claim that the liver is a source of
the same kind of capacity that is also present in plants.
A comparison to
plants turns out to be a significant explanatory device, and it plays an
important role in the first step, that is, showing that the liver – and not the
heart – is the source of veins.
He describes the growth of a tree from a
seed to a large plant and points out that its roots are always the ‘mouths’
through which the plant feeds.
Then he describes the animal body using
this very same pattern. He first compares arteries, the offshoots from the
heart, to the branches growing from the trunk of a tree. The arteries
drawing air from the lungs are said to be like plant roots drawing
Ti. E; Hankinson (a: ) notes that ‘Galen’s Platonising is neither slavish nor unthinking’,
as it comes with adaptations as well as the adoption of Peripatetic and Stoic elements when it
is useful.
PHP ..– de Lacy (.K).
PHP ..– de Lacy (.K).
PHP .. de Lacy (.K). For an extensive study of this claim as well as its Hippocratic pedigree,
see Holmes (). Plato’s Ti. E–E is also relevant background here (see the later discussion
for Galen’s interpretation of the claim about plant sensory capacities). See also Nat. Fac. . (–,
Helmreich¼.K), where Galen describes the genesis as starting with the casting of the seed
either into the womb or into the earth, as there is no difference. His claim there is that the initial
genesis is of the same kind in plants and animals.
PHP .. de Lacy (.K).
PHP ..– de Lacy (.–K).
. The Seat of the Vegetative Soul and Its Anatomy