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Hippocrates and Plato passage. Furthermore, in Differences of Diseases,
Galen divides the composition and construction of the body into three
kinds: of homoeomeries (arteries, veins, nerves, etc.), of structured parts
(the brain, the heart, the lungs, etc.) and of the body as a whole. He notes
that the differentiae of flesh qua flesh arise from only the combination of
primary elements; but when flesh is a part of a structured part, the
differentiae arise from construction and size (παρά τε τὴν διάπλασιν καὶ
τὸ μέγεθος).
Thus, he consistently describes the distinguishing features
of the structured parts as grounded in size and construction, nothing more
than μορφή. Galen appears to claim that the structured parts have εἶδος in
this text, while in others that they are described as having μορφή.
Is there inconsistency in Galen’s use of the term εἶδος in reference to
parts? Arguably, no. The comparison between homoeomerous/structured
parts to the soul can, and perhaps ought to, be read as referring not to the
differentiation of parts but to the differentiation of the ways in which parts
constitute wholes. In the passage, he is making a subtle distinction
between a part qua part and qua form. The souls according to him are
both parts and forms. They are parts, because they constitute the whole
person. Thus, a part denotes the simplest constitutive relationship: if A is
made up of B, C, D, then these are the parts of A. But it is not always
enough to know what parts there are. Sometimes, it is also necessary to
know how the parts constitute the whole,
and this is where the notion of
the form comes in. Although the term εἶδος has significant metaphysical
baggage, Galen uses it here in a rather specific sense, as the foundation of
distinctive kind-identity. It grounds the difference between two kinds of
homoeomerous tissues. The description of some tissue as a part tells us that
it forms part-whole relationship with the body and the description of the
same tissue as a form tells us how it forms that relationship, that is, as a
distinctively identifiable part.
The comparison to the division of parts into homoeomerous and
structured illustrates this point and serves to introduce different relation-
ships of constitution. Homoeomerous tissues can be divided endlessly,
with each new division sharing the same properties with all the others.
Morb. Diff. (.K).
For current purposes, I focus on the metaphysical aspect of Galen’s claim, but it certainly has a
psychological implication too, for which see Hankinson (a); Mansfeld (: –);
Schiefsky (); Tieleman (a: –).
Galen says this explicitly later in the text, after supplying a number of passages from Plato’s Republic
and Timaeus supporting this interpretation. PHP ..– de Lacy (.–K) ὅτι μηδ’ ἐγχωρεῖ
λέγειν μηδὲν σύνθετον ὁμοιομερές, ἑαυτῷ γε <μὴ> συνεχὲς ὅλον ὑπάρχον· ἐξ ὡρισμένων γὰρτὸν
Galen on Parts
Furthermore, two numerically distinct portions of homoeomerous matter
constitute the whole in the same way. Their status as parts is exactly the
same. The sub-parts of a structured part are different in form. The vein and
the bone (or the spirited and the rational soul, for that matter) are parts in
adifferent sense, they play different roles qua parts of the same whole,
owing to their difference in form.
This distinction is significant for Galen’s argument that the soul is
tripartite: there are three entities that constitute the human soul qua parts
and they are three in kind qua forms. The soul is like a structured part, it is
divisible into parts with discrete identities, and this fact grounds the
tripartition. If the soul were like a homoeomerous part, its parts would
have no distinct discrete identity: it could, in principle, be divisible into
three, five or ten parts, but this division would not be meaningful since
nothing would separate them from each other substantially. For all intents
and purposes, the soul would be unitary.
The distinction between forms and parts and, less directly, the division
into homoeomerous and structured parts play a significant role in theoris-
ing the tripartition, one of the major preoccupations of Galen’s. I will
come back to the notion of form in the final chapter of this work, where
I look at the ways in which it plays the role of unifying bodily activities.
In this context, however, it is a tool for dividing the soul in a very
particular way, that is, into distinctive parts or kinds. In this way, the
division of parts into structured and homoeomerous, despite its apparent
simplicity, serves as a crucial conceptual tool for motivating other theoret-
ical divisions of the body.
There is another significant aspect to this bipartite division that renders it,
in a certain sense, fundamental to thinking about the body: it is non-
reductive. Given his choice to describe structured parts as differentiated by
size and structure in Differences of Diseases, one might wonder if ascribing
διάπλασις and size, rather than form, to these parts suggests that they are
ἀριθμὸν σύγκειται μορίων· οὐδενὸςδὲ/ὁμοιομεροῦς ἀριθμῷ περιλαβεῖν ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
μορίων.
Galen also shows some affinity to the Aristotelian approach to homoeomerous parts, cf. Aristotle PA
.–, especially . ( b–a), where he discusses how homoeomerous tissues differ in
kind with an example of blood. See also GC . (a–), which describes homoeomerous
tissues (bone, flesh, etc.) as entities in which whole and part are synonymous.
This would also mean that such souls do not have activities that are distinct from each other; the
notion of the form, therefore, must be closely related to activity. Galen could, in principle,
introduce the notion of instrument in the context of this discussion, because each of the souls
performs a complete activity, and so they have both distinctive forms and activities. However, given
that he is commenting on Plato’s use of the terms ‘part’ and ‘form’ in reference to the souls, it is not
surprising that he does not address the question of souls as instruments as well.
. Homoeomeries, Structured Parts and Forms
derivative. After all, the form is notably associated with substantial identity
in ancient philosophy. But when he talks about the differentiae of parts, he
seems to emphasise a difference in activity, not in fundamentality. In fact,
the prominence of this division precisely indicates that it is, in some way,
pinpointing important non-reducible differences. Ultimately, in Galen we
find the idea that the activities of the structured organs cannot be reduced to
homoeomerous parts and these parts cannot account for the activities of the
structured organs. The differences between the two types have significant
consequences for medical practice. In order to understand human physi-
ology, a Galenic doctor needs to understand two types of ‘behaviour’:the
‘behaviour’ of homoeomerous tissues qua their mixtures and the ‘behaviour’
of structured organs qua their shape and structure.
The latter parts are
designed to perform certain activities in a set way. The size of the offshoots
from the stomach, for example, is directly dependent on whether it is useful
to permit a passage of coarse food or whether only digested matter ought to
be allowed.
The homoeomerous tissues, which constitute the structured
organs, are designed to perform a range of activities deriving from the four
natural capacities that underpin such functions as nutrition and growth of all
living beings. They will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
It is surprising that Galen did not adopt the terminology for distinguish-
ing the portions of homoeomeries and the sub-parts of discrete parts,
denoted by morion and meros, respectively, and instead chose to criticise
it as superfluous.
After all, it could be utilised very effectively together
with his own distinction between parts qua parts and parts qua forms.
Presumably, his interest in distinguishing proper activities from other
types, quite evident in his critique of the terminology, motivates the
rejection of this terminology. And, in fact, his four-fold division of parts,
much less known than the distinction between homoeomerous and struc-
tured parts, shows quite explicitly that he envisions the hierarchical div-
isions of the body according to their proper activities.
. The Four-fold Division
This little-discussed classification can be found in a short treatise Art of
Medicine. Having stated the signs of the best constitution, Galen starts the
The most extensive discussion is in On Mixtures, which begins with the claim that mixtures of hot,
cold, wet and dry are not the same in every case, see Temp. . (– Helmreich¼.K).
UP . (.– Helmreich¼ .–K) .
MM . (.–K). This passage is cited and discussed in Section ..
Galen on Parts
discussion of the constitutions that fall short of the ideal. He notes that he
has already written about the signs of a diseased body in On the Best
Constitution of Our Bodies in regard to genus,
and in Art of Medicine he is
going to write about them in terms of species (κατ’ εἶδος). Before doing so,
he sets out the division of parts as follows:
τέσσαρες δ’ αὐτῶνεἰσιν αἱ πᾶσαι διαφοραί· τὰ μὲνγὰραὐτῶν ἀρχαί τινές
εἰσι· τὰ δὲἀπ’ ἐκείνων ἐκπέφυκε· τὰ δὲ οὔτ’ ἄλλων ἄρχει τῆς διοικήσεως,
οὔθ’ ὑπ’ ἄλλων ἄρχεται, συμφύτους ἔχοντα τὰς διοικούσας αὐτὰ δυνάμεις·
ἔνια δὲ συμφύτους τε ἅμα καὶἐπιῤῥύτους ἔχει· ἀρχαὶ μὲνοὖνεἰσιν
ἐγκέφαλος, καρδία, ἧπαρ, καὶὄρχεις· ἀπ’ ἐκείνων δ’ ἐκπέφυκε, κἀκείνοις
ὑπηρετεῖ, νεῦρα μὲνκαὶ νωτιαῖος μυελὸς ἐγκεφάλῳ, τῇ καρδίᾳ δὲἀρτηρίαι,
φλέβες δὲἥπατι, τὰ σπερματικὰ δὲἀγγεῖατοῖς ὄρχεσιν· αὐτὰ δὲ αὑτὰ
διοικεῖ χόνδρος, ὀστοῦν, σύνδεσμος, ὑμήν, ἀδήν, πιμελή, σὰρξ ἁπλῆ· τὰ δ’
ἄλλα πάντα μόρια κοινὴν τούτοις ἔχοντα τὴν ἐξαὐτῶν διοίκησιν,
ἀρτηριῶντεκαὶ φλεβῶνκαὶ νεύρων προσδεῖται· τριχῶνδὲ καὶὀνύχων
οὐδὲ διοίκησίς τίς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ γένεσις μόνη· αὐταὶ μὲνοὖναἱ τῶν μορίων
διαφοραί.
The differentiae of these parts are four in all. Some of them are principles;
some grow out of those; some neither control the governance of others nor
are controlled by others, having innate powers that [allow them to] admin-
ister themselves; and some have both innate and inflowing capacities. The
principles are brain, heart, liver and testicles. Growing out of those and
serving them are nerves and spinal cord for the brain, arteries for the heart,
veins for the liver and spermatic ducts for the testicles. Those parts that
govern themselves are cartilage, bones, ligaments, membranes, glands, fat
and simple flesh. All the other parts which have in common with these the
governance of themselves need arteries, veins and nerves as well. There is no
governance of hair and nails, only genesis. These, then, are the differentiae
of the parts.
All the parts named in this passage are instruments, in the sense of being
parts that carry out complete activities. However, not all instruments are
made equal, and this classification reveals the grounds on which these parts
can be differentiated in their relationship with other parts. Only the
principles (the brain, the heart, the liver and, interestingly, the testicles)
are able to exercise influence on other parts (ἅρχειν).
They do this by
Opt. Corp. Const. – (– Helmreich¼.–K).
Ars. Med. .– (, –, Boudon¼.–K), Johnston (: –), slightly altered.
Two points are worth noting in reference to the last principle. First, this organ can be found in both
male and female animals (this is made explicit in Book of On the Usefulness of Parts, where the
anatomy of the reproductive system is discussed – the most pertinent passages are discussed in the
following section). Second, one might wonder why testicles are classified with principles here but
not in many other cases. An argument explaining this point will be presented in Section ..
. The Four-Fold Division
means of their offshoots (nerves, arteries, veins and spermatic ducts).
Galen does not say it explicitly, but the rest of the passage implies tha t
the offshoots are fully governed by the principles from which they spring.
The third group, by contrast, is comprised of the parts that are com-
pletely self-sufficient. These are discrete parts, each with its own form,
composed of just homoeomerous tissues. The fourth category is com-
prised of parts that are both self-managed and connected to the principles
by means of their offshoots. Galen does not give examples of such parts,
but, presumably, many of the organs would fall into this category, as they
are made up of homoeomerous tissues and connected by means of some
of the offshoots.
The last category, not mentioned in the four-fold division at the begin-
ning of the passage, differs significantly from the rest by virtue of containing
organs that have no self-management (διοίκησις), only genesis. The genesis
must refer to growth,
and the absence of the ability to self-manage
(διοικεῖν) presumably amounts to the absence of peculiar vital action. The
hair and nails simply increase in size, but do not attract what benefits, reject
what harms and so on. These parts ‘grow’ in a way that resembles more
closely inanimate objects rather than other animate tissues.
At first glance, the passage echoes Aristotle’s hierarchy of body parts
outlined in The Generation of Animals. Here, Aristotle also distinguishes
between necessary and subsidiary parts, dividing the latter into two further
categories. Unlike Galen, he associates functional priority with earlier
generation and better material constitution. Comparing nature to a good
housekeeper (οἰκονόμος), he notes that the purest nutriment is concocted
first and forms the noblest, the necessary organs: the flesh and the sense
organs. In an oikos, this nutriment is comparable to food set aside for the
free people. Meanwhile, the leftover food is divided hierarchically further
into the food for the enslaved people and for animals. In the body, the
In short, when discussing the governing organs, Galen is typically concerned with vitality (MM .
(.–K)). The removal or malfunction of the testicles obviously does not result in the loss of
life. Thus, it is a principle insofar as it is the epicentre of a reproductive system but it is not a vital
organ, and the testicles do not belong to the list of the overall principal parts on which
vitality depends.
Confusingly, given that in On the Natural Capacities Galen accuses his rivals of not keeping this
distinction clear.
In fact, in Natural Faculties, he distinguishes between animate ‘growth’ and ‘inanimate’ genesis, see
Section .. for the discussion of the passage. See also Nussbaum (: –), who argues that
the self-nourishment is a condition for animate life in Aristotle, notes the following: ‘An icicle grows
by absorbing material from the environment; a fire “nourishes” itself by consuming surrounding
matter. Yet we do not call these living, because there appears to be no selectivity.’
Galen on Parts
residual nutriment is given first to bones and sinews and only then to hair,
nails and so on.
Aristotle has three categories rather than four, but Galenic and
Aristotelian bodily hierarchies appear to be similar, starting from organs
responsible for perception and ending with hair, nails and so on. However,
there are also several significant differences. Galen emphasizes offshoots
(undoubtedly an influence of Hellenistic medical discoveries) and makes
no mention of the generation of parts or their nutrition. Most notably, the
hierarchies are organised differently: while Aristotle ties the significance of
parts proportionally to their place in line of generation and nutrition,
Galen divides them according to the way in which they are governed.
In Aristotle, the nature is a metaphorical οἰκονόμος, but, in Galen, the
capacity of parts to ἅρχειν others and to διοικεῖν themselves becomes the
central preoccupation, and the terms are used not as metaphors but as
technical vocabulary.
Principles govern themselves and other organs. Their offshoots depend
on them. The rest of the structured parts have their own distinct self-
managements owing to their innate natural capacities, but they can be also
governed by principles or not, depending on whether they are connected
via offshoots. The fact that Galen adds the fifth category to his four-fold
division is revealing: it shows that he thinks of body parts as divided (and
connected!) primarily in reference to their activities, and the parts that
merely grow serve as a useful contrast to the parts that do possess capacity
for the internal διοίκησις.
Apart from the final category containing nails and hair, all the parts are
described in relation to other parts. All of them require each other in order
to carry out their peculiar activities, even those with the capacity to ἅρχειν.
In another treatise, Galen poignantly points out that ‘neither the brain
alone without the foot nor the foot without the brain would be very useful,
for one of them, of course, needs something to support it and the other
needs sensation’.
The degree of co-dependence of the parts can vary.
They are especially tightly connected when some parts of one organ appear
GA . (b–); for a further discussion, including the differentiation of formal and material
causes, see Leunissen (: –, ).
The comparison between the oikos and its management to the body is not uncommon, it can be
used both to explain the body (as we see here) and the management of the oikos, see, for example,
Čelkytė (). On the language of household management and its connection to Galen’s concept
of nature, see Jouanna (: –).
UP . (., – Helmreich¼.K), tr. May (: , slightly altered): οὔτ’ ἐγκέφαλος
ἄνευ ποδὸς ἦν ἄν ποτε καλὸς μόνος οὔτε ποὺς ἐγκεφάλου χωρίς. δεῖ γὰροἶμαι τῷ μὲν ὀχήματός
τινος, τῷ δ’ αἰσθήσεως.
. The Four-Fold Division
to also be parts of another one. This problem was already raised in Section
., on the basis of the passage from On the Therapeutic Method, with the
conclusion that parthood is relative, or properly speaking, correlative to the
activity it contributes to the body. This passage from Art of Medicine
further explains how the correlative status of parts ought to be understood:
some parts both self-manage (διοικεῖν) and are subject to the principles
that govern them (ἅρχειν), which renders their activities correlative. The
eye, for example, is capable of sight both in virtue of parts that are self-
managing (the lens) and parts that are offshoots of the governing part, the
brain (the optic nerve).
Just like Aristotle, Galen sees body parts as hierarchically arranged:
some necessary, others subordinate. But unlike Aristotle, he sees them as
() varying in their degree of independence qua governance and self-
management and () extensively interconnected. His interest in differenti-
ating parts in reference to their activities seems justified, given that he
presents the body parts as physically intertwined in multiple complex ways,
and activities help to ‘untangle’ the connections and to identify their
relevant aspects for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes.
These purposes are, of course, of primary interest to someone identify-
ing as a doctor. Medicine, in essence, is the domain of knowledge that
becomes relevant when things go wrong and when it is necessary to restore
the healthy functions of the body. But bodies can veer off the ideal in
different ways: by means of injury, illness or even innate constitution.
In the division of the body that prioritises activities, the innate imper-
fections present a theoretical challenge.
. The Imperfection of Parts
Apart from health and injury, there is the third kind of physiological state
that Galen addresses: the imperfect functioning. An example of such a state
could be the loss of stomach described at the beginning of the chapter.
In such cases as these, the loss of a part can be compensated by the
activities of other parts. What do such cases tell us about the relationship
between the body as a whole and its parts? In order to understand Galen’s
approach, it is worth turning to the passages concerned with the loss of
parts and the inherent deformity of body parts.
In On the Therapeutic Method, Galen argues that it is important to make
a careful distinction between how the notion of ‘in accordance with nature’
ought to be understood. He argues that, for example, when a person has the
sixth finger or is missing the fifth finger, there is no need to try to ‘fix’ this
Galen on Parts
as if it was ‘against nature’. He adds that the term ‘against nature’ ought to
be applied only to those things that cause injury to activities.
As Galen
warns against attempting to ‘fix’ people in accordance to what would be the
perfect shape, he makes it clear that activities ought to be prioritised over
the ‘typical’ number or arrangement of parts. His concern here is that the
claim ‘everything against the nature ought to be eliminated/fixed’ could be
misunderstood as referring to everything tout court. Yet this is certainly not
the case. The medical intervention has clear limits: it ought to be only
concerned with the activities. Similarly, the beginning of the treatise To
Thrasybolous contains a rhetorically charged claim that it is for the activity,
not the constitution, that we need parts; the parts, therefore, are judged to
be useful simply in regard to their actual action.
Thus, Galen suggests that the focus of medicine is activities that take
place within the body, especially those that maintain its vitality. The
theoretical perfection and medicine, as a result, are completely divorced
notions. In addition to this, it is notable that Galen does not speak of the
‘perfection’ of parts as common. In fact, quite the opposite is the case.
In On the Best Constitution of Our Bodies, Galen discusses the perfection in
a human body as exceptional as follows:
εἰ μέλλει χρήσιμος ὁ λόγος ἔσεσθαι τοῖς ἐργαζομένοις τὴν τέχνην, μὴ μόνον
τὸ σπάνιον ἐναὐτῇ σῶμα καὶ οἷον παράδειγμά τι τοῦ Πολυκλείτου
κανόνος ἐντῷ λόγῳ πλάττειν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀπολειπομένων μὲναὐτῆς
κατά τι, μὴ μέντοι κατάφωρον ἤδη καὶ μέγα τὸ σφάλμα κεκτημένων
ἀναμνησθῆναι.
If, then, our discussion is to be of any value to practitioners of the art, it
would appear sensible not to confine ourselves to the construction, in our
argument, of that rare body which might be called the exemplification of
the Canon of Polycleitus, but to include also bodies which fall short of it in
some small respect, without, however, manifesting any large defect.
The contrast with the famous perfectly proportioned statue of Polycleitus
shows that the deviation from the perfect norm can be assumed in the vast
majority of people, because the perfect constitution is exceptionally rare.
And it is worth remembering that even if one is lucky enough to be born
MM . (.–K). See also MM . (.K). There is a difference between nature and
medicine, and the case of the extra finger is in the domain of nature.
Thras. (, –, Helmreich¼.K).
Opt. Corp. Const. (, –, Helmreich¼.–K) tr. Singer (: ). See also Ars. Med.
.– (, – Boudon¼.K) for the argument regarding the existence of the many classes
of bodies that are only slightly short of the best constitution; a doctor ought to adapt the causes that
preserve health to them proportionally.
. The Imperfection of Parts
with it, the state would only be temporary, because with age, the mixtures
of the animal body inevitably dry out, as it is stated in the passage from On
Hygiene.
In that case, the issue at stake is homoeomerous tissues, but
Galen does not distinguish between homoeomerous and discrete parthood,
so a person lacking, for example, moistness in her mixture is still lacking a
part, just like she would be lacking a part if she lost a limb. Ultimately,
some imperfection of parts is a given at least at some point in human life
and very likely present throughout lifetime.
It is quite clear that, according to Galen, every constitution is full of
shortcomings. At the same time, he also adopts a notorious piece of
Aristotelian biology concerning deformed animals.
This notion theorises
imperfections of certain species and kinds, with profound implications for
how the nature of such animals ought to be understood. There are some
debates going on in the current Aristotelian scholarship on how one ought
to interpret the notion of an incomplete animal that encompasses a
staggering number of species, from frogs to hippopotami.
Most relevant
for Galen is the inclusion of female mammals in this category. He takes it
upon himself to comment on this following Aristotle and to finish the
work that Aristotle left undone in Book of On the Usefulness of Parts.
As Sophia Connell has shown, Galen’s attack on Peripatetic views is not
entirely justified, and his own view, often lauded as more egalitarian, is not
substantially less sexist than Aristotle’s.
However, given that Galen
makes the female reproductive system inferior to male, the former presents
an important case study for understanding how he reconciles the supposed
imperfection of parts with his interest in the functionalist approach to
parthood. The remainder of this section is dedicated to this question, and,
having briefly outlined Galen’s account of female reproduction, I argue
that his view shows a strong commitment to functional understanding of
the body parts in this case too.
There are, according to Galen, two points on which female is inferior to
male: () the colder constitution and () the internal construction of the
organs that can be seen in the dissection.
These two claims turn out to be
San. Tu. ..– Koch (.–K); see also Chapter .
See the discussions in Boylan (, ).
See, for example Witt () and major studies in Connell () and Mayhew ().
UP . (., – Helmreich¼.–K). Galen’s conceptualisation of the woman is explored
extensively in Flemming (: –).
Connell (: –).
Such claims regarding the ‘colder constitution’ can be found in Hippocratic texts as well, which was
undoubtedly important for Galen. See, for example, Aër. , Diller (. Littré). See King (:
–) for a further discussion of the ‘wet’ constitution of women and its implications for medical
Galen on Parts
connected once he sets out his point (), which he describes as not easy to
explain. Ultimately, the anatomical inferiority amounts to the internal/
external distinction of the female and male reproductive systems.
In respect to (), Galen is reiterating the Aristotelian view, although he
is critical of the Peripatetic for the claim that the female form fails by virtue
of not being hot enough to produce seed.
In Galenic biology, females do
produce seed,
while nonetheless possessing colder constitutions.
The colder constitution is causally connected to the anatomical infer-
iority of the female reproductive system. This argument is grounded on the
assumption that female and male reproductive systems are, in a certain
sense, not two but one kind of system. According to Galen, females have
the same reproductive parts as males, except in the former they are
internal, and in the latter they are external. A lengthy exposition follows
arguing that the female reproductive organs would overlap exactly with the
male if they were turned inside out.
Galen illustrates this claim with a
comparison to the eyes of a mole, possibly the best-known example of the
Aristotelian deformed animal.
He notes that, according to Aristotle,
there are animals with varied natures, and they can be arranged hierarchic-
ally depending on how many senses they have. Then he explains the
inferiority of the female reproductive system by combining points ()
and (). He states that the colder constitution of the female embryo is
unable to push the reproductive organs outside.
This accounts for the
analogy between the mole’s eyes and the female reproductive system: both
are incomplete (by being internal) owing to their cold constitutions.
One might wonder if this is perhaps an unfortunate analogy. The eyes
of moles are incomplete because, despite having all the required organs, the
practice. This discussion also highlights a controversy concerning another elemental property,
‘heat’/’cold’, of a female body both in Hippocratic texts and in broader medical tradition (King
: –).
GA . (a–); . (a). Galen’s reading is not entirely correct, as Connell ()
shows, see especially Chapter on this issue. Connell demonstrates that the female side of
reproduction does offer an important generative contribution, including a seed-like material that
complement the paternal seed and is capable of producing maternal resemblance in an offspring.
See, for example, Sem. ..– de Lacy (.–K), where the two types of semen are used for
explaining the maternal resemblance in some parts and the paternal resemblance in others. A similar
argument, although in a very different context, can be found in Galen’s near-contemporary
Plotinus, see En. ...
UP . (., –, Helmreich¼.K).
UP . (., –, Helmreich¼.K). See also Aristotle HA . (b–a); de
An. . (a–); PA . (a–b). See also Witt (: ).
UP . (., – Helmreich¼.K). See also Connell (: –) for an argument
that, in this respect, Galen has a more sexist conception of gender than Aristotle.
. The Imperfection of Parts