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theoretical treatise, Physics. At the beginning of Book of his Physics,
Aristotle famously provides a clear conceptual account of the acts per-
formed by nature as follows:
Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲντάτεζῷα
καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶνκαὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ
πῦρκαὶἀὴρκαὶὕδωρ (ταῦτα γὰρεἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν),
πάντα δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸςτὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα.
Τούτων μὲνγὰρ ἕκαστον ἐν ἑαυτῷἀρχὴν ἔχει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ
μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ’ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν·
κλίνη δὲ καὶἱμάτιον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ἐστίν, ᾗ μὲν τετύχηκε
τῆς κατηγορίας ἑκάστης καὶ καθ’ ὅσον ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, οὐδεμίαν ὁρμὴν
ἔχει μεταβολῆς ἔμφυτον.
Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes.
By nature the animal and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple
bodies (earth, fire, air, water) – for we say that these and the like exist by
nature. All the things mentioned plainly differ from things which are not
constituted by nature. For each of them has within itself a principle of
motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth or decrease,
or by way of alteration). On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything
else of that sort, qua receiving these designations – i.e. in so far as they are
products of art – have no innate impulse to change.
In this passage, he contrasts the entities existing by nature and the
entities existing by craft, such as beds and coats. The key difference
between these two is that the principle of change is internal to the natural
entities, whereas in artefacts, it is external. The distinction is fairly straight-
forward, but it has some complex consequences when the Aristotelian
definition of change is taken into consideration. Change necessarily
involves two entities: the agent that initiates the change and the patient
that changes.
In the case of artefacts, it is easy to apply this model: the
artisan is the agent, and the artefact is the patient. In the case of organic
entities, however, when only one entity is changing, it is not immediately
obvious how to assign such roles. In Book of Physics, Aristotle addresses
this problem and offers the following solution:
εἴ τι κινεῖ αὐτὸ αὑτό, πῶς κινεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ τὸ
κινούμενον ἅπαν εἶναι διαιρετὸνεἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά· τοῦτο γὰρ δέδεικται
πρότερον ἐντοῖς καθόλου τοῖς περὶ φύσεως, ὅτι πᾶντὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ
κινούμενον συνεχές. ἀδύνατον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν πάντῃ κινεῖν
Ph. . (b–), tr. Hardie and Gaye (: ), from Barnes ().
See Waterlow (: –). The discussion at the beginning of Book of Physics (Ph. .– )
outlines the central model.
Nutrition, Growth and Vegetative Capacities
αὐτὸ αὑτό· φέροιτο γὰρ ἂν ὅλον καὶ φέροι τὴναὐτὴν φοράν, ἓν ὂνκαὶ
ἄτομον τῷ εἴδει, καὶἀλλοιοῖτο καὶἀλλοιοῖ, ὥστε διδάσκοι ἂνκαὶ μανθάνοι
ἅμα, καὶὑγιάζοι καὶὑγιάζοιτο τὴναὐτὴν ὑγίειαν ...τὸ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖ τὸ δὲ
κινεῖται τοῦ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦντος.
If a thing moves itself, in what sense and in what manner does it do so?
Now everything that is in motion must be infinitely divisible; for it has
been shown already in our general course on Physics, that everything that is
in motion in its own right in continuous. Now it is impossible that that
which moves itself should in its entirely move itself; for then, while being
specifically one and indivisible, it would as a whole both undergo and cause
the same locomotion or alteration; thus it would at the same time be both
teaching and being taught, or both restoring to and being restored to the
same health ... Therefore when a thing moves itself it is one part of it that
is the mover and another part that is moved.
In the case of change within an organic entity, there is still the agent and
the patient, but they are different parts or sections of that entity. In other
words, the principle governing change is exactly the same in organic
entities and artefacts; the difference lies in the number of discrete sub-
stances involved. In the case of artefacts, the agent and the patient are two
numerically distinct substances. In the case of an organic entity, there is
only one substance, and its parts act as the agent and the patient of
change.
It might seem counterintuitive to use the language of demiurgic
activity in the latter case as well as in the former, but, as Sarah Waterlow
noted, the agent of change in a single substance conceptually resembles an
artisan, for it does not change qua agent, for example, heating in fire is not
a change of fire,
so this analogy is conceptually coherent. A demiurge in
this sense is a part that acts as the agent of change within an organic entity,
that is ultimately circumscribed by formal nature.
Animal generation presents some of the more vivid examples of
Aristotle’s uses of these notions, and these uses were presumably es pe-
cially important to Galen. The intera ction between paternal and mater-
nal contributions to an embryo are called the agent and the patient,
respectively, in Generation of Animals, and the forme r is endowed with
the ability to cause movement.
The motions of maternal and paternal
Ph. . (a–b), tr. Hardie and Gaye ( : ).
Waterlow (: ).
Waterlow (: ); see also Connell (: –, –) for the scope of craft analogy in
embryology.
See Gelber (, esp. p. ); see also Kress ().
GA . (a) and GA . (b–).
. Galenic Demiurge(s)
contributions, as well as their effects on each other, play an important
role in accounting for both the patter n of familial resemblance and the
deviation from this pattern. While explaining the absence of family
resemblance, Aristotle presents a conceptual analysis of agent/patient
relationship that builds on Physics ..Insomecases,themovements
causing familial resemblance relapse (λύεσθαι), and the agent is acted
upon by its patient too. The example provided is of a knife that becomes
blunted by that which it cuts, or heat that becomes cooled by that which
it heats. With the exception of the prime mover, movers are moved in
turn. Aristotle refers his readers to anon-extanttreatiseforfurther
discussion, but this short analysis alone serves the purpose of explaining
how paternal resemblance might not occur and how different parts can
take on the resemblance of a d ifferent parent.
Ultimately, animal
generation has to be explained in terms of formal nature, yet the agent/
patient relationship plays an important role in explaining how various
biological motions take place in this process.
This sense of ‘demiurgic’ activity of the constituents of the human body
fits Galen’s description of various parts as ‘demiurges’ well. The expansion
and contraction of muscles that cause the change in other organs (e.g., the
expansion of the thorax moving the lungs, as discussed in Chapter ) are
demiurgic acts in this exact sense. The examples mentioned so far con-
cerned structured organs, but this scheme applies to the homoeomerous
parts as well. This point is important, given that the natural capacities are
properties of tissues, that is, the homoemerous parts. One important
passage comes from the treatise On the Therapeutic Method. Here, we find
an illuminating conceptualisation of a demiurgic act in the context of
therapeutics. The passage of interest can be found in the context of
explaining how to treat shallow wounds and ulcers. In a brief theoretical
interlude, Galen states the following:
ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἐντοῖς κοίλοις ἕλκεσι πρόκειται γεννῆσαι τὴν ἀπολωλυῖαν
σάρκα, δεῖ γινώσκειν τὶ περὶ σαρκὸς γενέσεως, ὡς ὕλη μὲναὐτῆςαἷμα
χρηστὸν, ὁ δ’ οἷον δημιουργός τε καὶ τεχνίτης ἡ φύσις. ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁπλῶς
εἰπεῖνχρὴ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ προσθεῖναι τὴν τίνων καὶ ποῦ. δῆλον δὲὅτι τῶν
ὑποκειμένων σωμάτων οἷςσὰρξ ἐπιτρέφεσθαι μέλλει, τούτων ἡ φύσις ἔσται
GA . (b–a); my discussion of the dynamics of hereditary resemblance in Aristotle is
necessarily abbreviated, but see Connell (, especially chapter ) for a more thorough
discussion.
See Gelber () for a more detailed study of the family resemblance problem in Generation of
Animals, and the argument that Aristotle resolves it by positing not a subspecific form but agent/
patient motions.
Nutrition, Growth and Vegetative Capacities
δημιουργὸςτῆς γενηθησομένης σαρκός. ἀλλ’ ἡ φύσις ἑκάστου τῶν
σωμάτων ἐδείχθη κατά τινα θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶὑγροῦ
κρᾶσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἡ τούτων εὐκρασία κατὰ τὸ
ὑποκείμενον μόριον ᾧ μέλλομεν ἐπιθρέψειν τὴν λείπουσαν σάρκα τὸν
λόγον ἕξει τοῦ δημιουργοῦ.
Accordingly, since in hollow wounds and ulcers our task is to recreate the
flesh that has been destroyed, it is necessary to know about the generation
of flesh, and that its material is useful blood, and that the ‘demiurge’ or
‘craftsman’, as it were, is Nature. But we must not simply say ‘Nature’ but
add the nature of what things and how. It is clear that the flesh of the bodies
underlying those wounds will be what causes growth, and the nature of
these will be the ‘demiurge’ of the flesh that will be regenerated. But the
nature of each of the bodies was shown to consist of a certain krasis of heat,
cold, dryness and moisture. It is clear that the eukrasia of these [qualities] in
the underlying part will have the ground of the ‘demiurge’ by which we will
cause the growth of the flesh that is lacking.
Galen’s claim that the term ‘nature ’ requires further explication echoes
the previous pas sages and further supports the argument that the term
‘demiurge’ can be meant in different senses.
In this specificcontext,
the subject is flesh, a homoeomerous par t, and its nature lies in the krasis
of the four qualities that is specifictoflesh. The four qua lities, when
mixed, give rise to the natural capacities that are responsible for the
activities of flesh. Strictly speaking, the warm and the cold are more
active than the dry and the wet, but it is a special proportion of each of
them that is responsible for the inherent natural ca pacitie s in the homo-
eomerous parts.
As noted earl ier in this chapter, these capacities
consist of rejecting what harms and attracting what benefits, ultimately
resulting in the processes of nutrition and growth. Thus, in wounds a nd
ulcers, the flesh, with the help of the nourishment from blood, will grow
and eventually cover up the ope ning in the flesh. Galen notes that, under
ideal conditions, this demiurgic process happens without medical inter-
vention,
but in certai n cases, drying medication needs to be used,
adjusting the degree of drying capacity to the mixture of the patient.
Equally illuminating are descriptions of the role that the demiurge
plays – or fails to play – in pathological conditions. When explaining the
difficulty in treating a dry febrile condition, Galen explains that ‘there is no
MM . (.–K), tr. Johnston and Horsley (: –).
This is not the only place where he does so. See PHP .. de Lacy (.K) where he notes that
the phrase ‘in accordance with nature’ can be used in many ways.
See Nat. Fac. . (– Helmreich¼.–K). See also MM . (.K).
MM . (.–K).
MM . (.–K).
. Galenic Demiurge(s)
difficulty in properly treating strong dryness of a body other than the fact
that the nourishment it requires restoratively is not of a nature to assimilate
itself, but needs the demiurge of what is actually nourishing it, which is
weak’.
The dry condition is hard to treat for one reason only: its
nourishment is not of such nature as to assimilate itself. Presumably, this
is owing to the fact that wetness is a passive quality. The restoration of a
healthy condition requires active work from the tissues (viz. the tissue must
act as demiurges), but they are weak when in a dry condition. In other
words, febrile conditions create a feedback loop: dried out tissues cannot
assimilate the nourishment they need for rectifying excessive dryness and
thus they keep on drying out.
This passage is quite clear on the point that a demiurge is simply a
catalyst triggering certain processes in an organic body. Before turning
back to the question of the vegetative soul and its generative powers, it is
worth remarking on the implications of this model. This model of organic
(as opposed to artisan-like) change establishes grounds for organic unity in
a way that is fundamentally different from the atomist accounts, like the
ones Galen ascribes to Erasistratus and Asclepiades in his On the Natural
Capacities and contrasts with the Hippocratic account grounded in the
notion of natural capacities.
For Galen, it is crucial to recognise not only
the external but also the internal type of demiurge. The physiological
change takes place not because one discrete atom bumps into another
discrete atom – in other words, when two distinct substances interact with
each other, which is an interaction that can be modelled on mechanistic
accounts.
Instead, physiological change takes place within a single
substance (e.g., a person), when her parts act as agents (e.g., muscles)
and patients (e.g., bones of the thorax), forming single, coherent unity.
The key difference is that these are parts; not entities that primarily operate
MM . (.K), tr. Johnston and Horsley (: ): οὐδὲ γὰροὐδὲ δι᾿ἄλλο τι χαλεπὸν
γίγνεται θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς ἰσχυρὰν ξηρότητα σώματος ἢὅτι χρῄζει μὲν ἀναθρέψεως, ἡ τροφὴ δ᾿
οὐ πέφυκεν ἑαυτὴν προσφύειν, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτοῦ δεῖται τοῦ τρεφομένου δημιουργοῦντος αὐτήν, ὅπερ
ἐστὶν ἄτονον.
Natural aging and eventual death is also caused by the dryness of mixtures, see San. Tu. ..–
Koch (.–K).
Although he also mentions that Aristotle belongs to this tradition in Nat. Fac. . (,
Helmreich¼.K); see also Hipp. Elem. . de Lacy (.K).
The insensitivity of atoms and the impossibility that their interaction would produce sensation
(which is a kind of alteration) are the key points Galen makes in his rejection of the ‘Epicurean‘
account of pain at the beginning of On the Elements According to Hippocrates. The argument is
discussed in greater detail in Chapter .
Nutrition, Growth and Vegetative Capacities
in accordance with the laws of physics in general, but the parts whose acts
are primarily circumscribed within a specific, biological whole, viz. a living
body. The parthood of the latter is fundamentally different from the
former, and more importantly, lays the ground for the kind of unity that
is necessary for organic life.
. The Vegetative Soul as a Demiurge
The claim that the vegetative soul is a demiurge has to be read against the
background of the Aristotelian tradition, especially its theorisation of vital
motion and vital change. When Galen talks about the demiurgic regener-
ation of tissues, he is clearly referring to the inherent capacities in tissues to
absorb nutriment and to grow. It is worth noting that this is already a kind
of generative capacity, owing to the fact that it accounts for the expansion
in mass when tissues grow. There is little reason to suppose that the
generative activity of the vegetative soul in the embryo amounts to any-
thing more. He does present the development of the embryo and the
restoration of tissues as the same type of processes in principle,
but the
most coherent and charitable way of reading this claim is with a reference
to the growth of tissues. The tissues grow, in the sense of expanding in size,
the same way in an embryo and an adult animal; after all, growth, together
with nutrition, is the hallmark of the fundamental vitality, that is, the
vegetative life. In so far as the vegetative capacities are capable of gener-
ation, they are ever-present in both the embryo and throughout the
remainder of the animal’s life, generating in the same way. However, they
are also clearly not designing agents, because the vegetative process only
increases (or restores) what is already in existence, rather than creating
something entirely new. Galen explicitly states that there is more than one
demiurge active in the womb. As well as the seed and blood, there is the
designer that permeates through and through, generating a new substance,
that is, the embryo. The generation of a new substance (in the Aristotelian
sense of the word) requires the generation of the form, which is a domain
of the shaping capacity whose substance (in the Stoic sense of the word)
Thras. (, – Helmreich¼.K), tr. Singer (: ): ‘Thus, if we had the capacity to
create an animal in the first place, the principles involved in that initial creation would be no
different from those involved in its restoration. In reality, though, we are not primarily responsible
for either of these tasks: it is Nature who first constructs the animal and subsequently heals it if it
is sick.’
. The Vegetative Soul as a Demiurge
Galen never identifies.
He is quite clear that the conception is a more
complex process than tissue growth.
Having noted the relatively primitive nature of the vegetative capacities,
it is important to emphasise that the notion of the vegetative soul as a
demiurge not only explains the body’s ability to grow and heal itself
(fundamental activities for maintaining life) but also provides a blueprint
for the conceptualisation of organic unity. The ability of bodily tissues to
perform certain activities is grounded in their elemental parts acting on
each other, thus enabling the tissue to change by virtue of its inherent
properties alone, viz. as an organic entity. As Galen explains, the vegetative
soul is in charge of the growth of a child after birth,
up until the full
formation of the internal organs, after which all three souls fully govern the
animal.
. Concluding Remarks: On Vegetative Unity
In the four-fold division of parts presented in Art of Medicine, the key
criterion for distinguishing different kinds of parthood is the ability to self-
manage (διοικεῖν) and to govern (ἅρχειν) or be governed by the principal
parts. In the case of the nutritive system, the governing part is the liver and
its governing activities are enabled by its offshoots, the veins. The veins are
spread throughout the body and are inserted into the parts made of
homoeomerous tissues that possess natural capacities and, therefore, the
capacity to self-manage. Some of the parts nourished this way, for example
the stomach, belong to the nutritive system, while others, for example a leg
muscle, do not. In the case of the latter, the connection to the nutritive
system helps it to be nourished and grow (e.g., by restoring tissues). In the
case of the former, however, there is more at stake, namely, the systematic
unity.
Galen’s nutritive system is like a conveyor belt: each part belonging to
this system does a little bit of processing. The liver, as the hēgemon, stands
at the end of the process, making the final conversion of foodstuffs into
Nat. Fac. . (, – Helmreich¼.K); . (–, – Helmreich¼.K). This is
also the third kind of demiurge mentioned in the passage from Sem. cited earlier, that which
permeates through and through. See also the discussion of the plastic capacity in the chapter on the
nervous system (Chapter ).
See the discussion in Hankinson (b: –); see also Hankinson (). The problem of the
substance of the rational soul will be addressed again in Chapter ; see the Introduction for the
discussion of the scholarship on the problem of the substance of this soul.
Prop. Plac. . ( Lami Garofalo).
Prop. Plac. . ( Lami Garofalo).
Nutrition, Growth and Vegetative Capacities
useful blood and sending it out to the rest of the body via the veins. The
nutritive parts (the stomach, the spleen, and so on) have a degree of
independence qua their ability to self-manage. They can absorb and
process the nutriment that is presented to them via their innate natural
capacities. However, they are all connected in such a way as to produce
that nutriment in the form of blood. At the risk of cliché, the whole is thus
greater than the sum of its parts, because the parts work together to sustain
themselves in a way they could not do individually: their tissues can absorb
the nutriment that is presented to them, but only in combination with
other parts, the whole nutritive system working as one, they can also
produce that nutriment for themselves and the rest of the body. They
are not only self-sufficient individually; when put together they constitute
a self-sufficient whole: a body that is able to nourish itself. It is not merely
the connection between parts (although that is also important) that renders
them as parts of a single whole, but their activities that come together to
form a single functionally unified entity.
At the beginning of this chapter, it was highlighted that Galen thinks of
the vegetative aspects of life as plant-like, and an embryo in this sense is
very much a plant-like entity. It is the development of the internal organs
that turns this entity into an animal, and underscores the emergence of the
more complex type of vitality. The development of these parts is not
simultaneous but staggered. Just like many other philosophers and doctors,
Galen maintained that the rationality does not properly manifest itself
until teenage years.
The domain of the brain and the nervous system in
general, thus, comes into play later in life. Before a person becomes a
rational animal, one has to become an animal. And the animal nature is
underpinned by the activities of the cardiac and pneumatic systems, which
are explored in Chapter .
One of his bigger points of contention against Chrysippus the Stoic and his unified psychological
model of the soul rests precisely on this point in PHP .. de Lacy (.K). The mainstream
Stoics ascribe affections to the rational part of the soul and, since it is not developed in children,
they deny that children have affections. Galen criticises this view as sophist and praises Posidonius’
adoption of tripartition. For a more detailed discussion of Posidonius’ scheme and its Platonic
influences, see Tieleman (a: –).
. Concluding Remarks: On Vegetative Unity
Respiration and Transpiration
The Cardiac System and Pneumatology
If the vegetative soul separates the organic plant life from the inorganic
existence, then the spirited soul is the hallmark of the animal life, and just
as the activities of the former are underpinned by the nutritive system, so
the activities of the latter are by the cardiac system.
The workings of the
cardiac system are centred around one key regulatory activity, breathing; it
is the ability to breath that distinguishes animals from plants. The signifi-
cance of breathing for animal vitality is evident from the fact that the
deprivation of breath swiftly leads to the end of life. The explanation of
this easily observable phenomenon posed a substantial challenge to ancient
philosophers and scientists, and Galenic texts are excellent sources for
debates and disagreements in this area. Galen opens On the Usefulness of
Respiration with the observation that the usefulness of breathing is self-
evident, as animals die quickly when deprived of breath.
He then sets out
a variety of explanations of the phenomenon by his predecessors. The rest
of the treatise consists of refutations of flawed accounts with arguments
At the same time, it is quite important for Galen not to mistake it for the seat of the hēgemonikon.
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that one of his most prominent lifelong projects was his rebuttal of
various cardiocentrists. Aristotle was one of them (see UP . (.– Helmreich¼.–K), for
a well-known, rhetorically charged criticism; see van der Eijk (: –) for an accompanying
discussion), although, on the whole, Galen spends more time engaging critically with the Stoics and
Stoicising doctors, such as the Pneumatists. His grand treatise On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and
Plato is focused on the attack on the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, representing those who maintain
that the hēgemonikon resides in the heart rather than the brain (see Tieleman (, a) for Galen
representations; see also Rocca (: –) for the cardiocentrism in the Classical and Hellenistic
philosophy and science). This debate shows up in other works too; in MM . (.K), Galen
attacks the Pneumatists for locating hēgemonikon in the heart. He claims that their hypocrisy is
evident when one sees that Athenaeus applies medicine to the head of a patient suffering from
phrenitis rather than the chest.
Ut. Resp. . ( Furley and Wilkie¼.K): Τίς ἡ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς χρεία; ὅτι γὰροὐχ ἡ τυχοῦσα,
φανερὸν ἐκτοῦ μηδὲ βραχύτατον ἡμᾶς χρόνον δύνασθαι διαρκεῖν ἀπολομένης αὐτῆς. Shorter
reiterations of the simple observation that animals die when they cannot breathe can be found in
other works too: Prop. Plac. . ( Lami Garofalo); Hipp. Elem. . de Lacy (.K); UP .
(., – Helmreich¼K); Foet. Form. , Nickel (.K). Galen is, of course, not the first
to make this claim; see Debru (: –).
supporting Galen’ s preferred view, namely that breathing is effectively
a process of the heat regulation of the heart and, to some extent, resupply
of the psychic pneuma. He associates this view primarily with
Hippocrates.
While to the contemporary mind, the heart is probably associated
primarily with blood, in the Galenic framework, blood properly belongs
to the nutritive systems and the liver that elaborates it.
The heart does
participate in the circulation of the blood to the extent that the blood is
located in arteries and the heart moves the arteries, but it has little to do
with its proper activity, which is nutrition. The nutriment is sent out by
the liver via veins.
Instead, it is the other material circulating in the
arteries, the pneuma, that is subordinate to the activities of the heart
specifically. Galen differentiates between three types of pneuma: vital,
psychic and natural.
All three will be covered in this chapter, although
special attention will be paid to the first two, not only because they are
discussed most extensively, but also because there is more at stake with
them.
As the name suggests, the vital pneuma is a key component to
animal vitality that is maintained by breathing. The psychic pneuma,
elaborated in the arteries and located in the brain and some nerves, plays
an important role in accounting for psychic capacities, including the
capacity for reasoning.
Some of the arguments against the cardio-centric
As the following discussion shows, Galen only engages with medical names in this treatise and does
not mention, for example, Aristotle and his view that respiration cools the cardiac system in Juv.
(b–) and Resp. (a–b). One possible explanation is that Aristotle’s view
closely resembles that of Diocles of Carystus, whose fragments on respiration, derived from Galen,
are collected in van der Eijk (: –). It has been suggested that Diocles was a pupil of Aristotle
(especially advocated by W. W. Jaeger, see, for example, Jaeger ()), leading to an extensive
scholarly debate covered in von Staden (), which found Jaeger’s suggestion to be unlikely; for a
current and more nuanced understanding of Diocles’ connection to Peripatos (as well as other
philosophers), see van der Eijk (–: xxxiv–xxxviii).
See the more detailed discussion in Chapter .
See Chapter for Galen’s argument on this precise point.
PHP ..– de Lacy (.–K).
When it comes to the role that pneuma plays in the brain/nervous system, Rocca () presents a
detailed and informative study. I make use of various points made there, especially regarding
anatomy, although the focus of this chapter is the cardiac system and the vital pneuma, which
plays the key role in conceptualizing animal vitality. For this reason, the discussion in this chapter
will be centred around the notion of the innate heat as well as the Galenic division of the bodily parts
in accordance with their viscosity, which is instrumental in accounting for the speed of
animal vitality.
UP . (., – Helmreich¼.K). Some of the arguments against the cardiocentric theory
are specifically focused on the evidence of the location of the psychic pneuma. See, for example, PHP
..– de Lacy (.K), tr. de Lacy (–: –): ‘For the present it is enough for me to
only make this further statement, that if speech were produced when pneuma in the lungs is
somehow shaped by the heart’s pneuma and then imparts this shape to the pneuma in the
Respiration and Transpiration