laumulin_TsA_v_zarubezhnoy_politologii

Resumé

Murat T. Laumulin

CentralAsia within Foreign Political Science and World Geopolitics.

Volume V. CentralAsia in XXI Century.

The Volume V includes the issues concentrating over Central Asia, its relationship with the great and regional powers. The first part regards the numerous aspects of influence on the region from geopolitical centers – USA, Europe, Russia and China. The second part is dedicated to participation of regional powers in the Great Game around CentralAsia.They are India, Japan, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.And the third part investigates exclusively the local relationship and domestic policies in CentralAsian countries.

The nations of Central Asia, surrounded by Russia, China, and South Asia, comprise the geopolitical centerpiece of the Eurasian continent. Their location makesthembothabufferandapassagewaybetweenEastandWest.CentralAsiais amajorenergyproducer.Theregioniscapableofreducingtheworld’sdependence onoilfromtheMiddleEast.CentralAsiaisthussubjecttocrosscurrentsofpolitical, economic,andmilitaryinterestsandpressures.Itisalsoatthecrossroadofnarcoterrorist traffic that originates inAfghanistan and Pakistan.

The current security and geopolitical situation in Central Asia is strongly determined by some different factors. The Western impact is now the one of most important. This impact is realized by two major players which are the US and EU, and through some political and military instruments. So, a stability of the region is depended on whole general framework which includes Russian- Westernrelations,Sino-Americancontradictions,Europeanambitions,Caspian economics etc. It is possible to conclude that the future security of CentralAsia will be managed by the West and its agents, but it should be a kind of smart and flexible management which should take into consideration the interests of CentralAsian states, also the real vital interests of other powers, first of all, that is Russia. Only this condition is demanded to secure the stability in the region andto preventnewreal‘Great Game’ina sense of 19th Century’spower rivalry anduncontrolledexpansion.Theunengagedexpertiseprovesthisepochisover. And mostly, the current Western presence in Central Asia in this own form confirms this final thesis.

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Лаумулин М.Т.

Центральная Азия в зарубежной политологии и мировой геополитике

It is obvious that security of CentralAsia is strongly impacted by the West. But what is the ‘West’in this regard? We focus on four major actors presenting theWest, they are the US, the European Union, the NATO, and partly -Turkey. All those geopolitical players are closed connected each one with the other and they influence on security of Central Asia in different ways. Actually, having carried out the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 years and having placed the bases in Central Asian countries, the USA have undertaken a role of the main military arbitrator in the center of Eurasia; a role which all other conducting powers of region have refused. It is became obvious that only AmericanmilitarypowercouldeliminateTalibanregimeandremovethedirect threat to CentralAsia.

These great world powers and the centres of geopolitical force involved in CentralAsia are Russia, the USA, China and the European Union. It is argued that the geopolitical configuration in the Central Asian region, as well as the balanceofpowerbetweentheselargeactorshavechanged.Theinfluenceofthe West, first of all the United States which have carried out the unprecedented for the modern epoch military operation in Afghanistan and have created military infrastructure not only on the territory of this country, but also in the number of CentralAsian states, has greatly increased. The policy of such largest neighbours of Central Asia as Russia and China has also undergone some changes. Moscow and Beijing, who were among the first countries rendered the support toAmericaneffortsinthestruggleagainstinternationalterrorismin2001,faced qualitativelynewsituationintheregion,touchingtheirnationalinterests,inthe beginning of 2002.

Being the largest economic power the European Union aspires to be also one of military-political and geopolitical centers in the world. The EU actively develops its common foreign and defensive policy, tries to act as one actor on theworldscenethoughnotalwayssuccessfully.Nevertheless,theexistenceofan objectivetrendisobvious:theEUpreparesinfutureifnottocompetewithUSA but certainly to promote independent policy and to occupy its own geopolitical place on international scene. This touchs on Central Asia since the EU tries to include into its sphere of geopolitical interests not only the countries of Eastern Europe,butalsoasignificantpartoftheCentralEurasia,thatistheCIS,including Caucasus, Caspian Sea and the CentralAsian region. “The expansion” of EU is frequently treated as economic, technological and cultural domination.

TheNATOcreatesagoodopportunitytoconnecttheWestern,Europeanand Eurasian security in general. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program is clear evidence, as well as Russian policy toward NATO. In the future the development of following scenario should not be excluded, when the development of events will go in such a manner that the certain consensus on the division of

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geopoliticalrolesbetweenEurope,AmericaandEurasiawillbefound.Itisalso possible, that instead of the notion “Atlantic Europe” dominating for the last half-centuries, the notion “the Eurasian Europe” will emerge.

In 2005, several political events and processes have changed the situation in the region rapidly. First, there were the color revolution in Kyrgyzstan and fall of Askar Akaev in March. This event raised the question about further geopolitical orientation of Kyrgyzstan that is currently uncertain. Secondly, the revolt in Uzbek city Andijan in May what provoked the serious deterioration of relationship between Tashkent and the West, and consequently, reduced US military presence in the region significantly.Thirdly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO)hasrealizedintheJuly2005Summitastronganti-American demarche concerning the perspectives of US presence. Actually, it was a new steptoformationofanewregionalmilitary-politicalorganizationundertheChi- nese-Russiandominance.Andfourthly,thepresidentialelectionsinKazakhstan in December 2005 and its previous intrigue lead to the silent consensus among thebiggerpowersrelatingtokeepstabilityinKazakhstannotwithstandingwith their different political goals and ideological motives.

U.S. relations with countries in Central Asia were fundamentally affected bytheattackslaunchedontheUnitedStatesonSeptember11,2001.Tosupport U.S. operations inAfghanistan, the U.S. military negotiated significant accessoverflight and air base arrangements - with Central Asian governments that initiallyproducedasenseofcommonpurposeandgoodwill,generatingconcern inRussiaandChina.Geopoliticsandgeo-strategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica isreallyglobalincharacterandtouchesuponpracticallyalltheregionsandany countryoftheplanet.TheregionofCentralAsiaisnoexception.Asawholethe American policy in Central Asia is a part of a more general Eurasian strategy of US covering, besides our region, the Caspian and Caucasus regions, Russia, Afghanistan, Middle East, SouthAsia and China.

Since 2005-06 the American policy in the region has entered a new stage, whichcanbecharacterizedasaformationof“GreaterCentralAsia”.Akeypoint of this project is a connection between CentralAsia andAfghanistan.

What factors affect Central Asian security? They have not changed much: Afghanistanandthemilitary-politicalsituationinit;Irananditsnuclearprogram; the relations between Russia and China; the activity of the West, etc. In the security sphere NATO is developing into an important factor in Central Asia. The Bucharest NATO Summit clearly demonstrated that the North Atlantic Alliance has never let Eurasia out of its sight despite the temporary setback experienced by Georgia and Ukraine. The Summit of April 2008 in Bucharest convincingly demonstrated that security in theAtlanticAlliance and in Eurasia isinterconnected.EventhoughGeorgiaandUkrainewerenotinvitedtojointhe

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Центральная Азия в зарубежной политологии и мировой геополитике

line it became abundantly clear that NATO affects, to the strongest extent, the security system in Central Eurasia. In view of theAfghan factor this role looks even more important, especially in CentralAsia. Sooner or later the consistent penetration of the Western security structures into the continent’s interior will raisethequestionofcooperationbetweentheAllianceandtworegionalstructures (the CSTO and SCO).

Western strategists have not yet sorted the SCO out: it remains to be seen whether it is an economic alliance, a military-political bloc, or something else. Theextenttowhichitsaimsarerealizableisstillunclear.TheWestisevenmore concernedaboutwhethertheSCO(or,rather,theRussia-Chinatandem)threatens thesovereigntyandindependenceoftheCentralAsianstates.Translatedintoclear termsthisreads:TowhatextentdotheCentralAsiancountriesmakeindependent decisionswithintheSCO?AfghanistanremainsoneofthekeyfactorsofCentral Asia’smilitary-politicalsecurity.TheCentralAsianrepublicswanttheterritory of the former Northern Alliance turned into a security belt to which they and Russia should particularly extend their assistance. A large-scale U.S. military operation will not be limited toAfghanistan - it will spread to Pakistan and tip themilitary-strategicbalanceinSouthernandCentralAsia.Thesedevelopments will inevitably affect the interests of India, China, and Russia.

The European Union has radically revised its CentralAsian policy and the way it cooperates with the regional structures (including the SCO). A recent document - The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership for the Years2007-2013-dated31May,2007identifiedthefollowingaims(1)stability andsecurityoftheregionalcountries;(2)lowerpovertylevelandhigherstandard of living within the Millennium Development Goals; and (3) stronger regional cooperation among the local states and between them and the EU, especially in the energy, transportation, higher education, and environmental protection spheres.ThedocumentpointsoutthatCentralAsia,whichservesasthelinkthat keeps Europe andAsia together, belongs to the OSCE (that is, to the European political expanse). The European Union and the Central Asian countries have the common aims - maintaining stability and enjoying prosperity.

During the years 2003-04 the tendency to strengthen the position of Russia inCentralAsiahadalreadystarted.Moscowdiversifieditsmethodsandspheres of its mutual interaction with the countries of the region by alternating the instruments of economics, politics and integration. Return of Russia to this regiontookplaceinthreedirections:1)settingupofbasesdirectly(Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan); 2) activization of efforts within the structures of integration and multilateral organizations (CSTO, SCO, EEC, CES); 3) development of bilateral ties (with all the countries of the region). The strategy of Russia with regard to Central Asia in the near future will be directed to achieve the

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following goals: creation of a united defence space of Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and possibly Tajikistan; creation of Collective Rapid Action Forces (CRAF) under the aegis of Russia; continuation of the process of further integration of economic and defence structures of the participating countries of CSTO; formation of an integration nucleus (at the level of CA) of Russia and Kazakhstan.

CentralAsia,asasourceoftransitenergyresources,occupiedasubordinate position in the European vector of Russia’s geostrategy. But in recent years, Gazprom’s activity in the region and Moscow’s aggressive energy cooperation strategyhavebeguntoturnCentralAsiaintoaspecialtargetofRussia’senergy, economic, and geopolitical expansion. Gazprom’s actions (with the support of theKremlin)lookeddifferentinCentralAsia,whichisapotentialresourcebase for Moscow’s energy strategy.

It is evident that between the years 1992-2000 China in this region has behaved like a winning side. Geo-strategic and military-political successes of China in Central Asia include the following: disappearance of USSR as geopolitical competitor; gradual departure of Russia from this region and objective economic weakness of the Newly Independent States of Central Asia; direct territorial acquisitions; direct economic advantage from trade with the countries of this region, in particular with Kazakhstan; economic rise of Xingjian thanks to improvement in geopolitical situation and intensification of economic ties with Central Asia and through it with other markets; getting control of trans-border rivers and their exploitation in its favour; creation of the geopolitical organization SCO with the clear dominance of PRC; expansion of geopolitical ambitions of China right up to the Caspian Sea.

CreationofShanghaiCooperationOrganizationopenedforChinaastrategic path to CentralAsia and became a breakthrough in its diplomacy in the region. Now SCO is for China a mechanism for ensuring security, a channel for participationintheaffairsofthecountriesofCentralAsiaandformsthebasisfor theirmultilateralties.ChinesestrategistsconsiderthatincasetheUnitedStates establishesitscontroloverCentralAsia,thenitwillbeabletoeconomicallykeep in its hands the developed Europe and EastAsia and, possibly, other regions of the world too. Comparing the successful military penetration of US in Central Asia with the expansion of NATO to the East, the Chinese experts have come to the conclusion that in reality the actions of NATO have gone far beyond the aimsandobjectivesofthisalliance.Strategically,thismeansthatinfuturethere is possibility of not only exerting pressure on Russia, they may even ignore the supremacy of Russia and China in this region.

Thus,themaininterestsofChinainCentralAsiaare:fightagainstterrorism, separatismandextremism;maintenanceofstabilityintheregion;encouragement

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Центральная Азия в зарубежной политологии и мировой геополитике

of economic well-being of Central Asia; ensuring friendly relations of the Republics of Central Asia with China; creation of a situation so that these countries do not fall into control of one of the Super powers; avoid creation of military blocs in the region against Beijing; ensure access of China to the energy resources of CA.

Long-terms perspectives of China are (after the year 2020): to occupy leadingeconomicandpoliticalpositionsinAsia(andPacific),toannihilatefully the geopolitical presence of US in the region; to annex Taiwan; to ensure total independenceofenergyrequirementsofChina;tobecomeoneoftheeconomic leaders of the planet and eventually become number one economy; to become World Power and achieve military-strategic and geopolitical parity with USA. In the first half of the 21st century China is expected to strengthen its position in the global political arena and unconditionally dominate a number of regions. Regarding CentralAsia, China can definitely become a significant geopolitical force like the U.S., the EU and Russia, in the very near future.

One of the most perspective and effective regional organizations seems to be the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But the SCO has its geographical and political peculiarities. It combines two major world powers and four smaller Central Asian countries, which are unequal in terms of their political,economic,military,demographic,andsocialpotential,thuscomposing a 2+4 organism. Beijing believes that all international forces in Central Asia may equally cooperate with the SCO. 16 Each side of this triangle has its own interest in the resources of the region. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has diversified its activity; however, Beijing insists that its main objective is the fight against terrorism. It is believed that the SCO is a provisional structure for China while it is developing into a central world power.When this happens, China is very much likely to treat other countries, and primarily its neighbors, harshly.Inthemedium-term,Chinawilltry,perhaps,tobecomealeaderinsuch organizations as the SCO andASEAN and to form the Economic Cooperation Organization in NortheastAsia (with Japan and South Korea) where it will also play a leading role. It will also try to strengthen its economic and demographic influence on the Far East, Mongolia, Siberia and CentralAsia.

It is certainly the case that China is isolated within the SCO, confronted by a block of post-Soviet states that share a common past and confronted with the sameproblems,whichfacilitatesunderstandingamongthem.Moreover,Russia has a specific, tried-and-tested approach to each of them. For Russia, the SCO is above all a framework for cooperation with China. The scale of cooperation betweenMoscowandBeijingreachedunprecedentedlevelsin2005.Russiaand Chinaheldaseriesofjointlarge-scalemilitaryexercises,madeajointdeclaration onworldorderinthe21stcentury,andhaveusedtheSCOtocounterUSmilitary

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presenceinCentralAsia.TheRussianmilitarycommunityviewsthepromotion of cooperation with China within the framework of the SCO as indispensable, butremaindividedovertheextentofsuchstrategicmilitarycooperationinlight of possible rivalry between the two.

Through the SCO, Kazakhstan remains at the mercy of the evolution of the Sino-Russian relations: on the one hand, excessive strategic rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow threatens to establish a double dictate of these powersinCentralAsia(includingwithintheframeworkoftheSCO);conversely, however, there is also the danger of a flare-up in Chinese-Russian rivalry in the region, which cannot be ruled out in the future.

Historically India has always been closely connected with Central Asia. In the recent past Delhi was a close and faithful ally of USSR. Presently those relationsbetweenIndiaandRussiaarebeingrestored.Moreover,India’spolicy cannotleaveuntouchedtheinterestsofChina,USandtheWestasawholeinthis region and, on the other hand, the situation inAfghanistan and Iran also cannot remain uninfluenced by the policies of India.Thus, directly or indirectly, India, nonetheless, must be considered a geopolitical force in Central Asia. Sudden splash of geopolitical activeness on the part of India in CentralAsia goes back to the years 2002-2003 after the anti-terrorists operations in Afghanistan and change in the entire geopolitical situation in the region. India’s interests can be divided into two groups: purely geopolitical which include rivalry with China and Pakistan, and partnership with Russia, and economic which include in the first place energy interests as also trade and economic interests.

StrategicgoalofIndiainmanyrespectsissimilartotheUSpolicyinCentral Asia.Inotherwords,activitiesofDelhiaredirectednotonlytowardsstabilization of situation in CentralAsia, but also towards creation of such conditions which will help India to play an important role in the region. India is gradually getting involvedinthe“GreatGame”inCentralAsia.Thereisnodoubtthatthispower has its geopolitical interests in the region which are determined by a number of factors. These factors include the following: partnership with Russia; Chinese presence in CentralAsia; India’s coming closer with West and US; rivalry with Pakistan; threat of spreading of militant Islamism; transport and energy and trade and economic interests of Delhi in Central Asia and in the neighbouring regions.

In this way India’s potential does exist for expansion of its economic, military-strategic and geopolitical presence in Central Asia. The realization of this potential will depend upon, firstly, on the state of Indo-Russian relations, implementation of a number of big communication and energy projects, and also on objective geopolitical and geographic factors. In spite of the apparent geographical proximity of the Indian sub-continent to Central Asia direct

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transport-communication connection between the two regions is very difficult. Besides this, with the growth of economic and geopolitical strength of India, as it is now happening with China, expansion of its influence and ambitions will inevitably affect CentralAsia in one or the other form. It is important for Delhi to remember that Central Asia will always maintain its traditional relations with Russia, will remain a part of “Eurasia” as a geopolitical phenomenon, and also a part of European (OSCE – Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe) political space.

ThesituationinAfghanistanshouldalsobeconsideredinlightofinternational factors. Afghanistan is a country under occupation, with limited national sovereignty. Its security, internal stability and further economic development dependontheU.S.,NATOandglobaleconomicaid.TheU.S.remainsthemost influential military and political power inAfghanistan.

Islamic Radicalism has become a serious problem in Central Asia. In Central Asia, the focus of Islamic revival and of radical groups has been the Ferghana valley, a densely populated and ethnically mainly Uzbek territory divided politically between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The valley hastraditionallybeenacenterofIslamicfervor,andwastheareawhereforeign radicalsfirstestablishedapresence.Aswewillsee,though,thereareotherfactors besides tradition at work here. . Radical Islamic groups active in the region and includegroupsacrossapoliticalspectrumrangingfromself-proclaimedpeaceful groups,suchasHizbut-Tahrir(HB)andTablighJemaat,tomilitantandterrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

Formorethan15yearsalready,theterm“multi-vectoredforeignpolicy”has been the official doctrine of Kazakhstan’s diplomacy. In one form or another, thisdoctrinehasbeenputintoservicebytheforeignpolicydepartmentsofother Central Asian states, with the exception, perhaps, of Turkmenistan, which has proclaimeditsneutrality,butneverthelessalsomeansmulti-vectoredness—that is, interaction in various directions in the international arena.

Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, even more than Kazakhstan’s early foreign policy, was not multi-vectored, but dualistic. This dualism by Tashkent was determined by the problems of security and the strategic choice to be made between Moscow and Washington. Karimov quarreled with Turkey, regarded theIslamiccountrieswithsuspicion,andforalongtimedistancedhimselffrom China (although he put its model of state capitalism into use).Thus,Tashkent’s choice was between America and Russia. The period from spring 2002 until spring 2004 was the time of the greatest cooling in Uzbekistan’s relations with Russia.Tashkent’sexpectationsofmajorfinancialadvantagesfromitssupportof theanti-terroristoperationinAfghanistanfellfarshortofbeingfullyrealized.In thecourseoftheeventsinAndijaninMay2005,Karimov’sregimedemonstrated

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to the West (with the full political support of Moscow and moral support from Astana) that it was capable of decisively putting a stop to any attempts to destabilizethecountry,andTashkentalsounequivocallyunfoldeditselffromthe West and moved in the direction of Russia. In the current period (2005-2008), bilateralrelationsbetweentheRepublicofUzbekistanandtheUnitedStatesare at their lowest level since Uzbekistan’s independence.

The main partners of Kyrgyzstan, upon which its security, economic development, and domestic stability depend, are its immediate neighbors - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and China - and also such powers as Russia and the United States. In such conditions, the main foreign policy task ofAskarAkaev alwayswasbalancingamongthem.OneconstantinKyrgyzstan’sforeignpolicy is Bishkek’s support for stable, good-neighborly relations with Kazakhstan, as well as its participation in all processes of integration in the framework of the CentralAsian region and the CIS.

The strategic and international position of Tajikistan is determined by its proximity to Afghanistan, by its total (until recently) dependence on Russia, by its cultural-historical bent toward Iran, by its position in the system of drug trafficking, by the Islamist threat, and by the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s foreign policy can be characterized not so much as multi-vectored, but as “anti-vectored.” Since the beginning of the 1990s, the regime of Saparmurat Niyazov has insisted on its “neutrality.” Turkmenistan holds a special place in CentralAsia and attracts interest thanks to two factors: first, its enormous supply of hydrocarbons, above all its gas resources, and secondly, the odious regime of Niyazov’s personal power. Turkmenistan is the largest producer of natural gas in Central Asia. After the death of Niazov in December 2006, the Turkmenistan foreign policy started to change slowly.

All sorts of geo-economic projects, related mostly to the transportation routesofenergyresources,figuredprominentlyinthegeopoliticalmaneuvering around Central Asia. The Caspian pipeline project is stalling mainly because there is another pipeline project on the table, the so-called Trans-Caspian pipeline, going across the Caspian via the South Caucasian states to Turkey and Europe. Ashghabad is using it for haggling over gas prices for Russia and lower transportation tariffs across its potential partners for itself. Today it has become abundantly clear that the importance of hydrocarbon fuel will rise and Kazakhstan can profit from this.

Moscow has abandoned its efforts to reintegrate the post-Soviet expanse on the basis of universal principles as having no future. While cementing bilateral relations Russia tried to pool corrective efforts in order to address the most urgent of tasks. Such are the CISAntiterrorist Center and the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces, as well as triple cooperation among Russia, Kazakhstan,

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and Azerbaijan on the Caspian issue. In Central Asia Russia has concentrated its efforts on Kazakhstan, which was fully confirmed by the fact that Dmitry Medvedev,asthenewlyelectedpresident,paidhisfirstvisittoAstana.Itseems thatunderthepressureofdomesticandforeignpoliticalfactorsRussiawillshift the weight of its geopolitical efforts to the West (the European part of the CIS and Europe) for the simple reason that it has close economic contacts with it and its security and modernization depend on it to a great extent. Subjectively, this bias might be promoted by the personality of the new Russian president. We should expect, therefore, that Moscow will pay relatively less geopolitical attentiontoitseasternpolicies(whichincludeChina,theAPR,theSCO,Southern and CentralAsia).

The response from the other key geopolitical player is easy to predict: Beijing will move in to fill the gaps left by Moscow, however the process will not be smooth. China has its own problems which will not remain long on the back burner. So far experts have identified several stumbling blocks in trade and economic relations between China and Central Asia: (1) from the very beginning they have been far from equal, with China’s obvious predomination;

(2) the border points and their role in promoting trans-border trade are a main problem; and (3) Chinese investments in the regional economy are a cause for worry. Beijing is steadily building up its economic presence in Central Asia by carrying out all sorts of projects (pipeline, transport and communication, trade, economic, construction, and investment) with each of the Central Asian states. Its involvement is clashing, to an increasing extent, with the interests of Russia and the United States in the context of rivalry over resources and the main pipelines.

Whatisgoingoninsidetheregion?Theaccumulatingchangeswillgradually cause qualitative shifts. Kazakhstan will remain the leader even though the current financial storms make this harder. Uzbekistan is openly (and other republics latently) opposed to Astana’s efforts to resume regional integration (cooperation) processes.

Kazakhstan, as one of the driving forces behind the integration processes across the post-Soviet expanse and because of its geostrategic importance, is Russia’s key strategic partner in Central Asia. Its energy, transport, transit, and military potential, as well as potential in other spheres, has not yet been fully tapped in the interests of both countries. It should be borne in mind that in the present geopolitical situation in Central Asia Russia will have to work harder than before to maintain and develop its allied and partner relations with Kazakhstan.

The relations between Kazakhstan and Russia are different from Russia’s relations with the other Central Asian and CIS countries. On the one hand,

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