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Fighting broke out again on 27 September. In the six week war that followed, Azerbaijan recaptured three of the seven provinces surrounding Karabakh, as well as Shusha. Russia brokered a ceasefire in November that solidified an Armenian retreat. It also introduced 2000 Russian peacekeepers to the war zone.

Weapons Purchases

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict led to a regional arms race. With its oil wealth, Azerbaijan purchases weapons from Russia at market price; Armenia, by contrast gets Russian weaponry as either military aid or at discretionary prices. Armenian Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan boasted that Armenia’s defense capability had doubled at no cost to the country’s budget. In early 1997, Russian newspapers reported the Kremlin had delivered to Yerevan some $1 billion in military hardware, despite a Yeltsin directive of September 1993 banning arms sales to either Armenia or Azerbaijan until they settled the dispute over Karabakh.87

Karabakh was not left out. In 2012, it formed a new tank brigade and received additional heavy artillery. In late 2013, it announced the provision of another 33 Russian-made tanks to its forces. (Russia also reportedly delivered 110 armored vehicles and 50 rocket systems to the Armenian military during the same period).88

Russia has felt no compunction in arming both sides in the conflict. When it negotiated the 2010 extension of the Gyumri basing agreement, it also negotiated the sale of an S-300 air-defense system to Azerbaijan. Dashnak international bureau leader Giro Manoyan was outraged. “It is incomprehensible and worrisome that our strategic partner has entered into such a deal with our opponent,” he commented. “We have to express our concern and dismay that such a step would encourage Azerbaijan to be more bold, more self-confident, and brazen. And that can bring unpredictable consequences for the entire region.”89

87Walker, Edward, ibid., 23–24.

88Danielyan, Emil. “Why Armenia’s Military Alliance with Russia Is Not at Risk,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 November 2015. Web. Retrieved 16 July 2019. https:// www.rferl.org/a/caucasus-report-armenian-russia-military-alliance/27351046.html.

89“AFRF-D Leaders Discuss Latest Armenia-Russia Military Agreement,” Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutyum, 25 August 2010. Web. Retrieved 7

60 J. J. COYLE

Azerbaijan did not have to limit its arms purchases to Russia. In 2012, Israeli defense officials confirmed the state-run Israel Aerospace Industries had a $1.6 billion deal to sell drones, anti-aircraft and missile defense systems to Baku.90 This would grow to almost $5 billion in arms purchases by 2016. In one instance, however, the Israeli Ministry of Defense suspended the export license of an Israeli drone manufacturer in 2017 when the company was involved in a live-fire demonstration of its equipment that targeted Armenian troops.91

President Aliyev described Azerbaijan’s relationship with the Jewish state as like an iceberg, nine-tenths of it below the surface. Israel purchased 40–50% of its oil from Azerbaijan, and much of the revenue was funneled back to the Jewish state in the form of weapons purchases.92 In 2016, President Aliyev said his country had purchased $4.85 billion in military equipment from the Jewish state. Israel sold Azerbaijan radar systems and drones, and collected intelligence on Iran from this Caucasus nation. According to other reports, an Israeli self-destructing killer drone—Israel Aerospace Industries’ Harop—was seen operating in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani soldiers are armed with Israeli Tavor rifles.93

Moscow lent the Armenian government $200 million for arms acquisitions in 2015. The weapons provided to the Armenian military under that deal included, among other things, multiple launch rocket systems, anti-tank rockets, and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. “The arms provided under the $200 million contract are advanced and modern, and

July 2019. https://old.arfd.info/2010/08/25/arf-d-leaders-discuss-latest-armenia-russia- military-agreement/.

90 “Israel Signs $1.6 Billion Arms Deal with Azerbaijan,” Haaretz, 26 February 2012. Web. Retrieved 15 July 2019. https://www.haaretz.com/1.5190757.

91 Gross, Judah Ari. “Drone Sale to Azeris Halted as Maker Accused of Bombing Armenia in Demo,” Times of Israel, 29 August 2017. Web. Retrieved 30 August 2017. https://timesofisrael.com/suicide-drone-sales-to-azeris-blocked-after-claim- it-hit-armenians-during-show.

92 Agayev, Zulfugar. “Israel’s Top Oil Supplier Endures Gaza as Azeri Ties Grow,” Bloomberg, 28 September 2014. Web. Retrieved 26 June 2019. https://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2014-09-28/israel-s-top-oil-supplier-endures-gaza-as-azeri-ties-grow.

93 Cohen, Gili. “Azerbaijan’s President: We’ve Bought Almost $5 Billion in Israeli Military Goods,” Haaretz, 14 December 2016. Web. Retrieved 26 June 2019. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-azerbaijan-has-bought-5-billion- in-israeli-military-goods-1.5473569.

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are not even in service yet in Russia,” said Armenia’s Defense Minister David Tonoyan.94 Yerevan secured another Russian loan in 2017, worth $100 million, for further arms purchases.

Immediately after the April 2016 fighting, Russia announced it was continuing its policy of selling weapons to Azerbaijan. On 8 April, both Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin visited Baku. Rogozin announced Russia would fulfill its weapons contract. This agreement, first announced in 2015, was to sell Azerbaijan a billion dollars of new weaponry. It included three battalions of T-90S tanks, and three battalions of BMP-3 (about 100 cars), as well as self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and a heavy flame thrower system.95 Russia’s continued sale of weaponry to Azerbaijan, was met with considerable hostility in Armenia. The visit of Russia’s foreign minister to Yerevan in summer 2016, as well as one by Vladimir Putin in October 2016, were both met with widespread anti-Russian demonstrations.96

Russian weapon sales to Azerbaijan did not mean a lessening of defense commitments to rival Armenia. It sold Armenia 9K720 Iskandar shortrange ballistic missiles, with a range of about 280 kilometers. Armenia made a public display of their arrival, by placing them prominently in a military parade marking that country’s twenty-fifth independence anniversary. Several Russian media outlets reported that Armenia had purchased at least one division, including a minimum of four launchers, of the Iskandar system, adding that this acquisition was outside the terms of 2015’s Armenian-Russian arms deal. It was also emphasized that these systems are not the same as the Iskandar-M systems dispatched to Armenia in 2013 as reinforcement for Russia’s 102nd Military Base in

94“Russia Ships $200 Million in Military Arms to Ally Armenia,” The Moscow Times, 23 July 2018. Web. Retrieved 7 July 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/ 07/23/russia-ships-200-million-military-arms-ally-armenia-a62318.

95“Rogozin: Russia Will Continue to Supply Weapons to Azerbaijan,” Contact.az, 8 April 2016. Web. Retrieved 1 June 2019. http://www.contact.az/.

96Balsyte, Erika. “Armenia: Russia First, EU Second?” European Union Institute for Security Studies, March 2017. Web. Retrieved 23 July 2019. https://www.iss.europa.eu/ sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_6_Armenia.pdf.

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we very well remember how the President of Azerbaijan helped us in the difficult times for Belarus.”99

Moscow was quite happy with its role as principal arms supplier to both sides in the Karabakh dispute, even though Yerevan frequently complained about the Kremlin giving aid to the enemy. Manvel Sargsyan, Director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, commented in 2015 that the military sales to Azerbaijan were the beginning of a military-political alliance with Baku. “Russia is trying its best to assure that the sale of weapons is just business,” he said. “But in the end it became clear that it is a new strategy of Russia.” Sargsyan observed that Moscow was keeping the two South Caucasus states locked in conflict over Karabakh, so that both could be dependent on Russian weapons.100

While Russia’s principal allies in the Armenian government lost power in 2018, it did not stop Moscow from continuing to be Armenia’s primary arms supplier. In February 2019 the Armenian Ministry of Defense confirmed it was expecting delivery of four Sukhoi SU-30SM multirole fighter jets. The Sargsyan administration had originally negotiated the deal in 2012 but were unable to complete the transaction because of lack of funds. Under Pashinyan, Yerevan would purchase the jets at CSTO concessionary prices with money borrowed from Russia. The Ministry also agreed to become the first foreign purchaser of the Russian AK-12 infantry assault rifle.101 Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan stated Yerevan would seek to acquire more such aircraft after receiving their first batch by “the beginning of next year.” Russian Defense Ministry officials announced additional contracts signed in Moscow by Armenia’s Deputy Defense Minister Davit Pakhchanyan and top Russian defense industry executives. The Armenian Defense Ministry confirmed the information

99Buniatyan, Heghine. “The Sale of Weapons by Belarus to Azerbaijan ‘Is Not Entirely Logical’—Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister,” Azatutyun, 11 June 2018. Web. Retrieved 7 July 2019. https://rus.azatutyun.am/a/29283647.html.

100Hayrumyan, Naira. “Allies and Allegiances: Armenia takes Russian-Azerbaijani Military Ties in Stride,” ArmeniaNow.com, 14 October 2015. Web. Retrieved 22 July 2019. www.armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/57619/armenia_azerbaijan_military_ cooperation.

101Elliott, Raffi. “Russia to Boost Armenian Military, Fighter Jets Approved,” Arme- nian Weekly, 5 February 2019. Web. Retrieved 22 July 2019. https://armenianweekly. com/2019/02/05/russia-to-boost-armenian-military-fighter-jets-approved/.