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Kazimirov glossed over the Bishkek Protocol’s lack of any mention of peacekeepers, which explains why the two sides continue to face each other on a line of contact.33

Kazimirov’s memoirs are a unique glimpse into the Russian interpretation of the peace process. He spent a lot of time complaining about Western attempts to be involved in the peace process, without explaining why he opposed them. Similarly, he did not explain his antipathy to an Azerbaijani proposal that the peacekeepers be international rather than Russian. While Kazimirov seemed genuinely interested in achieving a peace in the region, he appeared more interested in creating and/or preserving a Russian sphere of influence. (After leaving his post, Kazimirov became an advocate for the Armenian cause. He frequently appeared on Russian television supporting Yerevan’s interpretation of events.)

Russian Defense Minister General Grachev then invited the military leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh to Moscow. There, he ignored the fact that a cease-fire had already been in effect for four days and demanded that the participants sign another cease-fire that would include the stationing of an 1800-strong Russian peacekeeping force. Azerbaijani President Aliyev told Kazimirov that unless the Russian forces were part of a CSCE delegation they would only enter Azerbaijan “over my dead body.”34

Azerbaijan claimed that the May cease-fire was for thirty days; Kazimirov insisted there was no time limit to the agreement. Regardless, Western powers began preparations for a “permanent” cease-fire. The draft called for a CSCE multinational peacekeeping force, but it agreed that the troops would be under Russian command. Azerbaijan rejected the proposal.35

The Story of Section 907

American politics is electoral politics, and the American congress is frequently swayed by the organized lobbying groups with the most members, the largest contributions, or the strength of lobbying group

33Kazimirov, ibid.

34Croissant, ibid., 111.

35Walker, Edward. Ibid., 21.

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members’ interest in a single issue. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian community in the United States was fully engaged. Countering their efforts were few Azerbaijanis. As a result, after Armenia invaded Azerbaijan, seized large swaths of Azerbaijani territory by force, and continued to hold that territory in opposition to international law, the US Congress condemned Azerbaijan as the aggressor. It also failed to acknowledge that, under international law, Nagorno-Karabakh was a part of Azerbaijan.

Specifically, Congress passed the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act, aka the Freedom Support Act of 1992. This mammoth appropriations bill created numerous, frequently overlapping, mechanisms providing American aid to the countries of the former Soviet Union. Buried within the legislation was Section 907, prohibiting direct US government aid to Azerbaijan. “United States assistance under this or any other act…may not be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh”.36

Section 907 was so completely one sided that even as liberal a newspaper as the Washington Post took note of it. The editorial was four years after the passage of the legislation, but bears being quoted at length:

“The United States continues to intervene mischievously in the appalling conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Its particular contribution is to increase the misery of a million Azeri refugees, and in that way to draw out hopes for a settlement. Why would Washington wish to conduct such a policy, which runs against its own substantial strategic, economic and political interests? It is a policy thrust upon a reluctant president by a Congress heavily influenced by Armenian-Americans. This lobby has forced tough restrictions on direct American humanitarian and other aid to Azerbaijan…

“(L)ook at the situation on the ground. First… Azerbaijan is at war with Armenia; you would not expect them to trade with each other right now. Then, it is not only that Karabakh Armenians seized and hold the long-sovereign Azeri enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, whose turmoil sparked this war between the two formerly Soviet republics. Armenians

36 Freedom Support Act. PL 107-155. Stat. 2532. Sec. 907. Web. Retrieved 1 June 2019. https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/senate-bill/2532/text.

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also now occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijan proper. In short, the United States is punishing the loser and comforting the conqueror, occupier and evident winner of the war…

“(W)hat is on display is ethnic political power. The irony is that its wielding may not even be to the advantage of the Armenians. They would be better served, as would the Azeris, by enlisting the United States as an impartial moderator as they traded off territory for security for Karabakh and prosperity for themselves. But instead the Armenian lobby tends to tip American policy and to invite political intervention by an imperially inclined Moscow.”37

Secretary of State Madeline Albright protested the law to Congressman Robert Livingston. “Section 907 damages US national interests by undermining the administration’s neutrality in promoting a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, the ability to encourage economic and broad legal reforms in Azerbaijan, and efforts to advance an East-West energy corridor.”38 Her aide, Stephen Sestanovich, also protested the law as contrary to US National Security interests. “The Azerbaijani government is strongly pro-U.S. It is being helpful to us on Caspian energy questions, on proliferation, on Iranian terrorism—and on Nagorno-Karabakh. Section 907 has limited, and will continue to limit, the expansion of US-Azerbaijani relations—to no useful purpose.”39

As Sestanovich predicted, the bill hurt US-Azerbaijani relations for many years while Armenia strengthened its ties with Moscow. In 2001 Congress passed PL 107-115 authorizing the president to waive Section 907 if it is in the national interest. While promising the government of Armenia $90 million, it also states “The President may waive section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act if he determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that to do so–

(A)is necessary to support United States efforts to counter international terrorism; or

(B)is necessary to support the operational readiness of United States Armed Forces or coalition partners to counter international terrorism; or

37“Armenian Lobby,” Washington Post, 1 August 1996, A22.

38Cornell, ibid., 106.

39Cornell, ibid., 106.

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(C)is important to Azerbaijan’s border security; and

(D)will not undermine or hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia.”

The law further reads that “The President may extend the waiver Authority…on an annual basis on or after December 31, 2002.”40

Every president from both parties has done so annually.

The Clinton administration did its best to stay out of the conflict, except for its support for the Minsk process. Armenian President TerPetrosyan visited the White House in August 1994. Clinton told him that he (Clinton) would follow the Nagorno-Karabakh issue personally. Ambassador Maresca then made a series of proposals that included recognizing a Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh within the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the creation of an economic free zone that would include the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh.41

The proposal went nowhere, probably because the United States was already hedging how involved it wanted to be on the ground. The US Administration seemed willing to cede the leadership of any peacekeeping efforts to Russia, something that the OSCE fought hard to prevent. At the same meeting, President Clinton told Ter-Petrosyan the United States would not object to Russian troops’ presence in a peacekeeping force, “if the parties agree to it and there were clear OSCE safeguards so that we had the right sort of oversight.” A month later, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright went further, echoing Russian president Boris Yeltsin’s comments about the Caucasus being in Russia’s sphere of influence. The United States was not against Russian peacekeeping missions in the “near abroad,” she said, since “Russia has the resources, direct interests and the leadership required to help resolve the problem in this region.”42 With the United States giving signals like these, it was little wonder that Ter-Petrosyan would not agree to the US proposals without getting Russian approval first.

40Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Act 2002, PL 107-115, Assistance for the independent state of the former Soviet Union. Sec. g (2) and g (4). Web. Retrieved 1 June 2019. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/PLAW-107publ115/html/PLAW-107publ115.htm.

41Laitin and Suny, ibid.

42Human Rights Watch, ibid., 137.

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When the Republicans came to town in 2001, the new Secretary of State Colin Powell sponsored a summit meeting of Presidents Aliyev and Kocharyan in Key West, Florida. They negotiated a decentralized status for Karabakh and an exchange of territory. In the end, however, neither of the leaders believed their citizens had been prepared to accept the compromises they had made with each other. It was a lost opportunity. US co-chair Rudolf Perina said the two leaders had been “unbelievably close” to solving the conflict. In his analysis, any new peace proposal would only have minor technical changes in it, since the basic concepts for resolution had been agreed upon.43

Armenian-US relations took a hit in 2002 when the US government applied sanctions against the Armenian biochemical company Lizin for its sales to Iran. The president said Lizin was not a state-run company. The US Federal Register did not specify the nature of Lizin’s activities, only that the sanctions were imposed under the Iran Non-Proliferation Act of 2000. Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian effectively admitted that Lizin had sold sensitive dual-use technology to Iran despite American warnings. Oskanian seemed unrepentant and willing to continue banned sales. “Our relations [with Iran] have been on a high level since 1991, and they remain on that level today,” he said. “We see no reason to introduce any changes into our policy.”44

In 2003, Armenia allegedly assisted Iran to purchase rockets and machine guns. These were subsequently recovered in Iraq in 2007 during two Shi’a militant attacks that killed an American serviceman soldier and wounded six. The United States protested in 2008, and official Armenia

43Danielyan, Emil. “Armenian, Azerbaijani Presidents Were ‘Incredibly Close’ to Karabakh Settlement,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 30 October 2003. Web. Retrieved 7 June 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/armenia/armenian-azerbaijani-presid ents-were-incredibly-close-karabakh-settement.

44Danielyan, Emil. “Armenia: Officials Say Sanctions Will Not Worsen Ties with U.S.,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 21 May 2002. Web. Retrieved 16 July 2019. https:// www.rferl.org/a/1099761.html.

45“Top Armenian Officials Decline Comment on ‘Arms Supplies’ to Iran Allegations,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 30 November 2010. Web. Retrieved 16 July 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia_declines_comment_arms_supplies_iran/2235143.html.

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Foreign Minister Elmar Mammedyarov, “The United States unequivocally supports Azerbaijani territorial integrity…and is glad to take part in a monitoring mission on the occupied territories.”46 Sometimes the support was not easy to give, as the United States wanted to remain a neutral party with good relations in both capitals. On 13 January 2005, outgoing Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones commented in a video conference call that it was in Russia’s interest to have stability in areas such as Nagorno-Karabakh. She strayed into Armenian internal politics with the rest of her statement, that it was in Russia’s interest “for corruption to end there—for the criminal secessionists who rule there to be removed. It is not appropriate for this kind of instability and criminality to exist right in the middle of Europe.”47 Youthful demonstrators from Baze, the Armenian Revolutionary Front-Republican, and Orinats Yekir protested in front of the US Embassy, protected by a governmentprovided police cordon.48 In response to the demonstrations and to comments from the vice speaker of the Armenian National Assembly Vahan Hovannisian that Jones’ comments did not represent the views of the US Government, the embassy in Yerevan issued a strong statement of support for Jones and for Azerbaijan. “US policy with respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not changed. The United States does not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent country–and its leadership is not recognized internationally or by the United States.”49

Since the Obama administration, the United States has returned to the practices of the Clinton administration. It has stepped away from involving itself in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict except to continue to provide a co-chair to the Minsk process. As Chatham House noted, “Neither belligerent,” meaning Armenia and Azerbaijan, “has made

2019. http://asbarez.com/51209/assistant-us-secretary-of-states-statemens-hinder-peace- process-says-Karabakh-arf/.

48“Youth Demonstration Vocalizes Concern about US Remarks on Karabakh,” Asbarez, 19 January 2005. Web. Retrieved 1 June 2019. http://asbarez.com/51204/youth-dem onstration-vocalizes-concern-about-us-remarks-on-Karabakh/.

49“ARF Bureau Member Hovannisian Slams Jones’ MKR Statement,” Asbarez, 19 January 2005. Web. Retrieved 1 June 2019. http://asbarez.com/51207/arf-bureau-mem ber-hovannisian-slams-joness-mkr-statement/.