CHAPTER VI.
THE LEFT-BANK HETMANATE IN THE TIME BETWEEN INDEPENDENCE AND INCORPORATION
1. The Ruin. Ukraine in the Second Half of the 17th century
The great Ukrainian uprising of 1648 succeeded where most mass uprisings in early modern Europe had failed: it expelled a magnate-elite from most of the land and replaced it with a regime based on a native model. But while this epochal event brought about a great many changes, much remained unresolved. Sharp differences arose among the Cossack leaders as to whether Ukraine should remain under Moscow or seek the overlordship of another neighboring power. Pressing socioeconomic issues also came to the fore. Was Ukraine to become a unique society of free Cossack farmers, as envisaged by the peasants and Cossack rank and file, or would the Cossack starshyna simply take the place of the expelled nobles and thereby cause the destabilized social order to revert to the elite- dominated models typical for the period?
In the decades following Khmelnytsky's death, bitter conflicts over these issues pitted Ukrainians against each other. Civil strife, foreign intervention, and further devastation of an already despoiled land ensued. In Ukrainian historiography, the tragic spectacle of Ukrainians dissipating the tremendous energy and resolve that had been generated by the 1648 uprising in seemingly endless, self-destructive conflicts is often called the Ruin (Ruina). Twenty years after Khmelnytsky's death, the successes that had been scored against a common foe were cancelled out by the woeful inability of Ukrainians to unite towards a common goal. Their failure resulted in the loss of the promising opportunity created by the Khmelnytsky uprising to attain political self-determination.
Khmelnytsky's death came at an inopportune time for Ukrainian's. Their half-formed society, surrounded by predatory neighbors and rent by internal problems, had willingly accepted his leadership. But Khmelnytsky's successors, lacking his popularity and prestige, found it much more difficult to mobilize widespread support. Even the immediate issue of succession was not resolved without complications. Hoping to establish a dynasty of Ukrainian Cossack rulers, Khmelnytsky had arranged to have his young son, Yurii, succeed him. Yet, it soon became evident to the 16-year- old boy himself (as well as to the starshyna) that he was not prepared to rule at such a crucial juncture. Therefore, in 1657, Ivan Vyhovsky, one of B.Khmelnytsky's most experienced associates and the secretary-general of the Zaporozhian Host, was chosen hetman.
I.Vyhovsky was one of the most sophisticated and best educated of the Cossack leaders. An Orthodox nobleman from the Kiev region, he had studied at the renowned Mohyla Academy. In 1648, while serving with the Poles, he was captured at Zhovti Vody. Because he valued his education and experience, Khmelnytsky freed him and I.Vyhovsky joined the Cossacks, quickly rising to the post of secretary-general. The new hetman soon made it clear that he favored the rising starshyna. In international relations, his preference was for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian principality. However, Ukraine was too weak for such a step, so I.Vyhovsky concentrated on finding a counterbalance to Muscovite influence in Ukraine. For this reason, he established closer ties with Poland.
While the Cossack and ecclesiastical elite supported the rapprochement with Poland, the masses, suspicious of any understanding between the Cossack officers and the Polish nobles, vehemently opposed it. Vociferous in their opposition were the Zaporozhians, led by Iakiv Barabash, and the Cossacks of the Poltava regiment whose colonel, Martyn Pushkar, had ambitions to become hetman. Just as I.Vyhovsky hoped to play the Poles off against the tsar, the Muscovites, quick to observe the social tensions in Ukrainian society, began to agitate the masses against the hetman. By the end of 1657, a large part of the Cossack rank and file rebelled against the hetman and in June 1658, two opposing Cossack armies clashed in a bloody battle near Poltava. I.Vyhovsky emerged victorious, Pushkar was killed on the battle field along with 15,000 rebels, while Barabash was later captured and executed. For the hetman, it was a Pyrrhic victory, for the total cost of the fratricidal struggle was about 50,000 Ukrainian lives.
Realizing that a break with Moscow was imminent, I.Vyhovsky intensified his efforts to come to an understanding with the Poles. He was greatly aided by Yurii Nemyrych, a Ukrainian aristocrat who had studied extensively in Europe and who espoused the idea of a sovereign Ukrainian principality whose independence would be internationally guaranteed like that of Holland or Switzerland. But I.Vyhovsky, who was preparing for war with Moscow, was in no position to insist that the Poles recognize Ukrainian independence. In 1658, after lengthy debate, the Ukrainian and Polish envoys reached a compromise solution known as the Treaty of Hadiach.
According to the treaty, the provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv were to form a Ukrainian principality that, together with Poland and Lithuania, would become the third and equal partner in the Commonwealth. The Ukrainian principality was to have far-ranging autonomy. Its hetman was to be responsible only to the king and it was to
have its own army, courts, treasury, and mint. Unless invited by the hetman, Polish troops were to be banned from the territory of the principality. Traditional Cossack rights were to be guaranteed and every year, upon the recommendation of the hetman, 100 Cossacks were to be accepted into the nobility. The Poles made important concessions on the religious issue: the Union of Brest was to be abolished in the principality and the Orthodox were to enjoy equality with the Catholics of the Commonwealth. Finally, two universities were projected for Ukraine and as many schools and printing presses "as were necessary" were to be established.
Although the Treaty of Hadiach has fascinated historians because of its potential impact on Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian history, its actual influence was minimal because it was never implemented. Even before it was signed, a huge Muscovite army of about 150,000, led by the able Prince Aleksei Trubetskoi, invaded Ukraine. Hastily gathering his forces and uniting with his Polish and Tatar allies, I.Vyhovsky moved to the northeast to confront the invaders. On 29 June 1658, near Konotop, the tsar's troops suffered one of their worst defeats ever. The Russian historian Sergei Soloviev described its effect: "The flower of Muscovite cavalry perished in one day and never again would a Muscovite tsar be able to field such a splendid army. Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich came out to the people dressed in mourning and panic seized Moscow ... There were rumors that the Tsar intended to leave for Iaroslav beyond the Volga and that I.Vyhovsky was expected to advance directly on Moscow."1 The hetman, however, could not take advantage of his brilliant victory. The Muscovite garrisons in Ukraine continued to hold out; a Zaporozhian attack on the Crimea forced I.Vyhovsky's Tatar allies to return home; and unrest broke out again in the Poltava region. The final blow came when several pro-Moscow colonels accused the hetman of "selling Ukraine out to the Poles" and rebelled. Unable to continue the war against Moscow, I.Vyhovsky resigned in October 1659 and retired to Poland.
Moscow now had the advantage. Hoping that the appeal of his father's name might help to heal internal rifts, the starshyna elected the 18- year-old Yurii Khmelnytsky as hetman. Trubetskoi, who returned to Ukraine with another army, insisted that the young hetman come to his camp to renegotiate his father's treaty with the tsar. By acquiescing, Yurii committed the first in a long series of political blunders. Terrorized by the powerful Russian army, bullied by Trubetskoi, and confused by a falsified copy of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, Yurii concluded another, extremely disadvantageous version of it in 1659. The Pereiaslav pact of 1659 stipulated that Russian garrisons were to be stationed not only in Kiev, but in all major towns. Furthermore, the Cossacks were forbidden to conduct wars or to maintain foreign relations without the tsar's permission. Nor were hetmans, heneralna starshyna, or colonels to be elected without Moscow's approval. Thus, young Yurii agreed to concessions that five years earlier would not even have been considered by his father. For Moscow, the pact was a major step forward in its systematic attempts to tighten its hold on Ukraine.
In 1660, war broke out again between Moscow and Poland for control of Ukraine. When the tsar's troops found themselves surrounded by the Poles near Chudniv in Volhynia, lurii and the starshyna did not hurry to their aid. Instead, the young hetman began negotiations with the Poles and when the Russians suffered yet another disastrous defeat at Chudniv, Yurii agreed to return Ukraine to the Commonwealth. At this point, the already chaotic political situation became even more confused. On the Right Bank, where Khmelnytsky's army and the Poles were ensconced, the hetman's authority remained intact; on the Left Bank, however, where the tsar was still in control, the Cossacks deposed Khmelnytsky and elected Iakiv Somko as acting hetman. Rent by social strife and political factionalism, occupied by Polish and Russian armies, Cossack Ukraine was divided into two parts, each with its own hetman. The period of Ruin was now in full swing.
Depressed by what was in effect a partition of Ukraine and frustrated by his inability to deal with a rapidly deteriorating situation, in January 1663 a morose Yurii Khmelnytsky surrendered his hetman's mace and entered a monastery. The authority of his successor, Pavlo Teteria, was limited to Right-Bank Ukraine. A strong adherent of a pro-Polish policy, the noble-born and well-educated P.Teteria had served in a number of important positions under B.Khmelnytsky, but unlike his predecessors, he was unwilling to forge an independent Cossack policy and generally followed the Polish line. Together with the Poles, he invaded the Left Bank and urged King Jan Casimir to push the offensive as far as Moscow. When the attack failed, P.Teteria and the Poles returned to the Right Bank to crush the numerous insurrections that had broken out against the szlachta.
Eager to take vengeance on the region that had fostered the 1648 uprising, the Poles burned, pillaged, and murdered at every turn. Stefan Czarnecki, the Polish commander, even had Bohdan Khmelnytsky's grave opened and its contents scattered to the winds. Because he was perceived as a possible rival, I.Vyhovsky was arrested at P.Teteria's behest and executed by the Poles. As for Yurii Khmelnytsky, he was dragged from his monk's cell and interned in a Polish prison. As a result of his generally detested behavior and his Polish allies, the Right-Bank hetman lost (he little support that he had had among the Cossacks, resigned his office, and fled to Poland. It had now become abundantly clear that no matter what rationale was used to justify it, cooperation between Ukrainians (especially of the lower classes) and Poles had, practically speaking, become impossible.
With Ukraine divided into Polish and Russian spheres of influence and with rival hetmans who were little more than puppets of their foreign overlords, responsible Cossack leaders lamented the condition of "our poor mother, Ukraine," and called for a return to past glories. Among the most forceful proponents of Cossack regeneration was Petro Doroshenko, the 38- year-old colonel of Cherkasy and the next hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine.
P.Doroshenko's qualifications for leadership were impressive. The son of a Cossack colonel and grandson of a hetman, he had worked closely with B.Khmelnytsky and had held high office under I.Vyhovsky and P.Teteria. After removing two dangerous rivals, Vasyl Drozdenko and Stefan Opara, P.Doroshenko became hetman in 1666. He stressed that his goal was to unite Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine under his aegis. To solidify his position, the new hetman instituted several well-considcrcd reforms on the advice of his friend, Metropolitan Iosyp Tukalsky. In the hope of winning over the masses, P.Doroshenko frequently called general councils where he listened to the opinions of the rank and file. To free himself from overdependence on the starshyna, the hetman organized a corps of 20,000 mercenaries (serdiuky) who took orders only from him. However, P.Doroshenko's most far-reaching innovations were in the realm of foreign relations.
At the outset of his hetmancy, P.Doroshenko, like all Right-Bank hetmans, followed a pro-Polish line. But this policy changed radically when, in January 1667, the Poles and Russians signed the Treaty of Andrusovo. Although most of the treaty dealt with Ukraine, neither power bothered to consult the Ukrainians. In essence, the treaty partitioned Cossack Ukraine: the Poles recognized the tsar's sovereignty over the Left Bank, and the Muscovites agreed to a Polish return to the Right Bank. On the sensitive issue of Kiev, it was decided that the city would remain under Muscovite rule for two more years, after which it would revert to the Poles. Moscow never honored this point, however, retaining Kiev permanently. The vast, virtually empty lands of the Zaporozhians were placed under dual Polish-Muscovite overlordship and were to act as a buffer against Tatar attacks.
While both parties were pleased with the arrangement, for the Ukrainians it was an unmitigated political disaster. If it had been difficult enough for Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky, who ruled all of Dnieper Ukraine, to exercise freedom of action; for their successors, who controlled only half the land and were much more constrained by their foreign overlords, an independent policy was impossible. As the szlachta returned to the Right Bank and the realization spread that Moscow had grossly violated its 1654 commitment to keep the Poles out, disillusionment and anger enveloped both sides of the Dnieper.
P.Doroshenko, who reportedly suffered a seizure upon receiving news of the treaty, abandoned his pro-Polish stance and decided to revive one of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's old projects by approaching the Ottoman Porte for aid. His timing was fortunate, for the Porte had been planning a number of ambitious, expansionary wars and it willingly provided the hetman with support. In fall 1667, a combined Ottoman/Cossack army attacked the Polish forces in Galicia and compelled King Jan Casimir to grant P.Doroshenko wide-ranging autonomy on the Right Bank. But this success was not enough for the hetman. To rid himself completely of the Poles, he placed Ukraine under relatively loose Ottoman overlordship. With the Right Bank seemingly secured, P.Doroshenko led his army over to the Left Bank and deposed his rival hetman, Ivan Briukhovetsky. In 1668, P.Doroshenko reached the height of his power when, backed by the Ottomans and with both Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine under his control, he proclaimed himself hetman of all Ukraine.
His success was fleeting, however. Alarmed by his growing power, the het-man's numerous enemies set about to undermine it. To this end, they utilized the old tactic of supporting rivals for the hetmancy. The Tatars attempted to replace P.Doroshenko with a certain Sukhovienko. No sooner hadP. Doroshenko disposed of this rival than the Poles produced a more dangerous one in the person of Mykhailo Khanenko with whom they invaded the Right Bank. Turning to meet the invaders, P.Doroshenko appointed Demian Mnohohrishny acting hetman of the Left Bank. Now Moscow, seeing its chance, moved into the Left Bank and forced D.Mnohohrishny to renounce his ties with P.Doroshenko and recognize the overlordship of the tsar.
As his base of power crumbled, P.Doroshenko even found it difficult to maintain his hold on the Right Bank. In 1672, with a force of 12,000, he was forced to aid an Ottoman army of 100,000, which pushed the Poles out of Podilia and turned it into an Ottoman province. With his unpopularity growing because of his contacts with the hated infidels, the hetman's support was dwindling fast. The final blow came in 1675-76 when the Muscovites, aided by Left-Bank Cossacks, engaged the Ottomans in a bloody contest for Chyhyryn fortress and P.Doroshenko found himself supporting the "infidel" Ottomans against his Orthodox countrymen. Realizing that his position was untenable, he surrendered the regalia of his office to Ivan Samoilovych, the new hetman of the Left Bank. Treating him with relative leniency, the tsar ordered this "last of the true Cossacks" into exile near Moscow.
The Ottomans' replacement for P.Doroshenko was a surprise. In 1677, hoping to take advantage of his famous name, they appointed Yurii Khmelnytsky hetman of the Right Bank. This enigmatic and probably unbalanced individual already had a chequered career behind him. After entering the monastery, he served as an abbot and was subsequently imprisoned for three years by the Poles. Upon his release, he participated in a campaign against the Tatars, was captured by them, and sent to Constantinople where he spent six more years in prison. Unexpectedly, the Ottomans dragged this tragic figure from his cell, thrust the hetman's mace in his hands, and, to add a measure of dignity to their uninspiring puppet, grandiloquently styled him "Prince of Sarmatia and Ukraine, Lord of the Zaporozhian Host." But this title did him little good, for Yurii proved to be as inept in his second tenure as hetman as he had been in his first.
In 1677-78, he joined the Ottomans in several unsuccessful campaigns against his father's old capital of Chyhyryn. Both Russians and Ottomans deployed huge armies in these battles: the sultan's forces numbered about 200,000, while Moscow committed 70,000 Russians and about 50,000 Left-Bank Cossacks. After the inconclusive completion of the Chyhyryn campaigns, Yuri Khmelnytsky launched an incursion into the Left Bank, failing miserably. Unable to mobilize significant support, he controlled only a small stretch of territory in Podilia that the Ottomans had set aside for him. Even here his rule was so unstable and despotic that his Muslim patrons finally lost patience with him and, in 1681, executed him. That same year, Moscow concluded the Peace of Bakhchesarai with the Ottomans and Crimean Tatars, whereby they recognized each other's possessions in Ukraine. Five years later, Russia signed a similar agreement with Poland. By 1686, all of Ukraine was divided up among the powers that surrounded it.
Because of its proximity to Russia, the Left Bank remained in Moscow's orbit. During the chaotic 1660s and 1670s, the area experienced fewer of the recurrent Ottoman, Tatar, Polish, and Russians invasions that had plagued the once-flourishing Right Bank. Nonetheless, the Left Bank had its share of destructive upheavals, but these were brought on for the most part not by foreign invaders, but by conflicts between the starshyna- elite and the masses. These internal struggles flared up soon after Yurii Khmelnytsky's first hetmancy. Iakiv Somko, a member of a wealthy burgher family and an out-spoken champion of starshyna elitism, united with his erstwhile rival, Vasyl Zolotarenko, the colonel of Nizhyn, to secure the latter's election as hetman and thereby assure the starshyna a predominant position. Opposing the Somko-Zolotarenko faction was Ivan Briukhovetsky, a man of lower-class origins whose demagogic skill assured him election as otaman of the Zaporozhians. As usual, Moscow played one faction off against the other. In this case, it favored Briukhovetsky, since it suspected the starshyna of pro-Polish tendencies. In June 1663, Muscovite officials approvingly looked on at the famous "Black Council" (chorna rada), a riotous elective assembly at which the Cossack masses (cherri), reinforced by peasants and poor burghers, overwhelmed Ia.Somko's supporters by force and chose I.Briukhovetsky as hetman. Later, the new hetman had both Ia.Somko and V.Zolotarenko executed.
Ivan Briukhovetsky (1663-1668). Completely dependent on Moscow's support, I.Briukhovetsky made one concession after another to the tsarist government. He willingly endorsed the disadvantageous 1659 Pereiaslav Treaty and, in addition, offered to pay for the maintenance of Russian garrisons in Ukraine. In 1665, expressing a desire to "gaze upon the shining eyes of the monarch," he became the first hetman to journey to Moscow, accompanied by an entourage of 500. Flattered by the honors showered upon him by the Muscovites (he was awarded the rank of Muscovite boyar and a high-born Russian wife was found for him), he responded by signing an agreement that limited Ukrainian rights even more. It placed almost all major Ukrainian towns under Russian control; allowed the tsar's officials to collect taxes from Ukrainian peasants and burghers; agreed to have a Russian appointed head of the Ukrainian Orthodox church; and stipulated that the tsar's representatives were henceforth to be present at the elections of hetmans, who were now required to appear in Moscow to obtain confirmation in office.
But before long, I.Briukhovetsky paid dearly for his neglect of Ukrainian interests. As Muscovite garrisons moved into Ukrainian towns, as the tsar's census-takers pried into the people's personal affairs, and as arrogant tax officials imposed exorbitant duties, dissatisfaction grew with the Muscovites and particularly with the hetman who had invited them into Ukraine. Even members of the ecclesiastical elite, some of whom had previously supported a pro-Moscow line, openly protested against more Muscovite influence. The event that most outraged Ukrainians and decisively turned them against I.Briukhovetsky and Moscow was the Treaty of Andrusovo of 1667.
Like their compatriots on the Right Bank, Left-Bank Ukrainians were shocked and outraged that the tsar, who had promised to defend all of Ukraine against the Poles, had surrendered half of it to the hated szlachta. In 1667-68, a series of uprisings spread throughout the Left Bank against the tsar's garrisons and their Ukrainian supporters. Realizing that he had pushed his pro-Moscow policies too far, I.Briukhovetsky issued manifestos in which he decried "the ruin of our beloved motherland, Ukraine" and secretly established contacts with P.Doroshenko for the purpose of forming an anti-Russian alliance. But it was too late. As P.Doroshenko's regiments crossed over to the Left Bank in spring 1668, an angry crowd of I.Briukhovetsky's former Left-Bank supporters captured him and beat him to death.
Demian Mnoholirishny (1668-1672). Polish pressure had forced Doroshenko to return to the Right Bank and to appoint Demian Mnohohrishny, the colonel of Chernihiv, as acting hetman on the Left Bank. A "simple and unlettered man," D.Mnohohrishny had a reputation for eliciting obedience, if not loyalty, from his subordinates. As the fortunes of his nominal superior, P.Doroshenko, sank, D.Mnohohrishny abandoned all thoughts of breaking away from Moscow and instead renewed the pledge of loyalty to the tsar, for which he was rewarded by Moscow by being recognized as hetman of the Left Bank.
However, his rapprochement with Moscow did not mean that, like I.Briukhovetsky, he intended to be a puppet of the tsar. In characteristically blunt, forceful fashion, D.Mnohohrishny informed the Russians of Ukrainian grievances and insisted that Moscow's garrisons be withdrawn from the Left Bank. In a compromise solution, the tsar agreed to limit the garrisons to five of the major towns. On the issue of Kiev, the hetman pointedly reminded Moscow that the tsar had not conquered Kiev or the other Ukrainian towns, but that the Zaporozhian Host had submitted them voluntarily under his rule, and that, therefore, the Russians had no right to surrender Kiev to the Poles. In general, Moscow's responses were conciliatory. Apparently, its statesmen had concluded that they had been too hasty and aggressive during I.Briukhovetsky's tenure in office. Moscow's astute downplaying of its presence on the Left Bank compared favorably with the political ineptitude of the Poles, whose consistently repressive and vengeftil measures on the Right Bank only served to increase the population's hatred of them.
In addition to recouping some of the autonomy that had been lost by his predecessor, D.Mnohohrishny also made headway in restoring law and order to the Left Bank with the aid of his mercenaries (kompaniitsi). Yet the hetman's fatal flaw was his lack of tact and inability to cooperate with the starshyna. This led the resentful Cossack elite to conspire against him by sending the tsar a series of denunciations implying that D.Mnohohrishny was secretly corresponding with P.Doroshenko and planning to accept Ottoman overlordship. Finally, in 1673, the starshyna attained its goal.
Seeing that the obstreperous hetman was losing support, the tsar ordered Mnohohrishny to be arrested, tortured, and exiled to Siberia.
Ivan Samoilovych (1672-1687). While the election of I.Briukhovetsky reflected the conflict between the starshyna and the masses, the deposition of D.Mnohohrishny highhghted the inherent tensions between the hetmans and the starshyna. Fearful, in principle, of powerful hetmans, the starshyna delayed electing a successor to D.Mnohohrishny for about three months. Meanwhile, it turned to the tsar with proposals to limit the hetmans' prerogatives. For its part, Moscow was only too happy to comply. Thus, when I. Samoilovych was elected in 1672, it was on condition that he not discipline and judge members of the starshyna or carries on foreign relations without consulting the starshyna council. Moreover, the new hetman was forced to disband the hired troops that had traditionally been under his direct control. By imposing these conditions, the starshyna expanded its already considerable influence, but it did so at the cost of undermining the prerogatives of the hetmans and, with them, Ukrainian autonomy.
The son of a priest, I.Samoilovych had studied with notable success at the Kiev Academy before enrolling in the Zaporozhian Host. For most of his tenure as hetman, he was careful to maintain good relations with the starshyna. He awarded it generous land grants and created the so-called companions of the standard, a corps of junior officers - mostly sons of the starshyna — who became part of the hetman's entourage and were given special assignments in preparation for assuming the positions that would be vacated by their fathers. By creating this corps, i.Samoilovych encouraged the development of hereditary elite on the Left Bank.
In external affairs, I.Samoilovych, like all hetmans, attempted to extend his authority over all of Ukraine. He tightened his control over the unruly Zaporozhians and in 1676 valiantly led his regiments, together with the Russian armies, in the fierce struggle to evict the Ottomans and P.Doroshenko from the Right Bank. Probably the most satisfying moment of I.Samoilovych's career occurred in 1676 when P.Doroshenko ceremoniously surrendered his mace to him, whereupon I.Samoilovych began to title himself "Hetman of both sides of the Dnieper." Within two years, however, the Ottomans forced I.Samoilovych and his Russian allies to abandon the Right Bank. As he evacuated the region, the hetman organized the exodus of the population of the Right Bank to the Left Bank. As a result, the original homeland of the Cossacks was left practically uninhabited.
Another setback to I.Samoilovych's hopes of reuniting Ukraine came in 1686 when the Poles and Russians signed the so-called Eternal Peace. It placed Kiev and the Zaporozhian lands permanently under the sovereignty of the tsar. Yet, despite the hetman's remonstrations to Moscow that the Right Bank and Eastern Galicia (the Rus' palatinate) belonged to the Ukrainians and should not be given up, these lands were left under Polish control. Disgruntled by Moscow's policies, I. Samoilovych was not very cooperative when the Russians launched a huge campaign against the Tatars in 1687. Although over 100,000 Russians and about 50,000 Cossacks participated in the offensive, poor preparedness and natural calamities turned the campaign into a costly fiasco. Accused by dissident members of the starshyna of illegally enriching himself and his family and blamed by Russian commanders for the failure of the campaign, I.Samoilovych was removed from office in 1687 and exiled to Siberia.
Thus, during the period of the Ruin, the newly established Cossack polity in Ukraine experienced a catastrophic reversal of fortune. A powerful, aggressive force in the days of Khmelnytsky, it became in the twenty years following his death the helpless object of civil strife, foreign incursions, and partitions.
Among the underlying causes for the setbacks suffered by Ukrainians during the Ruin were the following:
The internal contradictions between the elitist and egalitarian tendencies in Cossack society;
the intense external pressure applied on the incompletely formed Cossack society by Muscovy, Poland, and the Ottomans — Eastern Europe's three greatest powers;
the Cossacks' lack of well-defined political goals and of adequate institutions to govern effectively all segments of Ukrainian society.
As a result, Cossack Ukraine was able to preserve only a part of the gains it had achieved in 1648.
2. Changes in the Political and Social System. < ultural Activity
At the time of Khmelnytsky's death, the C 'ossacks controlled most of the Right and Left banks of the Dnieper (the former provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv), while the West Ukrainian lands of Galicia and Volhynia remained in Polish hands. About 1.2 to 1.5 million people lived in the roughly 250,000 sq. km that were held by the Cossacks. In the first decades after the uprising, about 50% of the land - formerly owned by the Polish crown - became the property of the Zaporozhian Host, which, in return for taxes, allocated most of this land to self-governing peasant villages. The income from a part of these lands, the so-called rank lands, was used to remunerate high-ranking Cossack officers while they were in office. About 33% of the land was owned by Cossacks and Ukrainian nobles. And 17% was confirmed as the property of the Orthodox Church.
The Cossacks quickly established their own form of government. The territory they controlled was divided into sixteen military districts (polky), corresponding to the regiments in the Cossack army. Colonels who commanded the 3000-5000-man regiments in wartime served as their district's chief administrative and judicial officials in times of peace. Each regimental district was further divided into company subdistricts (sotni) in which captains performed military and administrative functions. Both regiments and companies had their headquarters in the major towns in their area and carried their names. At the bottom of this administrative structure were the individual small towns and villages in which Cossack otamany held sway. Initially, Cossack officers were elected by the Cossacks in their units. However, in time, these posts became hereditary.
At the pinnacle of this military-administrative system stood the hetman. Theoretically, he was subject to the will of the general Cossack council (rada) that had elected him. But the rapid growth in the number of Cossacks during the 1648-56 period made these general councils impractical and, consequently, hetmans called them infrequently. Khmelnytsky and his successors preferred to consult the increasingly influential council of officers instead. In practice, however, hetmans were free to exercise their wide prerogatives and they were considered to be the de facto rulers of Ukraine. In addition to commanding the Cossack army, they conducted foreign affairs, supervised the administrative and judicial systems, and controlled the Cossack treasury and land fund. The fund consisted of the estates that had been confiscated from the Poles and the hetman's right to distribute them as he saw fit contributed greatly to his political leverage. In addition to the confiscated lands, which were used mainly to support Cossack officeholders, the treasury had an annual income of about 1,000,000 gold pieces from taxation, duties, and tariffs.
Assisting the hetman in the fulfillment of his functions was the heneralna starshyna, a combination of general staff and council of ministers. It's most important member was the secretary-general (heneralny pysar) or chancellor, who established the agenda of the council meetings, formulated key government documents, and supervised the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs. Another key member of the staff was the quartermaster-general (heneralny obozny), a position analogous to minister of war, who was responsible for the military preparedness of 40,000- 60,000 Cossack regulars, including artillery. The judge-general (heneralny suddia) looked after judicial affairs and the two adjutants-general (heneralny osavul) as well as the standardbearer-general (heneralny khorunzhy) were used for special assignments by the hetman. Although Khmelnytsky and his successors always considered Kiev to be Ukraine's major city, the headquarters of the administration was based in the small Cossack town of Chyhyryn and, in the 18th century, in Baturyn and Hlukhiv. The formal designation for the Cossack order and the lands it controlled was the Zaporozhian Host. The Muscovites, however, usually referred to it as Malorossiia (Little Russia), although the Poles continued to call it Ukraine.