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country in which use of sources of ionization radiations is advanced. About eight thousand enterprises, organizations and scientific institutes use over hundred thousand sources of ionization radiation and radioisotope devices [4, 5].

There is a problem of use and burial place of radioactive waste products. Nuclear power plants are the main place of accumulation of radioactive waste products on which their initial processing and time storage [4] is carried out.

In Ukraine there are five enterprises for extraction and processing of radioactive ore. These enterprises are situated in the Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolaev and Kirovograd provinces. Almost all waste products of uranium ores which are formed during extraction and processing (stores of mine breeds, liquid dumps and gaseous emissions), are sources of environmental contamination. The basic danger is big with regard to the volumes with stores of waste products and the radioactive materials concentrated in them [4].

Radiation safety of Ukraine is formed, first of all, under influence of the enterprises for manufacture of fuel for the nuclear stations (the industry obtaining uranium; the industry processing uranium; atomic power stations), "UKRYTIE" object and Chernobyl problems. Compound radiation safety which is created by military activity, is important, and demands special attention. It is caused by significant specificity of military activity. There are a lot of potentially dangerous military objects and some kinds of military activity which have potential ability of substantial increase of a collective doze of an irradiation of the population. It is possible in adverse conditions, for example, in case of failure.

For the years of existence of Armed Forces of Ukraine such incidents did not occur. Absence of significant radiation incidents in Armed Forces of Ukraine does not mean that military activity was safe. Absence of significant radiation incidents is consequence of appropriate level of the organization of system of safety. The example for this is the work on liquidation of nuclear weapons.

3. Performance of works on nuclear disarmament

Ukraine has received in the inheritance from Soviet Union the third of the size of the nuclear arsenal in the world. It consists of 176 starting complexes of strategic rockets. From them are 130 rockets SS-19 (on Soviet classification RS-18) and 46 rockets SS-24 (on Soviet classification RS-22). In addition to strategic rockets in Ukraine were fourteen heavy strategic bombers and a significant arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons [7, 8].

The fighting part of rocket SS-19 contains 6 warheads. The fighting part of rocket SS-24 contains 10 warheads. The total of warheads on strategic rockets was equalled to 1240 units. 600 warheads were on cruise missiles for big range.

Warheads incorporate highly dangerous substances for their ecological behaviour. It is known that on each warhead about 3 kg of plutonium or 15 kg of enriched uranium is present that has created considerable accumulation of dangerous materials. For example, plutonium Pu-239 (a half-life period of 24065 years) is one of the most toxic elements. One ten-thousandth part of a gram of plutonium, in case of a hit in an organism of the person, will provoke a lethal consequence [7, 8].

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All activities, which were connected to the liquidation of the strategic nuclear arsenal of Ukraine, were ecologically dangerous and were carried out during a long period (figure 1, [18]). The application of the nominal rules and technologies of safety guaranteed exception of threat of an unauthorized atomic explosion. However the possibility of start offing of emergencies in atypical situations could not be eliminated. For example, in emergency situations, at errors or violations of technology, there is a potential of explosion of explosive material in warheads. Such an explosion, fire or transport accident can produce a radiation contamination on a distance of several kilometres

Unfortunately, cases of dangerous failures happened in world practice. In January, 1985 in Germany, there was an explosion of a rocket "Pershing-2". In December, 1987 there was a non-authorized start-up of a research rocket of NASA. In September, 1986 there was an explosion of a rocket in the shaft of the Soviet submarine in the area of the Bermuda triangle. In April, 1990 there was an explosion of the accelerator of a "Titan - 4" rocket on the Military - Air Forces of USA basis. Cases of destruction of rockets SS20 took place at overturning mobile launchers. The Joint Staff of Armed Forces SNG informed, that in USA during 1950 - 1989, 178 incidents have arisen with nuclear weapons. 43 refusals were accompanied by non-nuclear explosion of explosive which was in warheads. Approximately 170 similar cases happened in Great Britain [7]. Safety of a nuclear arsenal of Ukraine caused concern prior to the beginning of works on liquidation of the nuclear weapon. The characteristic name of articles of that time was V. Litovkina's article - "On rocket shafts of Ukraine: the second Chernobyl" [9]. The successful fulfilment of all complexes of activities on nuclear disarming was especially considerable on a background of such publications. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have acquired experience with a security system at fulfilment of activities of

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elimination of nuclear weapons and experience of unprecedented moving of nuclear ammunition.

4. The manipulation with radioactive waste products and sources ionization radiations

As a heritage from Armed Forces of Soviet Union one more problem has been identified. Such problem is the existence of a series of large radioactive waste storehouses. These storehouses are located close to Deljtin the Ivano-Frankovsk region; Cybulovo the Kirovograd region; Feodosiya and Bagerove, Autonomous Republic Crimea.

The today's radiating condition of territory of the radioactive waste storehouses is satisfactory. The radiating background for the protection of the territory of storehouses makes up to 13-15 ΠR/h. This parameter does not exceed the natural background.

Liquidation of nuclear weapons and reforming of Armed Forces of Ukraine [10] have made unnecessary the radioactive waste products storehouses for Armed Forces. The question on transfer of the big storehouses of radioactive waste products to the Ukrainian state association "Radon", which belongs to the Ministry of Emergency, therefore is considered. This organization is authorized to carry out burial places of all radioactive waste products from all the territory of Ukraine.

The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine plans in 2002:

State inventory of radioactive waste products and radiating sources.

Recycling of radioactive waste products is the most actual task. It speaks about the presence of a significant amount of radiation sources. After export from Ukraine of nuclear ammunition those radiations sources in Armed Forces of Ukraine were estimated to remain at about 75 thousand of them. Overwhelmingly, the majority of these sources are closed low-power Ȗ-sources. The basic kind of use of radiation of sources is their application for the control of serviceability of dosimetric devices. Under certain conditions these sources may create a threat of pollution of the territory.

In Armed Forces of Ukraine the State an inventory of radioactive waste and radiations sources is carried out. Work is carried out according to requirements of the reference of Program of use of radioactive waste [6]. The results have allowed to obtain the information on the quantity of radioactive waste outside of the big storehouses of radioactive waste. Specification of structure of radioactive waste and radiations sources is carried out. The tendency of reduction of quantity of radiations sources and radioactive waste became obvious (Table 1).

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Table 1. Presence radiations sources and radioactive waste in Armed Forces of Ukraine

RS: radiations sources; RW: radioactive waste.

Control of the condition of operation and storage of radiation sources and radioactive waste is executed simultaneously by the State inventory of radioactive waste. As a whole, the level of radiating safety corresponds to requirements of the present legislation.

5. Maintenance of radiation safety in case of a difficult radiation situation

Radiation safety is a component of ecological safety. The modern legislation of Ukraine obliges commanders of all levels, without exception, to solve questions of ecological safety. Therefore all officials in all kinds of armed Forces of Ukraine provide a necessary level of radiation safety. In addition, the service of ecological safety of Armed Forces of Ukraine carries out the control of completeness and correctness of observance of ecological laws.

The Ministry of Defence has entered a system of expedite and periodic reports. Their purpose is well-timed reacting to ecological threats by the military serving and environment. The expedite reports are done in case of detection of considerable violations of the ecological legislation, or in case of detection of pollutions of a natural medium. The periodic reports go into controls with a frequency of once a week.

The controls organs analyse the obtained information, organize and conduct measures with the purpose of avoidance of extraordinary situations in crisis cases. The purpose of activity varies in that case, when the extraordinary situation has taken place. In this case the purpose is the minimization of negative consequences.

The most indicative examples of such actions are works carried out for the liquidation of an extreme situation in Artemovsk area and works carried out for maintenance of radiation safety of the Ukrainian contingent of peace-making forces in

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Kosovo. Works in Kosovo were carried out in connection with application on the Balkan of weapons with depletion uranium.

5.1. LIQUIDATION OF AN EXTREME SITUATION IN ARTEMOWSK AREA

The extreme situation in Artemovsk area was fixed after revealing radiation dangerous subjects (further in the text - RDS) on an object which in past time belonged to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Documents, which specified that RDS belong to Armed Forces of Ukraine, were not found. Therefore for participation of Ministry of Defence in liquidation of this extreme situation, a special decision of the Cabinet of ministers of Ukraine (date of decision making - 14.11.2000, ʋ15159/29) was adopted.

For participation in works on liquidation of the specified extreme situation in Artemovsk area a special working group of experts of the Ministry of Defence was created.

The extraordinary situation was a consequence of the detection of an unidentified RDS on the terrain of a former ammunition warehouse of Air Forces. In figure 2, the RDS lie in zones of accumulation.

The operators searched RDS and dangerous segments on the terrain. This search up was executed by spectrometric complex of field VEKTOR (red fingers, figure 4). The complex VEKTOR is made by the Ukrainian Institute of Ecological and Medical systems. By complex VEKTOR the operators have conducted field examination of the whole terrain. The contaminated terrain has occupied about 1 percent of the area, on which there could be RDS. The labs made a refinement of outcomes of field measurements only on the contaminated terrain. Such procedure of measurements has allowed to analyze in lab the only "contaminated" objects and to not analyze samples from clean places. Usage of a complex VEKTOR has given considerable economies of time and means. The measurements by a field complex VECTOR have compared to laboratory researches. The matching has shown coincidence of outcomes of these methods. The high performance of the field method has been confirmed.

Search of RDS and potentially dangerous sites of district were made with the help of a field ϑ-spectrometer VECTOR complex (red pointers, figure 4) manufactured by the Ukrainian research-and-production firm, Institute of Ecological and Medical systems. Specification of field measurements was made in laboratory conditions. Such organization of the work has allowed to analyze in laboratory only polluted objects and to not consider samples from clean places. Comparison of results of measurements by a field complex the VECTOR and laboratory researches has shown concurrence of results of these methods. High efficiency of a field method has proved to be correct.

The field and laboratory methods have given identical results on the structure of radiation sources. Radiation sources contain Ra-226 and Th-232. The researches of air, dust and aerosols have not detected any Į-radiation. RDS were dangerous as a radiation source. In addition, in connection with presence Ra-226 and Th-232, RDS created threat of chemical pollution of district. Pollution might be more than maximum concentration limit (MCL).

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According to the legislation of Ukraine there were situations which corresponded to attributes of extreme situations:

10504 - Failures with radioactive unnecessary products which are not connected to nuclear stations;

10401 - Surplus in the soil of harmful substances.

In addition in the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine for performance of liquidation of an extreme situation were involved the Ministry of Ukraine on questions of extreme situations and the Ukrainian state association "Radon". All works were carried out in interaction with the Ministry of ecology of Ukraine, Donetsk regional sanitary epidemiological station and local State administration.

Fig. 2. An accumulation zone of Radiation Dangerous Subjects (RDS).

The organization of the interdepartmental interaction and the general management of liquidation of an extreme situation were carried out by the Ministry of Ukraine concerning the questions of extreme situations.

Experts of Armed Forces of Ukraine have already done most part of works on search and withdrawal of RDS.

From seven working groups which have executed this work, five groups were composed out of experts of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. The Ministry of Defence made separate group of servicemen for the most difficult works.

60 military men and 8 special cars of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine have taken part in the liquidation of the extreme situation. The working group consists of 15 sappers, 13 experts in dose measurements, 3 military ecologists, a military doctor and group of servicemen. Most part of the working group consist of NBC protection experts of the Armed Forces.

The territory of a former ammunition warehouse has an area of 700 000 m2. In this territory a search for RDS and explosive subjects were carried out. Figure 3 represents these works: yellow flags mark the places of collecting RDS.

RDS of a weight to 6165 kg were handed over the State association "Radon" in the Kharkov area after the termination of works.

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Fig. 3. Searching for Radiation Dangerous Subjects (RDS) and explosive subjects.

Security measures of works were chosen in view of absence of the necessary information. The degree of danger, the characteristic and condition of RDS were unknown. Therefore experts worked with RDS with observance of the greatest possible norms of safety. Experts worked protected by leather clothes - in overalls of filtering type, rubber gloves and stockings. When there was dust threat, experts put on respirators. Daily, after the termination of works, experts carried out a deactivation of their means of protection. A separate group carried out medical and a radiation control.

During work the external irradiation dose to the staff has not exceeded 7 mRem (at an annual rate limit of 500 mRem). Cases of diseases of staff, or the local population, connected to liquidation of an extreme situation, were not discovered.

The basic conclusions of the carried out work were:

ξ the legislation has shown its capacity in practice;

ξ the central authorities have shown ability to organize interaction of various executors;

ξ the executed works have confirmed expediency of the decision on creation of incorporated working group for liquidation of extreme situations;

ξ the executed works have confirmed expediency of use ϑ-spectrometric complex in the field;

ξ the executed works have allowed drawing conclusions on improvement of the organization of works and equipment of working group by dosimetric devices.

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Fig. 4. Field ϑ-spectrometric complex VECTOR.

5.2. SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS OF A RADIATION SAFETY IN KOSOVO

During the air raids of the NATO in former Yugoslavia in 1999 significant harm was brought to the environment of this country . First of all, pollution has taken place from application of the weapons on chemical enterprises and other industrial targets. The facts of deterioration of health of a certain circle of people are connected with the deterioration of an ecological situation. Many experts connect deterioration of health to application of depleted uranium ammunition. A manual of the Armed Forces of Ukraine regarding the decision on radiating inspection of military men, engineering, property, places of basing, routes of patrolling in a zone of the responsibility of the Ukrainian contingent of peace-making forces in Kosovo was accepted. Under the decision of Minister of Defence of Ukraine in the period from January 23 till January, 27, 2001, radiating inspection in Kosovo was carried out. Check was carried out by working group of NBC protection experts of the armies. The chief of the NBC protection of armed Forces of Ukraine general - lieutenant V. Litvak headed the working group.

Only with depleted uranium ammunition, which one applied on Balkan, there were shells of calibre of 30 mms. These shells came from the "A-10". armed airplanes of of USA air force. Officers of NATO of the working group have transferred documents which contained the list of objects on which, ammunition with depleted

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uranium was applied. It has allowed conducting examination and parts of such objects. For realization of radiometric examination were used:

1.Field ϑ-spectrometric complex VECTOR (red fingers, figure 4). The complex was applied for the measurement of the strength of the absorbed dose of ϑ- radiation on the surface of objects, for the definition of the type of radionuclides and for the measurement of spectra of radionuclides. The calibration of the device was done with the help of monitoring an ionising radiation source of ɋs-

137.The time for calibrating and measurement was not less than 120 seconds.

2.Automated complex SKRINER (figure 5) was effected by the Ukrainian research-and-production corporation Institute of Ecological and Medical systems. The complex was used for an estimation of the pollution by radionuclides of the organism of persons, for measurement of spectra of radionuclides in a body of person and on the condition of the servicemen. The calibration of the device was made on a monitoring ionizing radiation source ɋs-

3.For measurement of the strength of of ϑ-radiation the absorbed dose the nominal radiometer by IMD-12 and radiometer DKS-01 SELVIS of effecting of the Ukrainian research-and-production corporation SPARING-VIST were used.

The exploratory exploitation of a perspective complex for personal dosimetry constructed by the French corporation MGP Instruments has been conducted as a follow-up. In figures 4 and 5 the service-men carrying personal dosimeters DMC2000 (blue fingers), and in figure 6 the unit for reading the information coming from personal dosimeters (blue finger) are shown. The measurement of strength of the absorbed dose of ϑ-radiation was conducted by arranging the detector directly on the surface of the objects. The measurement of a background spectrum was conducted on uncontaminated terrain of the same type as the terrain that was investigated.

The duration of the measurement of a spectrum of ϑ-radiation took not less than 300 seconds. In a number of cases the duration of measurement of a spectrum was augmented up to 600 and 800 seconds. Spacing interval of the detector up to object of measurement was 10-15 mms and was separately fixed during the action.

Calibration of a complex SKRINER and measurement of a background spectrum of a were conducted in absence of the patients. The duration of measurement of spectra of radionuclides in a body of the person and on the form of clothes of the servicemen took not less than 120 seconds, in a number of cases it was augmented to about 360 seconds.

During the operation medical examinations of about 350 servicemen serving as special subdivision of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (UNMIC) are conducted and their radiation exposure measured.

The diseases, connected with irradiation, were not detected. Also at militaries and on their clothes no excess of the radioactive nuclides norms is revealed. Also potable water and foodstuffs which are consumed by militaries, do not contain radionuclides.

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