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Goldman Sachs

Credit Outlook

Cable & Satellite: Jason Kim

Sector View:

We have a Neutral coverage view on Cable & Satellite. Despite ongoing cord-cutting concerns, cable operators have continued to gain share in broadband, commercial and now mobile segments. We expect an acceleration in core cable fundamentals from CHTR and CVC/CEQUEL next year as they complete merger integration (CHTR) and cycle through tough margin comparisons (CVC/CEQUEL). That said, we believe investors will keep a watchful eye on (1) the fate of the announced S/TMUS merger, which is going through a regulatory approval process and will likely have large lateral implications on the cable/pay-TV sector as well from an M&A and potential partnership scenarios standpoint; and (2) continued roll-out of fixed wireless 5G broadband from VZ. The FSS industry’s competitive environment remains tough yet relatively unchanged. The biggest catalyst in the sector remains the C-band monetization opportunity.

Our top trade ideas in the sector are: (1) Buy DISH 7.75s of 2026s at 9.8%. It is an out-of-consensus call as we believe the core DBS business will fare better than market’s pessimistic expectations and (2) Buy INTEL Jackson 9.75s of 2025s at 9.0% as we see a visible catalyst on the horizon given our estimate that $3.0 bn or higher in C-band repurposing proceeds will enable INTEL to meaningfully improve its cap structure.

Exhibit 21: The HY Cable & Satellite Index has outperformed in

Exhibit 22: Cord-cutting has returned to recent declines in 3Q

2H18

Pay TV subscriber yoy % change

Yield to worst

 

7.4

HY Cable & Satellite Index

 

 

Total HY Index

6.9

 

 

YoY

6.4

Growth

 

5.9

 

5.4

 

1%

0%

-1%

-2%

-3%

-4%

-5%

1Q:11

2Q:11

3Q:11

4Q:11

1Q:12

2Q:12

3Q:12

4Q:12

1Q:13

2Q:13

3Q:13

4Q:13

1Q:14

2Q:14

3Q:14

4Q:14

1Q:15

2Q:15

3Q:15

4Q:15

1Q:16

2Q:16

3Q:16

4Q:16

1Q:17

2Q:17

3Q:17

4Q:17

1Q:18

2Q:18

3Q:18

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Incl Virtuals

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Excl Virtuals

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Company data, compiled by Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

4 December 2018

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Goldman Sachs

Credit Outlook

Exhibit 23: Cable has consistently won broadband share this year

Exhibit 24: Pay TV ARPU trends continue to decline

‘000s

DISH and DTV ARPU yoy % change (ex. streaming)

400

 

12%

350

 

 

8%

300

 

250

 

4%

200

 

 

0%

150

 

 

 

100

 

-4%

50

 

-8%

0

 

 

 

(50)

 

 

(100)

 

 

(150)

 

 

1Q18A

2Q18A

3Q18A

CMCSA CHTR T VZ FTR WIN CTL

DISH TV ARPU (ex. Sling TV) YoY % Chg DTV ARPU (ex. DTV NOW) YoY % Chg

Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Source: Company data

Exhibit 25: Pay TV inflation rates have substantially outpaced wage growth

US cable and pay TV vs. PCE / household and wages / household

240%

Since 2004, cable total ARPU

 

 

214%

220%

and pay-TV ARPU have gone

 

up ~95-115%, while PCE and

 

200%

wages per household have only

 

180%

increased ~40%.

195%

 

 

160%

 

143%

140%

 

 

 

120%

 

138%

 

 

100%

 

 

80%

 

 

 

PCE/household

Wages/household

 

Cable ARPU

Pay-TV ARPU

Exhibit 26: Pursuit of “convergence” has not been rewarding in the US up to now

AT&T and VZ stock performance (indexed to 6/29/2016)

120%

 

T

VZ

110%

 

100%

 

90%

 

80%

 

70%

 

60%

 

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Exhibit 27: Cable/Sat benchmark bonds YTD total returns

INTEL 9.75s of 2025

 

CEQUEL 7.75s of 2025

 

TELSAT 8.875s of 2024

 

CHTR 5.125s of 2027

 

CVC 5.5s of 2027

 

ATCNA 7.75s of 2022

Total Return (%)

DISH 7.75s pf 2026

 

-15 -10 -5 0

5 10 15 20

Source: Bloomberg

Exhibit 28: Cable/Sat benchmark bonds trading levels $mn

 

Amount

 

 

 

 

LTM Lvg

 

O/S

Rating

Price

YTW

STW

Gross

Net

CEQUEL 7.750% due 2028

$620

WR/NR

104.88

6.51

365

5.5x

5.3x

CHTR 5.000% due 2028

2,500

B1/BB

92.50

6.08

302

4.5x

4.5x

ATCNA 7.625% due 2025

1,480

B3/B-

81.68

11.88

898

5.2x

5.1x

SFRFP 7.375% due 2026

5,190

B1/B

96.66

7.98

505

3.9x

3.8x

ALTICE 7.500% due 2026

2,750

B1/B+

94.82

8.45

552

3.8x

3.6x

DISH 7.750% due 2026

2,000

B1/B

89.47

9.75

679

4.5x

4.5x

SATS 6.625% due 2026

750

B3/BB-

93.88

7.69

471

5.0x

2.0x

SIRI 5.375% due 2026

1,000

Ba3/BB

97.46

5.79

285

3.2x

3.2x

TELSAT 8.875% due 2024

500

B3/B

107.06

6.80

394

4.9x

4.2x

INTEL 9.750% due 2025

2,950

a2/CCC+

99.82

8.53

566

6.8x

6.5x

INTEL 8.125% due 2023

888

Ca/CCC-

83.99

12.94

1,005

8.5x

8.3x

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

4 December 2018

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Best ideas

Credit Outlook

Trade Idea 1: Buy the DISH DBS 7.75s of 2026. We believe that DISH’s core DBS business will have a longer tail and fare better than overly pessimistic market expectations. This, in turn, can help break the negative feedback loop that DISH DBS credit has experienced for over a year that has made the bonds one of the worst performers in our coverage - deteriorating fundamentals, diminishing time to reinvigorate strategic options, resorting to priming and/or completely separating DBS from rest of DISH Network.

More rational linear-TV competitive environment: We expect linear pay-TV trends to remain difficult. But over the past 2-3 quarters, we have seen emerging signs that DISH’s competitors are finally starting to act more rationally in this secular backdrop - managing for profitability as opposed to market share gains through aggressive promotions. We believe this bodes well for DISH because it has been the only operator managing its business this way since 2015, which has resulted in significant satellite-TV subscriber losses. We also think that DISH’s subscriber base is in a cleaner shape and less likely to churn than many other pay-TV distributors given that DISH has been pruning its less profitable subscriber base since 2015.

YoY comps remain easy: DISH DBS’ pre-SAC margins started to decline notably in 2Q17 driven by the subscriber-related expenses line. Since lapping the yoy impact (2Q18), margin trends have been much better and we expect several more quarters of yoy EBITDA benefit from easy comparisons.

8-10% is the key inflection point for the DBS credit: If the DBS EBITDA decline rates are better than -8-10%, then the credit can absorb the impact as FCF generation offsets the lower EBITDA. We project DISH DBS net leverage to go from 4.4x at the end of 2018 to 4.2x in 2020.

Risks to our view: Downside risks include weak core TV trends combined with a loss of the value of spectrum without adequate compensation to DBS bondholders.

Exhibit 29: DISH DBS EBITDA CAGR and leverage scenarios

 

 

 

 

DISH DBS Net Leverage

 

 

 

 

 

2017A

2018E

2019E

2020E

2021E

2022E

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CAGR

(4.0%)

4.77x

4.43x

4.06x

3.65x

3.20x

2.72x

 

 

(6.0%)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.77x

4.54x

4.30x

4.03x

3.73x

3.40x

 

 

EBITDA

(8.0%)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.77x

4.66x

4.55x

4.44x

4.32x

4.19x

 

 

 

 

 

2022-2017

(10.0%)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.77x

4.79x

4.83x

4.89x

4.98x

5.10x

 

 

 

 

 

 

(12.0%)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.77x

4.92x

5.12x

5.39x

5.72x

6.15x

 

 

 

(14.0%)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.77x

5.06x

5.44x

5.93x

6.57x

7.38x

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Exhibit 30: DISH DBS bond trading levels $mn

 

Amount

 

 

 

 

LTM Lvg

 

O/S

Rating

Price

YTW

STW

Gross

Net

DISH 7.875% due 2019

$1,338

B1/B

102.75

4.05

132

4.5x

4.5x

DISH 5.125% due 2020

1,100

B1/B

100.34

4.87

203

4.5x

4.5x

DISH 6.750% due 2021

2,000

B1/B

101.81

5.96

308

4.5x

4.5x

DISH 5.875% due 2022

2,000

B1/B

96.35

7.04

415

4.5x

4.5x

DISH 5.000% due 2023

1,500

B1/B

88.51

8.24

535

4.5x

4.5x

DISH 5.875% due 2024

2,000

B1/B

86.31

8.89

597

4.5x

4.5x

DISH 7.750% due 2026

2,000

B1/B

89.47

9.75

679

4.5x

4.5x

Source: Bloomberg

4 December 2018

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Credit Outlook

Trade Idea #2: Buy the INTEL Jackson 9.75% 2025s. We believe the developments since mid-2018 surrounding the C-band process and cap structure transactions have greatly derisked the INTEL credit story. Based on our expectations for INTEL’s core FSS business, we believe that $3.0bn or higher net proceeds from C-band repurposing monetization to the credit would make the structure sustainable over the medium term. We view those levels ($3.0bn or higher net proceeds for INTEL) as relatively undemanding scenarios.

C-band valuation scenarios: In order to obtain $3.0bn of net proceeds for INTEL, the implied valuation on the C-band would be around $0.16/MHz/PoP. This is the same level that the 3.4GHz spectrum auction cleared in the UK earlier this year. Spectrum valuations in the US have historically traded at large premiums to UK auctions of similar bands. For example, the 600Mhz broadcast auction in the US in 2017 cleared at $0.91/MHz/PoP vs. the auction in the 800MHz auction in the UK cleared at GBP 0.38/MHz/PoP - at today’s exchange rate, that implies a 87% premium for the US spectrum.

More conservative commentaries around pro forma balance sheet: Should net proceeds exceed $3.0bn for INTEL, the company in theory can start to distribute the excess proceeds to shareholders via restricted payments under the INTEL bond covenants. Management’s recent comments that it believes the company’s leverage should be below 6x (which would require net proceeds of $4.0bn or greater and used to repay debt) to the extent proceeds are large enough give us more comfort that INTEL’s credit profile can benefit beyond the minimum requirements dictated by its debt covenants.

Risks to our views: Downside risks include the FCC not ruling in favor of the satellite operators’ market-based approach, re-acceleration in pricing pressure in network services and less transponder demand from media customers that are coping with streaming competition.

Exhibit 31: C-band valuation scenarios and potential proceeds $mn

 

 

Assumed $ / MHz / PoP

 

 

 

$0.10

$0.16

$0.26

$0.36

 

 

MHz of C-band monetized

180

180

180

180

 

 

US population (mn)

320

320

320

320

 

 

Total MHz-POPs in US (mn)

57,600

57,600

57,600

57,600

 

 

Implied value of C-band (Total)

$5,760

$9,216

$14,976

$20,736

 

 

INTEL gross proceeds before clearing/

$2,592

$4,147

$6,739

$9,331

 

 

other costs (45% of total)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total clearing costs of 180MHz (Total)

($2,500)

($2,500)

($2,500) ($2,500)

 

 

INTEL's share of costs (45% of total)

($1,125)

($1,125)

($1,125)

($1,125)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INTEL net proceeds after clearing/

$1,467

$3,022

$5,614

$8,206

 

 

other costs (45% of total, $mn)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, C-Band Alliance

Exhibit 32: INTEL bond trading levels $mn

 

Amount

 

 

 

 

LTM Lvg

 

O/S

Rating

Price

YTW

STW Gross

Net

JKS 9.500% due 2022

$490

B1/B

115.75

4.94

207

2.9x

2.7x

JKS 8.000% due 2024

1,250

B1/B

104.44

5.55

318

2.9x

2.7x

JKS 5.500% due 2023

2,000

Caa2/CCC+

88.50

8.53

565

6.8x

6.5x

JKS 8.500% due 2024

2,950

Caa2/CCC+

98.75

8.77

584

6.8x

6.5x

JKS 9.750% due 2025

1,500

Caa2/CCC+

103.25

8.87

599

6.8x

6.5x

ICF 9.500% due 2023

1,250

Ca/CCC-

93.88

11.38

850

7.5x

7.5x

LUX 7.750% due 2021

421

Ca/CCC-

94.00

10.54

769

8.5x

8.3x

LUX 8.125% due 2023

888

Ca/CCC-

83.00

13.26

1,037

8.5x

8.3x

Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Bloomberg

4 December 2018

14