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F. Remedies

The primary remedy for defamation is an award of damages. Damages in defamation are "at large," meaning that once liability is established, damages are not restricted to the actual loss proved by the plaintiff. This is important because it may be difficult to prove the actual loss suffered as a result of a widely circulated defamatory statement. For example, it may be difficult for a business person who was wrongfully accused of fraudulent business practices to quantify precisely the financial loss suffered as a result of the loss of customers or business opportunities. The quantum of damages depends upon a variety of factors, including the nature and seriousness of the defamatory communication, the extent of publication and circulation of the defamatory material, the motivation and conduct of the defendant, the reputation of the plaintiff and whether or not the reputation was warranted, and the extent of the damage caused to the plaintiff. The conduct of the defendant may also warrant an award of aggravated damages or punitive damages.

Overall awards of damages for defamation can be high. In Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [Note 24: [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130. ] the Supreme Court upheld an award of $1.6 million in compensatory, aggravated, and punitive damages in respect of the defamation of the plaintiff lawyer relating to the performance of his professional duties. It is worthy of note that this award far exceeds any award of non-pecuniary damages for catastrophically injured accident victims. Those damages are currently capped at $260,000. There is, however, no cap on general damages for defamation even though the interest in personal safety would seem more compelling than the interest in reputation.

Injunctive relief to prevent the publication of a libel is available only in exceptional circumstances because of the threat to freedom of speech.

CHAPTER 7, DEFAMATION

G. THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, DEFAMATION, AND THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

In 1964 the Supreme Court of the United States in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan [Note 25: 376 U.S. 254 (1964).] held that the traditional law of defamation infringed upon the constitutional right of free speech. The case dealt with a defamatory statement made by a newspaper about a public official. In Canada such a statement, not being fair comment, must be justified. In Sullivan the Supreme Court recognized a qualified privilege to make defamatory statements of fact or comment in respect of public officials. This was later extended to all public figures. The defence can be defeated only by proof of "actual malice" on the part of the defendant. Malice in this context is established if the defendant knew that the statement was false or was reckless as to whether or not it was true or false. The burden on the plaintiff of proving malice is a difficult one to discharge. The new defence radically changed the balance between the protection of reputation and free speech in the United States.

Canadian courts did not adopt the "actual malice" rule after Sullivan but the issue was reignited by the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which recognizes in section 2(b) a right of free speech. The impact of Charter recognition of free speech on the law of defamation was addressed by the Supreme Court in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto. [Note 26: Above note 24. ] The Court held that, while the Charter was not directly relevant to the private action in defamation, it is important that the common law be applied and developed in a way that is consistent with fundamental Charter values. Nevertheless, the Court did not agree that the conventional law of defamation failed to balance appropriately the interest of free speech and the reputation of individuals. Indeed, the Court reaffirmed the importance of personal reputation to a person's self-worth and dignity and declined to change the existing law. In its view, it is not unduly onerous to ascertain the truth of statements before publication of them and the available defences are sufficient to protect the public's interest in free speech and the discussion of vital public affairs. The public is not well served, in the Court's opinion, by permitting the circulation of defamatory facts on matters of public interest.

The decision in Hill has not, however, abated concern in some quarters about the hidden and unquantifiable chill that Canadian defamation law creates for the media. [Note 27: See E. Barendt et al., Libel and the Media: The Chilling Effect (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) for an English study of this issue.] The concern is that Canadian media outlets may decline to publish defamatory material about public figures on a matter of vital public interest that it believes on reasonable grounds to be true because it is unable to prove the truth of the allegations in a court of law. The Canadian media is free to print or broadcast only the news it can prove to be true. This may lead to the suppression of matters of public interest and other issues that ought to receive public scrutiny and debate. The point may be illustrated by taking a situation like the Alan Eagleson affair. The wrongdoing of Eagleson when he was head of the National Hockey League Players Association was exposed by an American journalist writing in the United States. [Note 28: The story was broken by Russ Conway who was a journalist at the Eagle-Tribune of Lawrence, Massachusetts. His series of investigative reports, "Cracking the Ice," formed the basis of his book Game Misconduct: Alan Eagleson and the Corruption of Hockey (Toronto: MacFarlane Walter & Ross, 1997).] He was protected by Sullivan from a defamation suit if he was incorrect in his allegations so long as he was not malicious. The Canadian media may have had suspicions about Eagleson, it may have investigated his activities, and it may on reasonable grounds have believed him to be guilty of some misconduct. It would, nevertheless, be reluctant to publish those allegations for fear of the expense, time, and frustration of fighting a defamation suit that, because of the burden of proof, it was not assured of winning.

CHAPTER 7, DEFAMATION

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