Box 19.3 Reasons for not finding media effects on opinion and attitude

• Attitudes are determined by more fundamental and enduring personal circumstances

• Social environment and personal influence are more influential on opinions than are the media

• People tend to attend selectively to sources and messages they already agree with, leading to reinforcement, not change

• Different motives for attention to media lead to different effects

• Media offer competing views on issues that cancel each other out (e.g. in election campaigns)

• The public is resistant to attempts at persuasion

• Persuasive content is reinterpreted by its audience

Research attention has shifted to more indirect ways in which the media have an influence (for instance by framing, agenda-setting and informational incre­ments) and to special circumstances where media may play an enhanced role. In the following section, a model of the influence process is presented which takes account of incidental influence (whether given or taken).

The Elaboration-Likelihood Model of Influence

There are a number of models that represent the way that information and impressions are processed in any attempt at influence or persuasion, leaving aside the different variants of conditioning. One cognitive processing model in particular that has often been applied is Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) elaboration likelihood model (ELM). Elaboration refers to the extent to which a person thinks about the issue and about relevant arguments contained in a message. The model is based on the assumption that people are motivated to hold 'cor­rect attitudes' in the sense of their being rational, coherent and consistent with other views. At the same time, not everyone has the time or capacity to devote to developing such attitudes and we are selective in our attention to issues and arguments. We devote more effort to understanding and evaluating matters of greater personal interest and relevance. This is reflected in the way we process incoming information, either centrally (high elaboration) or peripherally. In the former case, we draw on our knowledge and experience to scrutinize informa­tion. In the second case we rely more on incidental cues, such as the perceived credibility or attractiveness of the source or the appeal of the presentational form rather than the cognitive content of the message itself. Whether or not we adopt a central or peripheral mode is affected by 'receiver' variables as well as 'message' variables. The difference between modes opens the way for matching the persuasive strategies of would-be communicators, who can choose either rational arguments or more superficial means of gaining attention and assent by way of simple cues and positive images and associations. The model is summa­rized in Figure 19.2.

The model has wide application, but only limited predictive value. It helps to summarize and describe aspects of persuasion. It also distinguishes between strategies for change that are likely to lead to more or less enduring effects. It reminds that the potential for Teaming without involvement' (Krugman, 1965) may sometimes be greater than an active interaction between source and receiver.

A related, but different, aspect of processing incoming information is dis­cussed by Cappella and Jamieson (1997). This is the distinction between 'online' and 'memory-based' approaches. The first of these assumes that the key infor­mation (e.g. in a news story) is all provided in the message itself as it is viewed or read. The second refers to the fact that any message (informational or persuasive) will tap into an existing store of information, impressions, beliefs, evaluations, and so on. It will activate predisposition rather than provide some­thing entirely new. This is a complex matter and in reality both online input and memory are likely to be active during processing. However, it has implications for strategies and probabilities of influence. In general, the more that memory-based processing operates, the more 'peripheral' is the route and also the greater is the chance of effects such as framing and priming.

The Spiral of Silence: the Formation of Climates of Opinion

The concept of the 'spiral of silence' derives from a larger body of theory of public opinion that was developed and tested by Noelle-Neumann (1974; 1984; 1991) over a number of years. The relevant theory concerns the interplay between four elements: mass media; interpersonal communication and social relations; indi­vidual expressions of opinion; and the perceptions which individuals have of the surrounding 'climate of opinion' in their own social environment. The main assumptions of the theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1991) are as follows:

• Society threatens deviant individuals with isolation.

• Individuals experience fear of isolation continuously.

• This fear of isolation causes individuals to try to assess the climate of opinion at all times.

• The results of this estimate affect their behaviour in public, especially their willingness or not to express opinions openly.

In brief, the theory proposes that, in order to avoid isolation on important public issues (like political party support), many people are guided by what they think to be the dominant or declining opinions in their environment. People tend to conceal their views if they feel they are in a minority and are more willing to express them if they think they are dominant. The result is that those views that are perceived to be dominant gain even more ground and alternatives retreat still further. This is the spiralling effect referred to.

In the present context, the main point is that the mass media are the most read­ily accessible source for assessing the prevailing climate, and if a certain view predominates in the media it will tend to be magnified in the subsequent stages of personal opinion formation and expression. The theory was first formulated and tested to explain puzzling findings in German politics where opinion poll indications were inconsistent with other data concerning expectations of who would win an election and signally failed to predict the result. The explanation put forward was that the media were offering a misleading view of the opinion consensus. They were said to be leaning in a leftist direction, against the under­lying opinion of the (silent) majority.

Two studies from Sweden reported in Rosengren (1981a) provided confirma­tion of an influence from the Swedish press on public opinion about the Middle East and on political opinion that seemed to support the standpoint of Noelle-Neumann and other proponents of 'powerful mass media' and the spiral of silence. A different test of the theory concerned the issue of nuclear energy. Noelle-Neumann (1991) found evidence of increasing press attention on the issue, accompanied by a steady increase in negative reporting. Over time, public support for nuclear energy also declined markedly, and the timing and sequence of changes suggested an interactive spiralling effect as predicted in the theory.

The spiral of silence theory is a close neighbour of mass society theory and involves a similar, somewhat pessimistic, view of the quality of social relations (Taylor, 1982). According to Katz (1983), its validity will depend on the extent to which alternative reference groups are still alive and well in social life. The more that is the case, the less scope there is for the process described to operate, since there will be support for minority or deviant views. Moscovici (1991) also sug­gests that, in general, we should pay less attention in public opinion formation to silent majorities and more to 'loud minorities', which often play a larger part in opinion change.

The spiral of silence theory is much more than a theory of media effect and involves several dimensions that need to be investigated in conjunction. It is not surprising that it remains in a hypothetical form or that evidence is weak and inconsistent from one context to another. For instance, Glynn et al. (1997) con­cluded from a recent meta-analysis of survey studies that there was little evidence that perception of support or not for one's own opinion is related to willingness to speak out. Even so, there is supportive evidence (e.g. Mutz and Soss, 1997; Gunther, 1998) for a simpler version of the theory that media coverage does shape individual perceptions of public sentiment on current issues (opinion about opinion).

There is also continuing support for the view that 'fear of isolation' is a key factor in affecting willingness to speak out on a controversial issue. Moy et al. (2001) looked at the case of a controversial and morally laden Washington state initiative to end positive discrimination in employment and education, against a strongly opposed public opinion. Fear of isolation did inhibit speaking out to support a perceived minority position. However, it was also found that the rele­vant 'climate' was really a micro-climate of immediate family and friends rather than the public as a whole.

Third-party effects

Related to the spiral of silence theory is the idea of third-party effects of media on public opinion, first proposed by Davison (1983). The key point is that many people seem to think (or say to pollsters) that other people are affected by vari­ous kinds of media content, but not they themselves. This perception goes with a tendency to support censorship (McLeod et al., 2001). There is much empirical support for the tendency to attribute effects to others, which helps to explain the widespread belief in the power of the media, even where not supported by evidence (Hoffner et al., 2001). The overestimate of media effects is also associated with the equally widespread tendency to believe that the news media are biased against the point of view of those engaged by a particular issue (Gunther and Christen, 2002), also with little or no support in evidence. Asking people to esti­mate the influence of media on themselves is clearly not a way to uncover the direction and scale of actual effects.

Structuring Reality and Unwitting Bias

Common to much theory in this area is the view that long-term media effects occur unintentionally, as a result of media organizational tendencies, occupa­tional practices, technical limitations and the systematic application of certain news values, frames and formats. Thus Paletz and Entman (1981) attributed the propagation of a 'conservative myth' by US media during the 1970s mainly to 'pack journalism' - the tendency of journalists to work together, arrive at a con­sensus, cover the same stories and use the same news sources. In their coverage of the Balkan wars, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1 and subsequently, most western media have tended to frame the news that is both consensual and supportive of western actions, although the Gulf War showed up deep fissures (e.g. Tumber and Palmer, 2004).

A tendency for mainstream media to take the side of the government of the day under conditions of war or emergency has often been observed, with various explanations offered (if explanations are needed). A key theory in this matter has been provided by Bennett (1990), which proposes that journalists tend to reflect or 'index' the range of voices and viewpoints according to the range of views in the mainstream political debate. This tends to marginalize minority and critical voices and promotes an apparent consensus. Althaus (2003) provides some evidence for this thesis and it seems to have been reconfirmed by the case of Iraq.

The notion that media 'structure reality' in a way that is often shaped by their own needs and interests has been demonstrated. An early example was the study by Lang and Lang (1953) of the television coverage of the return of General McArthur from Korea after his recall. This showed how a relatively small-scale and muted occasion was turned (in its reporting) into something approaching a mass demonstration of welcome and support by the selective attention of cam­eras and commentary to points of most activity and interest. The reportage was seeking to reproduce from rather unsatisfactory materials a suitable version of what had been predicted as a major occasion.

The media coverage of a large demonstration in London against the Vietnam War in 1968 followed much the same pattern (Halloran et al., 1970). The cover­age was planned for an event predefined (largely by the media themselves) as potentially violent and dramatic, and the actual coverage strained to match this predefinition, despite the scarcity of suitable reality material. The same research supported the conclusion that audiences perceived the event more in line with its framing on television than as it had actually transpired.

Evidence of an actual effect from such media practices on how people define reality is not easy to find. However, in their study of how children came to define the 'problem' of race and immigration, Hartman and Husband (1974) showed that dominant media definitions were picked up, especially where per­sonal experience was lacking. A different kind of effect was documented by Gitlin (1980) in relation to media coverage of the radical US student movement in the late 1960s. Here the media played a major part in shaping the image of this movement for the North American public. The line of effect generally accorded with the media's own needs (such as those for dramatic action, celebrities, personalities and conflict), and caused the student movement itself to respond to this image and adapt and develop accordingly. A more recent study of the definition by the media of the women's movement in The Netherlands in its early days (van Zoonen, 1992) provides another example of a similar process at work. Lind and Salo (2002) examined the framing of feminists and feminism in US TV news and public affairs programmes during the 1990s. They found a consistent tendency to marginalize and demonize both, with feminists portrayed as unlike 'regular women'.

Most of the effects referred to here probably derive from 'unwitting bias' in the media, but the potential to define reality is often exploited knowingly. The term 'pseudo-event' has been used to refer to a category of event more or less manu­factured to gain attention or create a particular impression (Boorstin, 1961; McGinnis, 1969). The staging of pseudo-events is now a familiar tactic in many election (and other) campaigns, but more significant is the possibility that a high percentage of media coverage of 'actuality' really consists of planned events which are intended to shape impressions in favour of one interest or another. Those most able to manipulate actuality coverage are those with most power; so the bias, if it exists, may be unwitting on the part of the media but is certainly not so for those trying to shape their own 'image' (Molotch and Lester, 1974; and see p. 525).

The Communication of Risk

One of the functions attributed to mass media is that of providing a public warning of possible dangers and risks. This is one of the explanations (if not justifications) offered for the disproportionate attention in news (and fiction) to crime, violence, disaster, death and disease. At certain key moments, media reports of danger can lead to short-term panic responses, but the issue of media effects is usually posed in other forms. First, there is the established tendency of media to portray the world, implicitly at least, as more dangerous than it really is (statistically speaking). Attention is skewed away from the mundane causes of death, disease and disaster (road accidents, poor diet, poverty) and towards more dramatic but rarer calamities (terrorist outrage, air crash, earthquake, etc). This can be said to mislead the public about the true nature of risks. A similar criticism applies to the links between crime reporting, real crime and public fear of crime (e.g. Lowry et al, 2003; Romer et al., 2003).

Secondly, there is the relative failure of the press, through lack of expertise and the intrinsic uncertainty of the case, to give advice to the public on many genuine risks connected with scientific innovation, environmental threats, biotechnology, genetics and similar matters (Priest, 2001). There is a third issue that relates to the tendency of the media to act as a conduit for all kinds of information and argument from all kinds of sources that can be alarming or reassuring, but for which no editorial responsibility is (or often can be) taken. The Internet opens new flood­gates in this respect. In the end, it seems as if the media themselves are a source of uncertainty and danger that the public has to take at its own peril, or avoid.

Political Communication Effects in Democracies

There has always been an intimate connection between mass communication and the conduct of politics, in whatever kind of regime. In totalitarian or author­itarian societies, ruling elites use their control of the media to ensure conformity and compliance and to stifle dissent by one means or another. In democracies, the media have a complex relationship with sources of power and the political system. On the one hand, they usually find their raison d'etre in their service to their audiences, to whom they provide information and views according to judgements of interest and need. In order to perform this service they need to be independent of the state and of powerful interests. On the other hand, they also provide channels by which the state and powerful interests address the people, as well as platforms for the views of political parties and other interest groups. They also promote the circulation of news and opinion within the politically interested public.

This general view of the neutral and mediating role of the media in politics has to be modified to take account of variant forms, especially one in which particu­lar media choose to play a partisan role on behalf of a party or interest, or are closely allied with some powerful economic interest or ideological bloc. There is a third possibility where the state has considerable effective power over nomi­nally free media and uses this power for its own advantage. Such a situation appears to pertain more and more in Putin's Russia, and other countries, such as Italy under Berlusconi, have approached a similar position. In global terms, the situation is not at all unusual.

Against this background we can identify and briefly characterize the main forms of political communication which can be considered under the heading of 'effects'. First, there are periodic campaigns for election in which the media are usually used intensively by competing candidates and parties. Secondly, there is the continuous flow of news which carries messages about events that reflect positively or negatively on governments and other actors in the political arena. This provides many opportunities for news management and PR intervention. Thirdly, there are, in varying degrees, opportunities for political advertising by the same actors, independent of elections. Specific attempts are also sometimes made to influence opinion on particular issues on behalf of various lobbies and pressure groups, by various means.

The most studied communication form is that of the election campaign, with research going back at least until 1940, when Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) made a detailed inquiry into the presidential election of that year. Since then thousands of democ­ratic elections have been an object of research (see Semetko, 2004), with some con­sistency in broad findings about effects. First, election campaigns are usually short and intensive and are not typically characterized by a great deal of net change from intention to vote. The media are intensively used by campaigners, but usually received with less interest by electors. It is rare to find clear support in evidence that media make a great deal of difference to the outcome of an election. They have little direct effect on voting (or not voting). Basic political attitudes are usually too deeply rooted to be susceptible to much change, although a growing detachment from firm allegiances opens the way for more influence. Opinions on particular issues may be influenced by media and there is evidence of a potential for learning about issues and policy stands, especially by the relatively ignorant and disinter­ested. To some extent this reflects the 'agenda-setting' process described above. Learning effects can be important when they lead to opinion change or, more likely, to perceptions of reality that favour one side or another. An unusual piece of exper­imental research by Norris et al. (1999) in a British general election showed that exposure to party positions contained within news broadcasts could significantly influence attitudes to the parties in the short term.

Election campaigns attract widely varying degrees and kinds of motivated audience attention (and much inattention) and the effects they do have depend more on the dispositions and motives of voters than on the intentions of cam­paigners. Blumler and McQuail (1968) found that an intensive general election cam­paign had larger effects where it reached sectors of a more or less captive audience that was previously uninformed and without firm allegiances. Schoenbach and Lauf (2002) call this a 'trap' effect. Although different media have different poten­tials for influence, the evidence suggests none are inherently superior and the message, plus audience disposition, is still what counts (Norris and Sanders, 2003).

The relative lack of decisive effects from campaigns can be attributed to several factors aside from selective attention and variable motivation. These include the lack of room for change on familiar issues, the cancelling effect of opposing messages, the part played by personal relations (see p. 476) and the ritual character of much cam­paigning that offers little that is new of any substance. In many western democra­cies, where the media are not co-opted by the political parties, the amount and quality of attention given to the main contenders tends to be very similar (Norris et al, 1999; D'Alessio and Allen, 2000; Noin, 2001). Campaigns tend to maintain the status quo, but we could expect large effects if one side failed to campaign, and sometimes a single incident can upset the equilibrium dramatically. Often election campaigns are aimed at mamtaining the status quo rather than creating change.

Campaigning parties and candidates usually choose from among a number of available communication strategies, depending on circumstances and resources, and often depending on whether they are incumbent or not. They can seek to associate themselves with particular issues on which they have a particular record or claim. This is where being able to frame issues and set news agendas matters. They may try to win on grounds of ideology or principle, which is harder and riskier. They can aim to acquire an attractive image by association, style or personality rather than policy. They can attack an opponent on whatever ground of weakness presents itself, although negativity can demotivate voters generally.

Political communication by way of general news reflects a continuous process of news management and competition to define events and issues. All significant actors employ professional news managers (spin doctors) to ensure access on favourable terms in normal daily news and to put the best gloss possible on a news story. Such influences are impossible to measure in terms of effectiveness, but there is good support in theory for the belief that the news provides a good environment for influential messages, since it is usually characterized by inde­pendence of source, credibility and lack of propagandist associations. In practice, in most functioning democracies, more or less equal access to news is usually available to the main contenders for office, sufficient to prevent a single dominant shape being given to the news.

Political advertising, on the other hand, depends on having resources, but is also limited in its potential by its propagandist character. It may have unpredictable side effects, and clear evidence of the value of political advertising is hard to come by (Goldstein and Freedman, 2002), although it may work as intended by simple attrition and repetition. The same applies to all campaigns with a political objec­tive. They meet with the kinds of obstacle summarized in Box 19.3. Advertising on television has tended to take negative forms, with the risks noted above.

Ever since the famous Kennedy-Nixon televised debate in 1960, this campaign form has been advocated as a means of enlivening politics and providing a deci­sive test of leader competence and persuasiveness. It has been tried out in vari­ous forms (Kraus and Davis, 1976). The fear of disaster testifies to the potency attributed to such events. However, the findings of research (e.g. Coleman, 2000) have reported little in the way of dramatic electoral consequences (true of the original debate), although they do lead to changed perceptions of candidates and some learning of policies. They seem to have reinforcement effects on voter choice. In fact, incumbent politicians have typically been very wary of debates, seeing no certain advantage and fearing uncontrolled effects.

This brief overview of the effects of mass communication in election campaigns may seem inconsistent with the reality of contemporary political campaigning in which communication strategies are planned in fine detail by a myriad of advisers and professional publicists and many ways are found to spend large sums of money, especially by those in media advertising. The fact is that even though the chances of decisively influencing the outcome of an election by means of communication are usually quite small, it would be easy to lose an election by not campaigning or com-paigning badly. Mounting a glittering, clever and confident campaign is an essential part of the institutional ritual and the appeal for public support and not to campaign to the utmost would mean not being taken seriously as a candidate.

Effects on the Political Institution and Process

The case of politics provides fairly clear evidence of the adaptation of a social institution to the rise of mass media, especially given the fact that the media have become a (if not the) main source of information and opinion for the public. The challenge to politics from the growing centrality of the mass media and the rise of 'media logic' have taken several forms. These include:

• the diversion of time from political participation to watching television (video malaise);

• the negative effects of political marketing on voter trust and goodwill;

• the increasing negativity of campaigning and campaign reporting;

• the rising costs and bureaucratization of campaigning;

• the loss by parties of their own channels for reaching a mass following and increased dependence on media channels and gatekeepers.

Ideas about the influence of 'media logic' on political institutions (see Mazzoleni, 1987b) include: the diversion of attention from the local and regional to the national stage; the reliance on personality and image more than on substance and policy; the decline of face-to-face political campaigning; the excessive reliance on and use of opinion polls. Mass media gatekeepers are thought, rightly or wrongly, to have increased their power over who gets access and over terms of access for politicians to the public. It is they who 'set the agenda' for political debate, so it is alleged. In addition to all this, 'trial by media' has become a fact of public life in most countries for any politician touched in any way by scandal (Thompson, 2000; Tumber and Waisbord, 2004).

The triumph of media logic over political logic also finds expression in the treatment of elections as more 'horse-races' than occasions for learning about issues and policies (Graber, 1976b). More recently this has been described as a tendency to concentrate on 'strategic' news, in which the ups and downs of the campaign and electioneering strategies become the news, not the substance of policy proposals and the related arguments. This undoubted tendency has been interpreted as steadily increasing the cynicism of voters (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997) and reducing informativeness (Valentino et al., 2001). There is little doubt that election campaigns have been widely transformed into skilfully and profes­sionally managed events more akin to advertising, public relations and market­ing than traditional politics (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). It is widely thought that the trends described originated in the USA and have been globally diffused (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Bennett and Entman, 2001; Sussman and Galizio, 2003). The rise of the 'spin doctor' has been interpreted as marking a new stage in the development of political communication, with journalism providing 'meta-communication' about media manipulation, defined as 'the news media's self-referential reflections on the nature of the interplay between PR and politi­cal journalism' (Esser et al., 2000).

As always, it is hard to separate out the effects of media change from broad changes in society working both on the media and on political institutions, and there is much room for dispute about the real cause of any given institutional effect. Cappella (2002) advises against treating the media as a 'cause'. Rather they propagate and replicate a certain prevailing view. There is also need for caution about the more sweeping complaints concerning the decay of political communication and the ravages of 'video malaise' (Schulz, 1997). There is no single condition and many of the traditional media supports for democracy still operate quite well (Norris, 2000).

The term 'mediatization' has been widely used to describe the adaptation of politicians to the media criteria of success and the growing importance of sym­bolic politics (Kepplinger, 2002). Meyer (2002) describes the process as one of colonization of one societal domain (politics) by another (the media). He writes: 'politicians feel themselves increasingly under pressure to get access to the media. They hope that if they master the rules governing access they can thereby increase their leverage over the way media present themselves to the public' (2002: 71). This leads to surrender to the logic of the media system, including a submission to theatricalization and symbolization of self-presentation. Critics also see a rise in superficiality and loss of sincerity and spontaneity.

Media influence on Event Outcomes

The case for studying the role of the media in the outcome of significant societal events has been persuasively put by Lang and Lang (1981), and they applied their own advice by studying the Watergate affair and the downfall of President Nixon (Lang and Lang, 1983). Other researchers (Kraus et al, 1975) have also recommended the study of what they term 'critical events', mainly elections but also other occasions of significance for society. The mass media may rarely initiate change independently, but they do provide the channels, the means and an arena for the playing out of events in which many actors and interests are involved, often in competition with each other. The primary object of influence may be not the general media public itself but other specific organized interest groups, elites, influential minorities, and so on.

The media provide horizontal channels (especially between elites) as well as vertical channels for communicating in either direction. Influence flows from the top down, but politicians often treat the media as a source of intelligence about the mood of the country. Lang and Lang (1983) noted that the media 'present political actors with a "looking-glass image" of how they appear to outsiders'. What they call the 'bystander public' (referring to the general media public) provides a significant reference group for political actors, and it is often for the benefit of a bystander public that they frame many of their actions. This is part of a process of 'coalition building'.

The kind of event in which the media play an active and significant part, as it unfolds, is likely to be characterized by having a public and collective character, a historic significance and a long time scale in which media and key actors inter­act with each other. Major international crises often meet these criteria, and there is steady growth in interest in the part played by the media in such events as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the crises in the Gulf and the former Yugoslavia, and the many aid missions to Third World countries.

The term 'CNN effect' has been given (somewhat ethnocentrically) to the general phenomenon of media exerting an influence on foreign policy, especially in regard to some foreign intervention (Robinson, 2001). A similar potential effect has been looked at with reference to the giving of foreign aid (Van Belle, 2003). The term derives from the myth that new global television channels can connect governments at home most directly and quickly to unfolding events abroad. The idea has much deeper roots, since the press has often played a role historically in decisions about war (for instance the American-Spanish conflict in 1899). According to Gilboa (2002) global communication can play a number of different roles: displacing policy-makers; constraining actions in real time; promoting intervention; and being used as an instrument of diplomacy. There is little doubt that global communication in general has become a more important factor in foreign interventions and it is more difficult to manage than domestic media. So far, there is no definitive evidence that it has been a major precipitat­ing factor in any recent international conflict (Robinson, 2001; Mermin, 1999). Livingston and Bennett's (2003) study of CNN news content does show some tendency for foreign news to be more event driven and less managed by officials at home, making such services more independent gatekeepers. Media, including global branches, still tend to reflect the debates within national governments and also the general balance of opinion without proposing new initiatives - a process described as 'indexing' (Bennett, 1990) (see p. 242).

Media can influence the outcome of quite different kinds of events and in different ways. In the case of the contested Bush-Gore election result in 2000, Jamieson and Waldman (2003) attributed the outcome in part to the Republican success in framing the debate in a way favourable to themselves, coupled with the failure of the press to fulfil its investigative role at the time. Another kind of event deserves attention, even if it is not always very significant. This is the polit­ical scandal, in which the media usually play a key role (Tumber and Waisbord, 2004). Thompson (2000) characterizes political scandals as 'mediated events that bring private and public life together'. Such events serve political as well as media ends and their course is often determined by the mass media.

Propaganda and War

Jowett and O'Donnell (1999: 6) define propaganda as 'the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist'. The con­notations of the term have generally been negative. It is the 'enemy' that makes propaganda, while 'our side' provides information, evidence and argument. In our time the primary association of propaganda is generally with conflict between states and currently the 'war against terrorism', but the term can be applied to almost any area where communication is planned to achieve some goal of influence. It differs in some respects from simple persuasion attempts. It can be coercive and aggressive in manner; it is not objective and it has little regard for truth, even if it is not necessarily false, since sometimes the truth can be good propaganda. It comes in a range of types from 'black' (deceptive, frightening and unscrupulous) to 'white' (soft and with a selective use of truth). Finally, it is always carried out to further some interest of the propagandist, not the target audience. Under conditions of information monopoly or severe ethnic conflicts, control of the media has often been used to foster hatred and mobilize popula­tions to violence. The historic examples of the twentieth century are obvious enough. More recent cases, as in the Balkans (Price and Thompson, 2002) and Rwanda (Des Forges, 2002), show that the same potential still exists.

The mass media are now regarded as essential to successful war propaganda, since they are the only channels guaranteed to reach the whole public and have the advantage (in open societies) of being regarded as trustworthy. War is also very much in the interest of the media, since it fits news values and news requirements for ongoing action. The possibilities for synergy between war-making and news-making are obvious. However, there are some obstacles. Journalists generally have an aversion to what they perceive as attempts to use them for propaganda purposes. Mass media are also uncertain instruments of propaganda since their audience cannot be restricted, and one of the require­ments of successful propaganda is that the right message reaches the right group. Especially since the Vietnam War, which has widely (but not very correctly) been regarded as a propaganda failure for the American authorities, every military action in the western sphere of influence has been conducted with great regard for effective propaganda. In the Falkland Islands expedition, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Arab-Israel conflict, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Iraq War and many minor skirmishes, the allied (western) authorities have sought to control the flow of military information (see Morrison and Tumber, 1988; Kellner, 1992; Iyengar and Simon, 1997; Taylor, 1992; Smith, 1999; Thussu and Freedman, 2003; Tumber and Palmer, 2004). Reports suggest that Russia had learnt which lessons to apply in the Chechnya War of 1999. Before these hot wars there was extensive (mainly American) propaganda at home and abroad in pur­suit of Cold War aims (Newman, 2003; Foerstal, 2001), despite the successful propagation of the view that it was the 'other side' that used propaganda.

In most of the war cases mentioned, the strategy of becoming the main or only source of useful news content was largely successful in achieving the primary propaganda aim of maintaining at least tolerant support from domestic and significant world public opinion. In the Iraq War the tactic of 'embedding' cor­respondents within the military ensured a one-sided (and more favourable) view of events. The factors working for success were the general docility of the press (Dorman, 1997); the upsurge of patriotic feelings engendered by military action (Zaller, 1997); public support for censorship; and the distance (physical and mental) of the scene of conflict from home, which inhibits the formation of oppo­sition or of alternative interpretations of events. The main conditions in support of successful propaganda have thus been present: near monopoly of supply of information and images (for the home population) and a broad consensus on goals. In most of the recent instances, 'enemy' propaganda has been largely unable to reach its targets in the 'home' country or internationally. Nevertheless, there is increasing difficulty in managing international opinion, because of the Internet and alternative forms of communication. In the case of Iraq, as events unfolded, control of the flow of information diminished and the propaganda of the victors was open to unsettling reality checks. Shifts in public opinion against the war in participating countries suggested that propaganda was successful initially and later weakened.

In the case of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, many of these conditions were also present, but there was more need of active offical propaganda efforts by Nato countries because of the moral and legal dubiousness of the air attack on civilian targets in Yugoslavia and divided public opinion (Goff, 1999). Familiar methods were used to demonize the Serb enemy (see p. 380) and media were open to manipulation by pressure groups eager to provoke that attack on Serbia, especially by Croatian and Kosovo activists. Foerstal (2001) describes propaganda efforts in relation to Serbia as similar to those used by Kuwaiti exiles in the lead-up to the first Gulf War. A 'blacker7 side of 'western' mass-mediated propaganda was revealed than had been the case for some time. A somewhat similar scenario was obtained in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

Historical and present-day examples of propaganda in action indicate that there is no single formula, since all depends on the contingent circumstances. The record also shows that free and independent media can almost as easily be vehicles for well-managed propaganda as the media in the hands of autocratic states. It is a propaganda victory if people think otherwise. The one certain thing is that for propaganda to work it has to reach people and be accepted (if not believed). Acceptance mainly depends on the reputation of the media source, the absence of alternative objective information, the inherent plausibility of the content in the light of information available, and the emotional and ideological climate of the time. It is difficult to sustain the blacker and more aggressive type of media coverage over the long term. Despite the special character of propa­ganda, all the normal rules for ensuring communication effectiveness still apply.