NON-FICTION.materials / 18. Social-Cultural Effects

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18. Social-Cultural Effects

• A model of behavioural effect

• The media, violence and crime

• Media, children and young people

• Collective reaction effects

• Diffusion of innovation and development

• The social distribution of knowledge

• Social learning theory

• Socialization

• Social control and consciousness formation

• Cultivation

• Media and long-term social and cultural change

• Entertainment effects

• Conclusion

This chapter deals with a wide range of media effects, including both short- and long-term processes, those that are collective as well as individual, con­sidered either negative or positive. For the most part they are effects not directly intended by the media, although they may be predictable. They are united by having a predominant reference to social or cultural aspects of media effects, in line with theories of mass communication discussed at the start of the book (especially in Chapters 4 and 5). For the most part, intended informational and political effects are reserved for discussion in the following chapter, although there is no sharp division, since unintended social effects also involve learning and other cognitive processes. The effects dealt with often have a social problematic character, especially where they relate to children and young people and to antisocial tendencies generally. This is a bias that has shaped research into mass communication since its earliest days and should not be taken to mean that the effects of mass media are actually more negative than positive. For the most part the basic theories and processes of effects have been outlined in Chapter 17, although some additions are made, especially the model of behavioural effect, with which the chapter begins. The main aim here is to assess briefly, with reference to the evidence, a number of hypotheses about the social and cultural influence of the media, especially television.

A Model of Behavioural Effect

The developments of theory described in Chapter 17 take one a good way from the simple conditioning model and help to account for some of the complexities encountered in research. It is obvious that in situations of unintended effect, some individuals will be more prone than others to react or respond to stimuli, 'more at risk' when harmful effects are involved. An elaboration of the basic stimulus-response model for the case of television viewing has been developed by Comstock et al. (1978) to help organize the results of research in this field, especially relating to violence. It rests on the presupposition that media experi­ence is no different in essence from any other experience, act or observation which might have consequences for learning or behaviour.

The process depicted by the model, and shown in Figure 18.1 [see a separate file in the folder], takes the form of a sequence following the initial act of 'exposure' to a form of behaviour on televi­sion ("TV act'). This is the first and main 'input' to learning or imitating the behav­iour concerned. Other relevant inputs (enclosed within the box in Figure 18.1) are the degree of excitement and arousal ('TV arousal') and the degree to which alter­native behaviours ("TV alternatives') are depicted: the more arousal and the fewer behaviours (or more repetition), the more likely learning is to take place. Two other conditions (inputs) have to do with the portrayal of consequences ('TV perceived consequences') and the degree of reality ('TV perceived reality'): the more that positive consequences seem to exceed negative ones and the more true to life the television behaviour, the more likely is learning (T TV act') to take place. Where the conditions for effect are not met (P = 0), the individual returns to the start of the process; where some probability of effect exists (P > 0), the question of opportunity to act arises.

All the inputs mentioned affect the probability of learning the action (the effect), but ultimately any resulting behaviour is conditional on there being an opportunity to put the act into practice. Apart from opportunity, the most impor­tant condition is 'arousal', since without arousal (connoting also interest and attention) there will be no learning. While full confirmation of this model from research is not yet available, it is an advance on the simple conditioning model and useful for directing attention to key aspects of any given case.

The Media, Violence and Crime

Much attention has focused on the potential of media to encourage, if not cause, crime, violence, and aggressive, antisocial and even criminal behaviour. The reason for concern lies primarily in the repeated demonstration of the high level of portrayal of crime and violence in popular media of all kinds (see Smith et al., 2002; and Chapter 14). A secondary reason is the widespread perception, whether correct or not, that the social evils mentioned grew step by step with the rise of the mass media during the twentieth century. Each new popular medium has given rise to a new wave of alarm about its possible effects. More recently, both the Internet and popular music have been linked to random acts of violence perpetrated by young people in particular. Aside from the 'problem' posed by new media outside the control of society and parents, there has been a general change in media that has encouraged a fresh look at an old issue. There has been a pro­liferation of television channels, a decline in regulation and a lowering of thresh­olds about what is acceptable, making it likely that children will have a much larger diet of televised violence (and also 'adult content') than ever before.

The persistent belief that screen violence (especially) is a cause of actual violence and aggression has led to many thousand research studies, but no great agreement on the degree of causal influence from the media. Nevertheless, the programme of research carried out for the US Surgeon General at the end of the 1960s resulted, according to Lowery and DeFleur (1995), in three main conclusions:

• Television content is heavily saturated with violence.

• Children are spending more and more time exposed to violent content.

• Overall, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the viewing of violent entertainment increases the likelihood of aggressive behaviour.

These conclusions still appear to stand more than thirty years later.

Theory

The main components of hypotheses about violent effects have remained fairly constant. Wartella et al. (1998: 58-9) outline three basic theoretical models for describing the process of learning and imitation of television violence. One is the 'social learning theory' of Albert Bandura, according to which children learn from media models what behaviour will be rewarded and what punished (see below, p. 493). Secondly, there are 'priming' effects (Berkowitz, 1984): when people view violence it activates or 'primes' other related thoughts and evaluations, leading to a greater predisposition to use violence in interpersonal situations. Thirdly, Huesmann's (1986) script theory holds that social behaviour is controlled by 'scripts' that indicate how to respond to events. Violence on television is encoded in such a way as to lead to violence, as a result of aggressive scripts.

In addition to learning and modelling effects, there is a widespread belief that exposure to portrayals of violence leads to a general 'desensitization' that lowers inhibitions against and increases tolerance of violent behaviour. As with all such theories there are many variables influencing the disposition of a person and several relating to the depiction of violence. The main contextual factors (in content) influencing audience reactions have already been indicated in Chapter 14 (Box 14.4) and in Figure 18.1. In addition to variables of personal dis­position and content there are also variables of the viewing situation that are important, especially being alone or being with parents or peers. The model of behavioural effect outlined in Figure 18.1 applies especially to several of the effects mentioned.

Content

The main findings of the Surgeon General's report as summarized above have often been confirmed (see, for example, Bryant and Zillman, 2002; Comstock, 1988; Oliver, 2003). There has continued to be a great deal of violence portrayed on television, and it exerts a great attraction for the young. Wilson and Smith (2002) found from the 1998 US National Television and Violence Study that pro­grammes targeted at children actually contained more violence than other types of programme (see also Smith et al., 2002). It is less easy to say if the average degree of exposure has increased or not over time, but the potential to see screen violence has gradually extended to most parts of the world, along with the means of viewing. Groebel (1998), reporting on a global survey of violence on television on behalf of Unesco, involving 5000 children in 23 countries, commented on the universality of media violence and on the widespread fascination with aggressive media hero figures, especially amongst boys. For instance, he found that 88% of the world's children knew Arnold Schwarzenegger's Terminator (1998:182).

Evidence of effect

The third finding noted above, concerning effects on behaviour, is much less unanimous and has always been controversial because of the industry and policy implications. It is not easy to be certain on this matter, and any general authorita­tive statement takes on a political character (Ball-Rokeach, 2001). The American Psychological Association (1993) concluded that 'there is absolutely no doubt that those who are heavy viewers of this [television] violence demonstrate increased acceptance of aggressive attitudes and increased aggressive behavior' (cited in Wartella et al., 1998). However, even this falls short of a clear statement of causa­tion and leaves aside the question of other influences such as environment. Groebel (1998) noticed in his finding that children from high-aggression environments (crime and war) and who were in a 'problematic emotional state' were much more likely to view and be attracted by aggressive violence than were others.

In her survey of the views of European academic researchers into media and violence, Linne (1998) asked their opinion of the causal link between violence in the media and violence in society. Twenty-two per cent thought there was an 'evident causal link', 33% a 'vague causal link and only for some children' and 4% 'no causal link'. The remainder found the issue too problematic to be given such a simple answer. In general, Linne found that research had shifted from the question of causation towards that of understanding the appeal of violence that undoubtedly exists.

From Groebel's research (see above) comes the observation (1998: 195) that 'children's aggressive behaviour patterns and perceptions are a mirror of what they experience in their real environment: frustration; aggression; problematic circumstances'. He goes on to say (1998:198): 'Media violence ... is primarily pre­sented in a rewarding context... [and] satisfies different needs. It "compensates" own frustrations and deficits in problem areas.' It offers 'thrills for children in a less problematic environment. For boys it creates a frame of reference for "attrac­tive role models" ... The "reward characteristics" of aggression are more system­atically promoted than non-aggressive ways of coping with one's life.' These findings are not novel and echo the lessons of much earlier research. We know for sure that undesirable effects occur following attention to television violence, although they are generally mediated by way of other factors that may well be the 'real' or fundamental cause.

The possibility that media portrayals of violence and aggression might have some positive effects by allowing a vicarious and harmless release of emotion and aggression has sometimes been advanced (see Perse, 2001: 220-1). The term 'catharsis', derived from Aristotle's theory of drama, has been applied to this process (Feshbach, 1955). Although it is clear that most aggression aroused by media portrayals is vicariously released without harm to others, there is little empirical support for a theory that sees a benefit in exposure to violence.

Inducement of fright

Another frequently observed effect of violent and 'horror' content is the arousal of fear and emotional disturbance (Cantor, 2002). Adults as well as children often seek out fright-inducing content for thrills and entertainment, but there are also unintended and negative consequences for some individuals. Fear induced by media can often be intense and endure for long periods. It is not always easy to predict which content will be disturbing. In assessing the likely degree of and harm of frightening content, we need to distinguish according to types of content (e.g. physical or psychological threat), degree of realism, motivation for 'exposure', plus receiver variables of age personality and emotional stability. Girls do seem more susceptible than boys to media-induced fear (Cantor, 2002). The context of exposure can also play a part. Valkenburg et al. (2000) found that 31% of children surveyed in Holland reported being frightened by television, but nearly always by films or adult series.

Media and crime

Although the media have often been invoked as a potential cause of real crime (leaving aside aggression and violence), research has uncovered no such causal connection. The reasons for treating media as a suspect are largely circumstan­tial. The theoretical arguments include the possibility that media glamorize the criminal lifestyle, show the rewards of crime and teach techniques. Nevertheless, the overwhelming message of the media has always been that crime does not pay and that criminals are not attractive people. While there are doubts about the effects on behaviour of media portrayals of crime, in fact and fiction, there is little doubt that they influence opinions about the incidence of crime (see e.g. Lowry et al., 2003) and about the risks of being a victim (see below on 'cultiva­tion analysis').

The possible link between media portrayal and actual violence has been high­lighted by some cases of apparently motiveless killing, where an association of the perpetrators with certain media can be established, as with the 1999 Columbine School massacre and the similar event in Erfurt, Germany in 2002. There have been a number of court cases in the United States alleging media stimuli as a cause of violence, although none have succeeded. Dee (1987) found that liability was thought to depend mainly on the question of negligence, which depends on whether the media took unreasonable risks. The extreme rarity of such cases of alleged effect makes it difficult to support a case against media, without leading to widespread suppression and censorship.

A similar problematic issue arises in the case of the effects of sexually explicit content. Perse concluded from her review of research that such material does encourage the acceptance of violence against women and desensitizes those exposed to it: 'exposure to pornography seems to be associated with harmful consequences' (2001: 229). Even so the issue remains unsettled. Einseidel (1988) reviewed the findings of three public commissions (in Britain, Canada and the USA) and concluded that social scientific evidence has been unable to settle the issue. Political and ideological considerations cannot be excluded from the inter­pretation of evidence. There is also a potential inconsistency between legal think­ing that typically adopts a direct model of effects, and content and media theory that has cast doubt on this model (see Calvert, 1997; Wackwitz, 2002).

A category of media effect not covered by the preceding discussion concerns violence that may be perpetrated at the instigation of the media against certain minorities, outgroups or hate figures. Although media are forbidden by law to incite violence openly, they can knowingly demonize identifiable persons or groups in such a way that there is a real risk of violence by individual or col­lective action. There is circumstantial evidence that violence has been directed at such groups as child sex offenders, other sexual deviants, ethnic minorities of different kinds, conscientious objectors, alleged terrorists, gypsies, migrants and so on, with a plausible connection to (effectively) hate campaigns in certain media. Other conditions have to be present, but there is little doubt of some causal contribution by media to some of the many cases recorded. There is a larger question concerning media incitement to civil or national war. There is some reason to believe that the media played a part in triggering the ethnic violence at the start of the wars in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.

Media, Children and Young People

Expectations and fears (mostly the latter) abound in the general and research literature about the influence of media on children, aside from the issue of violence and delinquency. Much research has been carried out into children's use of and response to media (especially television) from early to recent times (e.g. Schramm et al., 1961; Himmelweit et al., 1958; Noble, 1975; Brown, 1976; Buckingham, 2002; Livingstone, 2002; Carlsson and von Felitzen, 1998). Amongst the ideas expressed and tested about undesirable effects are the following expectations from media:

• an increase in social isolation;

• reduction of time and attention to homework;

• increased passivity;

• reduced time for play and exercise (displacement);

• reduced time for reading (due to television);

• undermining of parental authority;

• premature sexual knowledge and experience;

• unhealthy eating and obesity;

• promotion of anxiety about self-image leading to anorexia;

• depressive tendencies.

Beneficial effects attributed to media include:

• provision of a basis for social interaction;

• learning about the wider world;

• learning of prosocial attitudes and behaviours;

• educational effects;

• help in forming an identity;

• developing the imagination.

Many of the above hypotheses can be supported as plausible according to social learning theory (see p. 493) and a number have been investigated (see Perse, 2001). No general conclusion is possible and none of these can be regarded as either fully proven or entirely ruled out. Experience of research reminds us to be cautious about the many other influences that contribute to any one of these 'effects'. Despite this, there still does seem to be a consensus amongst researchers that children are better off on the whole without high exposure to television. But as Seiter (2000) shows, adult attitudes to the dangers of television vary according to social class, gender and other factors.

Collective Reaction Effects

Collective response to mass media can be dealt with according to the logic of the stimulus-response model, although other elements are present. The new elements mainly relate to the manner in which reactions are transmitted to others, often at great speed and with considerable amplification of overall effects. Often there is a self-generating and self-fulfilling process at work. The concept of 'con­tagion' has been applied in such circumstances, especially where crowds gather physically, but also where individuals are dispersed and reached by mass media as well as by personal contacts. One important kind of effect is manifested in widespread panic in response to alarming, incomplete or misleading informa­tion. This was instanced by the much-cited (but now doubted) panic reaction to the Orson Welles radio broadcast of The War of the Worlds in 1938, when simu­lated news bulletins reported a Martian invasion (Canrril et al., 1940). It was also exemplified by the hypothesized effect of the media in stimulating civil disorder in some US cities in the late 1960s. The collective reaction to the terrorist bomb outrage in Madrid in 2004 that immediately preceded a general election was thought to have been facilitated by personal contacts and influenced by distrust of official accounts of the event as given on mass media. In all these cases, the part played by mass media is somewhat ambiguous.

The relevance of such effects has been increased by the greater risk of unex­pected terrorist outrages, although natural disasters such as earthquakes and industrial emergencies such as power breakdowns and nuclear accidents offer quite enough potential stimuli. There is little doubt that in some circumstances the conditions for a panic reaction to news do arise. We are dealing here with a special case of rumour (see Shibutani, 1966), which typically involves an urgent need for information coupled with a restricted supply. The media contribute the element of reaching large numbers of separate people at the same moment with the same item of news (which may not be open to independent verification) which can either provoke panic or help to alleviate it. The other related conditions for a panic response are anxiety, fear and uncertainty. Beyond this, precipitating features of panic seem to be incompleteness or inaccuracy of information, leading to the urgent search for information, usually through personal channels, thus giving further currency to the original message (Rosengren, 1976).

Much terrorist violence is either planned, threatened or carried out for political objectives by people seeking, however indirectly, to use the media for their own purposes. This gives rise to a complex interaction between the two. The hoped benefits for terrorists include drawing attention to their cause and arousing public fear and alarm. Blackmail may also be involved. Schmid and de Graaf (1982) have also argued that violence is a means of access to media channels and a message in itself. The media are caught between two strong pressures, the first to apply normal news values to dramatic events and the second, to avoid being an instru­ment of harm and a hindrance to counter-terrorism. Despite a good deal of research (Alali and Eke, 1991; Paletz and Schmid, 1991) there is no clear assessment in respect of the popular belief that the media actually encourage the spread of terrorism. The media have many kinds of potential effect (Picard, 1991).

Studies of the reaction to the 9/11 terror attacks on New York suggest that despite the intensity of shock and horror and the complete unpreparedness for such events, there was no widespread public panic (Greenberg et al., 2002). We can suppose that full media coverage, beyond the immediate scene, contributed to calming the situation. The experience of the great Hanshin (Kobe) earthquake of 1995 taught many lessons about the value of media in disasters and the effects of media breakdown (Takahiro, 2004).

A different example of possible contagion effects is the sequence of aircraft hijacking crimes in 1971-2, which showed clear signs of being modelled on news reports. Holden (1986) reported correlational evidence of a similar kind that seems to point to an influence from media publicity. There has been other empirical support for the theory that press reports can 'trigger' individual but widespread actions of a pathological kind. Phillips (1980) showed that suicides, motor vehicle fatalities and commercial and non-commercial plane fatalities had a tendency to increase following press publicity for suicides or murder-suicides. He was also (Phillips, 1982) able to statistically link the portrayal of suicide in television fiction with the real-life occurrence of suicide, although the findings have been challenged on methodological grounds (Hessler and Stipp, 1985). There seems, at least, some evidence to make a plausible case for an imitation or 'contagion' effect. Ever since Goethe's book The Sorrows of Young Wertfter was published in 1774, there have been recurrent reports of suicide being stimulated by fiction and news. The evidence is discussed by Jamieson et al. (2003) and suggestions are made for ways in which reporting should be handled to minimize risks to vulnerable individuals.

Civil disorder

Because of the potential threat to the established order, non-institutionalized and violent collective behaviour has been extensively studied, and the media have been implicated in the search for causes of such behaviour. It has been suggested that the media can, variously, provoke a riot, create a culture of rioting, provide lessons on how to riot, and spread a disturbance from place to place. The evidence for or against these propositions is thin and fragmentary, although it seems to be acknowledged that personal contact plays a larger part than media in any riot situ­ation. There is some evidence, even so, that the media can contribute by simply sig­nalling the occurrence and location of a riot event (Singer, 1970), by publicizing incidents which are themselves causes of riot behaviour, or by giving advance pub­licity to the likely occurrence of rioting. In general, it seems likely that the media do have a capacity to define the nature of events, and even if they are ultimately 'on the side' of established order they can unintentionally increase the degree of polar­ization in particular cases.

While the media have not been shown to be a primary or main cause of rioting (see, for example, Kerner et al., 1968; Tumber, 1982), they may influence the tim­ing or form of riot behaviour. Spilerman (1976) lends some support to this and other hypotheses, on the basis of rather negative evidence. Despite extensive research, he failed to find a satisfactory structural explanation of many urban riots in the United States (that is, explanations in terms of community conditions). He concluded that television and its network news structure were primarily respon­sible, especially by creating a 'black solidarity that would transcend the bound­aries of community'. In our own time, mobilization to collective action seems likely to be conducted by mobile phone or the Internet rather than as an unin­tended effect from mass media. Examples include the Madrid case cited above and the organized protest actions directed at world economic summits, starting with Seattle in 1998 (Kahn and Kellner, 2004).

In treating together the topic of panic and rioting, it is worth noting that the most canvassed solution to the dangers just signalled, the control or silencing of news (Paletz and Dunn, 1969), might itself entail a local panic through lack of any explanation for observable neighbourhood disturbances.

Diffusion of Innovation and Development

Most evidence relates to the many attempts since the Second World War to harness mass media to campaigns for technical advance or for health and educational purposes in developing countries, often following models devel­oped in the rural United States (Katz et al., 1963). Early theory of media and development (for example, Lerner, 1958) portrayed the influence of media as 'modernizing' simply by virtue of promoting western ideas and appetites. The mainstream view of media effect has been as a mass educator in alliance with officials, experts and local leaders, applied to specific objectives of change.

A principal chronicler of this tradition has been Everett Rogers (1962; Rogers and Shoemaker, 1973), whose model of information diffusion envisaged four stages: information, persuasion, decision or adoption, and confirmation. This sequence is close to McGuire's (1973) stages of persuasion (see p. 47). However, the role of the media is concentrated on the first (information and awareness) stage, after which personal contacts, organized expertise and advice, and actual experience take over in the adoption process. The early diffusionist school tended to emphasize organi­zation and planning, linearity of effect, hierarchy (of status and expertise), social structure (thus also personal experience), reinforcement and feedback. Rogers (1976) has himself signalled the 'passing' of this 'dominant paradigm', its weakness lying in these same characteristics and its over-reliance on 'manipulation' from above.

Rogers and Kincaid (1981) have put forward an alternative 'convergence model' of communication which emphasizes the need for a continual process of interpretation and response, leading to an increased degree of mutual under­standing between sender and receiver (see also Rogers, 1986). Critical theory in the 1970s linked attempts at development from outside with the maintenance of dependency. Newer theories of development allot to mass media a more limited role, with success depending on their remaining close to the base of the society and to its native culture. The idea of participatory communication has been advo­cated and increasingly practised (Huesca, 2003; Servaes, 1999). It is worth noting that mass communication is itself an innovation which has to be diffused before it can play a part in diffusion processes of the kind familiar in modern or devel­oped societies (DeFleur, 1970; Rogers, 1986). For media to be effective, other conditions of modernity may also have to be present - such as individuation, trust in bureaucracies and in technology, and understanding of the basis of media authority, legitimacy and objectivity.

While development aid continues to be given by donor countries for commu­nication projects and the improvement of mass media infrastructure, there is now much less expectation of direct large-scale effects on levels of development. There is more awareness of the limitations of information-technological solutions and of the unequal distribution of any benefits. There is also more emphasis on the need to improve public communication for the mass of the people and communication freedom as a human right as preconditions of progress.

Box 18.1 Mass media and development

Mass media serve as agents of development by:

• Disseminating technical know-how

• Encouraging individual change and mobility

• Spreading democracy (elections)

• Promoting consumer demand

• Aiding literacy, education, health, population control, etc.

The Social Distribution of Knowledge

Here we deal briefly with one widely expected and major media effect - their capacity to inform and keep informed a large-scale society in a manner consis­tent with the needs of a modern economy and a participant democratic process. While mass-mediated information considerably raises the average and mini­mum level of 'knowledge' in a society and the speed of circulation of informa­tion, there is a good deal of dispute about continued inequalities and about the varying capacity of different media to achieve these results. The debate has been given fresh life and urgency by the arrival of the Internet, with its great infor­mative potential but variable diffusion and actual use. It has led to the coining of a new expression - that of the 'digital divide' - in place of the older term 'knowl­edge gap' (Norris, 2002).

It has long been assumed that the press and broadcasting have added so greatly to the flow of public information that they will have helped to modify differences of knowledge resulting from inequalities of education and social position (Gaziano, 1983). There is some evidence from political campaign studies to show that such 'information gap-closing' between social groups can occur in the short term (for example, Blumler and McQuail, 1968). However, there has also been evidence of the reverse effect, showing that an attentive minority gains much more information than the rest, thus widening the gap between certain sectors of the public.

Tichenor et al. (1970) wrote of the 'knowledge gap hypothesis' that it 'does not hold that lower status population segments remain completely uninformed (or that the poorer in knowledge get poorer in an absolute sense). Instead the propo­sition is that growth of knowledge is relatively greater among the higher status segments.' There is certainly a class bias in attention to 'information-rich' sources, and strong correlations are persistently found between social class, attention to these sources and being able to answer information questions on political, social or economic matters.

There are two main aspects to the knowledge gap hypothesis: one concern­ing the general distribution of aggregate information in society between social classes, the other relating to specific subjects or topics on which some are better informed than others. As to the first 'gap', it is likely to have roots in fun­damental social inequalities which the media alone cannot modify. As to the second, there are many possibilities for opening and closing gaps, and it is likely that the media do close some and open others. A number of factors can be named as relevant to the direction of the media effect. Donohue et al. (1975) put special emphasis on the fact that media operate to close gaps on issues that are of wide concern to small communities, especially under conditions of con­flict, which promote attention and learning.

In general, motivation and perceived utility influence information seeking and learning, and these factors come more from the social context than from the media. It has, however, been argued that different media may work in dif­ferent ways and that print media are more likely to lead to a widening of gaps than is television (Robinson, 1972), because these are the favoured sources for the favoured classes. The suggestion that television can have a reverse effect (benefiting the less privileged) is based on the fact that it tends to reach a higher proportion of a given population with much the same news and infor­mation and is widely regarded as trustworthy. However, much depends on the institutional forms adopted in a given society.

Public broadcasting arrangements in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, the national network system in the USA used to ensure (in part due to their de facto oligopoly) that television would provide a popular and homogeneous source of shared information about national and international concerns. Under more recent trends towards channel multiplication, greater competition and audience fragmentation, this large audience for information is vanishing. Television is becoming a more differentiated source of information more akin to print media, and without any captive mass audience. Robinson and Levy's (1986) evidence concerning news learning from television does not give much confidence in the capacity of television to close knowledge gaps, even in the days of mass viewing. A review by Gaziano (1997) of 39 studies of the knowl­edge gap hypothesis concluded that the effect of the media on closing or narrowing gaps remains uncertain, but the gaps continue (see also Visvanath and Finnegan, 1996).

The differential diffusion of new computer-based information technology also works towards increasing the division between the information rich and the information poor (Katz and Rice, 2002). Knowledge gap theory would indicate a widening of the gaps as a result, since people who are already information rich, with higher information skills and more resources, would move even further ahead of fnformationally poorer strata. It can be questioned if 'knowledge gap' theory is still relevant. It supposes a basic corpus of knowledge that we all need in order to operate in society. Under conditions of abundance and specialization of knowledge, this premise looks increasingly doubtful, although it may still be valid for the democratic political process of electing governments.

Social Learning Theory

A widely referenced model of media effects, especially in relation to children and young people, is Bandura's (1986) social learning (or observa­tional learning) theory. The basic idea is that we cannot learn all or even much of what we need to guide our own development and behaviour from direct personal observation and experience alone. We have to learn much from indi­rect sources, including mass media. Bandura's model posits four basic processes of social learning that occur in sequence: attention; retention; pro­duction; and motivation. Our attention is directed at media content of poten­tial relevance to our lives and personal needs and interests. We may then retain what we have learnt and add it to our stock of prior knowledge. The third stage - that of production - refers to the actual application in behaviour of lessons learnt, where it may be rewarded (reinforced) or punished, leading to greater or less motivation to follow any particular path.

The theory has a general application to socializing effects of media and the adoption of various models of action. It applies to many everyday matters such as clothing, appearance, style, eating and drinking, modes of interaction and personal consumption. It can also support long-term trends. According to Bandura (1986), the theory only applies to behaviour that is directly repre­sented in symbolic form. The theory also implies an active engagement on the part of the learner, and on the individual's self-reflective capability. It is not the same as imitation or mimicry. Mass media are rarely the only source of social learning and their influence depends on other sources such as parents, friends, teachers, and so on. There are strong collective influences on social learning. Even so, social learning theory holds that media can have direct effects on people and their influence does not have to be mediated by personal influence or social networks (see Bandura, 2002: 140).

Socialization

That the media play a part in the early socialization of children and the long-term socialization of adults is widely believed, although in the nature of the case it is difficult to prove. This is partly just because it is such a long-term process and partly because any effect from media interacts with other social background influences and variable modes of socialization within families (Hedinsson, 1981). Rare longitudinal studies of development have sometimes produced prima facie evidence of socialization from media (for example, Rosengren and Windahl, 1989). Nevertheless, certain basic assumptions about the potential socialization effects from media are often built into policies for control of the media, decisions by media themselves and the norms and expectations which parents apply or hold in relation to the media use of their own children. The thesis of media socialization has, in fact, two sides to it: on the one hand, the media can reinforce and support other agencies of socialization; on the other, they are also viewed as a potential threat to the values set by parents, educators and other agents of social control.

The main logic underlying the thesis is that the media can teach norms and values by way of symbolic reward and punishment for different kinds of behav­iour as represented in the media. An alternative view is that it is a learning process whereby we all learn how to behave in certain situations and the expec­tations which go with a given role or status in society. Thus the media are continually offering pictures of life and models of behaviour in advance of actual experience.

Early studies of children's use of media (for example, Wolfe and Fiske, 1949; Himmelweit et al., 1958; Noble, 1975; Brown, 1976) have confirmed a tendency for children to find lessons about life and to connect these with their own expe­rience. Studies of content also drew attention to the systematic presentation of images of social life which could strongly shape children's expectations and aspirations. Socialization theory does tend to emphasize the conformist role of media. In this view, the media are neither 'prosocial' nor 'antisocial' but tend to favour the most dominant and established values. In whichever formulation, the general proposition that media have a socialization effect is clear, but it is only indirectly founded on empirical evidence.

Social Control and Consciousness Formation

There is a continuum of theoretical positions about the degree and purposefulness of the mass media as an agent of social control. A common view is that the media act non-purposively to support the values dominant in a community or nation, through a mixture of personal and institutional choice, operational requirements, external pressure and anticipation of what a large and heterogeneous audience expects and wants. A stronger and more critical version of this position sees the media as essen­tially conservative because of a combination of market forces (especially ownership by large firms) and subordination to the interests of nation and state. These alterna­tive theories tend to draw on much the same kind of evidence, most of it relating to systematic tendencies in content, with very little directly about effects.

A hybrid critical theory of systematic long-term effect has been developed by Herman and Chomsky (1988) in the form of a 'propaganda model'. This says that news in capitalist countries has to be 'strained' through several 'filters', especially the financial integration of the media with the rest of the economy, advertising, news management campaigns, the dominant ideology of the society and reliance on official sources of information. Herman and Chomsky found a good deal of cir­cumstantial evidence of the last-named filter at work, as have other researchers, for instance Reese et al. (1994) and Manheim (1998).

Herman and Chomsky took the title of their book, Manufacturing Consent, from Walter Lippmann, who wrote (1922: 158) that the 'manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements ... and the opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the process are plain enough'. Lippmann's views exemplify what was referred to above as the first phase (that of 'all-powerful media') in the evolution of thinking about the power of the media, and the weak­ness of the Herman and Chomsky position is that they take so little account of later research and evidence (Klaehn, 2002).

The content of media with the largest audiences does appear broadly support­ive of reigning social norms and conventions (an aspect of socialization and of 'cultivation'). Fundamental challenges to the national state or its established insti­tutions are hard to find in the mass media. The argument that mass media tend towards the confirmation of the status quo is thus based on evidence both about what is present and about what is missing in media content. The former includes the rewarding (in fiction) of 'conformist' or patriotic behaviour, the high degree of attention and privileged (often direct) access given to established elites and points of view, and the often negative or unequal treatment of non-institutional or deviant behaviour. The mass media are repeatedly shown as supportive of national or community consensus, and as tending to show problems as soluble within the established 'rules' of society and culture. One outcome of 'cultivation' research is evidence of a link between dependence on television and the adoption of consensual or middle-of-the-road political views (Gerbner et al., 1984).

Correlatively, the media commonly define certain kinds of behaviours and groups as both deviant from, and dangerous to, society. Apart from the obvi­ously criminal, these include groups such as teenage gangs, drug-takers, 'football hooligans' and some sexual deviants. It has been argued that the media often demonstrably exaggerate the real danger and significance of such groups and their activities (Cohen and Young, 1973) and tend to create 'moral panics' (Cohen, 1972). Within the category of antisocial elements, those who rely on state benefit payments may also come to be included under the label of 'welfare scroungers' (Golding and Middleton, 1982; Sotirovic, 2001), and the same can happen to immigrants, refugees or travelling people (Horsti, 2003) and even just the poor (Clauson and Trice, 2001). The process has been called 'blaming the victim' and is a familiar feature of collective opinion forming to which the media can make an important contribution. The effect is to provide society with scapegoats and objects of indignation, to divert attention from real evils with causes lying in the institutions of society, and to rally support for the agencies of law and order.

The evidence of media omission is, in the nature of things, harder to assemble, but comparative content analyses of news in several countries have added evi­dence of systematic omission in the attention given to certain issues and parts of the world (Golding and Elliott, 1979). Detailed studies of news content such as those by the Glasgow Media Group (1976; 1980; 1985) have also documented some significant patterns of omission. In considering the often eloquent and plau­sible theoretical arguments for the ideological effects of the media, we should also keep in mind the equally plausible theories concerning the limited potential for media effect. Especially relevant is the evidence of audience selectivity and 'dif­ferential decoding' (Jensen, 1986; 1998; Liebes and Riback, 1994). Most of the theories about ideological or hegemonic effects are based on observation of media and content, not of audience or 'effects'. The lessons of 'reception' research offer a counterweight, even though they derive originally from the same critical school.

It is almost impossible to give any useful assessment of the degree to which the effects posited by this body of theory and research actually occur. Nevertheless, the media are mainly owned and controlled either by (often large) business inter­ests or (however indirectly) by the state - and thus by the interests which also have most political and economic power (Dreier, 1982). There is a good deal of prima facie evidence that such controlling power over the media is valued (by its possessors) beyond its immediate economic yield, especially for political and social influence and status. The effects are not uniformly consensual or supportive of the status quo. Gans's (1979: 68) judgement that 'news is not so much conserv­ative or liberal as it is reformist' probably still applies very widely. The media are committed by their own self-defined task and their ideology to serve as a carrier for messages (for instance, about scandals, crises, social ills and also innovations) which can also be an impulse to change. They probably do stimulate much activ­ity, agitation and anxiety that disturb the existing order, within the limits of sys­tems which have some capacity for generating change.

Cultivation

Among theories of long-term media effect, the cultivation hypothesis of Gerbner (1973) remains probably the best documented and most investigated (see Signorielli and Morgan, 1990). It holds that television, among modern media, has acquired such a central place in daily life that it dominates our 'symbolic environ­ment', substituting its (distorted) message about reality for personal experience and other means of knowing about the world. Television is also described as the 'cultural arm of the established industrial order [which] serves primarily to main­tain, stabilize and reinforce rather than to alter, threaten or weaken conventional beliefs and behaviours' (Gross, 1977: 180). This statement brings the cultivation effect very close to that posited by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School and not far from later Marxist analysis. According to Signorielli and Morgan (1990:15):

Cultivation analysis is the third component of a research paradigm called 'Cultural Indicators' that investigates (1) the institutional processes underlying the production of media content, (2) images in media content, and (3) relationships between exposure to television's message and audience beliefs and behaviors.

The theory