19. News, Public Opinion and Political Communication

• Learning from news

• News diffusion

• Framing effects

• Agenda-setting

• Effects on public opinion and attitudes

• The elaboration-likelihood model of influence

• The spiral of silence: the formation of climates of opinion

• Structuring reality and unwitting bias

• The communication of risk

• Political communication effects in democracies

• Effects on the political institution and process

• Media influence on event outcomes

• Propaganda and war

• Internet news effects

• Conclusion

This chapter deals with another diverse set of possible media effects, distinguished primarily by their relation to informational media content of several kinds, but especially news and various forms of political communication. The effects con­cerned relate to public 'knowledge', opinions and attitudes, especially of a short- or medium-term kind. Some of the effects are intended (as with election campaigning and propaganda), others are not (as with general news), but the line between the two is uncertain. Intentional communication can have unintended consequences, and unintended communication can have some systematic and predictable effects (for instance an unwitting bias is present in supposedly objec­tive news). Moreover, it has become a commonplace to observe that intentional communicators (propagandists of various kinds) often try to include their advo­cacy in concealed form within the 'news', or simply try to gain attention and free publicity.

News and political communication generally comprise an area of mass com­munication where traditional media are most open to competition and challenge from new online media, especially the Internet. The Internet can offer many more sources and more diverse news than any given newspaper or television channel and allows the receiver to select according to personal interests. It also adds the potential for interaction with and response to sources of news. There are also limitations and obstacles to audience use of the new potential and there­fore limits to effects. Some of the general models and processes effect introduced in Chapter 17 are relevant, but some new models of particular processes are introduced.

Learning from News

News does not typically set out with learning goals, but simply offers a service in which diverse items of information are made available to members of an audi­ence to select according to their interests. The circumstances of mass media news consumption are typically quite different from other informational situations, especially in the voluntariness of attention, the frequent lack of specific moti­vation and the high level of inattention that accompany broadcast news use in particular. The content of news is often very perishable and peripheral. Nevertheless, the overall purpose is informative and news content is usually judged according to some criteria of information value. Moreover, people do learn from the news and become more informed as a result. The extent to which news has effects depends on its reaching an audience that pays some attention to the content, understands it and is able to recall or recognize some of it after the event.

As with other kinds of effect, comprehension and recall depend on both message and sender factors and also on audience factors. News messages can be more or less relevant, attention-gaining, interesting and comprehensible. News sources are likely to vary according to the trust and credibility they have established amongst the audience. On the audience side, the main factors are likely to be general motivation for following news, previous familiarity with the topics and general educational level. It is fairly clear that much news is 'received' without much attention and with little active 'processing'.

Published research into learning from news is fairly thin on the ground (although important contributions have been made, especially by Findahl and Hoijer, 1981; 1985; Robinson and Levy, 1986; Woodall, 1986; Gunter, 1987; 1999; Davis and Robinson, 1989; Robinson and Davis, 1990; Newhagen and Reeves, 1992). The results so far have tended to confirm the outcome of much basic com­munication research of decades past (Trenaman, 1967). Thus the interest, rele­vance and concreteness of news stories aid comprehension, and both prior knowledge and the habit of discussion of news topics with others are still impor­tant, in addition to favourable educational background. Although television is routinely cited by the public as the main source of news, Robinson and Levy (1986) judged it to be overrated as a source of knowledge of public affairs. They also found that several common news production and presentation practices often worked against adequate comprehension of news by audiences (see also Cohen, 2001). On the other hand, Graber (1990) shows that visuals do aid recall of television news content. The general conclusion from (television) news research is that the average level of learning, as measured by either comprehen­sion or recall, is very low and what is learnt is fragmentary. Findahl (2001) esti­mated that people in natural situations remember less than 5% of news. Even so, what is learnt is shaped by selection and framing of content as presented.

News schemata and news processing

News content research has shown that much news is presented within frame­works of meaning which derive from the way news is gathered and processed (see Chapter 14). News is topically and thematically 'framed' for easier under­standing, and it is reasonable to suppose that audiences employ some of the same frames in their processing of incoming news. Graber (1984) applied this line of thinking to news processing. The interpretative frames or schemata men­tioned earlier (see Chapter 14, p. 378) provide guides to selection, relevance and cognition and are collectively constructed and often widely shared. Graber defined a schema as a 'cognitive structure consisting of organized knowledge about situations and individuals that has been abstracted from prior experiences. It is used for processing new information and retrieving stored information' (1984: 23). Schemata help in evaluating new information and filling gaps when information is missing or ambiguous. They are also aids to remembering news.

The broadest and most enduring frames may have an international currency (for instance, 'the Cold War', 'international terrorism' or 'threat to global environ­ment'), but others may be local and specific. Graber found the actual 'schemata in people's minds' were very diverse, fragmentary and poorly organized. The ways in which schemata were used in responding to news information were also varied, with several different strategies being observed. A simplified version of Graber's model of the way news is processed is given in Figure 19.1. [see a separate file in the folder]

According to this model, news learning can be conceived as the integration of new information into pre-existing schemata. This partly accounts for the fact that prior knowledge is associated with greater learning capacity. An active process by the receiver is presumed, although it is also the case that information is frequently presented in the form of pre-existing schemata that are simply taken over by a receiver rather than being critically examined.

Exemplification

One of the typical features of news that has been investigated in respect of effects is the use of 'exemplification' - the citing of specific concrete cases to illustrate more general themes and justify general conclusions. This is one form of fram­ing. However, the practice can lead to misinformation or bias, where the case is not in fact representative. Zillmann (2002) points to four possible effects. There will be greater influence on the perception of issues where concrete examples are used rather than abstract points; where examples are emotionally arousing; where multiple examples of the same kind are given; and where presentation is vivid. Generally, research has confirmed these propositions (Zillmann and Brosius, 2000).

Differential reception

Other research, in the tradition of 'reception analysis', has supported the view that actual interpretations of news are strongly influenced at the point of recep­tion by the circumstances, outlook and prejudices of the individual audience member in a domestic and 'everyday life' situation (see Jensen, 1986; 1998). Gurevitch and Levy (1986: 132) described the frames of interpretation brought by viewers to television news as 'meta-messages', 'latent meanings that are embedded in audience decodings', which help to link individual sense-making to larger stories. They assume that audiences, much as journalists, have 'tacit theories' to frame their understanding of events in the world and to help in their processing of information.

This view was confirmed by Jensen (2001) on the basis of a comparison of news reception in different countries. He found that the themes deployed by less educated and interested news audience members do not correspond with the 'super-themes' used by journalists to frame news accounts. The perspectives arising often cut across the actual topics of the news, especially international news. Jensen distinguished four dimensions by which audiences made sense of news, as follows:

• Space. Audiences decide if and how distant events might affect themselves.

• Power. Audiences: are likely to see news as concerning themselves as well as the more powerful.

• Time. Audiences see events in terms of their own past and future history.

• Identity. Audiences link or disassociate themselves with events, places and people in the news.

The earliest types of news reception research (see Alasuutari, 1999) were based on the encoding/decoding model of Stuart Hall (1974/1980) and involved the hypothesis that news could be decoded in 'hegemonic', 'negotiated' or 'opposi­tional' ways according to the outlook of the individual receiver. The evidence for this is not easy to come by, but a study of Palestinian and Jewish responses to news of the Intifada seems to offer clear support (Liebes and Riback, 1994). 'Extremists' on both sides tended to read the news in either a 'hegemonic' or an 'oppositional' way, while moderates on both sides applied a 'negotiated' mode of interpretation.

Box 19.1 Factors associated with news learning

• Prior knowledge and interest on part of audience

• Perceived relevance of topic

• Credible and trusted news channel or source

• Visual illustration

• Concrete subject matter and 'hard news' character

• News fits an available frame of interpretation

• Repetition of news

News credibility

A condition of news to achieve learning effects, as shown in Box 19.1, is the attribution of believability by an audience. Essentially, some trust is required for a news source to be effective, although there is plenty of evidence that people do habitually pay attention to media sources that they do not trust (see Kifati and Capella, 2003). Gaziano and McGrath (1987) found that credibility had more to do with perceived fairness, lack of bias and good faith rather than perceived accuracy or reliability of information as such. It is the quality of the source rather than the information that matters. A relevant component was a perception of a medium as having the interest of the public at heart. In the United States and the UK television rapidly outstripped newspapers after the 1960s as the most trusted source of news. Although the assumption that pictures are more dependable than words plays a part, the regulated impar­tiality of television is also a reason for public trust. In some countries a clear distinction appears between a more trusted public and a less trusted private television (in Germany, Japan and the UK). Survey evidence also shows public awareness of different degrees of credibility between newspapers, especially between quality and 'tabloid' variants.

There are also cross-country variations. Within Europe the newspaper press in the UK is much less trusted than the press in nearly all other countries of Western Europe (Eurobarometer, 1999). It seems that perceptions of credibility do reflect real differences between sources and can change. There remains a problem of what precisely is being measured.

The issue of credibility has been revived with the appearance of the Internet as a news medium. There are intrinsic difficulties for users in assessing the credibil­ity of information on the Internet unless it comes from established media names, but there is also a high general public expectation that the Internet can provide solutions to uncertainty. It is still too early for a clear pattern of public attitudes to emerge, and the findings of research have been mixed. Research comparing the Internet with television and newspapers as news sources in Germany (Schweiger, 2000) and the USA (Kiousis, 2001; Johnson and Kaye, 2002; Flanagan and Metzger, 2000; Metzger et al, 2003) showed the Internet lagging somewhat in perceived trust. Younger (student) users seem to trust online sources more than others (Bucy, 2003). Those who are generally more sceptical about politics prefer to go to non-mainstream sources, including the Internet, consistent with the idea that there is greater diversity.

News Diffusion

The diffusion of news in the sense of its takeup and incorporation into what people 'know' is mainly a short- or medium-term matter. Most early news effect research focused on 'diffusion' - the spread of news as measured by the capac­ity to recall certain named events. Four main variables have been at the centre of attention in this matter. They are the extent to which people (in a given population) know about a given event; the relative importance or perceived salience of the event; the volume of information about it that is transmitted; and the extent to which knowledge of an event comes first from news media or from personal contact. The possible interactions between these four are complex, but one model of the interaction is expressed by the J-curved relationship between the propor­tion who are aware of an event and the proportion who heard of the same event from an interpersonal source (Greenberg, 1964).

The J-shape expresses the following findings: when an event is known about by virtually everyone (such as the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, the death of Princess Diana in 1997 or the attacks of 9/11), a very high proportion (over half) are likely to have been told by a personal contact (associated conditions here being high event salience and rapid diffusion). When events are known by decreasing proportions of the population, the percentage of personal contact origination falls and that of media source rises (associated conditions are lower salience and slower diffusion rates). However, there is a category of events which is known about ulti­mately only by rather small proportions of a whole population. These comprise minorities for whom the event or topic is highly salient, and the proportion of knowledge from personal contact rises again in relation to media sources, because personal contact networks are activated in these circumstances.

The pattern of news information diffusion can take a variety of forms which deviate from the 'normal' S-curve of diffusion (a slow start, then an acceleration, then a flattening as the upper limit is reached). The J-curve, just described, is one important variant type. Chaffee (1975) has suggested three alternative patterns that are sometimes found: incomplete diffusion, very rapid early acceleration, and unduly slow acceleration. We should look for different explanations in terms of either 'content-specific' factors or source variables or receiver variables, often working in combination.

Theory about news diffusion is still held back by the bias of research towards a certain class of events, especially towards 'hard news', which has a high measure of unexpectedness (Rosengren, 1973; 1987). In order to have a fuller picture of processes of news diffusion we would need more evidence about 'soft news' and more about routine or anticipated events. We are also limited by the difficulty of estimating event importance independently of the amount of attention given by the media, bearing in mind the varying interests of different sectors of the society.

The diffusion of news has been made more complex by the increase in the number of channels available and the relative decline of centralized mass news channels. The fact noted above that word of mouth plays a key part in the dissem­ination of certain kinds of dramatic news is continually reconfirmed, despite the alleged decline of social contacts in modern society. In the case of the 9/11 terrorist attack on New York, interviews conducted a day later on people's immediate news source showed 50% hearing first from someone else, 33% from television, and 15% from radio. It took two hours for full diffusion to be achieved (Greenberg, 2002).

Framing Effects

The idea of framing (explained in Chapter 14, p. 378) is an attractive one and provides a strong hypothesis that an audience will be guided by journalistic frames in what it learns. It will also learn the frames themselves. However it is not obvious how framing will work as an effect process. As Cappella and Jamieson put it (1997: 98), 'The way the news is framed by journalists and how the audience frames news may be similar or different.' The same authors proposed a model of framing effects, with the central idea that news frames activate certain inferences, ideas, judgements and contrasts concerning issues, policies and politicians. Their particular concern was to assess whether consistent framing of political news as either 'strategic' (dealing with attempts to gain campaign advantage) or 'conflict oriented' (as opposed to objectively reporting substance) would contribute to greater public cynicism about politics. Their evidence supports the idea of a cumulative (spiralling) process of increased cynicism as a media effect.

Scheufele (1999) has suggested a process model of framing effects that recog­nizes them as outcomes of interaction between three different kinds of actor: interested sources and media organizations; journalists (media); and audiences. As he notes, we are dealing with two kinds of frame: media frames and individ­ual (receiver) frames. Both kinds of frame can be either independent (a cause) or dependent (an effect). According to the model, there are four interrelated fram­ing processes involving these actors. First, there is the construction and use of media frames by journalists and others working in news organizations under routine pressures, constantly dealing with sources and applying 'news values' and 'news angles' to event reports. Secondly, there is the transmission of 'framed' news reports (e.g. a cynical view of politicians) to the audience. Thirdly, there is an acceptance of certain frames by members of the audience, with consequences for their attitudes, outlook (e.g. cynicism) and behaviour (e.g. non-participation).

The groundwork for much framing research was laid by Entman (1993), but there has been some criticism of his ambition to construct a single general para­digm of the framing process. D'Angelo (2002) argues that the literature indicates the existence of at least three different framing paradigms. The first of these is a cognitivist model, according to which the texts of journalistic accounts become embodied in the thoughts and words of those affected. Secondly, there is a con­structionist variant of the process, which sees journalists as providing 'interpre­tative packages' of the positions of sponsors (i.e. sources) of news. Thirdly, there is a critical paradigm that sees frames as the outcome of news gathering routines and the values of elites. This attributes a hegemonic influence to framing.

Despite the complexities, there is sufficient evidence, especially from political communication research, to demonstrate the occurrence of effects on audiences that are in line with news frames. Iyengar (1991) showed that the way in which news about social problems was framed affected whether audiences were more or less likely to 'blame the victim' for their troubles. Research into the 1991 Gulf War showed that framing of news encouraged audiences to endorse military rather than diplomatic solutions (Iyengar and Simon, 1997). In the case of the news reporting of the two air disasters mentioned in Chapter 14 (Box 14.3), Entman (1991) found strong evidence of public opinion forming in line with the inbuilt news frames: the Soviets were strongly condemned for the loss of the Korean plane, and the Americans were largely absolved of responsibility for the Iranian loss. McLeod and Detenber (1999) found that differently framed news reports of the same protests had different effects on viewers. As noted on p. 529, Jamieson and Waldman (2003) attribute the failure of Al Gore in his challenge to George W. Bush over the con­tested US presidential election outcome to the way the issue was framed.

Agenda-Setting

The term 'agenda-setting' was coined by McCombs and Shaw (1972; 1993) to describe a phenomenon which had long been noticed and studied in the context of election campaigns. The core idea is that the news media indicate to the public what the main issues of the day are and this is reflected in what the public per­ceives as the main issues. As Trenaman and McQuail pointed out, 'The evidence strongly suggests that people think about what they are told but at no level do they think what they are told' (1961:178). The evidence collected at that time and much since consists of data showing a correspondence between the order of importance given in the media to 'issues' and the order of significance attached to the same issues by politicians and the public. Dearing and Rogers (1996) define the process as 'an ongoing competition among issue protagonists to gain the attention of media professionals, the public and policy elites'. Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) referred to it as the power to 'structure issues'. Politicians seek to con­vince voters that the most important issues are those with which they are most closely identified. This is an essential part of advocacy and attempts at influenc­ing public opinion. As a hypothesis, agenda-setting seems to have escaped the general conclusion that persuasive campaigns have small or no effects.

This is the essence of the agenda-setting hypothesis, but such evidence is insuf­ficient to show a causal connection between the various issue 'agendas'. For that we need to know the content of party programmes, evidence of opinion change over time in a given section of the public (preferably with panel data), plus con­tent analysis showing media attention to different issues in the relevant period. We also need some indication of relevant media use by the public concerned. Such data have rarely, if ever, been produced at the same time in support of the hypothesis of agenda-setting. The further one moves from the general notion that media direct attention and shape cognitions and towards examining actual cases, the more uncertain it becomes whether such an effect actually occurs.

Davis and Robinson (1986) criticized previous agenda-setting research for neglecting possible effects on what people think concerning who is important, where important things happen, and why things are important. According to Rogers and Dearing (1987), we need to distinguish clearly between three different agendas: the priorities of the media, those of the public and those of policy. These interact in complex ways and may have effects in different directions. The same authors also note that media vary in their credibility, that personal experience and the media picture may diverge, and that the public may not share the same values about news events as the media. In addition, 'real-world events' may intervene in unexpected ways to upset previous agendas (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Reese (1991) has pointed out that much depends on the relative balance of power between media and sources, a factor that varies considerably from case to case.

Each of these comments introduces new sources of variation. Despite the diffi­culties, agenda-setting has attracted mass communication researchers because it seems to offer an alternative to the search for directional media effects on individ­ual attitudes and behaviour change. Dearing and Rogers (1996: 15) write that agenda-setting is related to several other kinds of effects, including: the bandwagon effect, the spiral of silence, the diffusion of news, and media gatekeeping. Most evidence (for example, Behr and Iyengar, 1985) is inconclusive, and assessments (among them by Kraus and Davis, 1976; Becker, 1982; Reese, 1991; Rogers et al., 1993) tend to leave agenda-setting with the status of a plausible but unproven idea.

The doubts stem not only from the strict methodological demands for proof of a causal connection, but also from theoretical ambiguities. The hypothesis presupposes a process of influence, from the priorities of political or other inter­est groups to the news priorities of media, in which news values and audience interests play a strong part, and from there to the opinions of the public. There are certainly alternative models of this relationship, of which the main one would reverse the flow and state that underlying concerns of the public will shape issue definition by both political elites and the media. Such a process is fundamental to political theory and to the logic of free media. It is likely that the media do contribute to a convergence of the three 'agendas' mentioned above, but that is a different matter from setting any particular one of them.

Dearing and Rogers (1996) offer several generalizations about agenda-setting. One is that different media do tend to agree about the relative salience of a set of issues. Secondly, media agendas do not closely match 'real-world' indicators. It is not the absolute significance of an issue that counts but the relative strength of forces and people trying to define and promote an issue. Finally, the 'position of an issue on the media agenda importantly determines that issue's salience in the public agenda' (1996: 192). It is interesting to note that despite the centrality of agenda-setting to political communication effects research, the effect itself is likely to be accounted a 'peripheral' effect in terms of the ELM model (see p. 517), since it arises from incidental cues of significance given by presentation (Perse, 2001:100). This does not make such effects less significant, since they contribute to shaping public perceptions of political and social reality. One common condi­tion for agenda-setting is that different mass media tend to share the same set of news priorities. This condition is challenged by the availability of many new online news services, plus the greater chance for a 'news user' to seek news according to a personal agenda (see p. 532).

Priming

Reference is sometimes made (especially in political communication research) to 'media priming' effects, as a more specific aspect of agenda-setting. The idea of priming originated in social learning theory and the study of effects in aggres­sion. It also has a long history in election campaign research in the attempts by politicians to be associated with the issues on which they have the strongest reputation. The authors of this idea (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987) show that the political issues that receive most attention (highest on the agenda) also figure more prominently in public assessments of the performance of political actors. The general assessment of a party or a politician thus depends on the perception of how they do on the most salient issues.

The priming 'effect' is essentially one of promoting certain evaluative criteria and it plays a part in attempts to manage news. For instance, the often suspected attempts of national leaders to divert attention from domestic failure by some foreign policy success, or even military adventure, is an extreme example of priming. Like agenda-setting, although it seems true to what is going on, it is difficult to prove in practice. Pan and Kosicki (1997) investigated the process in relation to public assessments of the US President's media performance and concluded that any priming effect of media is too weak in relation to other influences to be demonstrated.