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C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 225
Box 1: Global
Barings, Daiwa, Sumitomo, and Allied Irish
Rogue Traders and the PrincipalÐAgent Problem. |
Leeson control both his own trades and the back |
The demise of Barings, a venerable British bank over a |
room, it increased asymmetric information, because it |
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century old, is a sad morality tale of how the principalÐ |
reduced the principalÕs (BaringsÕs) knowledge about |
agent problem operating through a rogue trader can |
LeesonÕs trading activities. This lapse increased the |
take a financial institution that has a healthy balance |
moral hazard incentive for him to take risks at the |
sheet one month and turn it into an insolvent tragedy |
bankÕs expense, as he was now less likely to be caught. |
the next. |
Furthermore, once he had experienced large losses, he |
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In July 1992, Nick Leeson, BaringsÕs new head |
had even greater incentives to take on even higher risk |
clerk at its Singapore branch, began to speculate on |
because if his bets worked out, he could reverse his |
the Nikkei, the Japanese version of the Dow Jones |
losses and keep in good standing with the company, |
stock index. By late 1992, Leeson had suffered losses |
whereas if his bets soured, he had little to lose since |
of $3 million, which he hid from his superiors by |
he was out of a job anyway. Indeed, the bigger his |
stashing the losses in a secret account. He even fooled |
losses, the more he had to gain by bigger bets, which |
his superiors into thinking he was generating large |
explains the escalation of the amount of his trades as |
profits, thanks to a failure of internal controls at his |
his losses mounted. If BaringsÕs managers had under- |
firm, which allowed him to execute trades on the |
stood the principalÐagent problem, they would have |
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Singapore exchange and oversee the bookkeeping of |
been more vigilant at finding out what Leeson was up |
those trades. (As anyone who runs a cash business, |
to, and the bank might still be here today. |
such as a bar, knows, there is always a lower likeli- |
Unfortunately, Nick Leeson is no longer a rarity in |
hood of fraud if more than one person handles the |
the rogue tradersÕ billionaire club, those who have |
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cash. Similarly for trading operations, you never mix |
lost more than $1 billion. Over 11 years, Toshihide |
management of the back room with management of |
Iguchi, an officer in the New York branch of Daiwa |
the front room; this principle was grossly violated by |
Bank, also had control of both the bond trading oper- |
Barings management.) |
ation and the back room, and he racked up $1.1 bil- |
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Things didnÕt get better for Leeson, who by late |
lion in losses over the period. In July 1995, Iguchi |
1994 had losses exceeding $250 million. In January |
disclosed his losses to his superiors, but the manage- |
and February 1995, he bet the bank. On January 17, |
ment of the bank did not disclose them to its regula- |
1995, the day of the Kobe earthquake, he lost $75 |
tors. The result was that Daiwa was slapped with a |
million, and by the end of the week had lost more |
$340 million fine and the bank was thrown out of the |
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than $150 million. When the stock market declined |
country by U.S. bank regulators. Yasuo Hamanaka is |
on February 23, leaving him with a further loss of |
another member of the billionaire club. In July 1996, |
$250 million, he called it quits and fled Singapore. |
he topped LeesonÕs and IguchiÕs record, losing $2.6 |
Three days later, he turned himself in at the Frankfurt |
billion for his employer, the Sumitomo Corporation, |
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airport. By the end of his wild ride, LeesonÕs losses, |
one of JapanÕs top trading companies. John Rusnak |
$1.3 billion in all, ate up BaringsÕs capital and caused |
lost only $691 million for his bank, Allied Irish |
the bank to fail. Leeson was subsequently convicted |
Banks, over the period from 1997 until he was caught |
and sent to jail in Singapore for his activities. He was |
in February 2002. The moral of these stories is that |
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released in 1999 and apologized for his actions. |
management of firms engaged in trading activities |
Our asymmetric information analysis of the princi- |
must reduce the principalÐagent problem by closely |
palÐagent problem explains LeesonÕs behavior and the |
monitoring their tradersÕ activities, or the roguesÕ |
danger of BaringsÕs management lapse. By letting |
gallery will continue to grow. |




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Duration Gap Analysis 2 |
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Table 1 Duration of the First National Bank’s Assets and Liabilities |
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Weighted |
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Amount |
Duration |
Duration |
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($ millions) |
(years) |
(years) |
Assets |
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Reserves and cash items |
5 |
0.0 |
0.00 |
Securities |
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Less than 1 year |
5 |
0.4 |
0.02 |
1 to 2 years |
5 |
1.6 |
0.08 |
Greater than 2 years |
10 |
7.0 |
0.70 |
Residential mortgages |
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Variable-rate |
10 |
0.5 |
0.05 |
Fixed-rate (30-year) |
10 |
6.0 |
0.60 |
Commercial loans |
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Less than 1 year |
15 |
0.7 |
0.11 |
1 to 2 years |
10 |
1.4 |
0.14 |
Greater than 2 years |
25 |
4.0 |
1.00 |
Physical capital |
5 |
0.0 |
0.00 |
Average duration |
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2.70 |
Liabilities |
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Checkable deposits |
15 |
2.0 |
0.32 |
Money market deposit accounts |
5 |
0.1 |
0.01 |
Savings deposits |
15 |
1.0 |
0.16 |
CDs |
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Variable-rate |
10 |
0.5 |
0.05 |
Less than 1 year |
15 |
0.2 |
0.03 |
1 to 2 years |
5 |
1.2 |
0.06 |
Greater than 2 years |
5 |
2.7 |
0.14 |
Fed funds |
5 |
0.0 |
0.00 |
Borrowings |
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Less than 1 year |
10 |
0.3 |
0.03 |
1 to 2 years |
5 |
1.3 |
0.07 |
Greater than 2 years |
5 |
3.1 |
0.16 |
Average duration |
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1.03 |
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assets and adding them up, the bank manager gets a figure for the average duration of the assets of 2.70 years.
The manager follows a similar procedure for the liabilities, noting that total liabilities excluding capital are $95 million. For example, the weighted duration for checkable deposits is determined by multiplying the 2.0-year duration by $15 million divided by $95 million to get 0.32. Adding up these weighted durations, the manager obtains an average duration of liabilities of 1.03 years.

3 Appendix 1 to Chapter 9
EXAMPLE 1: Duration Gap Analysis
The bank manager wants to know what happens when interest rates rise from 10% to 11%. The total asset value is $100 million, and the total liability value is $95 million. Use Equation 1 to calculate the change in the market value of the assets and liabilities.
Solution
With a total asset value of $100 million, the market value of assets falls by $2.5 million ($100 million 0.025 $2.5 million):
i % P DUR 1 i
where
DUR duration |
2.70 |
i change in interest rate 0.11 0.10 |
0.01 |
i interest rate |
0.10 |
Thus:
0.01
% P 2.70 1 0.10 0.025 2.5%
With total liabilities of $95 million, the market value of liabilities falls by $0.9 million ($95 million 0.009 $0.9 million):
i
% P DUR 1 i
where |
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DUR duration |
1.03 |
i change in interest rate 0.11 0.10 |
0.01 |
i interest rate |
0.10 |
Thus:
0.01
% P 1.03 1 0.10 0.009 0.9%
The result is that the net worth of the bank would decline by $1.6 million ( $2.5 million ( $0.9 million) $2.5 million $0.9 million $1.6 million).
The bank manager could have gotten to the answer even more quickly by calculating what is called a duration gap, which is defined as follows:
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A |
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DUR |
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DUR |
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L |
DUR |
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(2) |
gap |
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l |
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a |
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where DURa average duration of assets DURl average duration of liabilities
L market value of liabilities A market value of assets

Duration Gap Analysis 4
EXAMPLE 2: Duration Gap Analysis
Based on the information provided in Example 1, use Equation 2 to determine the duration gap for First National Bank.
Solution
The duration gap for First National Bank is 1.72 years:
DUR |
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DUR |
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L |
DUR |
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gap |
a |
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l |
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A |
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where |
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DURa average duration of assets |
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2.70 |
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L market value of liabilities |
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95 |
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A market value of assets |
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100 |
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DURl average duration of liabilities |
1.03 |
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Thus: |
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DUR 2.70 |
95 |
1.03 |
1.72 years |
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gap |
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100 |
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To estimate what will happen if interest rates change, the bank manager uses the DURgap calculation in Equation 1 to obtain the change in the market value of net worth as a percentage of total assets. In other words, the change in the market value
of net worth as a percentage of assets is calculated as: |
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NW |
DURgap |
i |
(3) |
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A |
1 i |
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EXAMPLE 3: Duration Gap Analysis
What is the change in the market value of net worth as a percentage of assets if interest rates rise from 10% to 11%? (Use Equation 3.)
Solution
A rise in interest rates from 10% to 11% would lead to a change in the market value of net worth as a percentage of assets of 1.6%:
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NW |
DUR |
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i |
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gap |
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A |
1 |
i |
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where |
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DURgap duration gap |
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1.72 |
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i change in interest rate 0.11 0.10 0.01 |
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i interest rate |
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0.10 |
Thus: |
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NW |
1.72 |
0.01 |
0.016 1.6% |
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A |
1 0.10 |
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