economics_of_money_banking__financial_markets
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298 P A R T I I I |
Financial Institutions |
Mutual funds have seen a large increase in their market share since 1980 (see Table 1), due primarily to the then-booming stock market. Another source of growth has been mutual funds that specialize in debt instruments, which first appeared in the 1970s. Before 1970, mutual funds invested almost solely in common stocks. Funds that purchase common stocks may specialize even further and invest solely in foreign securities or in specialized industries, such as energy or high technology. Funds that purchase debt instruments may specialize further in corporate, U.S. government, or tax-exempt municipal bonds or in long-term or short-term securities.
Mutual funds are primarily held by households (around 80%) with the rest held by other financial institutions and nonfinancial businesses. Mutual funds have become increasingly important in household savings. In 1980, only 6% of households held mutual fund shares; this number has risen to around 50% in recent years. The age group with the greatest participation in mutual fund ownership includes individuals between 50 and 70, which makes sense because they are the most interested in saving for retirement. Interestingly, Generation X (18Ð30) is the second most active age group in mutual fund ownership, suggesting that they have a greater tolerance for investment risk than those who are somewhat older. Generation X is also leading the way in Internet access to mutual funds (see Box 2).
The growing importance of investors in mutual funds and pension funds, socalled institutional investors, has resulted in their controlling over 50% of the outstanding stock in the United States. Thus, institutional investors are the predominant players in the stock markets, with over 70% of the total daily volume in the stock market due to their trading. Increased ownership of stocks has also meant that institutional investors have more clout with corporate boards, often forcing changes in leadership or in corporate policies.
Mutual funds are structured in two ways. The more common structure is an open-end fund, from which shares can be redeemed at any time at a price that is tied
Box 2: E-Finance
Mutual Funds and the Internet
The Investment Company Institute estimates that as |
high volume of online transactions were conducted |
of 2000, 68% of households owning mutual funds |
by a small number of shareholders. |
use the Internet, and nearly half of those online |
Online shareholders were typically younger, had |
shareholders visit fund-related web sites. The |
greater household income, and were better educated |
Internet increases the attractiveness of mutual funds |
than those not using the Internet. The median online |
because it enables shareholders to review perform- |
shareholder was 42 years old, had a household |
ance information and share prices and personal |
income of $100,900, and was college-educated. The |
account information. |
median shareholder not using the Internet was 51 |
Of all U.S. households that conducted mutual |
years old, had a household income of $41,000, and |
funds transactions between April 1999 and March |
did not have a college degree. |
2000, 18% bought or sold fund shares online. The |
The use of the Internet to track and trade mutual |
median number of funds transactions conducted over |
funds is rapidly increasing. The number of share- |
the Internet during the 12-month period was four, |
holders who visited web sites offering fund shares |
while the average number was eight, indicating that a |
nearly doubled between April 1999 and March 2000. |
300 P A R T I I I Financial Institutions
Box 3
The Long-Term Capital Management Debacle
Long-Term Capital Management was a hedge fund |
tial need to liquidate its portfolio of $80 billion in |
with a star cast of managers, including 25 PhDs, two |
securities and more than $1 trillion of notional value |
Nobel Prize winners in economics (Myron Scholes |
in derivatives (discussed in Chapter 13), the Federal |
and Robert Merton), a former vice-chairman of the |
Reserve Bank of New York stepped in on September |
Federal Reserve System (David Mullins), and one of |
23 and organized a rescue plan with its creditors. The |
Wall StreetÕs most successful bond traders (John |
FedÕs rationale for stepping in was that a sudden liq- |
Meriwether). It made headlines in September 1998 |
uidation of Long-Term CapitalÕs portfolio would cre- |
because its near collapse roiled markets and required |
ate unacceptable systemic risk. Tens of billions of |
a private rescue plan organized by the Federal |
dollars of illiquid securities would be dumped on an |
Reserve Bank of New York. |
already jittery market, causing potentially huge losses |
The experience of Long-Term Capital demon- |
to numerous lenders and other institutions. The res- |
strates that hedge funds are far from risk-free, |
cue plan required creditors, banks and investment |
despite their use of market-neutral strategies. Long- |
banks, to supply an additional $3.6 billion of funds |
Term Capital got into difficulties when it thought |
to Long-Term Capital in exchange for much tighter |
that the spread between prices on long-term |
management control of funds and a 90% reduction in |
Treasury bonds and long-term corporate bonds was |
the managersÕ equity stake. In the middle of 1999, |
too high, and bet that this ÒanomalyÓ would disap- |
John Meriwether began to wind down the funds |
pear and the spread would narrow. In the wake of |
operations. |
the collapse of the Russian financial system in |
Even though no public funds were expended, the |
August 1998, investors increased their assessment of |
FedÕs involvement in organizing the rescue of Long- |
the riskiness of corporate securities and as we saw in |
Term Capital was highly controversial. Some critics |
Chapter 6, the spread between corporates and |
argue that the Fed intervention increased moral haz- |
Treasuries rose rather than narrowed as Long-Term |
ard by weakening discipline imposed by the market |
Capital had predicted. The result was that Long- |
on fund managers because future Fed interventions of |
Term Capital took big losses on its positions, eating |
this type would be expected. Others think that the |
up much of its equity position. |
FedÕs action was necessary to prevent a major shock to |
By mid-September, Long-Term Capital was unable |
the financial system that could have provoked a finan- |
to raise sufficient funds to meet the demands of its |
cial crisis. The debate on whether the Fed should have |
creditors. With Long-Term Capital facing the poten- |
intervened is likely to go on for some time. |
between $100,000 and $20 million, with the typical minimum investment being $1 million. Long-Term Capital Management required a $10 million minimum investment. Federal law limits hedge funds to have no more than 99 investors (limited partners) who must have steady annual incomes of $200,000 or more or a net worth of $1 million, excluding their homes. These restrictions are aimed at allowing hedge funds to be largely unregulated, on the theory that the rich can look out for themselves. Many of the 4,000 hedge funds are located offshore to escape regulatory restrictions.
Hedge funds also differ from traditional mutual funds in that they usually require that investors commit their money for long periods of time, often several years. The purpose of this requirement is to give managers breathing room to pursue long-run
302 P A R T I I I |
Financial Institutions |
Box 4
Are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Getting Too Big for Their Britches?
With the growth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to |
capital-to-asset ratios than banks. Critics also charge |
immense proportions, there are rising concerns that |
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have become so |
these federally sponsored agencies could threaten the |
large that they wield too much political influence. In |
health of the financial system. Fannie Mae and |
addition, these federally sponsored agencies have |
Freddie Mac either own or insure the risk on close to |
conflicts of interest, because they have to serve two |
half of U.S. residential mortgages (amounting to $2 |
masters: as publicly traded corporations, they are |
trillion). In fact, their publicly issued debt is well over |
supposed to maximize profits for the shareholders, |
half that issued by the federal government. A failure |
but as government agencies, they are supposed to |
of either of these institutions would therefore pose a |
work in the interests of the public. These concerns |
grave shock to the financial system. Although the fed- |
have led to calls for reform of these agencies, with |
eral government would be unlikely to stand by and |
many advocating full privatization as was done vol- |
let them fail, in such a case, the taxpayer would face |
untarily by the Student Loan Market Association |
substantial costs, as in the S&L crisis. |
(ÒSallie MaeÓ) in the mid-1990s. |
Concerns about the safety and soundness of these |
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institutions arise because they have much smaller |
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In recent years, government financial intermediaries experienced financial difficulties. The Farm Credit System is one example. The rising tide of farm bankruptcies meant losses in the billions of dollars for the Farm Credit System, and as a result it required a bailout from the federal government in 1987. The agency was authorized to borrow up to $4 billion to be repaid over a 15-year period and received over $1 billion in assistance. There is growing concern in Washington about the health of the federal credit agencies. To head off government bailouts like that for the Farm Credit System, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 set new rules that require such agencies to increase their capital to provide a greater cushion to offset any potential losses. However, there have been growing concerns about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Box 4).
Securities Market Operations
The smooth functioning of securities markets, in which bonds and stocks are traded, involves several financial institutions, including securities brokers and dealers, investment banks, and organized exchanges. None of these institutions were included in our list of financial intermediaries in Chapter 2, because they do not perform the intermediation function of acquiring funds by issuing liabilities and then using the funds to acquire financial assets. Nonetheless, they are important in the process of channeling funds from savers to spenders and can be thought of as Òfinancial facilitators.Ó
First, however, we must recall the distinction between primary and secondary securities markets discussed in Chapter 2. In a primary market, new issues of a security are sold to buyers by the corporation or government agency borrowing the funds. A secondary market then trades the securities that have been sold in the primary mar-
304 P A R T I I I Financial Institutions
Following the Financial News |
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New Securities Issues |
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Information about new securities being issued is pre- |
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sented in distinctive advertisements published in the |
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This announcement is under no circumstances to be construed as an |
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Wall Street Journal and other newspapers. These |
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offer to sell or as a solicitation of an offer to buy any of these securities. |
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The offering is made only by the Prospectus Supplement |
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advertisements, called ÒtombstonesÓ because of their |
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and the Prospectus to which it relates. |
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appearance, are typically found in the ÒMoney and |
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New Issue |
January 31, 2003 |
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InvestingÓ section of the Wall Street Journal. |
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5,700,000 Shares |
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The tombstone indicates the number of shares of |
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stock being issued (5.7 million shares for Cinergy) |
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and the investment bank involved in selling them. |
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Source: Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, February 12, 2003, p. C5.
Common Stock
Price $31.10 Per Share
Copies of the Prospectus Supplement and the Prospectus to which it relates may be obtained in any State or jurisdiction in which this announcement is circulated from the undersigned or other dealers or brokers as may lawfully offer these securities in such State or jurisdiction.
Merrill Lynch & Co.
Securities |
Securities brokers and dealers conduct trading in secondary markets. Brokers act as |
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Brokers and |
agents for investors in the purchase or sale of securities. Their function is to match |
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Dealers |
buyers with sellers, a function for which they are paid brokerage commissions. In |
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contrast to brokers, dealers link buyers and sellers by standing ready to buy and sell |
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securities at given prices. Therefore, dealers hold inventories of securities and make |
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their living by selling these securities for a slightly higher price than they paid for |
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themÑthat is, on the ÒspreadÓ between the asked price and the bid price. This can be |
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a high-risk business because dealers hold securities that can rise or fall in price; in |
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recent years, several firms specializing in bonds have collapsed. Brokers, by contrast, |
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are not as exposed to risk because they do not own the securities involved in their |
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business dealings. |
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www.sec.gov |
Brokerage firms engage in all three securities market activities, acting as brokers, |
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The Securities and Exchange |
dealers, and investment bankers. The largest in the United States is Merrill Lynch; |
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Commission web site contains |
other well-known ones are PaineWebber, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, and Salomon |
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regulatory actions, concept |
Smith Barney. The SEC not only regulates the investment banking operation of the |
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releases, interpretive releases, |
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firms but also restricts brokers and dealers from misrepresenting securities and from |
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and more. |
