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прагматика и медиа дискурс / 语用学关键概念 Key Notions for Pragmatics (2009)

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As the lexical material between brackets show, implicit constituents vary in nature, ranging over locations, activities and situations.

Semantically underdetenninate sentences therefore represent a class with the specific property of leaving out a conceptual element which must be supplied before a proposition is yielded. The process whereby the complete proposition is identified in such cases is not, however, the same as the expansion or enrichment process advo­ cated by Sperber & \\Tilson ( 1986) and Carston ( 1988),because in the cases discussed by them a complete proposition was already there it only was not the one the speaker might have plausibly meant, and consequently it was not reputed by them to be the proposition expressed by the utterance, but only a logical form, or a blueprint, of the proposition.

Therefore, Bach prefers to think of the process as "conceptual strengthening·: in that the insertion of lexical material leads to a conceptually more elaborate proposi­ tion than the one strictly expressed. Thus, Bach grants that there are pragmatic aspects of what is said which are to be kept di tinct from what is implicated, but in his view these aspects cannot properl)r be considered •explicit': rather, they are implicit in what is said, and can be called 'implicitures'.

Two types of implicitures can be distinguished, depending on the process by

which they are identified: (a) if the sentence is semantically underdeterminate, that is, no complete proposition can be identified, then a process of conceptual filling ts

required; (b) if the speaker cannot be plausibly supposed to mean what the sentence literally means. then a processoffleslring out is in order. The fillingin ofa propositional

..radical': a...hec; calls it, is a matter ofcompletion; the fleshing out ofthe minimal propo­ sition expressible by an utterance is a matter of expansion.

The implicitures thus identified are clearly distinct from implicature.s. in that, as the name suggests, they are implicit r.\' what is said, while implicatures are implicated BY (the saying of) what is said. lmpticatures are therefore external to what is said, while implicitures are built out ofwhat is said.

3.Implicitness and cognition

As these notes may have shown, implicitness is a penrasive, multifaceted phenom­ enon, involving important theoretical questions which touch upon the complexities of language understanding as a whole.

'.Yhen considering the cognitive side of implicitness, the basic question is: why is implicitness allowed at all in human natural languages?

The search for a plausible answer starts from the rather trivial obsenration that the primary aim of the mind in processing verbal (and non verbal information) is to achieve and constantly improve knowledge ofthe world. In order to reach that aim, the

160Marcella Bertuccelll Papl

mind can resort to different modes of knowledge and to different modes of processing.

These are ruled by a general principle ofeconomy, according to which the mind tends to obtain the maximum with the minimum effort.

In so far as it is reasonable to assume that languages are (globally. if not in the details) structured in such a way as to favour not to hinder the functioning ofthe mind, a plausible answer to our question is that implicitJ1ess is such a widespread phe­ nomenon because either the mind can resort to it asa wayofsimplif)ring and speeding mformation processing or, when extra effort is required, the processing costs are bal­ anced b)' the quantity and quality ofinformation thereby gathered. Howexactlyall this works is still a matter ofcontention. Among the hottest questions that the research on implicitness has to answer. are the following:

a.The instruments for explicating explicitness are inferences. What are the types of inferences that are used in the recovery of in1plicit tneanings? The three basic modes of inferencing that philosophy has handed down to us are deduction, induction and abduction. How and when are they activated? How do they inter­ act with imagistic reasoning, associative processes, and other forms of pragmatic. everyday reasoning?

b.Types of knowledge. Inferences operate on information units of various types and formats: shared knowledge, private knowledge. stereotyped knowledge in the fom1 of frames, scripts and schemas may all be resorted to in order to recover implicit meanings. Can their activation be foreseen to some extent?

c.1l1e levels of implicitness. Implicitness is a multilayered phenomenon. Implicit meanings can be conveyed at microand macrolevels. How do they interact with

d.

the dynamics oftext/discourse comprehension?

Thedegreesofimplicitness. Implicitness is notan all or none phenomenon. There is a gradient ofexplicitness which goes from silences, the extreme where the speaker does not say anythmg but means a lot, through the half said. where explicit hints are given of what the speaker means but does not want to say (Bertuccelli Papi

1996), to the other extreme where the speaker says a Jot but does not mean any· thing. Which strategies underlie the various stages of implicit communication?

e.Whatare the limitsofimplicitness? Up to what extentcan we omit saying something without any communication fuilure? Here the balance between effectiveness and

efficiency as parameters ofdiscourse structuring comes into play (de Beaugrande & Dressler 1981).

f.How transparent can implicit meanings be, and for whom? Who are the addressees of implicit message.c;? Implicitness is able to select among the audience the people who will recover the intended me,c;sage while inviting others to other forms and levels ofcomprehension, thus suggesting the relevance ofpolyphonic approach to

interaction (Ducrot 1984).

'fxtus Vlll:

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g.Howdoes the rational apparatus set out toaccount for the rational sideofimplicit communication interact with the emotions, attitudes and values ofspeakers and

hearers (Bertuccelli Papi 1997• see also the above comments on Ostman's 1986 viewofimplicitness)?

h.Finally, how is implicitness related to language acquisition and language impair ment/rehabilitation? And,diachronically) which roledoes implicitness play in the processes of grammaticaliz.ation and degrammaticalization?

References

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Lnngung.: andsocialcontext.Penguin:67-86.

de Beaugrande, R. & W. Oressler (1981). Jnlrodrtction totextlinguistifs, longman. Bertuccdli Papi. ·t. (1995). Semantic 'ragueness and degrees of precision ad\'erbs.

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--(1996). lnsinuating: The seduction ofunsaying. Pmgmnlics6: 191-104.

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Bruneau, T.j. (1981). Communicati\'e silences in cross·cultut"'.ll pcrspccti\'e. Medin Development 24:6-8.

Carston, R. (1988). Implicature, explicature and truth-theoretic semantics. In R. Kempson (Ed.), Mctunl repn!sentations: I:>5-181. C'..ambridge University Press.

Oucrot.0. (1972}. Din: etncpnsdm. Hermann. -- (1984). Lc directledit. Lcs cd. de minuit.

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--(1990). I limWddl'interpn:tn=ione. Bompiani.

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25-50.

Gdzdar,G. (1979}. Pmgmmirs: implicatw·c,pt·esuppositioll nndlogimlfonu. Academic Press. Gotfman. f.. (1967). Interaction t·itunl. Double Dar.

Green, G. (1989). Prngmatics nnd natumllnllgungc undeJ-stnndmg. Erlbaum.

Grice, H.P.(J957). Meanmg. 'fltcphilosoplucnlreview 66: 377-388. -- (1989).Studies in the wayof words. Han·ard Universit)' Press. Gumperz, ). {1982). Dis.cours.c stmtcgii.S. C'..ambridge Universit)' Press.

Hom. L (1984). Towards a new taxonomy for pragmal!c inference: Q-based and R-based implica­

ture. ln D. Shiffrin (Ed.), Menmug.form and usc iu colltt'Xt: linguistic nppilcntion. Georgetown

Univcrsit)' Press.

JakobO\·its (Eds), Semantics. 345-369.

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-- (1996). Prc:suppMition and implicature. ln $. Lappin (Ed.). '111e flattdbook of contemporary stmumtictheory: 29'9-319. Oxford.

Hrmes, D.(1962). ·lhe cthnograph)'ofspeaking. fnT. Gladwin & W.C.Sturtc\•ant (Eds), Anthropology andlluman &lravior: 13-53. Anthropological SocietyofWashington.

--(1972). Modelsofthe intemction oflanguagcandsocial life. In J.Gumperz& D. Hymes (Eds). Direct1ons insociolinguistiCs:35-71. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

--(1974). roundations insociolingwstic:s: An etiJnograpilicapproadt. Uni\'ersityofPennsrh'llnia

Press.

Jaworski, A. (1993). Thepowerofsilence. Sage.

Karttunen. L. (1971). Implicative verbs. umguage 47:340-357.

--(1973). Presuppositions ofcompound sentences. Li11gmstic inquiry 4:2: 169-193.

--(1974). Presuppositions and linguistic context. 'fllooretlcallingwslir$ 1: 3-44.

Karttuncn, L & S. Peters(1977). Requiem for presupposition Prou.edmgsof the thirdmmualmeeting of the 8c1·keley Li11gmsttc soc1ety: 266-278.

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Kempson. R.M. (1975). Presupposition andtiredelimitation ofsmrantirs.CambridgeUni•lersit)' Press.

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Cambridge University Press.

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Lc,·inson,S. (1983). Pragmatics. Ca-. mbridge University Press.

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Ostman, J.O. (1986). Pragmatics andimplicimess. UMI no.8624885.

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Stalnaker, R. {1977}. Pragmatic presuppositions. In R. And)'. B. Wall & J.P. furphy (Eds). Pro­ uedingsof lire '/'has cot (crenc:c on Pcrformativcs. Prcsuppositiousand mzpliraturcs: 13>-!47. Arlington nter for applied linguistics.

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Non-verbal communication

Lluls Payrat6

University ofBarcelona

1.Introduction

Non-verbal communication (NVC) has been envisaged in this re\·iewmainl)rfrom a (broad) pragmatic/linguistic perspective. more specifically from that ofseveral lan­ guage sciences (see §3-6).1 Naturally other, non-linguistic views could be adopted and indeed havebeen adopted (see §2),and n"'all)' topics are covered at the sametime by different (sub)disciplines. The option chosen here does not neglect these cross sections but seeks to assess the amount ofwork that has (or has not) been done in NVC in relation to their relevance for linguistics and pragmatics. Because of this choiceofapproach onlyworksconcernedwith face-to-face interaction are discussed, and special attention is paid to gesture. General topics such as conceptions and defi­ nitions ofNVC (§Ll 1.2), (sub)categories (§1.3) and functions (§1.4) are reviewed at the beginning of the text, while theoretical models (§7.1) and methodological remarks ( 7.2) are studied in later sections.

1.1Broad conception and scope (literal definitions)

NVC is usually defined as the kind of communication achieved through any code. medium, or channel other than verbal language. Obviously this definition literally derives fromthesyntagmnon verbalcommtmication,but its negativecharacteroffends some(surelymany)specialists. whoprefer other morepositive terms. Criticismsofthe

1. This paper aims to b a general introduction for the unitiatcd to a vast domain and also an abstract for thosewhoarcworkingon some ofits topics.'Ihe re\'icw is based on wo spublished mainly in the last thirty years (since 1972) and dally in English but also in some Romance languages (fr nch, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, and Catalan). Unfortunatcl)· works published in otherlanguages (inparticularGerman)arcnot taken mtoaccount (andofcoursethis ism)' fault). I prefer to state frankl)· thelimitation insteadofpresupposing that onlyworks written in English arc worthy of consideration (as is often the case in man}' grounds and reviews). Another bib­ liographical limitation concerns the kinds ofworksconsulted: doctoral theses.manuscripts, and individual (usuallybrief) articles arc in general not included: most ofthe comments is ofcollec­ tive works (in which more specific references can be found}. Other attempts to produce similar statesofthe art on VC can be found in Wieman & Harrison (1983): £11gring (1984}:Scherer & Wallbott (1985); Burgoon (1993): DePaulo & friedman (1998}.

164Uuis Payrat6

term and ofthe verbal/non-verbal dichotom}' ha,re been frequent in theliterature (see, among others, Scheflen 1979; Koneya 1981; \"/iemann & Harrison 1983; van Poecke

1988; Moerman 1990}.

As a form of communication, NVC meets all the requirements of this general phenomenon. such as a functional. procedural. dynamic, irreversible. and meaning ful character. and a presupposed systematicity which qualifies it for scientific stud}'.' As a non-verbal entity, NVC relies upon an implicit definition ofhuman verbal Ian· guage, which is thebasis foritsdelimitation.Tilis relation isnot only the source ofthe negative character mentioned above but also ofsomecontroversies on whatshould be conceived as specifically human, verbal language (as a cognitive capacity). and oral, natural languages (as manifestations ofthat capacity}. For instance, on the one hand. until recently a topic as important as sign language was often associated 'Aith NVC, although no one todaydoubts the linguisticness ofsign languages and their relevance for general linguistics.3 On the other hand, the expansion of the scope of the term means that an)' informative or behavioral phenomenon - some verr far from word

('verbal') production will have been studied sometime or somewhere as C. In this conception, a simple equation states that NVC is tl1e result obtained by subtract­ ing language from communication, but theepistemologic paradigm resultingfrom the operation does notseem veryfruitful - in fact.quite the reverse.

1.2Some basic concepts & distinctions (narrow definitions)

Thescopeofdefinitions ofNVCvariesmain))'according to the parameter ofintention· ality, deliberateness, or consciousness (on the side of the sender and, partially, also of the receiver) and secondarily according to the (usually implicit) conception ofverbal

language. The most usual border is drawn between definitions based on the concepts

of informntion and non-verbal behavior versus definitions based on the concepts of communicatio1t as interaction (see Wieneret al. 1972). While in broad definitionsNYC includes any kind ofnon·verbal messages (or non-verbal signs} proper to informative processes, more narrow definitions restrict it to non-language (or better ltOif·linguistic} phenomenathatare interrelated often inan intricateway-with verbal languageand can be found in interactive or communicative processe.s. Sometimesthese phenomena have been termed parali,guistic, i.e., according to their etymology as something beside

2. None of thc.c-s-.- characteristics wiU be revised here (but Knapp 1984). Other entries of the Handbook of Pragmatics arc devoted to them, cf.'C'..ommunication' in this volume, cf. also Human Communicntion R enrcll nnd Communicationiifonographs.

J. Topics dircctl)· related tosign language arc not considered in thtsreview.

Non-verbal communication 165

linguistics, inespective of their origins or channel (vocal or gestural). However, this term is used mainly forvocal communication (see§1.4). although a priori there are no clear reasons for holding that vocal communication is closer or more similar toverbal comrnunication than gestural comrnunication is.

VC is presented in narrow definitions as communication achieved br non linguistic mechanisms which participate in human interaction in connection with verballanguage.In thisview VCcouldbedefinedasasetiesofintentional processes ora procedural ensemble based on multimodal mterchangesofsignswhich provoke the reciprocal modification of the behavior of interlocutors in a social context. This behavioral modification is attained through the intersubjectivity ofsharing common codes(knowledgeofrules, experiences,andemotions) and through the mutual recog· nition ofintentions on the part ofcommunicators.

However the frontier between language and non-language is situated in dif· ferent zones by different specialists, and misconceptions about the exact meaning of terms like (non·) verbal or (non·} vocal language are very old. Some attempts to clarify them were made more than thirty years ago (Lyons 1972; Leach 1972}, where it was asserted thata precise distinction between language and non-language is impracticable in the long run, because there is no way ofestablishing sharp sepa rations between linguistic and non-linguistic components in human interaction. In

fact verbal language is performed through a vocal (auditory) channel, simultane·

ously with other vocal and gestural signals, or through a non-vocal (usually writ· ten) channel,simultaneously in thiscasewith non-verbal markers (like punctuation, distribution ofspace,documentstyles, etc.}. Intonation is an unquestionable linguis­ tic feature. but a non-verbal one (at least if verbal is understood in its usual sense, i.e., 'made ofwords', and not as a simple synonym oflinguistic). Therefore the need to consider linguistiwess degrees (Lyons 1972.) is immediately apparent) and differ· ent scales could be established between (regular, unmarked} words, onomatopoeic words, ideophonic mechanisms} interjections. and several kinds of gestures like emblematic (autonomous) gestures, deictic gestures or other coverbal gestures (the case is similar to that oficonicity; see Muller 1998}.

Moreover, the synchronization between mechanisms oflanguage production and other non-linguistic (vocal and gestural) mechanisms has been stressed in 1he litera· ture for more than thil1y years as well (Kendon 1972; Condon 1976; cf. Heath 1986 and more recentlyStreeck 1993; Gualtella 1995; Poggi & Magno Caldognetto 1997; de Ruiter & vVilkins 1998; Goodwin et al. 2002). The contradiction between the evidence ofdata and the traditional maintenance ofa categorical distinction applied to verbality became more and more obvious, until MeNeill (1985) - in his provocatively titled 'So you think that gesturesare non verbal?' - 'Narned ofthe misconceptions surrounding the verbal dimension and the term itself. The reasons adduced for the studies men· tioned and others that followed them placeNVC (thedomain} injeopardyand convert