прагматика и медиа дискурс / 语用学关键概念 Key Notions for Pragmatics (2009)
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is defined as a set of propositional elements factually constrained and relevant to the goals of the ongoing interaction. The content of the context. therefore, is mind· transcendent,objective, and independentofwhat speakers have in mind during their communicative exchanges. ft is this objective notion ofcontext that Gauker uses to explain presuppositional phenomena, such as their informative function. Presuppo· sitions reflect participants' takes on the objective conte>..'1 Speakers may or may not be aware ofthe content ofthe context. i.e., about which facts are relevant to the goals of the communication. And they may not be aware of facts their interlocutors take as relevant for the conversation. If the speaker utters a sentence that carries a cer· tain presupposition r, whether or not the listener is aware that the objective context assumed by the speaker contains r, she comes to believe r for the simple reason that presuppositions are conceived as part of the objective context, and not of speaker's menta] state. As pointed outby Sbisil (1999), Gauker's contribution involvesa norma· tive insight into presuppositionaJ phenomena. According to Sbisa, presuppositions should be considered
not as shared assumptions, but as assumphons whsch ought to be shared. (...) if the hearer takes the obj tivc context not to contain the presupposed propositional clement, he or she will be bound to consider the speaker not only as being wrong about the facts {as occurs when somcbodr says s<lmcthmg fattuall}' false), but also as VIOlating some norm of discourse. Violating norms of dsscourse may in turn be deemed a kind of uncooperath·c behaviOur: it is in fact a kmd of behaviour which makes it ditllcult to continueconversational cooperation. (Sbisa 1999: SOI}
6.Hybrid presuppositions
A new framework for the study of presuppositional phenomena was introduced with the appearance of dynamic semantic theories. In this framework, the mean ing ofan expression is defined in terms ofcontext change. Two different dynamic approaches to presupposition have been developed during the last decade. The first derives from the pragmatic tradition initiated by Stalnaker, Karttunen, and gave rise to Heim's theory. I will refer to this as the 'cognitive' approach. 11)e second was developed by van der Sandt (1992} and Geurts (1999) within the frarnework of Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) (Kamp & Reyle 1993}. I will refer to this as the 'anaphoric' approach.
In the cognitive approach, presuppositions of a sentence are a requirement that the context must satisfy for the sentence to be admitted into that context. Since the context is defined in relation tospeakers' cognitivestates) the notion ofpresupposition has a dear cognitive connotation. In the anaphoric model, presuppositions are ana· phora (instances ofan expression referring to another). In discourse, presuppositions
PresuppoSition 203
play the same role as anaphoric expressions such as pronouns. i.e.• they are bound to a linguistic antecedent previously mentioned in the discourse. Since DRT defines con text as a semantic representation built for the preceding discourse, presuppositions are more directly associated with linguistic structure. Despite their different theoretical implications, the two models are essentially equivalent (see for example Zeevat 1992). Nevenheless. as pointed out by Geurts (1999), they give rise to two different presup position theories in relation to the projection problem.
For the projection problem, it is widely acknowledged that the anaphoric model is more empirically adequate (see, for example, Krahmer 1998). It correctly predicts presupposition behaviour in a wider range of sentence,c; than competing theories. In fact, the success of Van der Sandts solution to the projection problem rests on the assumption that pre,c;uppositions arejust anaphora. They must be bound to a linguistic antecedent to be interpreted, just as anaphoric pronouns need an antecedent to be understood. For instance, in example (3) (If]tlck lws children, allofjack's childrett are bald), the presupposition that Jack has children has an antecedent in the antecedent· clause of the conditional. Its semantic content is thus absorbed by (or bound to) the antecedent and we end up 'htith the following interpretation:
(8)(fJack has children, they arc bald.
When the presupposition is resolved by such antecedent binding. it does not give rise to a presuppositiona} reading of the sentence.3
Van der Sandt claims that the only difference between presuppositions and other anaphoric expressions is that the former have a richer semantic content. Presuppositions can be accommodated into the global context when thecontextdoes not supplya suitable antecedent. The accommodation processgives rise to presuppositional reading ofthesen· tences in which presuppositions are triggered. For example, in sentence (4) (lfbnlduess is ltereditary, tl1en all ofJack's children arebald). the presupposition thatJack has children has no suitable antecedent to be bound to. Nevertheless, the sentence can be interpreted by accommodating the presuppositional semantic content into the context, thereby creating its proper antecedent. The interpretation obtained is the following one:
(9)Jack haschildren and ifbaldness is hereditarr. they are bald.
3· Van der Sandt (1992) pointed out that the anaphoric properties of definite descriptions (in addition totheprcsuppositional ones) had already been notedb)' several authors,suchas McCawie)'
(I979),Lewis (1979) and Heim (J983). lt was taken for granted,however, that these properties had to be handledb)•separatc mechanisms.Van dcrSandt's claim ts that all paradigmatic cases ofpre suppositions arcanaphoric.Factivc and aspcctual verbs,cleft constructions, temporal clauses,and iterative adverbs displar the sante anaphoric behaviour as definite descriptions. According to van der Sandt,"the claim that definites arc anaphoric is thus seen as a special case of the more general phenomenon that all presuppositions arc anaphoric expressions.. (1992: 342).
tation to their presuppositional sentences is pragmaticallyconstrained.
Presupposition 205
(Bos et al. 1995), world knowledge, and rhetorical relations (such as Explanation, Background, Narration. etc.) that connect the subparts of a discourse in a coherent reprelientation (Asher & Lascarides 1998a; Asher & Lascarides 1998b).
The advocates of the cognitive approach, on the other hand, have to face the problem of producing correct interpretations for sentences such as (4). The cognitive approach predicts that the sentence presupposes that ifbaldness is hereditary, Jack has children. This is, evidently, a counterintuitive result. Beaver ( 1999) developed a per· sonal account ofhow to obtain the correct interpretation while maintaining the origi nal Heimean framework. Beaver's proposal is to consider the listener's point ofview. 1l1e listener does not know the context, or common ground, assumed by the speaker. But to understand the ongoing discourset the listener must reconstruct the speaker's assumptions. Beaver pointed out that this reconstruction process involves taking into consideration not only what has been said so far, *'but also what assumption the author is likely to have made as to the initial common ground:' (Beaver 1999: 14) Common sense knowledge ofthe world will be used to determine plausibility orderittgover the set of contexts the listener has identified as possible initial common ground candi dates. As the discourse proceeds, the listener will rule out contexts that do not satisfy the presuppositions of the sentences uttered. Beaver identifies this selection process as accommodation. Sometimes it seems more plausible that the speaker assumes a context containing a conditionalized presupposition (as in (10) above), at other times a stronger presupposition (as in (4)). What is peculiar in Beaver's proposal is that what is actually accommodated might not coincide \\'ith the propositions triggered b)' the presuppositional expressions uttered, as in van der Sandt model. It depends on extra-linguistic factors such as world knowledge. common sense reasoning. and plausibility considerations.
The current debate originated by the anaphoric approach to presuppositions seems to lead to the conclusion that an empirically adequate theory ofpresupposition should take extra-linguistic infom1ation into consideration. To accomplish this, future research on presuppositions should take advantage of interdisciplinary approaches in which linguists, philosophers and cognitive scientists cooperate to provide integrated models ofdiscourse understanding.
References
Asher, N. & A. Lascarides (1998a). Uridgmg.}oumnlof S&:mmuics 15. 83-113.
--(1998b). lhc Semantics and Pragmatics ofPresupposition.foumnlofSenrantics 15: 239-299. Beaver. D. ( 1997). Presupposition. In J. van Benthem & A. tcr Mculen (£ds), IJandbook of log1caud
language: 939-1008. E-lsevier.
--{1999). Prc.supposition: A Plea for Common Sense. ln L. Moss. J. Ginzburg & ·1. de Rijkc (£ds), Logic, Language and C,omputmiou 2: 21-44.CSll.
