es4
.pdfEffects and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions
Author(s): Michael P. Malloy, Barry E. Carter, Adrien K. Wing and Covey T. Oliver
Source: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 84 (MARCH 28-31, 1990), pp. 203-213
Published by: American Society of International Law
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25658538
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203
ations with regard to limited sovereignty because of special circumstances. Panama was such a case.
Katherine Rahman*
Reporter
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Effects |
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and |
Effectiveness |
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of Economic |
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Sanctions |
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The |
panel |
was |
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convened |
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by |
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itsModerator, |
Michael |
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P. Malloy,** |
at 8:30 |
a.m., |
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March |
30, |
1990. |
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Remarks |
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by Michael |
P. Malloy |
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A |
thoroughgoing historical |
presentation |
ofU.S. |
sanctions would |
lead us back |
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to the |
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earliest days of theRepublic. |
While |
these first instances may |
seem modest, |
particu |
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larly against |
the standard of contemporary U.S. |
practice, |
they are nevertheless |
clearly |
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in evidence. |
This |
factwas highlighted inpassing by theHouse |
Committee |
on Foreign |
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Affairs |
in 1945, during consideration of implementing legislation for the newly |
ratified |
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UN |
Charter. |
The |
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Committee |
referred to: |
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the embargo |
legislation approved |
June 4, |
1794, giving |
thePresident power |
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to lay |
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embargoes on |
all ships and vessels inAmerican |
ports whenever |
inhis |
opinion |
the |
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public |
safety should |
require (1 Stat. 372). |
Legislative |
enactments |
in 1798 |
(1 Stat. |
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565-566), |
1799 (1 Stat. 613, |
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615), |
1800 (2 Stat. 7, 9), |
1808 |
(2 Stat. 490) |
and |
1809 |
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(2 Stat. 506) |
suspended |
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commercial |
relations with |
various |
countries |
but |
left the |
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discontinuance |
of the restraints to the discretion of the President. |
. . . Congress |
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has likewise, |
in 1886, authorized |
thePresident |
to exclude |
foreign vessels |
for retal |
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iation |
against |
discrimination |
to American |
commerce |
(24 |
Stat. 79). There are |
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many |
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subsequent examples |
of such delegation |
of power |
to the President.1 |
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Despite |
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the venerable |
pedigree |
of economic |
sanctions |
inU.S. |
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practice, |
itmust |
be |
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admitted |
that the |
invocation |
of |
sanctions was |
a markedly |
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less frequent occurrence |
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before |
the advent |
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of the twentieth century. |
In part, |
thismay |
reflect the relatively |
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limited economic |
leverage that theUnited |
States could |
apply before |
itsascendancy |
in |
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this |
century. |
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Two |
other features seem |
to distinguish |
contemporary |
practice |
from the past. Huf |
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bauer and |
Schott |
remarked |
thatmost |
episodes |
of the application |
of economic |
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sanc |
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tions prior toWorld |
War |
I "foreshadowed |
or accompanied |
warfare. Only |
afterWorld |
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War |
I was |
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extensive attention given to the notion |
that economic |
sanctions might |
sub |
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stitute for armed |
hostilities."2 |
In addition, |
in the present |
century |
there has |
been a |
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marked |
increase |
in the rate at which |
sanctions programs |
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have |
been |
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initiated, a |
fact |
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that ishardly |
surprising |
in lightof the increasing substitution of economic |
hostility for |
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armed |
hostility. Some of the characteristics |
of this historical |
progression |
in our own |
centurymay be discerned inFigure 3.1 (pp. 188-90) ofmy book Economic Sanctions and U.S. Trade (1990).
One characteristic of this historical summary is particularly graphic, that is, the proliferation of sanctions programs as one proceeds through the century. Economic
Department |
of Government, |
College |
ofWilliam |
and Mary. |
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Professor of Law, |
Fordham |
University |
School |
of Law. |
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!H.R. Rep. |
No. |
1383, 79th Cong., |
1st Sess. (1945), |
reprinted in |
1945 U.S. Code Cong. |
Serv. 927, |
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932-33. |
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2G. Hufbauer |
& |
J. Schott, |
Economic |
Sanctions |
Reconsidered |
4 (1985). |
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204
dominance |
by theUnited |
States |
in the period |
immediately |
following World |
War |
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II |
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may |
be understandable, |
but |
the trend towards |
increasing use |
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of sanctions |
becomes, |
if |
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anything, evenmore marked |
in theperiod |
of relatively lessU.S. |
dominance |
thatbegan |
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in the late |
1960s. Notice |
also, |
however, |
that economic |
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sanctions |
inU.S. |
practice have |
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not become |
detached |
from their original |
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connection |
with |
actual |
or potential |
armed |
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conflict. The |
increase |
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in sanctions |
programs |
owes |
a |
great deal |
to this connection? |
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sabre-rattling has been |
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replaced |
by the jingling of coins. Today, |
theUnited |
States has |
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many |
economic |
sanctions |
programs |
in place: |
the vestiges of theWorld War |
II assets |
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blockings, |
and |
complete |
embargoes |
on North |
Korea, |
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Cuba, |
Vietnam, |
Cambodia, |
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South Africa |
and Libya. |
The |
United |
States |
also |
has |
related |
trade controls on what |
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used |
to be |
called |
the Soviet bloc, |
but |
the controls |
and |
the bloc |
are both |
in the process |
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of dissolution. |
Sanctions |
were |
just |
recently |
lifted from Nicaragua, |
Panama |
and |
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Namibia. |
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In |
light of the dramatic |
changes |
in the sanctions field recently, this panel |
will |
be |
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examining |
two |
interrelated questions. |
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First, why |
use |
sanctions? |
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Second, when |
are |
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sanctions |
effective (and |
how would |
you know when |
they are)? |
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can |
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Confusion |
over |
the policy objectives |
behind |
economic |
sanctions |
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programs |
sig |
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nificantly hinder |
a |
rational |
critique of the effectiveness of such programs. |
It is there |
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fore important to identifyand distinguish |
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the choices |
available, |
considering the policy |
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objectives, |
from the totalmenu |
of sanctions. |
I can |
think of no one better qualified |
to |
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address |
this |
issue |
than our |
first speaker, |
Barry |
E. |
Carter, |
professor of |
law |
at Ge |
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orgetown |
and chair of itsCommittee |
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on |
International |
Law |
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Programs. |
Barry |
has |
a |
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long and distinguished |
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career, |
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in and |
out of government. He |
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is a prolific author, |
and |
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one of his recent accomplishments |
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is his celebrated |
book |
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International |
Economic |
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Sanctions, |
published |
by Cambridge |
University |
in 1988. |
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Remarks |
by Barry |
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E. Carter* |
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Two |
themes are |
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the subject |
ofmy |
remarks: |
the policy |
justifications |
for sanctions |
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and |
the laws for seeking |
such policies. |
I particularly want |
to focus on |
the laws, but |
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firsta few remarks about |
the policy justifications. |
Sanctions |
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have |
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been |
used |
increas |
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ingly in recent years fora variety of reasons. Until |
about |
1960, sanctions were |
primar |
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ily used |
for national |
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security-based |
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reasons: |
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for |
example, |
blockades, |
efforts |
to |
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overthrow |
a |
government |
and |
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coercion |
intended |
to pressure |
a |
country |
to withdraw |
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from another country. |
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Sanctions |
also were used |
to limit strategic and military |
poten |
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tial, such |
as |
restrictions on |
exports of high |
technology |
products |
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to the Soviet bloc. |
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Sanctions |
were occasionally |
used to help |
settle expropriation |
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claims. |
Especially |
since |
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1972, a |
variety of other justifications have |
emerged, |
such as human |
rights, antiterror |
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ism and nuclear |
nonproliferation |
concerns. |
Sanctions |
have also been specifically trade |
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based; |
for example, |
those directed |
against |
the trading practices |
of Japan. |
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Since |
there is a |
limit on what |
we |
can |
cover |
today,my |
discussion |
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will |
focus on |
the |
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use of sanctions |
for national |
security and |
foreign policy |
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reasons |
that do |
not |
include |
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purely |
trade-related matters. |
There |
are |
a |
variety ofU.S. |
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laws on |
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the subject. |
Some |
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U.S. |
laws are specific, e.g., |
theExport |
Administration |
Act |
provides |
specific authority |
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for national |
security-based |
export controls and |
there are |
specific |
import laws on |
ter |
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rorism. Generally, |
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though, the laws can |
be used |
for any |
"willy-nilly" purpose. |
The |
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policy justifications can change because |
the laws permit a variety of justifications. |
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It is important tonote |
that under |
international |
law there is very little tobe found on |
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the subject. |
There |
are bilateral |
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trade treaties as well |
as multilateral |
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agreements, |
such |
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Professor of Law, |
Georgetown |
University |
Law |
Center. |
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205
as |
theGeneral |
Agreement |
on Tariffs |
and Trade |
(GATT). |
In theNicaragua |
case, |
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however, |
the International Court |
of Justice indicated that customary |
international |
law |
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did |
not prohibit U.S. |
embargoes |
against Nicaragua. |
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Frankly, |
what |
is more |
interesting |
is U.S. |
domestic |
law. Two |
important |
points |
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should |
be made. |
One, |
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there |
is a wealth |
of U.S. |
law, but |
it is haphazard. |
The |
laws |
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skew the President's discretion |
toward |
those sanctions |
that are not necessarily |
in the |
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national |
interest. For |
example, |
as |
a general |
rule, the laws push |
the President |
to im |
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pose export controls. Two, |
the laws also |
skew thePresident's |
discretion |
towards dubi |
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ous declarations |
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of national |
emergency. |
I believe |
that there are better ways |
to operate |
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sanctions. At |
the conclusion |
ofmy |
presentation |
I will |
offer some |
recommendations. |
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Chart |
I ofmy |
handout |
materials1 |
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illustrates |
the degree of presidential |
discretion |
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under U.S. |
sanctions |
law, absent |
a |
national |
emergency. |
As |
you |
can |
see from |
the |
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handouts, |
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I also |
divide |
presidential |
sanctions |
authority |
into emergency |
and nonemer |
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gency |
situations. |
Chart |
I divides |
sanctions |
into five categories: |
(1) bilateral govern |
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ment |
programs; |
(2) |
exports; |
(3) |
imports; |
(4) |
private |
financial |
transactions; |
and |
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(5) |
international financial |
institutions. |
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As |
is clear from the chart, thePresident has nearly unlimited |
discretion |
concerning |
bilateral government programs and export controls. Judicial review ishighly limited.
For |
example, |
theU.S. |
Government |
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can require an exporter to obtain a |
license to ship |
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paper |
clips |
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to Brazil. |
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The |
limits that do |
exist on |
the President's |
authority |
to impose |
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export |
controls primarily |
involve agricultural boycotts |
and contract |
sanctity |
issues. |
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In contrast, U.S. |
laws extensively |
limit the President's |
discretion |
to impose |
import |
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controls. |
This |
reverse situation |
is due |
principally |
to the fact that restrictions on |
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im |
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ports |
into theUnited |
States |
are based |
on |
economic |
grounds, |
not reasons |
of national |
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security or |
foreign policy. |
For |
instance, existing |
import prohibitions |
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involve critical |
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defense materials, |
sugar, beef and |
Soviet |
bloc |
exports |
under |
the Jackson-Vanik |
ban. |
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One |
vivid |
example |
involves |
the prohibition |
on seven |
types of Soviet |
furs, excluding |
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sable. |
In the trade community, |
the ban |
is referred to as |
the "Seven |
Deadly |
Skins." |
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Another |
example |
illustrating the economic |
focus of import controls |
involves President |
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Carter's |
effortsduring |
theAfghanistan |
crisis to cut off the import of Soviet |
ammonia |
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by |
invoking section 406 of the 1974 Trade |
Act. |
Section |
406 authorizes |
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restrictions on |
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imports from Communist |
countries |
if injury to U.S. |
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industry resulting from an |
in |
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crease |
in the imports is shown. |
President |
Carter was |
able |
to impose an extensive |
cut |
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offofU.S. |
exports to the Soviet Union, |
but was |
unsuccessful |
inbanning |
the import of |
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Soviet |
ammonia |
by Armand |
Hammer. |
The |
International Trade |
Commission, |
which |
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administers |
section 406, found |
insufficienteconomic |
evidence to warrant |
a ban. |
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As with |
import controls, |
the President's |
discretion |
is also |
limited |
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in the areas |
of |
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private financial |
transactions |
and |
international |
lending institutions. There |
are |
exten |
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sive restrictions regarding South Africa, but |
they are unique. |
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In national |
emergency |
situations, |
the President |
is given greater |
freedom |
to cut off |
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imports and |
financial |
transactions. |
A |
presidential |
declaration |
of national |
emergency |
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is fairly easy |
tomake |
under currentU.S. |
laws. The |
criteria are open-ended. |
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The |
1985 |
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Nicaraguan |
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embargo |
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is a good example?as |
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evidenced |
by theDoonesbury |
cartoon |
in |
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my |
handout |
material.2 |
The |
embargo was |
imposed |
by |
the President |
with |
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little con |
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gressional |
review. |
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lSee |
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.Carter, |
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International |
Economic |
Sanctions: |
Improving |
the |
Haphazard |
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Legal |
Re |
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gime |
26-27, |
33, |
200, |
239, |
244 |
(1988). |
Chart |
I |
is at page |
33. |
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2Id. |
at |
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206
As |
I noted earlier inmy discussion, |
I think that there are better ways |
to apply |
and |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
operate |
sanctions. My |
recommendations |
|
are presented |
in outline |
form on page |
7 of |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
my |
handouts.3 |
Generally, |
I recommend |
|
that thePresident's |
export control powers be |
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reduced |
somewhat |
and |
his |
|
import powers |
increased. |
|
In |
addition, |
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the President's |
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emergency |
powers |
authority |
should |
be more |
clearly defined. |
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Professor Malloy: |
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Before continuing, |
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I would |
just |
like to add |
that besides |
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little |
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congressional |
oversight |
in declared |
|
emergency |
situations |
like |
the Nicaraguan |
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em |
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bargo, |
there |
is little judicial |
oversight. As |
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an example, |
the court |
inBeacon |
Product |
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Corp. |
v.Reagan, District ofMassachusetts, |
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1stCircuit, |
held that the President's |
dis |
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cretionary |
authority was |
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not |
subject |
to review. |
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I would |
now |
like to turnour attention |
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to the second question |
before |
this panel, |
that |
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of assessing |
the effectiveness of sanctions. |
|
Arguing |
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that a |
particular |
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sanctions pro |
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gram |
is?or |
is not?"effective" |
is often a politically |
charged statement. What |
itmay |
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express |
is fundamental |
opposition |
to the overarching |
foreign policy with |
respect to the |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
target,more |
than any specific objection |
to sanctions. |
|
In addition, public |
debate |
about |
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the "effectiveness" |
of a particular |
sanctions |
program |
quickly escalates |
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into the argu |
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ment |
that sanctions?any |
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sanctions?are |
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never, or almost |
never, effective. This |
sort |
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of criticism, |
though often overly generalized, may |
relate to genuine, |
analytically |
based |
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criteria of effectiveness. The |
problem |
remains, however, |
that criticism |
|
is often highly |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
episodic, |
ifnot |
idiosyncratic, and |
seems |
to treat sanctions |
as |
iftheyoccur inan instant |
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and |
could |
be assessed |
absolutely |
in that context. Yet |
|
sanctions |
are applied |
over time, |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
and |
their immediate objectives may |
shift in emphasis |
|
over time. In addition, |
tracking |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
the effectof sanctions |
in any direct |
causal |
|
sense |
is not an |
easy matter. |
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For |
example, |
Vietnam |
|
has |
been |
the target of U.S. |
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|
sanctions |
since |
1964, with |
the |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||
former South Vietnam |
added |
to the sanctions |
in 1975. Clearly, |
these sanctions began |
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as an |
instrument incidental |
to the involvement of U.S. |
armed |
forces |
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in theVietnam |
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conflict, but |
they are now |
counterpoised |
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against |
continuing |
foreign policy |
differences |
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between |
the United |
States |
and Vietnam. |
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|
Sanctions |
|
have |
not |
in and |
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of |
themselves |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
resolved |
thewide |
range of foreign policy |
differences that exist between |
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the two states. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Yet we do know thatVietnam |
has |
experienced |
severe economic difficulties that cannot |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
have been |
eased by continuing U.S. |
sanctions, |
and |
this situation has persisted. Yet |
we |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
are |
sometimes |
told by visitors to the area |
thatU.S. |
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policy |
has |
led to isolation |
of the |
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United |
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States, |
not Vietnam. |
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The |
fact remains |
that |
themovement |
of events |
is not |
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embargoed |
by |
sanctions, |
and |
critics as well |
as policy makers must |
be |
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sensitive |
to the |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
fact that sanctions may |
become more?or |
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less?effective |
over time. |
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To |
say that, given |
the current circumstances |
of any |
international crisis, the applica |
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tion of |
sanctions will |
not immediately work |
a cure does not necessarily |
counsel |
re |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
fraining from sanctions. |
|
The |
Iran hostage |
crisis |
is a |
case |
in point. |
Ultimately, |
the |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
unilateral actions undertaken by thePresident |
did not, of themselves, |
resolve |
the crisis |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
between |
the United |
States |
and |
Iran. Given |
the religious |
and |
revolutionary |
fervor |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
prevalent |
in Iran, |
then and |
now, |
perhaps |
no unilateral |
action, |
no matter |
how |
harsh, |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
could |
have |
effecteda resolution of the crisis. Yet |
embargo and blocking |
restrictions of |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
the |
type applied |
to |
that situation have |
|
traditionally |
been |
viewed |
by U.S. |
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courts as |
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necessary |
for resolving |
international |
crises. |
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caution |
inmaking |
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This |
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long view |
of |
the application |
of |
sanctions |
would |
suggest |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
quick |
assessments |
of |
sanctions programs, |
yet |
instant analysis |
continues |
|
to be |
the |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
norm. |
For |
example, |
in less than fourmonths |
from their imposition, |
|
theNicaraguan |
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sanctions were |
declared |
to be a failure. By mid-1987, |
|
the long-term effectof the sane |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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*Id. |
at 244. |
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207
tions was |
said |
to be |
a |
gain |
in trade for Japan, to the detriment of theUnited |
States. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Yet |
by |
the end of |
1988, information fromNicaragua |
|
appeared |
to |
indicate |
that the |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
country was |
|
in a |
state of perhaps |
irrevocable |
economic |
decay, which |
apparently per |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
sisted. Since |
|
then, economic malaise |
has |
fueled an electoral |
upset |
for the ruling party |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
inNicaragua. |
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Where |
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a political |
consensus, |
pro or con, develops |
with |
respect |
to a particular |
sanc |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
tions |
target, public |
perception |
of |
the effectiveness of sanctions may |
|
coalesce. |
Other |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
wise, |
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itmay |
|
seem that critics are speaking about differentprograms |
altogether. |
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|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Criticism |
of the effectiveness of sanctions |
often illustrates two potential |
problems |
in |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
assessing |
them. First, |
|
identifyinga |
single, dramatic |
objective |
of a |
sanctions program |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
may |
|
be |
disingenuous. |
|
For |
example: |
"Sanctions |
have |
not ended |
apartheid; |
hence, |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
sanctions |
are |
ineffective." The |
simple |
truth is that sanctions cannot |
end |
apartheid; |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
South Africa must |
|
end apartheid. |
Sanctions, |
as an |
instrument ofU.S. |
foreign policy, |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
generally |
can |
change |
only overall |
circumstances |
and may |
affect the pace |
of events. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Second, |
and |
related |
to the firstproblem, much |
criticism views sanctions |
in isolation |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
and |
attempts |
to test for a direct, causal |
relationship |
between |
the imposition of sanc |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
tions and |
the achievement |
of a broadly |
conceived, |
dramatic |
objective. |
Putting |
aside |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
the epistemological |
difficulties of establishing |
causal |
relationships |
in any complex |
of |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
events, the fact remains |
that such criticism |
implicitly assumes |
that the causal |
relation |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ship here |
is a binary one, and |
that it should be ascertainable |
|
in the short term. These |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
assumptions |
|
are questionable. |
As |
the chair of theHouse |
Foreign |
Relations |
Subcom |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
mittee |
on Africa |
|
was |
|
reported |
to |
have |
said: |
"Sanctions |
aren't |
a quick |
fix |
for |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
apartheid. |
There |
is a |
long, protracted struggle inprocess, |
and |
[sanctions] |
are part of a |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pattern of developments |
thatwill |
shorten this time frame and accelerate |
the onset |
of |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
negotiations."1 |
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This |
is not |
to say that circumstances |
may not affect the appropriateness |
of specific |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
sanctions |
in particular |
|
situations. |
In |
the case of the Libyan |
sanctions, |
for example, |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
U.S.-Libyan |
|
trade was |
|
reported |
to have |
been |
generally |
|
low before |
|
the imposition of |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
trade prohibitions. |
On |
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the other hand, |
unknown |
or uncontemplated |
circumstances |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
may |
have |
surprising effectson |
the "pattern of developments" |
intowhich |
sanctions |
are |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
inserted. |
In the case |
of theLibyan |
sanctions, |
on |
the positive |
side, |
itappears |
that the |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Libyan Government |
|
assets |
blocked |
by the sanctions may |
have |
far exceeded U.S. |
Gov |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ernment |
expectations. |
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On |
the |
negative |
|
side, |
sanctions |
|
against |
Libya |
|
carried |
repercus |
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|||||||||||||||||||||
sions |
forU.S. |
|
relations with other |
Islamic |
states. |
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It |
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is against |
this troubling factual background |
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we |
must |
seek reliable criteria for |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
that |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
assessing |
the effectiveness of economic |
sanctions. |
Presumably, |
thesewould |
be criteria |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
that are |
sensitive to the purposes |
of sanctions, |
as Professor Carter |
has |
suggested |
inhis |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
book. |
There |
|
is, however, |
considerable |
uncertainty |
over |
the purposes |
against which |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
the sanctions |
are |
to be measured. |
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Typically, |
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the result of such assessments |
seems to be |
somewhat |
of a |
rigged game. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Seeking |
a direct causal |
|
relationship between, for example, |
a |
trade embargo |
and |
a fun |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
damental |
and |
immediate change |
in a |
significant policy of a |
target state places |
an often |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
unrealistic |
expectation |
upon the use of a sanction. Not |
surprisingly, under |
such crite |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ria it has |
been |
said |
that generally |
"sanctions |
do |
not |
contribute |
very much |
|
to |
the |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
achievement |
of foreign policy |
goals";2 |
that is to say, |
that sanctions |
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are not generally |
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effective. |
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^reenberger, |
at |
U.S. |
Trade |
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Sanctions |
on South |
Africa Starting |
toPay |
Long-Term |
|
Dividends, |
Wall |
St. J., |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
Sept. |
21, |
1987, |
24, |
col. |
1 (quoting |
Rep. |
Howard |
W?lpe). |
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2Hufbauer |
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& |
Schott, |
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supra p. |
203, |
note |
2, at |
79. |
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208
From |
studies |
like that of Hufbauer |
and |
Schott one may |
derive |
certain |
useful, |
if |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
anecdotal, |
"political" |
criteria or rubrics for assessing |
sanctions. Nevertheless, |
|
|
certain |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
features |
of |
these |
studies |
|
tend |
to raise |
questions |
about |
|
the efficacy of their recom |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
mended |
|
approaches |
to the task of assessment. |
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First, |
there is a problem with |
|
the identification of the purposes of a particular |
sanc |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
tions program. |
|
Effectiveness |
or |
"success" |
of a |
sanctions |
program |
has |
tended |
to be |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
measured |
|
against |
broad |
|
pronouncements |
of policy objectives, |
rather than the instru |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
mental |
objectives |
of sanctions |
|
themselves. |
Yet |
sanctions, |
if successful, |
only |
directly |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
effect instrumental objectives: |
preventing |
themovement |
|
or |
transfer of assets |
already |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
subject |
to the sanctioning |
state's jurisdiction; |
|
limiting the flow of foreign exchange |
to |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
the |
target state; isolating |
the |
target country |
from |
international trade |
and |
financial |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
markets; |
and maintaining |
|
sanctions |
(and |
embargoed |
assets) |
as a counter or "bargain |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ing chip" |
for any |
future resolution |
of the differences between |
sanctioning |
and |
target |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
states. |
In a properly formulated foreign policy, |
these instrumental objectives |
fitwithin |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
a broader |
scheme |
of objectives |
|
but are |
not |
|
coincident |
with |
the |
latter. What |
most |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
studies |
of |
sanctions |
effectiveness tend |
to do |
ismeasure |
|
the success |
|
of that broader |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
scheme |
of objectives |
only, as |
if sanctions were |
coincident. |
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as |
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||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Second, most |
|
studies |
treat the identifiedobjectives |
of a |
sanctions |
program |
ifthey |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
were |
static; |
in other words, |
the objective, |
once |
announced, |
|
is not |
contemplated |
as |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
changing over timewith change of circumstances. |
Yet |
|
instrumental purposes |
|
of sanc |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
tions are oftenmultiple, |
with |
relative emphasis |
shifting (and |
contemplated |
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to be |
shift |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ing) over |
time. |
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at face |
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Third, many |
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studies |
take public |
pronouncements |
of broad |
policy |
objectives |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
value. |
This |
problem may |
|
be |
unavoidable |
|
ifone |
seeks |
to develop |
a |
consistent |
and |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
regular |
system of assessment |
to apply |
to sanctions |
programs. |
Yet |
|
the uncritical |
ac |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ceptance |
of publicly |
announced |
|
policy |
objectives |
can |
skew one's assessment. |
|
For |
ex |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ample, |
the League |
ofNations |
embargo |
against |
Italy was, |
ostensibly, |
|
intended |
to stop |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
the Italian |
war |
against Abyssinia, |
but it |
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be |
argued |
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that "effective" |
sanctions were |
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may |
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of sanc |
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not |
in any real |
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sense a primary policy |
goal |
of British Government |
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sponsors |
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tions. Yet |
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this episode |
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is recorded |
as |
an |
example of |
the ineffectiveness of economic |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
sanctions. |
The |
|
real |
point |
is that |
the sanctions |
as |
applied |
failed |
their |
instrumental |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
purpose; |
theywere neither constructed nor applied |
adequately |
to |
isolate |
Italy. |
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What |
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is still required are a |
relatively greater attention |
to the instrumental purposes |
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of economic |
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sanctions |
and |
a more |
directly |
empirical, |
less abstract |
approach |
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to |
the |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
available |
data. |
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For |
example, |
two relatively straightforward |
instrumental purposes |
of |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
sanctions?to |
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limit theflow of foreign exchange |
and |
to isolate |
the target from interna |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
tional |
trade and financial markets?ought |
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to be |
reflected |
in data |
concerning |
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foreign |
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exchange holdings |
and volume |
of exports and |
imports. Inmy book |
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I have |
focused on |
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such data, |
and |
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inmany |
cases |
|
some apparently |
significantmovement |
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in the year-to |
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year data |
can be |
perceived. |
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On |
this basis, |
the case |
of thePeople's |
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Republic |
of China |
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suggested moderate |
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effec |
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tiveness |
in achieving |
instrumental objectives. |
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It also |
seems undeniable |
that the impact |
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of the Iran blocking was |
swiftand |
significant. In contrast, performance |
of the South |
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ern Rhodesian |
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sanctions |
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appeared, |
at best, |
erratic. |
a |
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set of |
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In the case |
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of South Africa, |
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we |
are |
faced with |
very complex |
sanctions, |
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applied |
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over |
a |
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relatively |
long period of |
time. Some |
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indication of |
these complexities |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
should be evident inFigure |
8.2 |
(pp. 486-88) |
|
ofmy |
book |
|
previously |
referred to. |
|
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The |
South Africa |
sanctions |
are ongoing, but |
the empirical |
data, |
through |
1988, have |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
not been encouraging. |
Foreign |
exchange |
holdings, on |
the readily available |
data, |
have |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
been |
on |
an upward |
trend since |
sanctions were |
first imposed. |
Trends |
|
in both |
export |
This content downloaded from 92.242.58.12 on Mon, 8 Dec 2014 04:38:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
209
and |
import data |
have |
generally |
remained |
relatively positive. |
Performance |
of broader |
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indicators, such as gross domestic |
product, has been more |
erratic, but at the very least |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
does |
not |
suggest a |
significant impact of sanctions on |
the economy. |
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Events |
inSouth Africa may |
be overtaking us, however, and we now |
turn to our next |
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speaker |
for a more |
particularized |
examination |
of the effectsof sanctions |
on develop |
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ments |
in South Africa. |
Adrien |
K. Wing |
has been |
extremely active |
|
in the affairs of the |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Society, |
having |
recently |
served |
three years |
on |
the Executive |
Council, |
|
and |
on |
this |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
year's Nominating |
Committee. |
|
She has |
chaired |
two panels at past annual meetings |
of |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
the Society, |
and she |
currently |
serves on |
the Executive |
Board |
of |
the South African |
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Interest Group. |
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Remarks |
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by Adrien |
K. Wing* |
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The |
rapidly changing |
events |
in South Africa make |
|
any discussion |
of sanctions |
diffi |
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cult. To |
date, Nelson |
Mandela |
|
|
is free, theAfrican |
|
National |
Congress |
is no |
longer |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
banned, Namibia |
|
is independent, and |
de Klerk |
is the new head of the South African |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Government. |
|
Many |
of |
these events were |
inconceivable |
even |
six months |
ago. |
|
It |
is |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
difficult to speculate on |
|
the influence ofU.S. |
sanctions |
against |
South Africa. |
Never |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
theless, as |
international |
lawyers,we |
can |
examine |
the rationales |
for theU.S. |
sanctions. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Three |
rationales |
are discernible: |
|
to influence South African |
policies; |
to punish |
South |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Africa |
financially; |
and |
to demonstrate |
symbolically U.S. |
opposition |
to apartheid. |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
It is important to note |
the background |
fromwhich |
the current sanctions derive. |
In |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1986, Congress |
|
passed |
theComprehensive |
Anti-Apartheid |
Act.1 |
The |
|
1986 sanctions |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
bill |
was |
a |
compromise |
measure |
resulting |
from |
a |
prolonged |
campaign |
by |
|
anti |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
apartheid |
forces. Although |
the bill was |
vetoed |
by |
then President |
|
Reagan, |
Congress |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
overrode |
the veto. Congressman |
Dellums |
|
still has |
a bill pending formore |
comprehen |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
sive |
sanctions |
than those mandated |
by |
the 1986 |
legislation. |
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There |
are |
a |
number |
of questions |
to ask when |
measuring |
the success |
|
of |
theU.S. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
sanctions. Were |
the stated policies |
achieved |
by |
the |
legislation, |
and, |
if so, |
to what |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
extent? Many |
argue |
that the sanctions |
should be |
liftedbecause |
Mandela |
|
|
is now |
free. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
However, |
|
South Africa |
still has a |
longway |
to go toward achieving |
themost |
important |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
goals, |
namely, |
the establishment |
of |
"one man, |
one |
vote" |
and |
|
the elimination |
of |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
apartheid. |
I believe |
it is far too early |
to say |
that the sanctions have |
been |
successful. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
We |
also |
need |
to examine |
the contribution |
of the sanctions to the recent positive |
out |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
comes. |
The |
economic |
indicators |
are hard |
to decipher?foreign |
policy |
objectives |
are |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
only |
beginning |
to be |
achieved. |
The |
|
1986 sanctions were |
not |
the first. The |
United |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Nations |
|
agreed |
to arms-related |
sanctions beginning |
in 1963 and adopted |
a mandatory |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
arms embargo |
in |
1967. |
During |
|
the |
1980s, theUnited |
States |
extended |
|
its sanctions, |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
and |
in 1983 opposed |
funding by |
the International Monetary |
Fund. |
Congressionally |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
mandated |
|
sanctions were |
temporarily preempted |
in 1985 when |
the President, |
by exec |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
utive order,2 imposed sanctions under |
the authority of the International |
Emergency |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Economic |
|
Powers |
Act. |
|
In addition, |
|
there was |
a divestment |
campaign |
taking place |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
outside |
government. |
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Using |
Professor Carter's |
framework, the 1986 sanctions |
affected five areas?govern |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ment |
programs, U.S. |
exports, |
|
imports from South Africa, |
and private |
and |
interna |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
tional |
financial |
transactions. |
The |
1986 |
legislation |
|
in many |
instances |
codified |
the |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
President's |
|
1985 executive |
order. Examples |
of affected government |
programs |
are: |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Professor |
of Law, |
University |
of |
Iowa |
College |
of Law. |
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*26ILM 77 (1987). |
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224 ILM |
1488(1985). |
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This content downloaded from 92.242.58.12 on Mon, 8 Dec 2014 04:38:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
210
prohibition on air landing rights; scholarship |
programs |
to |
assist |
the |
victims |
of |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
apartheid; |
and extension |
of credit |
to nonwhite |
South Africans |
by |
the EXIM |
Bank. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The |
export |
controls mandated |
|
by |
|
the legislation also codified provisions |
of the |
1985 |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
executive |
order; |
for example, |
controls on nuclear-related |
items and |
computer |
equip |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ment. |
The |
|
import ban |
applied |
|
to a number of |
items?Krugerrands, |
|
arms, military |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
equipment, |
|
uranium, |
textiles, sugar and |
imports from companies |
owned |
or controlled |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
by |
the South African |
Government. |
It is interesting to note |
that the uranium |
import |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
prohibition |
|
has been |
ignored. Also |
notable |
for their absence |
from the import ban |
are |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
strategic materials |
and |
diamonds. |
|
As |
for financial |
transactions, |
the |
1986 |
|
legislation |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
codified |
existing |
regulations |
on no |
new |
loans |
to South African |
Government |
|
entities. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
In addition, |
the law prohibited |
new |
investments in companies |
in South Africa, |
except |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
(and |
these are big exceptions) |
the extension of short-term trade credits and |
|
the rein |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
vestment of profits generated |
in South Africa. |
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It |
is arguable |
that if theUnited |
States were |
truly serious |
about |
South Africa, |
then |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
we |
would |
|
institute a |
total embargo, similar to that against |
Libya, |
inwhich |
all U.S. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
companies |
would |
|
be |
required |
to |
leave |
the country. Moreover, |
|
the current sanctions |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
contain |
loopholes |
resulting not |
only from the scope of |
the |
law |
itselfbut |
|
also |
|
from |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Executive |
Branch |
discretion |
|
in carrying out the law. |
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What |
should be done now? Many |
would |
claim that theBush |
administration |
policy |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
is "constructive |
engagement" |
by another |
name. |
For |
example, |
funding forUNITA |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
continues while |
very |
little aid |
is allocated |
to the newly independent Namibia. |
|
I be |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
lievewe must pressure theBush |
|
administration |
tomaintain |
the sanctions. |
Currently, |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
sanctions |
can |
be |
lifted if all |
political prisoners are released (25 |
percent |
have |
been |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
released), |
and |
if three of the following |
four conditions |
are met: |
repeal of the state of |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
emergency; |
|
legalization |
of |
all |
political |
groups |
(which |
has |
occurred); |
repeal |
of |
the |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Group |
Areas |
and Population |
Registration |
Act; |
|
initiation of negotiations |
between |
the |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
South African |
Government |
and |
the black |
leadership. |
Thus, |
sanctions |
can |
be |
lifted |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
even iftheGroup Areas |
and Population |
Registration |
Act |
remains |
in place. |
|
|
This Act |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
is |
the fundamental basis |
of |
apartheid. |
Sanctions |
should |
not |
be |
lifted under |
such |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
circumstances. |
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Professor Malloy: |
|
Covey |
T. Oliver will now comment on what |
|
has |
been |
said at |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
today's panel. |
From |
his |
long service |
as |
a |
law |
teacher, prolific author, |
ambassador, |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
World |
Bank |
Executive Director, |
|
Assistant |
Secretary of State, Co-ordinator |
|
of theAl |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
liance forProgress |
and |
long-time servant of the Society, I pluck |
one |
interestingdetail. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Professor |
Oliver |
was |
in at |
the creation |
of theWorld |
War |
|
II |
economic |
|
sanctions. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
When |
I talk to him about |
old Executive |
Order |
No. |
8389, |
I see |
the glint inhis |
eye of |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
the true economic |
warrior. |
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||||||||||
Remarks |
|
by Covey |
T. Oliver* |
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|||||||||||
I am |
reminded |
of |
the |
line?old |
|
economic |
warriors |
never |
die |
they just |
|
get |
their |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||
assets |
frozen. |
I seemy |
tasks as |
the following: |
(1) identifycertain |
terminological |
vari |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ables |
that are |
thought to be |
followed by |
linkages |
that relate to the effectsof economic |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
sanctions; |
(2) |
appraise |
those effectsbriefly; (3) |
provide |
a |
few functional |
observations |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
about |
effectiveness. |
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As |
to terminological |
variables, |
|
it is important to determine who |
is sanctioning; |
|
that |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
is, an |
international organization, |
|
a |
group |
of states, or |
a |
state acting |
unilaterally. |
In |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
addition, |
one |
should |
determine what |
kind of "economic |
sanction" |
|
is involved. |
For |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
example, |
one |
type of economic |
|
sanction |
is a form of self-help through countermeas |
*Professor Emeritus of International Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
This content downloaded from 92.242.58.12 on Mon, 8 Dec 2014 04:38:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
211
ures. The |
excellent panel |
discussion |
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on Self-help |
in International Trade |
Disputes |
calls |
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this tomind?particularly |
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the observations |
of Professor |
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Zoller. |
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Self-help |
is a |
legiti |
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mate |
response |
(provided |
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it is not excessive |
and |
unreasonable) |
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to a |
preceding |
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injury |
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sufferedby the acting state under general or treaty international |
law. We |
should keep |
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this concept inmind |
both |
to differentiateand |
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to examine |
permissible |
responses. As |
an |
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example, |
I note |
the League |
of Nations |
embargo |
against |
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Italy mentioned |
earlier |
by |
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Professor Malloy |
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in his remarks. An |
economic |
sanction |
can also |
be a form of retalia |
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tion?whether |
directly, |
remotely or not |
even?linked |
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to actions by |
the other con |
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cerned |
state. Then |
comes |
economic |
warfare, |
or as |
it is called |
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today, authorized |
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use of |
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economic |
force as |
an alternative |
to the use of armed |
force. The |
concept |
is enshrined |
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in theUN |
Charter. |
It has |
also |
been |
used |
in a semidefensive way |
by a |
state or groups |
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of states. The notion |
goes beyond mere |
denial |
and |
is specifically directed |
to coerce |
the |
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will |
of the target state. Economic |
warfare |
has |
also |
been |
applied |
unilaterally as a kind |
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of spurious self-defense. |
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What |
about |
the effects of economic |
sanctions? |
The |
effects of economic |
sanctions |
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can |
be |
described |
as |
psycho-political |
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in nature. |
They |
are |
always |
tension building |
in |
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international relations. They |
cut |
to the quick |
as |
far as national |
prestige |
is concerned. |
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They |
triggerdelicate |
internal reactions |
in the target state and |
sometimes |
in the acting |
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state. |
Interactions |
also occur |
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in domestic |
politics |
as well |
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as |
international politics. |
In |
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addition, economic sanctions |
affect the development |
process. |
Losses |
come |
from sanc |
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tions, particularly |
sanctions |
that are on/off in nature. |
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I have |
called |
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it the "gringo's |
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light switch" effect in a |
development assistance context. The development process |
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requires a |
steady |
input to produce |
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exponential |
development |
effects. When |
we |
use |
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sanctions, |
even |
for purposes |
of human |
rights or helping |
democracy, |
we must |
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recog |
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nize |
the negative |
effectson the development |
pattern of the target country. For |
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exam |
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ple, |
Chile |
suffered enormously |
in economic |
development |
when |
the United |
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States |
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imposed unilateral |
sanctions designed |
to induce Pinochet |
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to leave power. |
It is impor |
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tant to recognize |
that sanctions |
carry a human |
price for their otherwise |
appropriate |
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use. |
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At |
this point my |
discussion |
culminates |
in examining |
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the difficult area |
of human |
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rights and |
economic |
sanctions. |
To |
what extent |
in theworld |
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community |
through |
in |
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ternational organizations, |
multipartite |
structures and unilateral |
actions |
should |
a state |
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use this or that kind of economic |
sanction |
to further the cause |
of human rights? |
I am |
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glad |
sanctions happened |
in South Africa, but |
I am |
also |
glad |
I did not have |
to face the |
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issue as a |
State Department |
or World |
Bank |
official. A World |
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Bank |
official |
is not |
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supposed |
to consider |
political |
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factors when making |
development |
loans and grants. |
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My |
successors |
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as U.S. |
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Executive |
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Director, |
however, |
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have |
been |
required |
to vote |
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against |
certain |
loans on |
noneconomic |
grounds. |
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I am |
sure of one |
effect: economic |
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sanctions work |
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in time of armed |
conflict against |
an |
enemy |
that is highly |
industrial |
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ized, short of rawmaterials |
and vulnerable |
by sea. Other |
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than under |
those conditions, |
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effectiveness of sanctions |
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has |
been |
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spotty. |
I would |
say |
that sanctions |
in pursuit of |
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human |
rights have |
been |
successful |
in the case |
of South Africa. |
However, |
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there are a |
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number of failures?Cuba |
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and North Korea |
come |
tomind. |
Rhodesia |
was |
a multipar |
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tite failure. I end with a view |
that sanctions |
are an extremely dangerous |
weapon |
that |
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must |
be used with |
utmost |
caution, |
and in the process |
of using |
them agonizing |
value |
choices often have to be made.
This content downloaded from 92.242.58.12 on Mon, 8 Dec 2014 04:38:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions