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PART I
LITERATURE REVIEW
A literature review is a piece of discursive prose, not a list describing or summarizing one piece of literature after another. It's usually a bad sign to see every paragraph beginning with the name of a researcher. In this section you will learn how to organize the literature review into sections that present themes or identify trends, including relevant theory. You will see that literature review is not an attempt to list all the material published, but to synthesize and evaluate it according to the guiding concept of your research question.
You will find out how to use an overall introduction and conclusion to state the scope of your coverage and to formulate the question, problem, or concept your chosen material illuminates. Usually you will have the option of grouping items into sections—this helps you indicate comparisons and relationships. You may be able to write a paragraph or so to introduce the focus of each section
According to Bourner (1996)there are good reasons for spending time and effort on a review of the literature before embarking on a research project. These reasons include:
to identify gaps in the literature
to avoid reinventing the wheel (at the very least this will save time and it can stop you from making the same mistakes as others)
to carry on from where others have already reached (reviewing the field allows you to build on the platform of existing knowledge and ideas)
to identify other people working in the same fields (a researcher network is a valuable resource)
to increase your breadth of knowledge of your subject area
to identify seminal works in your area
to provide the intellectual context for your own work, enabling you to position your project relative to other work
to identify opposing views
to put your work into perspective
to demonstrate that you can access previous work in an area
to identify information and ideas that may be relevant to your project
to identify methods that could be relevant to your project
Some questions to think about as you read the texts presented in the given reader or as you develop your literature review:
What is known about the subject?
Are there any gaps in the knowledge of the subject?
Have areas of further study been identified by other researchers that you may want to consider?
Who are the significant research personalities in this area?
Is there consensus about the topic?
What aspects have generated significant debate on the topic?
What methods or problems were identified by others studying in the field and how might they impact your research?
What is the most productive methodology for your research based on the literature you have reviewed?
What is the current status of research in this area?
What sources of information or data were identified that might be useful to you?
TEXT1 ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT
Read the Text and define the research topic and problem.
( An excerpt from What Really is Alliance Management Capability and How does It Impact Alliance Outcomes and Success? by M. Schreiner, P. Kale, and D. Corsten Strategic Management Journal 30, 2009)
PRIOR RESEARCH ON ALLIANCE CAPABILITY
In this section, we review extant research on alliance capability to highlight the issues that scholars are studying in this context, and the different ways (and levels) in which they are doing so. This will also clarify the specific focus and scope of our work, in light of what has already been done. Some scholars have suggested that an ability to effectively manage interfirm alliances is a source of competitive advantage to firms (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002), and earlier work broadly refers to it as alliance capability (Anand and Khanna, 2000). With a growing interest in this topic, two broad streams of research seem to have emerged over time to understand the alliance capability puzzle in greater depth, and scholars in each stream have developed distinct terms to better conceptualize the particular issue being studied in each respective stream.
The first research stream examines how firms develop alliance capability. Here, scholars have suggested that firms can develop alliance capability by having greater experience in managing such relationships (Simonin, 1997; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005), and they have also found empirical support for it. Later work shows, however, that apart from having more experience, firms can also undertake deliberate actions to establish certain structural mechanisms or organizational processes to develop their alliance capability. For instance, Kale et al. (2002) show that having a dedicated alliance function helps build alliance capability because it not only facilitates effective coordination of alliance-related activity in a company, but also serves as a repository for building alliance management know-how in a firm.
Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) have extended this work to suggest that structural mechanisms like a dedicated alliance function are more effective in building alliance capability in large firms than in small firms. More recent work shows that firms also can develop alliance capability by implementing processes to learn and accumulate alliance management skills and best practices by carefully capturing, codifying, sharing, and internalizing relevant alliance know-how—Kale and Singh (2007) use a term ‘alliance learning process’ to account more precisely for the knowledge accumulation processes that underlie the development of alliance capability in firms.
The research on development of alliance capability does not directly conceptualize or measure alliance capability; it simply implies its existence by showing how factors that underlie its development lead to greater alliance success (Kale and Singh, 2007). Thus, although we know a lot about how firms develop alliance capability, such knowledge does not fully inform us about the skills that actually constitute such a capability. Therefore, a second stream of research on alliance capability has emerged that takes a more direct step toward understanding the constituent elements that actually comprise it. Here, constituent elements of alliance capability are being studied at two different levels: at the level of a firm and its portfolio of alliances, and at the level of each individual alliance of a firm. One set of scholars argues that since most firms have several alliances, we can conceptualize alliance capability in terms of the skills required to manage a firm’s entire alliance portfolio. They refer to it as alliance portfolio capability and they see it as comprising skills such as the ability to (a) form new alliances that do not compete with other existing alliances in the portfolio, (b) carefully select partners for a given alliance that are compatible with partners in other extant alliances, (c) set up an appropriate firm-level mechanism to monitor various alliances in its portfolio, or (d) coordinate activities and knowledge flows across individual alliances in the portfolio, and others (Hoffmann, 2007).
A second set of scholars in this stream suggests that constituent dimensions of alliance capability can be potentially understood in terms of skills required to address different phases in the life cycle of any individual alliance (Gulati, 1998). Such a capability is distinct from the alliance portfolio capability discussed earlier. An individual alliance goes through different stages in its life cycle (Doz, 1996; Gulati, 1998), such as (a) the formation phase, wherein a firm evaluates its decision to form an alliance and selects an appropriate partner, (b) the design phase, wherein a firm sets ups an appropriate governance structure and design for the alliance, and (c) the post-formation management phase, wherein a firm has to manage the alliance after it is up and running. Based on this rationale, firms need a capability to effectively handle each of these phases. For example, some researchers have hinted that a firm’s success in any individual alliance rests upon having a suitable alliance partner (e.g., Hitt et al., 2000) in terms of complementarity and fit (Harrigan, 1988; Geringer, 1991; Park and Ungson, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998)—this implies that a firm needs skills to screen and select appropriate alliance partners. Others have suggested that a firm succeeds in any given alliance if it makes appropriate choices about the structure (Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Hennart and Zeng, 2005) and contractual terms (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Reuer and Arino, 2007) of that alliance, and, if necessary, adapts them to changing conditions facing the alliance (e.g., Reuer, Zollo, and Singh, 2002; Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam, 2005). A third group suggests that the success of an individual alliance also rests on how a firm manages that alliance after formation, in terms of coordinating tasks, sharing relevant know-how and information, resolving conflicts, and so on (Van de Ven and Polley, 1992; Doz, 1996; Arino and De la Torre, 1998; Kumar and Nti, 1998; Madhok and Tallman, 1998).
The above mentioned research provides a broad notion of some of the skills that a firm potentially requires to handle any individual alliance. Our reading of this literature suggests that we now have a fairly rich understanding of the issues and skills that are relevant to addressing the formation and design/structure phase in any given alliance. In contrast, prior research does not sufficiently account for some of the specific implementation skills that enable a firm to effectively manage an alliance when it is up and running after formation or design. Also, it does not empirically validate these skills or provide evidence of their impact on alliance performance. Thus, in this study we attempt to investigate these particular aspects in greater detail.
To summarize, our study attempts to extend the second stream of research on alliance capability that investigates skills or dimensions that actually constitute a firm’s alliance capability instead of examining factors that underlie or lead to its development. Here, we mainly look at skills that comprise a firm’s capability to manage an individual alliance, in contrast to skills that comprise its capability to manage its entire alliance portfolio.
At the alliance level, too, we focus mainly on skills relevant to addressing issues at the post-formation management phase of an individual alliance, as opposed to skills relevant to the formation, governance, or structure of that alliance. We take this approach not only because we already have a vast body of literature that provides useful insights pertaining to the formation, design, and governance of an individual alliance, but also because it provides greater parsimony and focus in investigating this issue in more depth. To this end, we develop the notion of alliance management capability to denote specifically a firm’s capability to manage the post-formation phase of an individual alliance. By conceptualizing alliance management capability in this fashion we suggest that (1) it essentially involves the knowledge/skills to address key issues that arise in managing any individual interfirm collaboration after it has been formed and set up, (2) it gets reflected at the level of a particular alliance in a firm, and (3) it is mainly embodied in the practices and behaviors of individuals that are involved in managing that alliance on an ongoing basis. In the next section, we build on prior literature and our fieldwork to provide a detailed account of the main constituent elements of alliance management capability, and we examine its impact on relevant outcomes in a given alliance.
Tasks:
Comprehension
State the following
the topic of the section presented above
the problem the research addresses
the main research streams set forth in the article (What makes them distinct from each other?)
which approach is pursued by the article authors and why
Explain how you understand:
a) competitive advantage
b) alliance capability
c) alliance portfolio capability
Explain what, according to the article is considered to be a source of competitive advantage to firms
Vocabulary
Find synonyms for the following word combinations using the vocabulary of the text:
present study =
and others =
besides =
different =
in operation; functioning =
consisting of =
regarding =
Find English equivalents to the following Russian expressions
ранние исследования в основном рассматривают это как
разработали четкие понятия для объяснения определенных вопросов
дать практическое обоснование
группа ученых
исходя из данного обоснования
анализировать и отбирать
недостаточно полно описывает/ объясняет
подтверждать практически
факторы лежащие в основе
предоставить подробное описание
Paraphrase the underlined expressions using synonymous clichés
This will also clarify the specific focus and scope of our work, in light of what has already been done.
Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) have extended this work to suggest that structural mechanisms like a dedicated alliance function are more effective in building alliance capability in large firms than in small firms.
Kale and Singh (2007) use a term ‘alliance learning process’ to account more precisely for the knowledge accumulation processes that underlie the development of alliance capability in firms.
Based on this rationale, firms need a capability to effectively handle each of these phases.
We already have a vast body of literature that provides useful insights pertaining to the formation, design, and governance of an individual alliance
Paraphrase the sentences using nouns instead of the verbs underlined.
Strategy scholars have asserted that a firm’s alliance capability provides competitive advantage.
We review extant research on alliance capability to highlight the issues that scholars are studying in this context.
This implies that a firm needs skills to screen and select appropriate alliance partners.
One set of scholars argues that since most firms have several alliances, we can conceptualize alliance capability in terms of the skills required.
Our study attempts to extend the second stream of research on alliance capability.
Write out from the article clichés that may be used in the literature review part of your project proposal.
Abbreviations are frequently found in an academic context. Most of them are of the Latin origin. Match the columns in the table to get the definition of some common abbreviations.
Abbreviation (= Latin) |
definition |
et al (= et alii) |
and so on |
e.g. (=exempli gratia) |
which you can see |
i.e. (= id est) |
compare |
etc. (= et cetera) |
see previously quoted work by author |
ibid. (= ibidem) |
and others |
cf (=confer) |
that is (it means) |
q.v. (=quod vide) |
for example |
op.cit. (=opus citatum) |
in the same place as the preceding footnote |
Translate the underlined expressions into Russian.
Writing
Complete the article summary with appropriate ideas.
Since there is ______________ that a firm’s alliance capability provides __________ ____________ and due to the ____________ interest in _____________ ___________ the article analyses two __________ ________ __________ that address ___________, ______ ___________ ___________ issues related to this subject: one stream that focuses on _______________________, and a second stream that investigates ____________________. In recent literature, the question of ________________has received greater attention than the question of _______________; therefore, this study addresses the _________ issue in great _________by building on ___________ _____________ and on ___________and linking this capability _______________ __________________at the alliance and firm level..
TEXT 2 UNBUNDLING COMPETITIVE HETEROGENEITY
Read the Text and define the research topic and problem.
(An excerpt from Unbundling Competitive Heterogeneity: Incentive Structures and Capability Influences on Technological Innovation by M. J. Leiblein and T.L. Madsen Strategic Management Journal., 30: 711–735 (2009)
Many studies argue that the continual creation of new ideas by small and young firms steadily destroys the competitive positions of their larger, more established rivals. Despite this attention, empirical results relating firm size to innovation remain exceedingly fragile. This study proposes three reasons for the empirical inconsistencies in the literature: that small and large firms differ in their: (1) stock of technological experiences, (2) use of own- and partner-firm experiences, and (3) abilities to translate own- and partner-firm experiences into innovation activity. Results from a 10-year study of 463 semiconductor firms demonstrate that the mixed findings generated from prior work are partially attributed to these three general propositions. In particular, resource flows, in the form of operating experience developed internally and accessed through co-development partners, positively affect innovation activity; but these benefits diminish as a firm increases in size. The findings broadly support the notion that differences in the incentives and abilities of small and large firms give rise to heterogeneity in the firms’ innovation activity.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A substantial body of theoretical and empirical research examines the relationship between firm size and innovation activity. Given the variety of definitions and measures of innovation, this study examines process technology innovations at the firm level. Process technology innovations are defined as significant changes in the tools, devices, and knowledge that mediate between inputs and outputs (Rosenberg, 1972). Managers perceive new process technology as a means of increasing productivity and flexibility, reducing cycle times, and improving quality (Adler, 1988; Stalk, 1988). Technology scholars state that process technology innovation is crucial to competitiveness (e.g., Ettlie, 1988). Although process innovations do not necessarily require fundamental changes in product design, they often necessitate the development of new manufacturing skill sets and the integration of new manufacturing equipment. When the changes in these skill sets are significant, they drastically affect the cost and/or value of the output.
At least three research streams examine the relationship between firm size and the amount of a firm’s innovation activity. The first stream relates firm size and market power to the incentive to invest in innovation activities. This work suggests that large firms typically are better able to control the resources necessary to direct technical change, or to develop barriers that allow them to appropriate the gains from innovation relative to small firms (e.g., Schumpeter, 1942). As such, large firms, on average, will have greater incentives to invest in R&D and, in turn, will be more likely to innovate as compared to small firms. Focusing on the risky nature of R&D investment, Galbraith (1952) extended this basic reasoning by arguing that firms may reduce their exposure to risky investments in innovation activity by spreading investment across a large number of projects. If large firms can spread their investment over a larger number of R&D projects than small firms can, large firms may be able to invest more resources in innovation for a given risk level and, in turn, generate larger amounts of innovation activity than their smaller rivals.
Subsequent work refined these arguments by examining how various product- and factor-market imperfections affect the relationship between firm size and innovation activity. For instance, if capital market imperfections exist, large firms may secure financing for risky R&D investments more efficiently than small firms by leveraging internal capital markets (e.g., Armour and Teece, 1981). Similarly, if imperfections exist in the market for technological knowledge, large, and presumably more diversified, firms may be better positioned to exploit innovations through internal application rather than eternal licensing (e.g., Teece, 1982), relative to their smaller, and more focused, rivals. Other work argues that scale economies in R&D activities directly favor large firms and/or that complementarities between R&D, manufacturing, and other downstream activities favor large firms (Teece, 1986). The results from this work however, are extremely fragile. Given this fragility, Teece states that, ‘A large but unsatisfactory literature exists in industrial organization on the relationship between market structure and innovation, and between firm size and innovation, but both the theoretical and empirical literature are almost completely silent on interfirm and intrafirm organizational issues. When these issues have been addressed, it is without much of a theoretical foundation (Teece, 1992 : 2).
A second body of work, couched within the framework of patent races, explores the trade-offs established firms (incumbents) and entrant firms face when considering investments in innovation. The first of these arguments states that when mechanisms such as the patent system, brand identification, spatial location, or capacity expansion, effectively protect the economic benefits of an innovation, established firms alone stand to reap the benefits of monopoly power once the innovation is introduced. As such, established firms will have greater incentives to invest in innovation than entrants (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982). A second argument conditions the first by pointing out that even when mechanisms exist to protect the economic rents generated from innovation, uncertainty in the invention process, and in subsequent demand, may diminish established firms’ incentives to innovate (Reinganum, 1983). For example, established firms have lower incentives to invest in innovation than entrants when there is uncertainty about whether an innovation will cannibalize a portion of the established firms’ rents (e.g., Reinganum, 1983). This work assumes that established and entrant firms have relatively homogeneous, research capabilities. Yet, few empirical studies test these competing arguments. Indeed, the only empirical article we were able to identify provides a case study that describes how Xerox’s failure to invest in research and development to counteract Canon’s challenge in the early 1980s was due, in part, to Xerox’s unwillingness to cannibalize revenues from its plain paper copier business (Bresnahan, 1985).
Stimulated by the 1961 work of Burns and Stalker that relates to environmental uncertainty and organizational form, a third area of inquiry describes how the complexity and bureaucracy that emerges within firms as they increase in size inhibits subsequent innovation activity. This work examines how the structural and cultural characteristics associated with large firm size influence a firm’s administrative ability to manage innovation (e.g., Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Damanpour, 1996; Haveman, 1992, 1993; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997). Existing work demonstrates that as firms grow, they develop formal administrative systems and structures that slow their abilities to adjust to shifting environmental conditions (e.g., Haveman, 1992, 1993). For instance, large firms may be more likely to utilize financial control systems over strategic control systems. The use of formal financial control systems may dampen a firm’s commitment to innovation (e.g., Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1990). Other work emphasizes that, as firms grow, they also develop norms, values, and intraorganizational social networks for operating (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997); these factors often become embedded in an organization and, over time, attenuate an organization’s ability to adopt changes in processes. Coupling these conditions with managers’ willingness to maintain the status quo further limits a firm’s ability to adjust to shifting environmental conditions. In combination, these bureaucratic and cultural sources of inertia make it exceedingly difficult and costly for large firms to recognize and estimate the value of new ways of operating (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Madsen andWalker, 2007). As a result, large firms may be more susceptible to competence traps (Levitt and March, 1988) and slower to change (e.g., Barnett and Hansen, 1996; Barnett, Greve, and Park, 1994) than small firms. This work suggests that to facilitate innovation, firms need to manage new opportunities outside the formal organizational structure.
In sum, the preceding arguments emphasize how variance in market imperfections, market power, and broad administrative characteristics may contribute to differences in firms’ innovation activity. However, these arguments downplay how the relationship between firm size and other idiosyncratic firm-level differences, such as heterogeneity in firms’ experience stocks, might affect firms’ innovation activity. The lack of attention paid to the latter firm-level differentials is troublesome for at least two reasons. First, typical measures of firm characteristics only explain a small percentage of the variance in overall innovation rates captured by firm-fixed effects. While approximately one-half of the overall variance in innovation activity explained by industry-fixed effects is captured by existing measures such as an industry’s demand and an industry’s appropriability regime, ‘the most widely used measures of firm characteristics . . . jointly explain less than 10 percent of the variance explained by firm effects’ (Cohen and Levin, 1989: 1097). Second, these arguments highlight two effects brought about by large firm size—one associated with firm incentives and the other with organizational bureaucracy. The net effect observed in the empirical literature depends upon which of these two effects dominates. Additional insight might be gained by introducing a theoretical mechanism and empirical variables that distinguish these arguments.
Tasks
Comprehension
1. State the following
the topic of the section presented above
the problem the research addresses
the main research streams set forth
the main reasons for the lack of consensus about the topic