Скачиваний:
218
Добавлен:
16.04.2015
Размер:
367 Кб
Скачать
☆

Interrelations of Network Attributes

To what degree are these characteristics of Russian social networks intercorrelated? We might expect, for instance, that trust and ideological agreement to be related. Table 2 reports these correlations.

Note first that these correlations summarize at­tributes of the entire social networks. Thus, the first coef­ficient (.53) is the relationship between the number of network alters named and the average level of politicization within the network. Because not all re­spondents named three network alters, some portion of these correlations is merely a function of network size.

Network trust is strongly related to most of the other characteristics. Politicization does not undermine trust, although trust is strongly correlated with the degree of ideological agreement. Trust is weakly correlated with network weakness, an important finding in that weak­ness clearly does not undermine trust (note the sign of the relationship—more weak ties are associated with greater trust, although not strongly). Put differently, net­work trust is not dependent upon social networks being family-based. Note as well that network political capacity is moderately related to trust (.46) and to ideological

28In keeping with the relatively high degree of politicization of Russian social networks, only very small percentages of the re­spondents are unable to characterize the level of political agree­ment with each network member.

agreement (.49), as well as being strongly a function of network size and "weakness."

Summary

Russian social networks may well have emerged prima­rily as a response to the repressive state. Unable to orga­nize publicly, Russians may have substituted private so­cial networks for formal organizations (see Booth and Richard 1998). But Russians are not atomized, and as a consequence, Russian social networks have a variety of characteristics that may allow them to serve as important building blocks for the development of a vibrant civil so­ciety. In addition to carrying considerable political con­tent, these networks are characterized by a relatively high degree of trust. Because the networks are not closed (strong), they link Russians together to an extent not of­ten recognized by most analysts.

Interpersonal Trust

Many theories of civil society assume that interpersonal trust is essential to successful democratic governance. Mishler and Rose describe the conventional wisdom when they assert: "Trust is necessary [to the establish­ment of civil society] so that individuals may participate voluntarily in collective institutions, whether in political institutions, such as political parties, or in economic and social institutions, such as labor unions, business associa­tions, and churches" (1997, 419). Further: "'Generalized social trust' (trust in people in general), trust in govern­ment and public officials, tolerance, and optimism are all seen, in many versions of the argument, as integral com­ponents of social capital directly linked to its beneficial impact on participation and civic engagement and de­mocracy in general" (Foley and Edwards 1998, 13). As a consequence, there has been a tidal wave of research re­cently on interpersonal trust in a wide variety of contexts

SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

61

(e.g., Fukuyama 1995; Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Norris 1999). Several scholars argue that, at least at the macro level, interpersonal trust and effective democratic gover­nance are intimately interconnected (e.g. Putnam 1993; Inglehart 1990, 1997; Muller and Seligson 1994), even if there is debate about the causal structure of trust (e.g., Brehm and Rahn 1997).

How trustful are Russians? The conventional mea­sure of interpersonal trust asks whether "most people can be trusted" or whether one "can't be too cautious when dealing with people." Table 3 reports the responses of the Russians in my surveys, as well as the responses from a variety of surveys compiled as part of the World Values Survey.29 The World Values Surveys were conducted in the early 1990s.

Russians in 1998 expressed more distrust than trust—59.0 percent said one cannot be too cautious, while only 30.5 percent claimed that other Russians can be trusted. These figures at first glance seem to indicate low levels of trust. But in comparison to the countries in the World Values Survey, Russians are not particularly distrustful. The percentage of Russians responding that one cannot be too cautious is lower, for instance, than the percentage in Spain, France, and Portugal (focusing on Western European countries) and is dramatically lower than most countries in Eastern and Central Europe. In­deed, if we take sampling error into account, the Russian data are not that different from the British data. This is a remarkable finding in light of the political, social, and economic turmoil in contemporary Russia.

Unlike most research on interpersonal trust, we do not rely on this single measure of the concept. Instead, we have measured trust along several different dimen­sions. First, we asked the Russians the traditional inter­personal trust question. Second, we modified that ques­tion by delimiting the object of trust to those whom the respondent knows. Third, we asked the respondents to es­timate how much they are trusted by others. Finally, of course, we measured the level of trust between the re­spondent and each of the network alters. For good mea­sure, I have also reported the responses to an item mea­suring trust in Russian political leaders. The replies to these queries are reported in Table 4.

The frequencies on these different aspects of inter­personal trust differ markedly depending upon the spe-

29Caution must be exercised in interpreting this table since the data were collected under a variety of national circumstances. Per­haps most important is how readily survey agencies accept "don't know" responses. In our surveys, we are entirely willing to accept such a response. But given the infrequency of "don't know" re­sponses in many of the World Value Surveys, it seems unlikely that "don't know" was as easily accepted in all of the countries.

cific object being addressed. Trust in people in general may be relatively low in Russia (less than one-third are trustful), but trust in acquaintances is relatively high (nearly 60 percent). Members of the social networks are trusted even more, and most people estimate that others trust them. Russian political leaders are quite widely dis­trusted. But when it comes to ordinary Russians, levels of trust among people who know each other are high and roughly double the levels among strangers.

These various measures of interpersonal trust are not strongly intercorrelated. Especially significant is the non­existent relationship between trust in strangers and trust within the social network (r = .03). Those who trust people they know tend to trust strangers (although re­member the differences in the frequency distributions— see Table 4), but clearly interpersonal trust has quite dif­ferent manifestations depending upon the object of trust. Upon reflection, this finding is not surprising.

It is instructive to consider further the relationship between trust in people in general and trust in acquain­tances. Table 5 reports this relationship, using trichoto-mized versions of each variable.

Almost all (93.7 percent) of those who trust strang­ers (people in general) tend to trust people they know. This finding is not surprising. But those who are uncer­tain about strangers also tend to trust people they know (62.2 percent). Most importantly, 41.4 percent of those who are cautious with strangers tend nonetheless to trust people they know (with another 15.7 percent claiming uncertainty). These figures provide useful perspective on the meaning of trust in people in general. Of those dis­trustful of strangers, less than a majority (42.9 percent) are distrustful of people they know, and of those uncer­tain whether to trust strangers, only a tiny proportion (8.3 percent) is distrustful of acquaintances. These find­ings may well limit the debilitating effects of low levels of trust among Russians who do not know each other.

Which type of trust is important to civil society? The answer to this question is not entirely unambigu­ous. To the extent that democracy requires political co­operation among strangers, these findings are discour­aging for democrats. But to the extent that democratic cooperation is based on friendships and acquaintances (but not family members), then these data are encourag­ing. Indeed, perhaps the significance of these data turns entirely on how easy it is for Russians to convert strang­ers into acquaintances—that is, the degree to which the line between people one knows and people one does not know is easily traversed. After all, political cooperation does not take place among perfect strangers. Weak, not strong, social networks facilitate converting strangers to friends.

62

JAMES L. GIBSON

Table 3 Cross-National Differences in Interpersonal Trust

Percentages

Country

Cautious

Uncertain

Trust

Total

Weighted N

Sweden

30.6

9.8

59.6

100.0

1047

Switzerland

34.9

38.6

26.5

100.0

1358

Norway

34.9

0.0

65.1

100.0

1156

Finland

35.6

4.5

59.9

100.0

584

China

39.6

.7

59.7

100.0

1323

Denmark

40.8

3.6

55.6

100.0

154

Netherlands

43.1

4.5

52.4

100.0

521

Canada

46.0

3.2

50.7

100.0

1727

Russia, 1992

47.9

14.9

37.1

100.0

2529

United States

48.6

2.8

48.6

100.0

2004

West Germany

51.3

17.4

31.2

100.0

3059

Ireland

52.3

.7

47.0

100.0

179

Japan

52.5

9.9

37.6

100.0

2224

Iceland

54.1

4.0

41.9

100.0

700

Great Britain

54.6

3.3

42.1

100.0

2805

Northern Ireland

55.4

1.7

42.9

100.0

79

Russia, 1996

58.2

6.2

35.6

100.0

2094

Russia, 1998

59.0

10.5

30.5

100.0

1719

India

59.7

9.2

31.2

100.0

2511

Italy

60.2

4.3

35.5

100.0

2280

Austria

60.8

10.9

28.4

100.0

1460

Mexico

60.8

8.6

30.6

100.0

1515

Belgium

61.6

7.8

30.6

100.0

307

Spain

62.2

6.0

31.8

100.0

2059

Moscow

64.4

2.8

32.9

100.0

1010

East Germany

65.4

12.0

22.5

100.0

1328

Poland

65.5

0.0

34.5

100.0

852

South Korea

65.8

0.0

34.2

100.0

1229

Bulgaria

66.0

5.2

28.8

100.0

1031

Lithuania

69.2

0.0

30.8

100.0

1000

South Africa

71.7

0.0

28.3

100.0

1622

Nigeria

71.9

6.7

21.4

100.0

460

Czech-Slovak

72.2

0.0

27.8

100.0

1394

France

72.4

6.3

21.4

100.0

2806

Estonia

72.4

0.0

27.6

100.0

1008

Hungary

73.1

3.0

23.8

100.0

998

Argentina

73.6

4.1

22.4

100.0

1002

Byelorus

73.6

1.3

25.1

100.0

1010

Chile

75.1

2.8

22.1

100.0

1500

Portugal

76.2

3.0

20.8

100.0

477

Slovenia

77.7

6.0

16.3

100.0

1034

Latvia

81.0

0.0

19.0

100.0

903

Romania

82.4

1.8

15.8

100.0

1103

Turkey

88.9

1.3

9.9

100.0

1025

Brazil

92.5

.9

6.6

100.0

1747

Note: The source of the data for most countries is the World Values Survey, conducted in the early 1990s. The countries are ranked on the percentage asserting one cannot be too cautious in dealing with people.

63

Table 4 Different Facets of Interpersonal Trust, Russia, 1998

N

Percentages

Measure

Distrustful Uncertain Trustful

Total

59.0

27.3

33.1b

73.8

Generally speaking, do you agree that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too cautious when dealing with people?

And what about people you know—can they be trusted, or do you have to be very careful when dealing with people whom you know?

Trust in Social Network Members

First Network Member

Second Network Member

Third Network Member .

Do you think that most people you know trust you?

And finally what about the political leaders of Russia—can they be trusted, or do you have to be very careful when dealing with Russian political leaders?

10.5

1719

30.5

100.0

13.1

59.6

1720

100.0

5.0

26.1a

69.0

100.0

1773

7.5

31.1

61.4

100.0

1408

7.9

30.6

61.6

100.0

881

1714

11.6

55.3

100.0

19.1

7.0

1717

100.0

aThis figure combines the center-point on a five-point scale with those who are uncertain how much they trust the network member.

bThis figure includes 1.5 % who say that "most people do not trust me" and 31.6 % who say that "some do trust me, others do not."

Table 5 The Relationship Between Trust in Strangers and Trust in Acquaintances, Russia, 1998

Trust in Strangers

Trust in Acquaintances

Cautious

Uncertain

Trust

Cautious

Uncertain

Trust

Total N

42.9

15.7

41.4

100.0 1012

8.3 29.562.2

100.0

181

3.9

2.4

93.7

100.0

525

Note: Entries are percentages (except for N).

The Consequences of Russian Social Networks

What consequences do these network attributes have for attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes? Following earlier research (e.g., Gibson 1995), I have measured support for democratic institutions and pro­cesses along five separate subdimensions: (1) the relative value of social order and individual liberty; (2) support for a free and pluralistic media; (3) support for competi­tive elections and a multi-party system; (4) support for dissent; and (5) rights consciousness.30 Through Com-

30I have excluded political tolerance as one of the dimensions of democratic values since (a) the tolerance subscale does not fit well with the other subscales (as indicated in this and virtually all ear­lier work on democratic values in Russia), and (b) Russians are vir­tually consensual in their political intolerance (see Gibson 1995; Gibson and Duch 1993; Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon 1997).

mon Factor Analysis, I created a summary index of sup­port for democratic institutions and processes.31

Given the unidimensional structures, I created a measure of support of democratic institutions and pro­cesses in 1996 and 1998 by averaging the responses to the five indices. The correlation between democratic values in 1996 and 1998 is .43, indicating considerable stability

31Factor analysis of the five subscales in the 1996 survey reveals a strongly unidimensional factor structure, with four of the five subscales loading on the factor approximately equally. The excep­tion is the measure of rights consciousness, which has a factor loading of .44. The smaller relationship to the factor is most likely because virtually all Russians are highly conscious of claiming rights and therefore the subscale suffers somewhat from degener­ate variance.

Similar results characterize the 1998 survey. A strongly unidi­mensional structure emerged; the loadings for four of the five sub­scales are approximately equal; and rights consciousness has the lowest loading on the factor.

64

JAMES L.

GIBSON

Table 6 The Impact of Trust on Support for

Democratic Institutions and Processes,

Russia, 1998

Model 1

Model II

r

β

s.e.

β

b

s.e.

β

Trust In People in General

.05

-.00

.01

-.01

.00

.01

.02

Trust In People You Know

.09

.02

.01

.07*

.02

.01

.06*

Trust In Me

.10

.04

.01

.08**

.04

.01

.07**

Education

.28

.03

.00

.22***

Age

-.27

-.00

.00

Rural Residence

-.13

-.05

.01

-.11***

Gender

-.10

-.08

.02

-.11***

N

1708

1702

R

.11**

.40***

Standard Deviation - Dependent Variable

.38

.38

Standard Error of Estimate

.38

.35

***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05

in these values. Following the logic outlined above, I hy­pothesize that those having social networks with strong political capacity are more likely to support democratic institutions and processes, as are those with higher levels of interpersonal and network trust. The equations rel­evant to these hypotheses are shown in Table 6.

Table 6 reports two models. The first is based on an equation in which only the three measures of trust are in­cluded as independent variables. Model II adds four con­trol variables often found to be useful predictors of sup­port for democratic institutions and processes.32 Consider first the degree to which the various measures of trust are related to these democratic values. None of the standard­ized regression coefficients for the trust measures exceeds .10 (which is a low threshold for survey data). Though trust generally has little predictive capacity, it is notewor­thy that the strongest relationships are found with the measures of whether people trust the respondent and whether people the respondent knows are trustworthy, not the measure of trust in people in general. These rela­tionships are certainly slight, but general trust is an espe­cially weak (and statistically insignificant) predictor of democratic values. Particularly when it comes to support for democratic institutions and processes, trust seems to have only the most marginal influence (at best).

Table 7 reports a similar analysis for the measure of network political capacity. Note first that the measure of network political capacity is moderately related to sup­port for democratic institutions and processes in the bi-variate analysis. Those embedded in more politicized and

32For instance, Bahry (1993) has convincingly shown that these four variables are important predictors of a variety of attitudes to­ward democratic institutions and processes. According to her analysis, age and education are by far the most significant factors in need of statistical control.

"weak" networks are more likely to support the main in­stitutions and processes of democratic governance. The multivariate controls reduce the magnitude of this rela­tionship somewhat, but even in Model II the standard­ized regression coefficient is highly statistically signifi­cant and exceeds .10. In general, social networks appear to be an important source of learning—from others and from experience—about the meaning of democratic in­stitutions and processes. This finding is substantively sig­nificant since it withstands the control for powerful but somewhat amorphous predictors of democratic values (in the sense that demographic factors typically represent a multitude of specific micro-level processes).

There are several reasons why these correlations are not stronger. First, Russia has been in the democratiza­tion process for several years now, making democratic ideas less novel than they once were. Second, being em­bedded in social networks with high political capacity is perhaps a necessarybut not sufficient condition for access to democratic ideas. Without such networks, diffusion is difficult; but the existence of a network does not insure that democratic ideas will flow if no network members are exposed to democratic values. Third, all Russians do not require social networks to the same degree in order to learn about social norms.33

33The next logical step in the analysis might be to put all of the in­dependent variables into a single equation. I have conducted that analysis, but note that the variables are not drawn from the same survey. That is, network capacity is measured in 1996, while the trust variables are measured in 1998. Nonetheless, the conclusion from the analysis (with the control variables) is that capacity is sta­tistically significant at less than .001 ((3 = .08), while the strongest trust variable is only significant at .01 (with nearly 1700 cases) and has a P of .06. Even a test this unfair to the capacity variable (be­cause capacity is measured two years earlier than the dependent variable) supports the same substantive conclusions. Finally, if the

65

Table 7 The Impact of Network Political Capacity on Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes, Russia, 1996

Model I

β

Model II

b

b

r

s.e. β

s.e.

Network Political Capacity Education

Age

Rural Residence

Gender

,16

.35

-.25

-.18

-.08

.03

N R

2053

Standard Deviation - Dependent Variable Standard Error of Estimate

.43 .42

.00

.16***

.16**

02

.00

.10***

05

,00

.29***

00

.00

-17***

07

.01

-.15***

07

.02

-.08***

2038

44***

42

38

***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05

Discussion and Conclusions

Several important conclusions emerge from this research.

  • It is useful to think of "civil society" as a concept includ­ ing the social networks within which individual Rus­ sians are embedded. Ordinary Russians are far from be­ ing atomized, perhaps suggesting an unexpected legacy of the totalitarian period. Instead, Russian social net­ works are politically charged, dense, and characterized by high levels of trust, but only moderate levels of po­ litical agreement. Most importantly, Russian social net­ works are politically "strong" because they are "weak."

  • Contrariwise, interpersonal trust is a concept of limited utility for understanding processes of democratization. Trust generally seems to be fairly unimportant, but trust in strangers seems to be particularly insignificant. Ear­ lier research suggesting (and to a limited degree, find­ ing) support for the trust—democratic values hypoth­ esis has probably been confounded by the difference between trust in strangers and trust in acquaintances. For most Russians, interpersonal trust is certainly not a prerequisite to support for democratic institutions and

processes34

1998 equation includes a control for democratic values in 1996 (i.e., an equation in which the dependent variable is in effect short-term change in attitudes toward democratic institutions and pro­cesses), both capacity and trust are reduced to significance at only the .05 level. I do not present all of the details of this analysis due to the problem of the variables being measured at different points in time, and because unraveling the causal structure of short-term change in values requires a great deal more theoretical and empiri­cal work.

34Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) make an interesting argument implying that strong social network would obviate the need for in­terpersonal trust. Trust is primarily important in the context of so-

Taking a step or two away from the data, I can con­struct a somewhat speculative picture of Russian civil so­ciety. Russia seems not to have the wide variety of au­tonomous, relatively formal organizations that are said to characterize vibrant democracies in the West.35 And so­cial networks, even "weak ones," are not an alternative manifestation of a civil society. For democracy to be en­tirely consolidated in Russia, these social networks must at some point evolve into more formal organizations. So­cial networks developed in response to an organizational vacuum created by the old regime. For democracy to suc­ceed, these networks must give rise to broader and more impersonal forms of social organization.36

rial uncertainty, but social uncertainty can be reduced by extensive (and "weak") social networks. Further, they assert that while trust may be important to initiate a relationship, it is not necessary to maintain it. Generally, their analysis is one of the most sophisti­cated and variegated to be found in the literature.

35 The rigorous evidence in support of this assertion is remarkably limited and ought to be the focus of extensive new empirical re­search. I am convinced that most research on participation in such activities and organizations in Russia vastly underestimates the ex­tent of the population involved because too much stress is placed on relatively formal organizations (like clubs) rather than loose as­sociations of citizens (like football teams). However, no data ad­dressing this question have yet been collected.

36Indeed, Rose (1998) argues that the need for social networks is created by the failure of the "modern state" and its formal organi­zation to produce. Confusing cause and effect, he argues that, while social networks may be necessary, "the persistence of such networks is a formidable barrier to Russia's transition from an anti-modern to a modern society" (1998,4). An important differ­ence in our perspectives has to do with our points-of-reference. In comparison to an atomized society, social networks offer a valu­able basis for the development of civil society. From the perspec­tive of vibrant civil societies in developed western democracies, the need for informal social networks is evidence of the failure of al­ternative mechanisms of organization.

66

JAMES L. GIBSON

Still, the crucial point is that the task of building so­cial organizations is greatly facilitated by the ease with which Russians interact with each other. Weak social networks contribute to social cooperation. The task of building a civil society would he far more complicated were there in fact a legacy of totalitarian atomization. Weak social networks are not an alternative to civil soci­ety; but their existence makes the prospects for civil so­ciety much brighter.

These networks continue to be a source of learning about the art of democratic governance. Weak social net­works are probably more important during the early days of a major political transformation, but they remain sig­nificant in Russia today, since Russians have not learned all there is to know about democracy. For instance, they definitely have not learned to tolerate their political en­emies. Learning how to apply democratic values is a de­manding task. Social networks facilitate social learning, especially learning about how to govern democratically.

I contend that interpersonal trust is not a necessary part of this equation. People do not base their decisions to become active in organizational life on the basis of whether they believe strangers can be trusted. These data have shown just how great the distinction is between trust in people in general and in people one knows. Organiza­tions are not formed from strangers. People play football, discuss politics, and attend churches with people they know, and Russians generally trust people they know. In few countries does the existence of political parties de­pend upon the willingness of people to trust strangers.37

Careful attention must be given to the various forms of trust, and in particular to the relationship between trust in people and trust in institutions. In modern soci­eties, people do not need to trust one another since they can rely upon institutions to rectify problems that arise. This is certainly true of economic relations (does one trust the dealer from whom one buys a car?), but prob­ably pertains to political relations as well. When people in a community band together to try to solve a problem, they most likely do so out of common interests, without giving much consideration to whether their neighbors and comrades are trustworthy. Perhaps people must trust institutions in order to make use of them, but trust in people seems to be a much overrated element of a demo­cratic political culture.

Why is organizational life so barren in Russia? First, as I noted, it may not in fact be so barren. But, second, social networks may have enabled Russians to accom-

37Ironically, it may well be that dictatorial regimes depend more on trust than do democratic regimes, in part due to the lack of institu­tional checks on power.

plish many of their goals without resorting to formal or­ganizations. Third, economic necessity, caused by the greed of Russia's ruling elites, has also limited the amount of time and energy left for recreational or social activities of any sort. But perhaps most important is the simple fact that such organizations take time to develop and evolve into formal organizations. Russians are surely distrustful of organizations imposed upon them from the top. Organizations that evolve from the grassroots take time to grow. Russian civil society may well be evolv­ing just about as rapidly as can be expected. The exist­ence 'of dense, weak, and politicized social networks should give encouragement to those favoring the consoli­dation of democracy in Russia.

Manuscript submitted October 8, 1999. Final manuscript received July 5, 2000.

References

Arato, Andrew, and lean Cohen. 1992. Civil Society and Demo­cratic Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Bahry, Donna. 1993. "Society Transformed? Rethinking the So­cial Roots of Perestroika." Slavic Review 52:512-554.

Bahry, Donna, and Brian D. Silver. 1987. "Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR." American Political Science .Review 81:1065-1098.

Bahry, Donna, Cynthia Boaz, and Stacy Burnett Gordon. 1997. "Tolerance, Transition, and Support for Civil Liberties in Russia." Comparative Political Studies 30:484-510.

Banfield, Edward С 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Soci­ety. Glencoe, III: Free Press..

Bernhard, Michael. 1996. "Civil Society after the First Transi­tion: Dilemmas of Post-communist Democratization in Po­land and Beyond." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29:309-330.

Booth, John A., and Patricia Bayer Richard. 1998. "Civil Society and Political Context in Central America." American Behav­ioral Scientist 42:33-46.

Braithwaite, Valerie, and Margaret Levi. Eds. 1998. Trust and Governance. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Brehm, John, and Wendy Rahn. 1997. "Individual-Level Evi­dence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital." American Journal of Political Science 41:999-1023.

Burt, Ronald S. 1987. "A Note on the General Social Survey's Ersatz Network Density Item." Social Networks 9:75-85.

Crawford, Beverly, and Arend Lijphart. 1995. "Explaining Po­litical and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures." Comparative Political Studies 28:171-199.

Ekiert, Grzegorz. 1991. "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration." British Journal of Political Science 21:285-313.

SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Foley, Michael W., and Bob Edwards. 1998. "Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and Social Capital in Comparative Perspective." American Behavioral Scientist 42:5-20.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Cre­ation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press.

Gibson, James L. 1995. "The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Rus­sian and Ukrainian Democracies." In Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharp.

Gibson, James L. 1996. "Political and Economic Markets: Changes in the Connections Between Attitudes Toward Po­litical Democracy and a Market Economy Within the Mass Culture of Russia and Ukraine." Journal of Politics 58:954-984.

Gibson, James L. 1997. "Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991: Collective Action, Rational Choice, and Democratic Values in the Former Soviet Union." American Political Science Review 91:671-684.

Gibson, James L, and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1998. "Changes in the Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice: A Post-Maastricht Analysis." British Journal of Political Science 28:63-91.

Gibson, James L, and Raymond M. Duch. 1993. "Political In­tolerance in the USSR: The Distribution and Etiology of Mass Opinion." Comparative Political Studies 26:286-329.

Gibson, James L, Raymond M. Duch, and Kent L. Tedin. 1992. "Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union." Journal of Politics 54:329-371.

Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." Ameri­can Journal of Sociology 78:1360-1380.

Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. "Kitchen Debate." The New Republic 207:22-25.

Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul Allen Beck, Russell J. Dalton, and Jef­frey Levine. 1995. "Political Environments, Cohesive Social Groups, and the Communication of Public Opinion." American Journal of Political Science 39:1025-1054.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jennings, M. Kent, Jan W. van Deth, et al. 1989. Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orienta­tions in Three Western Democracies. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Kish, Leslie. 1965. Survey Sampling. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Knoke, David. 1990. Political Networks: The Structural Perspec­tive. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kornhauser, William. 1959. The Politics of Mass Society. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Kubik, Jan. 1994. The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Kumar, Krishan. 1993. "Civil Society: An Inquiry Into the Use­fulness of an Historical Term." The British Journal of Sociol­ogy 44:375-395.

Lake, Ronald La Due, and Robert Huckfeldt. 1998. "Social

Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation." Politi­cal Psychology 19:567-584.

Ledeneva, Alena V. 1998. Russia's Economy of Favours: Blot, Net­working and Informal Exchange. New York: Cambridge Uni­versity Press.

McLeod, Jack M., Dietram A. Scheufele, Patricia Moy, Edward M. Horowitz, R. Lance Holbert, Weiwu Zhang, Stephen Zubric, and Jessica Zubric. 1999. "Understanding Delibera­tion: The Effects of Discussion Networks on Participation in a Public Forum." Communications Research 26:743-774.

Meyer, Gordon W. 1994. "Social Information Processing and Social Networks: A Test of Social Influence Mechanisms." Human Relations 47:1013-1047.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1999. "What are the Ori­gins of Political Threat? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies." Unpublished manuscript. University of Arizona.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1997. "Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Insti­tutions in Post-Communist Societies." Journal of Politics 59:418-451.

Mondak, Jeffery J., and Adam F. Gearing. 1998. "Civic Engage­ment in a Post-Communist State." Political Psychology 19:615-637.

Moore, Barrington, Jr. 1954. Terror and Progress USSR: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. "Civic Cul­ture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relation­ships." American Political Science Review 88:635-652.

Mutz, Diana. 1999. "Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Nelson, Daniel N. 1996. "Civil Society Endangered." Social Re­search 63:345-368.

Norris, Pippa. 1999. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Demo­cratic Government. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ost, David.1990. Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Op­position and Reform in Poland Since 1968. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. (with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti). 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ries, Nancy. 1997. Russian Talk: Culture and Conversation dur­ing Perestroika. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Remington, Thomas. 1981. "The Mass Media and Public Com­munication in the USSR." Journal of Politics 43:803-817.

Roeder, Philip G. 1999. "The Revolution of 1989: Post-communism and the Social Sciences." Slavic Review 58:743-755

Rohrschneider, Robert. 1999. Learning Democracy: Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rose, Richard. 1998. "Getting Things Done in an Anti-Modern Society: Social Capital Networks in Russia." Studies in Pub­lic Policy, #304. Glasgow, Scotland: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.

Russian Federation State Committee on Statistics. 1994. The Demographic Yearbook of the Russian Federation 1993. Mos­cow 1994.

68 JAMES L. GIBSON

Stokes, Gale. 1993. The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Col- Weigle, Marcia A., and Jim Butterfield. 1992. "Civil Society in

lapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. New York: Oxford Reforming Communist Regimes: The Logic of Emergence."

University Press. Comparative Politics 25:1-24.

Tismaneanu, Vladimir (ed.). 1995. Political Culture and Civil Yamagishi, Toshio, and Midori Yamagishi. 1994. "Trust and

Society In Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, Commitment in the United States and Japan." Motivation

N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. and Emotion 18:129-166