Interrelations of Network Attributes
To what degree are these characteristics of Russian social networks intercorrelated? We might expect, for instance, that trust and ideological agreement to be related. Table 2 reports these correlations.
Note first that these correlations summarize attributes of the entire social networks. Thus, the first coefficient (.53) is the relationship between the number of network alters named and the average level of politicization within the network. Because not all respondents named three network alters, some portion of these correlations is merely a function of network size.
Network trust is strongly related to most of the other characteristics. Politicization does not undermine trust, although trust is strongly correlated with the degree of ideological agreement. Trust is weakly correlated with network weakness, an important finding in that weakness clearly does not undermine trust (note the sign of the relationship—more weak ties are associated with greater trust, although not strongly). Put differently, network trust is not dependent upon social networks being family-based. Note as well that network political capacity is moderately related to trust (.46) and to ideological
28In keeping with the relatively high degree of politicization of Russian social networks, only very small percentages of the respondents are unable to characterize the level of political agreement with each network member.
agreement (.49), as well as being strongly a function of network size and "weakness."
Summary
Russian social networks may well have emerged primarily as a response to the repressive state. Unable to organize publicly, Russians may have substituted private social networks for formal organizations (see Booth and Richard 1998). But Russians are not atomized, and as a consequence, Russian social networks have a variety of characteristics that may allow them to serve as important building blocks for the development of a vibrant civil society. In addition to carrying considerable political content, these networks are characterized by a relatively high degree of trust. Because the networks are not closed (strong), they link Russians together to an extent not often recognized by most analysts.
Interpersonal Trust
Many theories of civil society assume that interpersonal trust is essential to successful democratic governance. Mishler and Rose describe the conventional wisdom when they assert: "Trust is necessary [to the establishment of civil society] so that individuals may participate voluntarily in collective institutions, whether in political institutions, such as political parties, or in economic and social institutions, such as labor unions, business associations, and churches" (1997, 419). Further: "'Generalized social trust' (trust in people in general), trust in government and public officials, tolerance, and optimism are all seen, in many versions of the argument, as integral components of social capital directly linked to its beneficial impact on participation and civic engagement and democracy in general" (Foley and Edwards 1998, 13). As a consequence, there has been a tidal wave of research recently on interpersonal trust in a wide variety of contexts
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CIVIL SOCIETY
61
(e.g., Fukuyama 1995; Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Norris 1999). Several scholars argue that, at least at the macro level, interpersonal trust and effective democratic governance are intimately interconnected (e.g. Putnam 1993; Inglehart 1990, 1997; Muller and Seligson 1994), even if there is debate about the causal structure of trust (e.g., Brehm and Rahn 1997).
How trustful are Russians? The conventional measure of interpersonal trust asks whether "most people can be trusted" or whether one "can't be too cautious when dealing with people." Table 3 reports the responses of the Russians in my surveys, as well as the responses from a variety of surveys compiled as part of the World Values Survey.29 The World Values Surveys were conducted in the early 1990s.
Russians in 1998 expressed more distrust than trust—59.0 percent said one cannot be too cautious, while only 30.5 percent claimed that other Russians can be trusted. These figures at first glance seem to indicate low levels of trust. But in comparison to the countries in the World Values Survey, Russians are not particularly distrustful. The percentage of Russians responding that one cannot be too cautious is lower, for instance, than the percentage in Spain, France, and Portugal (focusing on Western European countries) and is dramatically lower than most countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Indeed, if we take sampling error into account, the Russian data are not that different from the British data. This is a remarkable finding in light of the political, social, and economic turmoil in contemporary Russia.
Unlike most research on interpersonal trust, we do not rely on this single measure of the concept. Instead, we have measured trust along several different dimensions. First, we asked the Russians the traditional interpersonal trust question. Second, we modified that question by delimiting the object of trust to those whom the respondent knows. Third, we asked the respondents to estimate how much they are trusted by others. Finally, of course, we measured the level of trust between the respondent and each of the network alters. For good measure, I have also reported the responses to an item measuring trust in Russian political leaders. The replies to these queries are reported in Table 4.
The frequencies on these different aspects of interpersonal trust differ markedly depending upon the spe-
29Caution must be exercised in interpreting this table since the data were collected under a variety of national circumstances. Perhaps most important is how readily survey agencies accept "don't know" responses. In our surveys, we are entirely willing to accept such a response. But given the infrequency of "don't know" responses in many of the World Value Surveys, it seems unlikely that "don't know" was as easily accepted in all of the countries.
cific object being addressed. Trust in people in general may be relatively low in Russia (less than one-third are trustful), but trust in acquaintances is relatively high (nearly 60 percent). Members of the social networks are trusted even more, and most people estimate that others trust them. Russian political leaders are quite widely distrusted. But when it comes to ordinary Russians, levels of trust among people who know each other are high and roughly double the levels among strangers.
These various measures of interpersonal trust are not strongly intercorrelated. Especially significant is the nonexistent relationship between trust in strangers and trust within the social network (r = .03). Those who trust people they know tend to trust strangers (although remember the differences in the frequency distributions— see Table 4), but clearly interpersonal trust has quite different manifestations depending upon the object of trust. Upon reflection, this finding is not surprising.
It is instructive to consider further the relationship between trust in people in general and trust in acquaintances. Table 5 reports this relationship, using trichoto-mized versions of each variable.
Almost all (93.7 percent) of those who trust strangers (people in general) tend to trust people they know. This finding is not surprising. But those who are uncertain about strangers also tend to trust people they know (62.2 percent). Most importantly, 41.4 percent of those who are cautious with strangers tend nonetheless to trust people they know (with another 15.7 percent claiming uncertainty). These figures provide useful perspective on the meaning of trust in people in general. Of those distrustful of strangers, less than a majority (42.9 percent) are distrustful of people they know, and of those uncertain whether to trust strangers, only a tiny proportion (8.3 percent) is distrustful of acquaintances. These findings may well limit the debilitating effects of low levels of trust among Russians who do not know each other.
Which type of trust is important to civil society? The answer to this question is not entirely unambiguous. To the extent that democracy requires political cooperation among strangers, these findings are discouraging for democrats. But to the extent that democratic cooperation is based on friendships and acquaintances (but not family members), then these data are encouraging. Indeed, perhaps the significance of these data turns entirely on how easy it is for Russians to convert strangers into acquaintances—that is, the degree to which the line between people one knows and people one does not know is easily traversed. After all, political cooperation does not take place among perfect strangers. Weak, not strong, social networks facilitate converting strangers to friends.
62
JAMES L. GIBSON
Table 3 Cross-National Differences in Interpersonal Trust
|
|
|
Percentages |
|
|
|
|
Country |
Cautious |
Uncertain |
Trust |
Total |
Weighted N |
|
Sweden |
30.6 |
9.8 |
59.6 |
100.0 |
1047 |
|
Switzerland |
34.9 |
38.6 |
26.5 |
100.0 |
1358 |
|
Norway |
34.9 |
0.0 |
65.1 |
100.0 |
1156 |
|
Finland |
35.6 |
4.5 |
59.9 |
100.0 |
584 |
|
China |
39.6 |
.7 |
59.7 |
100.0 |
1323 |
|
Denmark |
40.8 |
3.6 |
55.6 |
100.0 |
154 |
|
Netherlands |
43.1 |
4.5 |
52.4 |
100.0 |
521 |
|
Canada |
46.0 |
3.2 |
50.7 |
100.0 |
1727 |
|
Russia, 1992 |
47.9 |
14.9 |
37.1 |
100.0 |
2529 |
|
United States |
48.6 |
2.8 |
48.6 |
100.0 |
2004 |
|
West Germany |
51.3 |
17.4 |
31.2 |
100.0 |
3059 |
|
Ireland |
52.3 |
.7 |
47.0 |
100.0 |
179 |
|
Japan |
52.5 |
9.9 |
37.6 |
100.0 |
2224 |
|
Iceland |
54.1 |
4.0 |
41.9 |
100.0 |
700 |
|
Great Britain |
54.6 |
3.3 |
42.1 |
100.0 |
2805 |
|
Northern Ireland |
55.4 |
1.7 |
42.9 |
100.0 |
79 |
|
Russia, 1996 |
58.2 |
6.2 |
35.6 |
100.0 |
2094 |
|
Russia, 1998 |
59.0 |
10.5 |
30.5 |
100.0 |
1719 |
|
India |
59.7 |
9.2 |
31.2 |
100.0 |
2511 |
|
Italy |
60.2 |
4.3 |
35.5 |
100.0 |
2280 |
|
Austria |
60.8 |
10.9 |
28.4 |
100.0 |
1460 |
|
Mexico |
60.8 |
8.6 |
30.6 |
100.0 |
1515 |
|
Belgium |
61.6 |
7.8 |
30.6 |
100.0 |
307 |
|
Spain |
62.2 |
6.0 |
31.8 |
100.0 |
2059 |
|
Moscow |
64.4 |
2.8 |
32.9 |
100.0 |
1010 |
|
East Germany |
65.4 |
12.0 |
22.5 |
100.0 |
1328 |
|
Poland |
65.5 |
0.0 |
34.5 |
100.0 |
852 |
|
South Korea |
65.8 |
0.0 |
34.2 |
100.0 |
1229 |
|
Bulgaria |
66.0 |
5.2 |
28.8 |
100.0 |
1031 |
|
Lithuania |
69.2 |
0.0 |
30.8 |
100.0 |
1000 |
|
South Africa |
71.7 |
0.0 |
28.3 |
100.0 |
1622 |
|
Nigeria |
71.9 |
6.7 |
21.4 |
100.0 |
460 |
|
Czech-Slovak |
72.2 |
0.0 |
27.8 |
100.0 |
1394 |
|
France |
72.4 |
6.3 |
21.4 |
100.0 |
2806 |
|
Estonia |
72.4 |
0.0 |
27.6 |
100.0 |
1008 |
|
Hungary |
73.1 |
3.0 |
23.8 |
100.0 |
998 |
|
Argentina |
73.6 |
4.1 |
22.4 |
100.0 |
1002 |
|
Byelorus |
73.6 |
1.3 |
25.1 |
100.0 |
1010 |
|
Chile |
75.1 |
2.8 |
22.1 |
100.0 |
1500 |
|
Portugal |
76.2 |
3.0 |
20.8 |
100.0 |
477 |
|
Slovenia |
77.7 |
6.0 |
16.3 |
100.0 |
1034 |
|
Latvia |
81.0 |
0.0 |
19.0 |
100.0 |
903 |
|
Romania |
82.4 |
1.8 |
15.8 |
100.0 |
1103 |
|
Turkey |
88.9 |
1.3 |
9.9 |
100.0 |
1025 |
|
Brazil |
92.5 |
.9 |
6.6 |
100.0 |
1747 |
Note: The source of the data for most countries is the World Values Survey, conducted in the early 1990s. The countries are ranked on the percentage asserting one cannot be too cautious in dealing with people.
63
Table 4 Different Facets of Interpersonal Trust, Russia, 1998
N
Measure
Distrustful Uncertain Trustful
Total
59.0
27.3
33.1b
73.8
And what about people you know—can they be trusted, or do you have to be very careful when dealing with people whom you know?
Trust in Social Network Members
First Network Member
Second Network Member
Third Network Member .
Do you think that most people you know trust you?
And finally what about the political leaders of Russia—can they be trusted, or do you have to be very careful when dealing with Russian political leaders?
10.5
1719
30.5
100.0
13.1
59.6
1720
100.0
|
5.0 |
26.1a |
69.0 |
100.0 |
1773 |
|
7.5 |
31.1 |
61.4 |
100.0 |
1408 |
|
7.9 |
30.6 |
61.6 |
100.0 |
881 |
1714
11.6
55.3
100.0
19.1
7.0
1717
100.0
aThis figure combines the center-point on a five-point scale with those who are uncertain how much they trust the network member.
bThis figure includes 1.5 % who say that "most people do not trust me" and 31.6 % who say that "some do trust me, others do not."
Table 5 The Relationship Between Trust in Strangers and Trust in Acquaintances, Russia, 1998
Trust in Strangers
Trust
in Acquaintances
Cautious
Uncertain
Trust
Cautious
Uncertain
Trust
Total N
42.9
15.7
41.4
100.0 1012
8.3 29.562.2
100.0
181
3.9
2.4
93.7
100.0
525
Note: Entries are percentages (except for N).
The Consequences of Russian Social Networks
What consequences do these network attributes have for attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes? Following earlier research (e.g., Gibson 1995), I have measured support for democratic institutions and processes along five separate subdimensions: (1) the relative value of social order and individual liberty; (2) support for a free and pluralistic media; (3) support for competitive elections and a multi-party system; (4) support for dissent; and (5) rights consciousness.30 Through Com-
30I have excluded political tolerance as one of the dimensions of democratic values since (a) the tolerance subscale does not fit well with the other subscales (as indicated in this and virtually all earlier work on democratic values in Russia), and (b) Russians are virtually consensual in their political intolerance (see Gibson 1995; Gibson and Duch 1993; Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon 1997).
mon Factor Analysis, I created a summary index of support for democratic institutions and processes.31
Given the unidimensional structures, I created a measure of support of democratic institutions and processes in 1996 and 1998 by averaging the responses to the five indices. The correlation between democratic values in 1996 and 1998 is .43, indicating considerable stability
31Factor analysis of the five subscales in the 1996 survey reveals a strongly unidimensional factor structure, with four of the five subscales loading on the factor approximately equally. The exception is the measure of rights consciousness, which has a factor loading of .44. The smaller relationship to the factor is most likely because virtually all Russians are highly conscious of claiming rights and therefore the subscale suffers somewhat from degenerate variance.
Similar results characterize the 1998 survey. A strongly unidimensional structure emerged; the loadings for four of the five subscales are approximately equal; and rights consciousness has the lowest loading on the factor.
|
64 |
|
|
|
|
|
JAMES L. |
GIBSON |
|
Table 6 The Impact of Trust on Support for |
Democratic Institutions and Processes, |
Russia, 1998 |
|
||||
|
|
|
|
Model 1 |
|
|
Model II |
|
|
|
r |
β |
s.e. |
β |
b |
s.e. |
β |
|
Trust In People in General |
.05 |
-.00 |
.01 |
-.01 |
.00 |
.01 |
.02 |
|
Trust In People You Know |
.09 |
.02 |
.01 |
.07* |
.02 |
.01 |
.06* |
|
Trust In Me |
.10 |
.04 |
.01 |
.08** |
.04 |
.01 |
.07** |
|
Education |
.28 |
|
|
|
.03 |
.00 |
.22*** |
|
Age |
-.27 |
|
|
|
-.00 |
.00 |
|
|
Rural Residence |
-.13 |
|
|
|
-.05 |
.01 |
-.11*** |
|
Gender |
-.10 |
|
|
|
-.08 |
.02 |
-.11*** |
|
N |
1708 |
|
|
|
1702 |
|
|
|
R |
|
|
|
.11** |
|
|
.40*** |
|
Standard Deviation - Dependent Variable |
.38 |
|
|
|
.38 |
|
|
|
Standard Error of Estimate |
.38 |
|
|
|
.35 |
|
|
***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05
in these values. Following the logic outlined above, I hypothesize that those having social networks with strong political capacity are more likely to support democratic institutions and processes, as are those with higher levels of interpersonal and network trust. The equations relevant to these hypotheses are shown in Table 6.
Table 6 reports two models. The first is based on an equation in which only the three measures of trust are included as independent variables. Model II adds four control variables often found to be useful predictors of support for democratic institutions and processes.32 Consider first the degree to which the various measures of trust are related to these democratic values. None of the standardized regression coefficients for the trust measures exceeds .10 (which is a low threshold for survey data). Though trust generally has little predictive capacity, it is noteworthy that the strongest relationships are found with the measures of whether people trust the respondent and whether people the respondent knows are trustworthy, not the measure of trust in people in general. These relationships are certainly slight, but general trust is an especially weak (and statistically insignificant) predictor of democratic values. Particularly when it comes to support for democratic institutions and processes, trust seems to have only the most marginal influence (at best).
Table 7 reports a similar analysis for the measure of network political capacity. Note first that the measure of network political capacity is moderately related to support for democratic institutions and processes in the bi-variate analysis. Those embedded in more politicized and
32For instance, Bahry (1993) has convincingly shown that these four variables are important predictors of a variety of attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes. According to her analysis, age and education are by far the most significant factors in need of statistical control.
"weak" networks are more likely to support the main institutions and processes of democratic governance. The multivariate controls reduce the magnitude of this relationship somewhat, but even in Model II the standardized regression coefficient is highly statistically significant and exceeds .10. In general, social networks appear to be an important source of learning—from others and from experience—about the meaning of democratic institutions and processes. This finding is substantively significant since it withstands the control for powerful but somewhat amorphous predictors of democratic values (in the sense that demographic factors typically represent a multitude of specific micro-level processes).
There are several reasons why these correlations are not stronger. First, Russia has been in the democratization process for several years now, making democratic ideas less novel than they once were. Second, being embedded in social networks with high political capacity is perhaps a necessarybut not sufficient condition for access to democratic ideas. Without such networks, diffusion is difficult; but the existence of a network does not insure that democratic ideas will flow if no network members are exposed to democratic values. Third, all Russians do not require social networks to the same degree in order to learn about social norms.33
33The next logical step in the analysis might be to put all of the independent variables into a single equation. I have conducted that analysis, but note that the variables are not drawn from the same survey. That is, network capacity is measured in 1996, while the trust variables are measured in 1998. Nonetheless, the conclusion from the analysis (with the control variables) is that capacity is statistically significant at less than .001 ((3 = .08), while the strongest trust variable is only significant at .01 (with nearly 1700 cases) and has a P of .06. Even a test this unfair to the capacity variable (because capacity is measured two years earlier than the dependent variable) supports the same substantive conclusions. Finally, if the
65
Table 7 The Impact of Network Political Capacity on Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes, Russia, 1996
Model I
β
b
b
r
s.e. β
s.e.
|
Network Political Capacity Education Age Rural Residence Gender |
,16 .35 -.25 -.18 -.08 |
.03 |
|
N R |
|
2053 |
|
Standard Deviation - Dependent Variable Standard Error of Estimate |
|
.43 .42 |
.00
.16***
.16**
|
02 |
.00 |
.10*** |
|
05 |
,00 |
.29*** |
|
00 |
.00 |
-17*** |
|
07 |
.01 |
-.15*** |
|
07 |
.02 |
-.08*** |
|
|
|
2038 |
|
|
|
44*** |
|
42 |
|
|
|
38 |
|
|
***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05
Discussion and Conclusions
Several important conclusions emerge from this research.
-
It is useful to think of "civil society" as a concept includ ing the social networks within which individual Rus sians are embedded. Ordinary Russians are far from be ing atomized, perhaps suggesting an unexpected legacy of the totalitarian period. Instead, Russian social net works are politically charged, dense, and characterized by high levels of trust, but only moderate levels of po litical agreement. Most importantly, Russian social net works are politically "strong" because they are "weak."
-
Contrariwise, interpersonal trust is a concept of limited utility for understanding processes of democratization. Trust generally seems to be fairly unimportant, but trust in strangers seems to be particularly insignificant. Ear lier research suggesting (and to a limited degree, find ing) support for the trust—democratic values hypoth esis has probably been confounded by the difference between trust in strangers and trust in acquaintances. For most Russians, interpersonal trust is certainly not a prerequisite to support for democratic institutions and
processes34
1998 equation includes a control for democratic values in 1996 (i.e., an equation in which the dependent variable is in effect short-term change in attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes), both capacity and trust are reduced to significance at only the .05 level. I do not present all of the details of this analysis due to the problem of the variables being measured at different points in time, and because unraveling the causal structure of short-term change in values requires a great deal more theoretical and empirical work.
34Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) make an interesting argument implying that strong social network would obviate the need for interpersonal trust. Trust is primarily important in the context of so-
Taking a step or two away from the data, I can construct a somewhat speculative picture of Russian civil society. Russia seems not to have the wide variety of autonomous, relatively formal organizations that are said to characterize vibrant democracies in the West.35 And social networks, even "weak ones," are not an alternative manifestation of a civil society. For democracy to be entirely consolidated in Russia, these social networks must at some point evolve into more formal organizations. Social networks developed in response to an organizational vacuum created by the old regime. For democracy to succeed, these networks must give rise to broader and more impersonal forms of social organization.36
rial uncertainty, but social uncertainty can be reduced by extensive (and "weak") social networks. Further, they assert that while trust may be important to initiate a relationship, it is not necessary to maintain it. Generally, their analysis is one of the most sophisticated and variegated to be found in the literature.
35 The rigorous evidence in support of this assertion is remarkably limited and ought to be the focus of extensive new empirical research. I am convinced that most research on participation in such activities and organizations in Russia vastly underestimates the extent of the population involved because too much stress is placed on relatively formal organizations (like clubs) rather than loose associations of citizens (like football teams). However, no data addressing this question have yet been collected.
36Indeed, Rose (1998) argues that the need for social networks is created by the failure of the "modern state" and its formal organization to produce. Confusing cause and effect, he argues that, while social networks may be necessary, "the persistence of such networks is a formidable barrier to Russia's transition from an anti-modern to a modern society" (1998,4). An important difference in our perspectives has to do with our points-of-reference. In comparison to an atomized society, social networks offer a valuable basis for the development of civil society. From the perspective of vibrant civil societies in developed western democracies, the need for informal social networks is evidence of the failure of alternative mechanisms of organization.
66
JAMES L. GIBSON
Still, the crucial point is that the task of building social organizations is greatly facilitated by the ease with which Russians interact with each other. Weak social networks contribute to social cooperation. The task of building a civil society would he far more complicated were there in fact a legacy of totalitarian atomization. Weak social networks are not an alternative to civil society; but their existence makes the prospects for civil society much brighter.
These networks continue to be a source of learning about the art of democratic governance. Weak social networks are probably more important during the early days of a major political transformation, but they remain significant in Russia today, since Russians have not learned all there is to know about democracy. For instance, they definitely have not learned to tolerate their political enemies. Learning how to apply democratic values is a demanding task. Social networks facilitate social learning, especially learning about how to govern democratically.
I contend that interpersonal trust is not a necessary part of this equation. People do not base their decisions to become active in organizational life on the basis of whether they believe strangers can be trusted. These data have shown just how great the distinction is between trust in people in general and in people one knows. Organizations are not formed from strangers. People play football, discuss politics, and attend churches with people they know, and Russians generally trust people they know. In few countries does the existence of political parties depend upon the willingness of people to trust strangers.37
Careful attention must be given to the various forms of trust, and in particular to the relationship between trust in people and trust in institutions. In modern societies, people do not need to trust one another since they can rely upon institutions to rectify problems that arise. This is certainly true of economic relations (does one trust the dealer from whom one buys a car?), but probably pertains to political relations as well. When people in a community band together to try to solve a problem, they most likely do so out of common interests, without giving much consideration to whether their neighbors and comrades are trustworthy. Perhaps people must trust institutions in order to make use of them, but trust in people seems to be a much overrated element of a democratic political culture.
Why is organizational life so barren in Russia? First, as I noted, it may not in fact be so barren. But, second, social networks may have enabled Russians to accom-
37Ironically, it may well be that dictatorial regimes depend more on trust than do democratic regimes, in part due to the lack of institutional checks on power.
plish many of their goals without resorting to formal organizations. Third, economic necessity, caused by the greed of Russia's ruling elites, has also limited the amount of time and energy left for recreational or social activities of any sort. But perhaps most important is the simple fact that such organizations take time to develop and evolve into formal organizations. Russians are surely distrustful of organizations imposed upon them from the top. Organizations that evolve from the grassroots take time to grow. Russian civil society may well be evolving just about as rapidly as can be expected. The existence 'of dense, weak, and politicized social networks should give encouragement to those favoring the consolidation of democracy in Russia.
Manuscript submitted October 8, 1999. Final manuscript received July 5, 2000.
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