The Great Boer War

ers are numerous and aggressive, and the column, which was 900 strong, could clear all resistance from its front, but found it impos­sible to brush off the snipers upon its fl anks and rear. Shortly after their start the column was deprived of the services of its gallant leader, Colonel Little, who was shot while riding with his advance scouts. Colonel Dalgety took over the command. Numerous desul­tory attacks culminated in a fi erce skirmish at Quaggafontein on August 31st, in which the column had sixty casualties. The event might have been serious, as De la Rey’s main force appears to have been concentrated upon the British detachment, the brunt of the action falling upon the Kaffrarian Rifl es. By a rapid movement the column was able to extricate itself and win its way safely to Kru­gersdorp, but it narrowly escaped out of the wolf’s jaws, and as it emerged into the open country De la Rey’s guns were seen gallop­ing for the pass which they had just come through. This force was sent south to Kroonstad to refi t.

thirteen trucks. Almost at the same time a train was captured near Kroonstad, which appeared to indicate that the great De Wet was back in his old hunting-grounds. On the same day the line was cut at Standerton. A few days later, however, the impunity with which these feats had been performed was broken, for in a similar venture near Krugersdorp the dashing Theron and several of his associates lost their lives.

their supplies from Lourenco Marques was still intact. General Pi­enaar and the greater part of his force, amounting to over two thou­sand men, had crossed the frontier and had been taken down to Delagoa Bay, where they met the respect and attention which brave men in misfortune deserve. Small bands had slipped away to the north and the south, but they were insignifi cant in numbers and depressed in spirit. For the time it seemed that the campaign was over, but the result showed that there was greater vitality in the resistance of the burghers and less validity in their oaths than any one had imagined.

garrison in any one of the numerous posts in the Transvaal, and in that portion of the Orange River Colony which lies east of the railway, which was not surrounded by prowling rifl emen, there was no convoy sent to supply those garrisons which was not liable to be attacked upon the road, and there was no train upon any one of the three lines which might not fi nd a rail up and a hundred raiders covering it with their Mausers. With some two thousand miles of railroad to guard, so many garrisons to provide, and an escort to be furnished to every convoy, there remained out of the large body of British troops in the country only a moderate force who were avail­able for actual operations. This force was distributed in different districts scattered over a wide extent of country, and it was evident that while each was strong enough to suppress local resistance, still at any moment a concentration of the Boer scattered forces upon a single British column might place the latter in a serious posi­tion. The distribution of the British in October and November was roughly as follows. Methuen was in the Rustenburg district, Barton at Krugersdorp and operating down the line to Klerksdorp, Settle was in the West, Paget at Pienaar’s River, Clements in the Mag­aliesberg, Hart at Potchefstroom, Lyttelton at Middelburg, Smith­Dorrien at Belfast, W. Kitchener at Lydenburg, French in the East­ern Transvaal, Hunter, Rundle, Brabant, and Bruce Hamilton in the Orange River Colony. Each of these forces was occupied in the same sort of work, breaking up small bodies of the enemy, hunting for arms, bringing in refugees, collecting supplies, and rounding up cattle. Some, however, were confronted with organised resistance and some were not. A short account may be given in turn of each separate column.