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THE GREAT BOER WAR
and Hamilton had taken Heidelberg, and his force was about to join
hands with Buller at Standerton. Sporadic warfare broke out here
and there in the west, and in the course of it Snyman of Mafeking
had reappeared, with two guns, which were promptly taken from
him by the Canadian Mounted Rifl es. On all sides it was felt that
if the redoubtable De Wet could be captured there was every hope
that the burghers might discontinue a struggle which was disagreeable to the British and fatal to themselves. As a point of honour it
was impossible for Botha to give in while his ally held out. We will
turn, therefore, to this famous guerilla chief, and give some account
of his exploits. To understand them some description must be given
of the general military situation in the Free State.
When Lord Roberts had swept past to the north he had brushed
aside the fl ower of the Orange Free State army, who occupied the
considerable quadrilateral which is formed by the north-east of
that State. The function of Rundle’s 8th Division and of Brabant’s
Colonial Division was to separate the sheep from the goats by preventing the fi ghting burghers from coming south and disturbing
those districts which had been settled. For this purpose Rundle
formed a long line which should serve as a cordon. Moving up
through Trommel and Clocolan, Ficksburg was occupied on May
25th by the Colonial Division, while Rundle seized Senekal, forty
miles to the north-west. A small force of forty Yeomanry, who entered the town some time in advance of the main body, was suddenly attacked by the Boers, and the gallant Dalbiac, famous rider
and sportsman, was killed, with four of his men. He was a victim, as
so many have been in this campaign, to his own proud disregard of
danger.
The Boers were in full retreat, but now, as always, they were
dangerous. One cannot take them for granted, for the very moment
of defeat is that at which they are capable of some surprising ef-
421

ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
fort. Rundle, following them up from Senekal, found them in strong
possession of the kopjes at Biddulphsberg, and received a check in
his endeavour to drive them off. It was an action fought amid great
grass fi res, where the possible fate of the wounded was horrible to
contemplate. The 2nd Grenadiers, the Scots Guards, the East Yorkshires, and the West Kents were all engaged, with the 2nd and 79th
Field Batteries and a force of Yeomanry. Our losses incurred in the
open from unseen rifl es were thirty killed and 130 wounded, including Colonel Lloyd of the Grenadiers. Two days later Rundle,
from Senekal, joined hands with Brabant from Ficksburg, and a defensive line was formed between those two places, which was held
unbroken for two months, when the operations ended in the capture of the greater part of the force opposed to him. Clements’s Brigade, consisting of the 1st Royal Irish, the 2nd Bedfords, the 2nd
Worcesters, and the 2nd Wiltshires, had come to strengthen Rundle, and altogether he may have had as many as twelve thousand
men under his orders. It was not a large force with which to hold
a mobile adversary at least eight thousand strong, who might attack
him at any point of his extended line. So well, however, did he select
his positions that every attempt of the enemy, and there were many,
ended in failure. Badly supplied with food, he and his half-starved
men held bravely to their task, and no soldiers in all that great host
deserve better of their country.
At the end of May, then, the Colonial Division, Rundle’s Division, and Clements’s Brigade held the Boers from Ficksburg on the
Basuto border to Senekal. This prevented them from coming south.
But what was there to prevent them from coming west, and falling upon the railway line? There was the weak point of the British position. Lord Methuen had been brought across from Boshof,
and was available with six thousand men. Colvile was on that side
also, with the Highland Brigade. A few details were scattered up and
422

THE GREAT BOER WAR
down the line, waiting to be gathered up by an enterprising enemy.
Kroonstad was held by a single militia battalion; each separate force
had to be nourished by convoys with weak escorts. Never was there
such a fi eld for a mobile and competent guerilla leader. And, as luck
would have it, such a man was at hand, ready to take full advantage
of his opportunities.

XXVII.
THE LINES
OF COMMUNICATION
Christian de Wet, the elder of two brothers of that name, was
at this time in the prime of life, a little over forty years of age. He
was a burly middle-sized bearded man, poorly educated, but endowed with much energy and common-sense. His military experience dated back to Majuba Hill, and he had a large share of that
curious race hatred which is intelligible in the case of the Transvaal,
but inexplicable in a Freestater who has received no injury from the
British Empire. Some weakness of his sight compels the use of tinted
spectacles, and he had now turned these, with a pair of particularly
observant eyes behind them, upon the scattered British forces and
the long exposed line of railway.
De Wet’s force was an offshoot from the army of Freestaters under De Villiers, Olivier, and Prinsloo, which lay in the mountainous
north-east of the State. To him were committed fi ve guns, fi fteen
hundred men, and the best of the horses. Well armed, well mounted, and operating in a country which consisted of rolling plains with
occasional fortress kopjes, his little force had everything in its favour. There were so many tempting objects of attack lying before
him that he must have had some diffi culty in knowing where to begin. The tinted spectacles were turned fi rst upon the isolated town
of Lindley.
424

THE GREAT BOER WAR
Colvile with the Highland Brigade had come up from Ventersburg with instructions to move onward to Heilbron, pacifying the
country as he passed. The country, however, refused to be pacifi ed,
and his march from Ventersburg to Lindley was harassed by snipers
every mile of the way. Finding that De Wet and his men were close
upon him, he did not linger at Lindley, but passed on to his destination, his entire march of 126 miles costing him sixty-three casualties, of which nine were fatal. It was a diffi cult and dangerous march,
especially for the handful of Eastern Province Horse, upon whom
fell all the mounted work. By evil fortune a force of fi ve hundred
Yeomanry, the 18th battalion, including the Duke of Cambridge’s
Own and the Irish companies, had been sent from Kroonstad to join
Colvile at Lindley. Colonel Spragge was in command. On May 27th
this body of horsemen reached their destination only to fi nd that
Colvile had already abandoned it. They appear to have determined
to halt for a day in Lindley, and then follow Colvile to Heilbron.
Within a few hours of their entering the town they were fi ercely
attacked by De Wet.
Colonel Spragge seems to have acted for the best. Under a heavy
fi re he caused his troopers to fall back upon his transport, which
had been left at a point a few miles out upon the Kroonstad Road,
where three defensible kopjes sheltered a valley in which the cattle
and horses could be herded. A stream ran through it. There were all
the materials there for a stand which would have brought glory to
the British arms. The men were of peculiarly fi ne quality, many of
them from the public schools and from the universities, and if any
would fi ght to the death these with their sporting spirit and their
high sense of honour might have been expected to do so.
They had the stronger motive for holding out, as they had taken
steps to convey word of their diffi culty to Colvile and to Methuen.
The former continued his march to Heilbron, and it is hard to blame
425

ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
him for doing so, but Methuen on hearing the message, which was
conveyed to him at great personal peril by Corporal Hankey of the
Yeomanry, pushed on instantly with the utmost energy, though he
arrived too late to prevent, or even to repair, a disaster. It must be
remembered that Colvile was under orders to reach Heilbron on
a certain date, that he was himself fi ghting his way, and that the
force which he was asked to relieve was much more mobile than his
own. His cavalry at that date consisted of 100 men of the Eastern
Province Horse.
Colonel Spragge’s men had held their own for the fi rst three
days of their investment, during which they had been simply exposed to a long-range rifl e fi re which infl icted no very serious loss
upon them. Their principal defence consisted of a stone kraal about
twenty yards square, which sheltered them from rifl e bullets, but
must obviously be a perfect death-trap in the not improbable event
of the Boers sending for artillery. The spirit of the troopers was admirable. Several dashing sorties were carried out under the leadership of Captain Humby and Lord Longford. The latter was a particularly dashing business, ending in a bayonet charge which cleared
a neighbouring ridge. Early in the siege the gallant Keith met his
end. On the fourth day the Boers brought up fi ve guns. One would
have thought that during so long a time as three days it would have
been possible for the offi cer in command to make such preparations
against this obvious possibility as were so successfully taken at a later stage of the war by the handful who garrisoned Ladybrand. Surely
in this period, even without engineers, it would not have been hard
to construct such trenches as the Boers have again and again opposed to our own artillery. But the preparations which were made
proved to be quite inadequate. One of the two smaller kopjes was
carried, and the garrison fl ed to the other. This also was compelled
to surrender, and fi nally the main kopje also hoisted the white fl ag.
426

THE GREAT BOER WAR
No blame can rest upon the men, for their presence there at all is
a suffi cient proof of their public spirit and their gallantry. But the
lessons of the war seem to have been imperfectly learned, especially
that very certain lesson that shell fi re in a close formation is insupportable, while in an open formation with a little cover it can never
compel surrender. The casualty lists (80 killed and wounded out of
a force of 470) show that the Yeomanry took considerable punishment before surrendering, but do not permit us to call the defence
desperate or heroic. It is only fair to add that Colonel Spragge was
acquitted of all blame by a court of inquiry, which agreed, however,
that the surrender was premature, and attributed it to the unauthorised hoisting of a white fl ag upon one of the detached kopjes.
With regard to the subsequent controversy as to whether General
Colvile might have returned to the relief of the Yeomanry, it is impossible to see how that General could have acted in any other way
than he did.
Some explanation is needed of Lord Methuen’s appearance
upon the central scene of warfare, his division having, when last described, been at Boshof, not far from Kimberley, where early in April
he fought the successful action which led to the death of Villebois.
Thence he proceeded along the Vaal and then south to Kroonstad, arriving there on May 28th. He had with him the 9th Brigade
(Douglas’s), which contained the troops which had started with
him for the relief of Kimberley six months before. These were the
Northumberland Fusiliers, Loyal North Lancashires, Northamptons, and Yorkshire Light Infantry. With him also were the Munsters, Lord Chesham’s Yeomanry (fi ve companies), with the 4th and
37th batteries, two howitzers and two pom-poms. His total force was
about 6000 men. On arriving at Kroonstad he was given the task of
relieving Heilbron, where Colvile, with the Highland Brigade, some
Colonial horse, Lovat’s Scouts, two naval guns, and the 5th battery,
427

ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
were short of food and ammunition. The more urgent message from
the Yeomen at Lindley, however, took him on a fruitless journey to
that town on June 1st. So vigorous was the pursuit of the Yeomanry
that the leading squadrons, consisting of South Notts Hussars and
Sherwood Rangers, actually cut into the Boer convoy and might
have rescued the prisoners had they been supported. As it was they
were recalled, and had to fi ght their way back to Lindley with some
loss, including Colonel Rolleston, the commander, who was badly
wounded. A garrison was left under Paget, and the rest of the force
pursued its original mission to Heilbron, arriving there on June 7th,
when the Highlanders had been reduced to quarter rations. ‘The
Salvation Army’ was the nickname by which they expressed their
gratitude to the relieving force.
A previous convoy sent to the same destination had less good
fortune. On June 1st fi fty-fi ve wagons started from the railway line
to reach Heilbron. The escort consisted of one hundred and sixty
details belonging to Highland regiments without any guns, Captain
Corballis in command. But the gentleman with the tinted glasses
was waiting on the way. ‘I have twelve hundred men and fi ve guns.
Surrender at once!’ Such was the message which reached the escort,
and in their defenceless condition there was nothing for it but to
comply. Thus one disaster leads to another, for, had the Yeomanry
held out at Lindley, De Wet would not on June 4th have laid hands
upon our wagons; and had he not recruited his supplies from our
wagons it is doubtful if he could have made his attack upon Roodeval. This was the next point upon which he turned his attention.
Two miles beyond Roodeval station there is a well-marked kopje
by the railway line, with other hills some distance to the right and
the left. A militia regiment, the 4th Derbyshire, had been sent up to
occupy this post. There were rumours of Boers on the line, and Major Haig, who with one thousand details of various regiments com-
428

THE GREAT BOER WAR
manded at railhead, had been attacked on June 6th but had beaten
off his assailants. De Wet, acting sometimes in company with, and
sometimes independently of, his lieutenant Nel, passed down the
line looking fur some easier prey, and on the night of June 7th came
upon the militia regiment, which was encamped in a position which
could be completely commanded by artillery. It is not true that they
had neglected to occupy the kopje under which they lay, for two
companies had been posted upon it. But there seems to have been
no thought of imminent danger, and the regiment had pitched its
tents and gone very comfortably to sleep without a thought of the
gentleman in the tinted glasses. In the middle of the night he was
upon them with a hissing sleet of bullets. At the fi rst dawn the guns
opened and the shells began to burst among them. It was a horrible
ordeal for raw troops. The men were miners and agricultural labourers, who had never seen more bloodshed than a cut fi nger in their
lives. They had been four months in the country, but their life had
been a picnic, as the luxury of their baggage shows. Now in an instant the picnic was ended, and in the grey cold dawn war was upon
them – grim war with the whine of bullets, the screams of pain, the
crash of shell, the horrible rending and riving of body and limb.
In desperate straits, which would have tried the oldest soldiers, the
brave miners did well. They never from the beginning had a chance
save to show how gamely they could take punishment, but that at
least they did. Bullets were coming from all sides at once and yet no
enemy was visible. They lined one side of the embankment, and they
were shot in the back. They lined the other, and were again shot in
the back. Baird-Douglas, the Colonel, vowed to shoot the man who
should raise the white fl ag, and he fell dead himself before he saw
the hated emblem. But it had to come. A hundred and forty of the
men were down, many of them suffering from the horrible wounds
which shell infl icts. The place was a shambles. Then the fl ag went up
429

ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
and the Boers at last became visible. Outnumbered, outgeneralled,
and without guns, there is no shadow of stain upon the good name
of the one militia regiment which was ever seriously engaged during
the war. Their position was hopeless from the fi rst, and they came
out of it with death, mutilation, and honour.
Two miles south of the Rhenoster kopje stands Roodeval station,
in which, on that June morning, there stood a train containing the
mails for the army, a supply of great-coats, and a truck full of enormous shells. A number of details of various sorts, a hundred or more,
had alighted from the train, twenty of them Post-offi ce volunteers,
some of the Pioneer Railway corps, a few Shropshires, and other
waifs and strays. To them in the early morning came the gentleman
with the tinted glasses, his hands still red with the blood of the Derbies. ‘I have fourteen hundred men and four guns. Surrender!’ said
the messenger. But it is not in nature for a postman to give up his
postbag without a struggle. ‘Never!’ cried the valiant postmen. But
shell after shell battered the corrugated-iron buildings about their
ears, and it was not possible for them to answer the guns which were
smashing the life out of them. There was no help for it but to surrender. De Wet added samples of the British volunteer and of the British regular to his bag of militia. The station and train were burned
down, the great-coats looted, the big shells exploded, and the mails
burned. The latter was the one unsportsmanlike action which can
up to that date be laid to De Wet’s charge. Forty thousand men to
the north of him could forego their coats and their food, but they
yearned greatly for those home letters, charred fragments of which
15
are still blowing about the veld.
15
Fragments continually met the eye which must have afforded curious reading for the victors. 'I hope you have killed all those Boers by now,'
was the beginning of one letter which I could not help observing.
430
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