Добавил:
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз: Предмет: Файл:

The Great Boer War

.pdf
Скачиваний:
0
Добавлен:
07.09.2026
Размер:
2 Мб
Скачать
THE GREAT BOER WAR
and Hamilton had taken Heidelberg, and his force was about to join hands with Buller at Standerton. Sporadic warfare broke out here and there in the west, and in the course of it Snyman of Mafeking had reappeared, with two guns, which were promptly taken from him by the Canadian Mounted Rifl es. On all sides it was felt that if the redoubtable De Wet could be captured there was every hope that the burghers might discontinue a struggle which was disagree­able to the British and fatal to themselves. As a point of honour it was impossible for Botha to give in while his ally held out. We will turn, therefore, to this famous guerilla chief, and give some account of his exploits. To understand them some description must be given of the general military situation in the Free State.
When Lord Roberts had swept past to the north he had brushed aside the fl ower of the Orange Free State army, who occupied the considerable quadrilateral which is formed by the north-east of that State. The function of Rundle’s 8th Division and of Brabant’s Colonial Division was to separate the sheep from the goats by pre­venting the fi ghting burghers from coming south and disturbing those districts which had been settled. For this purpose Rundle formed a long line which should serve as a cordon. Moving up through Trommel and Clocolan, Ficksburg was occupied on May 25th by the Colonial Division, while Rundle seized Senekal, forty miles to the north-west. A small force of forty Yeomanry, who en­tered the town some time in advance of the main body, was sud­denly attacked by the Boers, and the gallant Dalbiac, famous rider and sportsman, was killed, with four of his men. He was a victim, as so many have been in this campaign, to his own proud disregard of danger.
The Boers were in full retreat, but now, as always, they were dangerous. One cannot take them for granted, for the very moment of defeat is that at which they are capable of some surprising ef-
421
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
fort. Rundle, following them up from Senekal, found them in strong possession of the kopjes at Biddulphsberg, and received a check in his endeavour to drive them off. It was an action fought amid great grass fi res, where the possible fate of the wounded was horrible to contemplate. The 2nd Grenadiers, the Scots Guards, the East York­shires, and the West Kents were all engaged, with the 2nd and 79th Field Batteries and a force of Yeomanry. Our losses incurred in the open from unseen rifl es were thirty killed and 130 wounded, in­cluding Colonel Lloyd of the Grenadiers. Two days later Rundle, from Senekal, joined hands with Brabant from Ficksburg, and a de­fensive line was formed between those two places, which was held unbroken for two months, when the operations ended in the cap­ture of the greater part of the force opposed to him. Clements’s Bri­gade, consisting of the 1st Royal Irish, the 2nd Bedfords, the 2nd Worcesters, and the 2nd Wiltshires, had come to strengthen Run­dle, and altogether he may have had as many as twelve thousand men under his orders. It was not a large force with which to hold a mobile adversary at least eight thousand strong, who might attack him at any point of his extended line. So well, however, did he select his positions that every attempt of the enemy, and there were many, ended in failure. Badly supplied with food, he and his half-starved men held bravely to their task, and no soldiers in all that great host deserve better of their country.
At the end of May, then, the Colonial Division, Rundle’s Divi­sion, and Clements’s Brigade held the Boers from Ficksburg on the Basuto border to Senekal. This prevented them from coming south. But what was there to prevent them from coming west, and fall­ing upon the railway line? There was the weak point of the Brit­ish position. Lord Methuen had been brought across from Boshof, and was available with six thousand men. Colvile was on that side also, with the Highland Brigade. A few details were scattered up and
422
THE GREAT BOER WAR
down the line, waiting to be gathered up by an enterprising enemy. Kroonstad was held by a single militia battalion; each separate force had to be nourished by convoys with weak escorts. Never was there such a fi eld for a mobile and competent guerilla leader. And, as luck would have it, such a man was at hand, ready to take full advantage of his opportunities.
XXVII.
THE LINES
OF COMMUNICATION
Christian de Wet, the elder of two brothers of that name, was at this time in the prime of life, a little over forty years of age. He was a burly middle-sized bearded man, poorly educated, but en­dowed with much energy and common-sense. His military experi­ence dated back to Majuba Hill, and he had a large share of that curious race hatred which is intelligible in the case of the Transvaal, but inexplicable in a Freestater who has received no injury from the British Empire. Some weakness of his sight compels the use of tinted spectacles, and he had now turned these, with a pair of particularly observant eyes behind them, upon the scattered British forces and the long exposed line of railway.
De Wet’s force was an offshoot from the army of Freestaters un­der De Villiers, Olivier, and Prinsloo, which lay in the mountainous north-east of the State. To him were committed fi ve guns, fi fteen hundred men, and the best of the horses. Well armed, well mount­ed, and operating in a country which consisted of rolling plains with occasional fortress kopjes, his little force had everything in its fa­vour. There were so many tempting objects of attack lying before him that he must have had some diffi culty in knowing where to be­gin. The tinted spectacles were turned fi rst upon the isolated town of Lindley.
424
THE GREAT BOER WAR
Colvile with the Highland Brigade had come up from Venters­burg with instructions to move onward to Heilbron, pacifying the country as he passed. The country, however, refused to be pacifi ed, and his march from Ventersburg to Lindley was harassed by snipers every mile of the way. Finding that De Wet and his men were close upon him, he did not linger at Lindley, but passed on to his destina­tion, his entire march of 126 miles costing him sixty-three casual­ties, of which nine were fatal. It was a diffi cult and dangerous march, especially for the handful of Eastern Province Horse, upon whom fell all the mounted work. By evil fortune a force of fi ve hundred Yeomanry, the 18th battalion, including the Duke of Cambridge’s Own and the Irish companies, had been sent from Kroonstad to join Colvile at Lindley. Colonel Spragge was in command. On May 27th this body of horsemen reached their destination only to fi nd that Colvile had already abandoned it. They appear to have determined to halt for a day in Lindley, and then follow Colvile to Heilbron. Within a few hours of their entering the town they were fi ercely attacked by De Wet.
Colonel Spragge seems to have acted for the best. Under a heavy fi re he caused his troopers to fall back upon his transport, which had been left at a point a few miles out upon the Kroonstad Road, where three defensible kopjes sheltered a valley in which the cattle and horses could be herded. A stream ran through it. There were all the materials there for a stand which would have brought glory to the British arms. The men were of peculiarly fi ne quality, many of them from the public schools and from the universities, and if any would fi ght to the death these with their sporting spirit and their high sense of honour might have been expected to do so.
They had the stronger motive for holding out, as they had taken steps to convey word of their diffi culty to Colvile and to Methuen. The former continued his march to Heilbron, and it is hard to blame
425
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
him for doing so, but Methuen on hearing the message, which was conveyed to him at great personal peril by Corporal Hankey of the Yeomanry, pushed on instantly with the utmost energy, though he arrived too late to prevent, or even to repair, a disaster. It must be remembered that Colvile was under orders to reach Heilbron on a certain date, that he was himself fi ghting his way, and that the force which he was asked to relieve was much more mobile than his own. His cavalry at that date consisted of 100 men of the Eastern Province Horse.
Colonel Spragge’s men had held their own for the fi rst three days of their investment, during which they had been simply ex­posed to a long-range rifl e fi re which infl icted no very serious loss upon them. Their principal defence consisted of a stone kraal about twenty yards square, which sheltered them from rifl e bullets, but must obviously be a perfect death-trap in the not improbable event of the Boers sending for artillery. The spirit of the troopers was ad­mirable. Several dashing sorties were carried out under the leader­ship of Captain Humby and Lord Longford. The latter was a particu­larly dashing business, ending in a bayonet charge which cleared a neighbouring ridge. Early in the siege the gallant Keith met his end. On the fourth day the Boers brought up fi ve guns. One would have thought that during so long a time as three days it would have been possible for the offi cer in command to make such preparations against this obvious possibility as were so successfully taken at a lat­er stage of the war by the handful who garrisoned Ladybrand. Surely in this period, even without engineers, it would not have been hard to construct such trenches as the Boers have again and again op­posed to our own artillery. But the preparations which were made proved to be quite inadequate. One of the two smaller kopjes was carried, and the garrison fl ed to the other. This also was compelled to surrender, and fi nally the main kopje also hoisted the white fl ag.
426
THE GREAT BOER WAR
No blame can rest upon the men, for their presence there at all is a suffi cient proof of their public spirit and their gallantry. But the lessons of the war seem to have been imperfectly learned, especially that very certain lesson that shell fi re in a close formation is insup­portable, while in an open formation with a little cover it can never compel surrender. The casualty lists (80 killed and wounded out of a force of 470) show that the Yeomanry took considerable punish­ment before surrendering, but do not permit us to call the defence desperate or heroic. It is only fair to add that Colonel Spragge was acquitted of all blame by a court of inquiry, which agreed, however, that the surrender was premature, and attributed it to the unau­thorised hoisting of a white fl ag upon one of the detached kopjes. With regard to the subsequent controversy as to whether General Colvile might have returned to the relief of the Yeomanry, it is im­possible to see how that General could have acted in any other way than he did.
Some explanation is needed of Lord Methuen’s appearance upon the central scene of warfare, his division having, when last de­scribed, been at Boshof, not far from Kimberley, where early in April he fought the successful action which led to the death of Villebois. Thence he proceeded along the Vaal and then south to Kroons­tad, arriving there on May 28th. He had with him the 9th Brigade (Douglas’s), which contained the troops which had started with him for the relief of Kimberley six months before. These were the Northumberland Fusiliers, Loyal North Lancashires, Northamp­tons, and Yorkshire Light Infantry. With him also were the Mun­sters, Lord Chesham’s Yeomanry (fi ve companies), with the 4th and 37th batteries, two howitzers and two pom-poms. His total force was about 6000 men. On arriving at Kroonstad he was given the task of relieving Heilbron, where Colvile, with the Highland Brigade, some Colonial horse, Lovat’s Scouts, two naval guns, and the 5th battery,
427
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
were short of food and ammunition. The more urgent message from the Yeomen at Lindley, however, took him on a fruitless journey to that town on June 1st. So vigorous was the pursuit of the Yeomanry that the leading squadrons, consisting of South Notts Hussars and Sherwood Rangers, actually cut into the Boer convoy and might have rescued the prisoners had they been supported. As it was they were recalled, and had to fi ght their way back to Lindley with some loss, including Colonel Rolleston, the commander, who was badly wounded. A garrison was left under Paget, and the rest of the force pursued its original mission to Heilbron, arriving there on June 7th, when the Highlanders had been reduced to quarter rations. ‘The Salvation Army’ was the nickname by which they expressed their gratitude to the relieving force.
A previous convoy sent to the same destination had less good fortune. On June 1st fi fty-fi ve wagons started from the railway line to reach Heilbron. The escort consisted of one hundred and sixty details belonging to Highland regiments without any guns, Captain Corballis in command. But the gentleman with the tinted glasses was waiting on the way. ‘I have twelve hundred men and fi ve guns. Surrender at once!’ Such was the message which reached the escort, and in their defenceless condition there was nothing for it but to comply. Thus one disaster leads to another, for, had the Yeomanry held out at Lindley, De Wet would not on June 4th have laid hands upon our wagons; and had he not recruited his supplies from our wagons it is doubtful if he could have made his attack upon Roode­val. This was the next point upon which he turned his attention.
Two miles beyond Roodeval station there is a well-marked kopje by the railway line, with other hills some distance to the right and the left. A militia regiment, the 4th Derbyshire, had been sent up to occupy this post. There were rumours of Boers on the line, and Ma­jor Haig, who with one thousand details of various regiments com-
428
THE GREAT BOER WAR
manded at railhead, had been attacked on June 6th but had beaten off his assailants. De Wet, acting sometimes in company with, and sometimes independently of, his lieutenant Nel, passed down the line looking fur some easier prey, and on the night of June 7th came upon the militia regiment, which was encamped in a position which could be completely commanded by artillery. It is not true that they had neglected to occupy the kopje under which they lay, for two companies had been posted upon it. But there seems to have been no thought of imminent danger, and the regiment had pitched its tents and gone very comfortably to sleep without a thought of the gentleman in the tinted glasses. In the middle of the night he was upon them with a hissing sleet of bullets. At the fi rst dawn the guns opened and the shells began to burst among them. It was a horrible ordeal for raw troops. The men were miners and agricultural labour­ers, who had never seen more bloodshed than a cut fi nger in their lives. They had been four months in the country, but their life had been a picnic, as the luxury of their baggage shows. Now in an in­stant the picnic was ended, and in the grey cold dawn war was upon them – grim war with the whine of bullets, the screams of pain, the crash of shell, the horrible rending and riving of body and limb. In desperate straits, which would have tried the oldest soldiers, the brave miners did well. They never from the beginning had a chance save to show how gamely they could take punishment, but that at least they did. Bullets were coming from all sides at once and yet no enemy was visible. They lined one side of the embankment, and they were shot in the back. They lined the other, and were again shot in the back. Baird-Douglas, the Colonel, vowed to shoot the man who should raise the white fl ag, and he fell dead himself before he saw the hated emblem. But it had to come. A hundred and forty of the men were down, many of them suffering from the horrible wounds which shell infl icts. The place was a shambles. Then the fl ag went up
429
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
and the Boers at last became visible. Outnumbered, outgeneralled, and without guns, there is no shadow of stain upon the good name of the one militia regiment which was ever seriously engaged during the war. Their position was hopeless from the fi rst, and they came out of it with death, mutilation, and honour.
Two miles south of the Rhenoster kopje stands Roodeval station, in which, on that June morning, there stood a train containing the mails for the army, a supply of great-coats, and a truck full of enor­mous shells. A number of details of various sorts, a hundred or more, had alighted from the train, twenty of them Post-offi ce volunteers, some of the Pioneer Railway corps, a few Shropshires, and other waifs and strays. To them in the early morning came the gentleman with the tinted glasses, his hands still red with the blood of the Der­bies. ‘I have fourteen hundred men and four guns. Surrender!’ said the messenger. But it is not in nature for a postman to give up his postbag without a struggle. ‘Never!’ cried the valiant postmen. But shell after shell battered the corrugated-iron buildings about their ears, and it was not possible for them to answer the guns which were smashing the life out of them. There was no help for it but to surren­der. De Wet added samples of the British volunteer and of the Brit­ish regular to his bag of militia. The station and train were burned down, the great-coats looted, the big shells exploded, and the mails burned. The latter was the one unsportsmanlike action which can up to that date be laid to De Wet’s charge. Forty thousand men to the north of him could forego their coats and their food, but they yearned greatly for those home letters, charred fragments of which
15
are still blowing about the veld.
15
Fragments continually met the eye which must have afforded cu­rious reading for the victors. 'I hope you have killed all those Boers by now,' was the beginning of one letter which I could not help observing.
430
Соседние файлы в предмете [НЕСОРТИРОВАННОЕ]