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THE GREAT BOER WAR
ried out this part of the plan, supported by six batteries of fi eld artillery, one howitzer battery, and two 4.7 naval guns. Three hours
later a telegram was on its way to Pretoria to tell how triumphantly
the burghers had driven back an attack which was never meant to
go forward. The infantry retired fi rst, then the artillery in alternate
batteries, preserving a beautiful order and decorum. The last battery,
the 78th, remained to receive the concentrated fi re of the Boer guns,
and was so enveloped in the dust of the exploding shells that spectators could only see a gun here or a limber there. Out of this whirl of
death it quietly walked, without a bucket out of its place, the gunners drawing one wagon, the horses of which had perished, and so
effected a leisurely and contemptuous withdrawal. The gallantry of
the gunners has been one of the most striking features of the war, but
it has never been more conspicuous than in this feint at Brakfontein.
While the attention of the Boers was being concentrated upon
the Lancashire men, a pontoon bridge was suddenly thrown across
the river at a place called Munger’s Drift, some miles to the eastward.
Three infantry brigades, those of Hart, Lyttelton, and Hildyard, had
been massed all ready to be let slip when the false attack was suffi ciently absorbing. The artillery fi re (the Swartz Kop guns, and also
the batteries which had been withdrawn from the Brakfontein demonstration) was then turned suddenly, with the crashing effect of
seventy pieces, upon the real object of attack, the isolated Vaalkranz.
It is doubtful whether any position has ever been subjected to so
terrifi c a bombardment, for the weight of metal thrown by single
guns was greater than that of a whole German battery in the days
of their last great war. The 4-pounders and 6-pounders of which
Prince Kraft discourses would have seemed toys beside these mighty
howitzers and 4.7’s. Yet though the hillside was sharded off in great
fl akes, it is doubtful if this terrifi c fi re infl icted much injury upon
the cunning and invisible rifl emen with whom we had to contend.
251
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
About midday the infantry began to stream across the bridge,
which had been most gallantly and effi ciently constructed under
a warm fi re, by a party of sappers, under the command of Major Irvine. The attack was led by the Durham Light Infantry of Lyttelton’s Brigade, followed by the 1st Rifl e Brigade, with the Scottish
and 3rd Rifl es in support. Never did the old Light Division of Peninsular fame go up a Spanish hillside with greater spirit and dash
than these, their descendants, facing the slope of Vaalkranz. In open
order they moved across the plain, with a superb disregard of the
crash and patter of the shrapnel, and then up they went, the fl itting
fi gures, springing from cover to cover, stooping, darting, crouching,
running, until with their glasses the spectators on Swartz Kop could
see the gleam of the bayonets and the strain of furious rushing men
upon the summit, as the last Boers were driven from their trenches.
The position was gained, but little else. Seven offi cers and seventy
men were lying killed and wounded among the boulders. A few
stricken Boers, fi ve unwounded prisoners, and a string of Basuto ponies were the poor fruits of victory – those and the arid hill from
which so much had been hoped, and so little was to be gained.
It was during this advance that an incident occurred of a more
picturesque character than is usual in modern warfare. The invisibility of combatants and guns, and the absorption of the individual
in the mass, have robbed the battle-fi eld of those episodes which
adorned, if they did not justify it. On this occasion, a Boer gun, cut
off by the British advance, fl ew out suddenly from behind its cover,
like a hare from its tussock, and raced for safety across the plain.
Here and there it wound, the horses stretched to their utmost, the
drivers stooping and lashing, the little gun bounding behind. To
right to left, behind and before, the British shells burst, lyddite and
shrapnel, crashing and riving. Over the lip of a hollow, the gallant
gun vanished, and within a few minutes was banging away once
252
THE GREAT BOER WAR
more at the British advance. With cheers and shouts and laughter,
the British infantrymen watched the race for shelter, their sporting
spirit rising high above all racial hatred, and hailing with a ‘gone to
ground’ whoop the fi nal disappearance of the gun.
The Durhams had cleared the path, but the other regiments of
Lyttelton’s Brigade followed hard at their heels, and before night
they had fi rmly established themselves upon the hill. But the fatal
slowness which had marred General Buller’s previous operations
again prevented him from completing his success. Twice at least in
the course of these operations there is evidence of sudden impulse to
drop his tools in the midst of his task and to do no more for the day.
So it was at Colenso, where an order was given at an early hour for
the whole force to retire, and the guns which might have been covered by infantry fi re and withdrawn after nightfall were abandoned.
So it was also at a critical moment at this action at Vaalkranz. In the
original scheme of operations it had been planne d that an adjoining hill, called the Green Hill, which partly commanded Vaalkranz,
should be carried also. The two together made a complete position,
while singly each was a very bad neighbour to the other. On the
aide-de-camp riding up, however, to inquire from General Buller
whether the time had come for this advance, he replied, ‘We have
done enough for the day,’ and left out this essential portion of his
original scheme, with the result that all miscarried.
Speed was the most essential quality for carrying out his plan
successfully. So it must always be with the attack. The defence does
not know where the blow is coming, and has to distribute men and
guns to cover miles of ground. The attacker knows where he will
hit, and behind a screen of outposts he can mass his force and throw
his whole strength against a mere fraction of that of his enemy. But
in order to do so he must be quick. One tiger spring must tear the
centre out of the line before the fl anks can come to its assistance.
253
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
If time is given, if the long line can concentrate, if the scattered guns
can mass, if lines of defence can be reduplicated behind, then the
one great advantage which the attack possesses is thrown away. Both
at the second and at the third attempts of Buller the British movements were so slow that had the enemy been the slowest instead of
the most mobile of armies, they could still always have made any
dispositions which they chose. Warren’s dawdling in the fi rst days
of the movement which ended at Spion Kop might with an effort be
condoned on account of possible diffi culties of supply, but it would
strain the ingenuity of the most charitable critic to fi nd a suffi cient
reason for the lethargy of Vaalkranz. Though daylight comes a little
after four, the operations were not commenced before seven. Lyttelton’s Brigade had stormed the hill at two, and nothing more was
done during the long evening, while offi cers chafed and soldiers
swore, and the busy Boers worked furiously to bring up their guns
and to bar the path which we must take. General Buller remarked
a day or two later that the way was not quite so easy as it had been.
One might have deduced the fact without the aid of a balloon.
The brigade then occupied Vaalkranz and erected sangars and
dug trenches. On the morning of the 6th, the position of the British
force was not dissimilar to that of Spion Kop. Again they had some
thousands of men upon a hill-top, exposed to shell fi re from several
directions and without any guns upon the hill to support them. In
one or two points the situation was modifi ed in their favour, and
hence their escape from loss and disaster. A more extended position
enabled the infantry to avoid bunching, but in other respects the
situation was parallel to that in which they had found themselves
a fortnight before.
The original plan was that the taking of Vaalkranz should be the
fi rst step towards the outfl anking of Brakfontein and the rolling up of
the whole Boer position. But after the fi rst move the British attitude
254
THE GREAT BOER WAR
became one of defence rather than of attack. Whatever the general
and ultimate effect of these operations may have been, it is beyond
question that their contemplation was annoying and bewildering in
the extreme to those who were present. The position on February
6th was this. Over the river upon the hill was a single British brigade,
exposed to the fi re of one enormous gun – a 96-pound Creusot, the
longest of all Long Toms – which was stationed upon Doornkloof,
and of several smaller guns and pom-poms which spat at them from
nooks and crevices of the hills. On our side were seventy-two guns,
large and small, all very noisy and impotent. It is not too much to say,
as it appears to me, that the Boers have in some ways revolutionised
our ideas in regard to the use of artillery, by bringing a fresh and
healthy common-sense to bear upon a subject which had been unduly fettered by pedantic rules. The Boer system is the single stealthy
gun crouching where none can see it. The British system is the six
brave guns coming into action in line of full interval, and spreading
out into accurate dressing visible to all men. ‘Always remember,’ says
one of our artillery maxims, ‘that one gun is no gun.’ Which is prettier
on a fi eld-day, is obvious, but which is business – let the many duels
between six Boer guns and sixty British declare. With black powder it
was useless to hide the gun, as its smoke must betray it. With smokeless powder the guns are so invisible that it was only by the detection
with powerful glasses of the dust from the trail on the recoil that the
offi cers were ever able to localise the guns against which they were
fi ghting. But if the Boers had had six guns in line, instead of one behind that kopje, and another between those distant rocks, it would
not have been so diffi cult to say where they were. Again, British traditions are all in favour of planting guns close together. At this very
action of Vaalkranz the two largest guns were so placed that a single
shell bursting between them would have disabled them both. The
offi cer who placed them there, and so disregarded in a vital matter
255
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
the most obvious dictates of common-sense, would probably have
been shocked by any want of technical smartness, or irregularity in
the routine drill. An over-elaboration of trifl es, and a want of grip of
common-sense, and of adaptation to new ideas, is the most serious
and damaging criticism which can be levelled against our army. That
the function of infantry is to shoot, and not to act like spearmen in
the Middle Ages; that the fi rst duty of artillery is so far as is possible
to be invisible – these are two of the lessons which have been driven
home so often during the war, that even our hidebound conservatism can hardly resist them.
Lyttelton’s Brigade, then, held Vaalkranz; and from three parts
of the compass there came big shells and little shells, with a constant shower of long-range rifl e bullets. Behind them, and as useful
as if it had been on Woolwich Common, there was drawn up an
imposing mass of men, two infantry divisions, and two brigades of
cavalry, all straining at the leash, prepared to shed their blood until
the spruits ran red with it, if only they could win their way to where
their half-starved comrades waited for them. But nothing happened.
Hours passed and nothing happened. An occasional shell from the
big gun plumped among them. One, through some freak of gunnery,
lobbed slowly through a division, and the men whooped and threw
their caps at it as it passed. The guns on Swartz Kop, at a range of
nearly fi ve miles, tossed shells at the monster on Doornkloof, and
fi nally blew up his powder magazine amid the applause of the infantry. For the army it was a picnic and a spectacle.
But it was otherwise with the men up on Vaalkranz. In spite of
sangar and trench, that cross fi re was fi nding them out; and no feint
or demonstration on either side came to draw the concentrated fi re
from their position. Once there was a sudden alarm at the western
end of the hill, and stooping bearded fi gures with slouch hats and
bandoliers were right up on the ridge before they could be stopped,
256
THE GREAT BOER WAR
so cleverly had their advance been conducted. But a fi ery rush of
Durhams and Rifl es cleared the crest again, and it was proved once
more how much stronger is the defence than the attack. Nightfall
found the position unchanged, save that another pontoon bridge
had been constructed during the day. Over this Hildyard’s Brigade
marched to relieve Lyttelton’s, who came back for a rest under the
cover of the Swartz Kop guns. Their losses in the two days had been
under two hundred and fi fty, a trifl e if any aim were to be gained,
but excessive for a mere demonstration.
That night Hildyard’s men supplemented the defences made by
Lyttelton, and tightened their hold upon the hill. One futile night
attack caused them for an instant to change the spade for the rifl e.
When in the morning it was found that the Boers had, as they naturally would, brought up their outlying guns, the tired soldiers did
not regret their labours of the night. It was again demonstrated how
innocuous a thing is a severe shell fi re, if the position be an extended one with chances of cover. A total of forty killed and wounded
out of a strong brigade was the result of a long day under an incessant cannonade. And then at nightfall came the conclusion that the
guns were too many, that the way was too hard, and down came all
their high hopes with the order to withdraw once more across that
accursed river. Vaalkranz was abandoned, and Hildyard’s Brigade,
seething with indignation, was ordered back once more to its camp.
XVII.
BULLER’S FINAL ADVANCE
The heroic moment of the siege of Ladysmith was that which
witnessed the repulse of the great attack. The epic should have ended at that dramatic instant. But instead of doing so the story falls
back to an anticlimax of crowded hospitals, slaughtered horses, and
sporadic shell fi re. For another six weeks of inactivity the brave garrison endured all the sordid evils which had steadily grown from inconvenience to misfortune and from misfortune to misery. Away in
the south they heard the thunder of Buller’s guns, and from the hills
round the town they watched with pale faces and bated breath the
tragedy of Spion Kop, preserving a fi rm conviction that a very little
more would have transformed it into their salvation. Their hearts
sank with the sinking of the cannonade, and rose again with the
roar of Vaalkranz. But Vaalkranz also failed them, and they waited
on in the majesty of their hunger and their weakness for the help
which was to come.
It has been already narrated how General Buller had made
his three attempts for the relief of the city. The General who was
inclined to despair was now stimulated by despatches from Lord
Roberts, while his army, who were by no means inclined to despair,
were immensely cheered by the good news from the Kimberley
side. Both General and army prepared for a last supreme effort. This
time, at least, the soldiers hoped that they would be permitted to
burst their way to the help of their starving comrades or leave their
258
THE GREAT BOER WAR
bones among the hills which had faced them so long. All they asked
was a fi ght to a fi nish, and now they were about to have one. General Buller had tried the Boers’ centre, he had tried their extreme
right, and now he was about to try their extreme left. There were
some obvious advantages on this side which make it surprising that
it was not the fi rst to be attempted. In the fi rst place, the enemy’s
main position upon that fl ank was at Hlangwane mountain, which
is to the south of the Tugela, so that in case of defeat the river ran
behind them. In the second, Hlangwane mountain was the one
point from which the Boer position at Colenso could be certainly
enfi laded, and therefore the fruits of victory would be greater on
that fl ank than on the other. Finally, the operations could be conducted at no great distance from the railhead, and the force would
be exposed to little danger of having its fl ank attacked or its communications cut, as was the case in the Spion Kop advance. Against
these potent considerations there is only to be put the single fact
that the turning of the Boer right would threaten the Freestaters’
line of retreat. On the whole, the balance of advantage lay entirely with the new attempt, and the whole army advanced to it with
a premonition of success. Of all the examples which the war has
given of the enduring qualities of the British troops there is none
more striking than the absolute confi dence and whole hearted delight with which, after three bloody repulses, they set forth upon
another venture.
On February 9th the movements were started which transferred
the greater part of the force from the extreme left to the centre and
right. By the 11th Lyttelton’s (formerly Clery’s) second division and
Warren’s fi fth division had come eastward, leaving Burn Murdoch’s
cavalry brigade to guard the Western side. On the 12th Lord Dundonald, with all the colonial cavalry, two battalions of infantry, and
a battery, made a strong reconnaissance towards Hussar Hill, which
259
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
is the nearest of the several hills which would have to be occupied
in order to turn the position. The hill was taken, but was abandoned
again by General Buller after he had used it for some hours as an
observatory. A long-range action between the retiring cavalry and
the Boers ended in a few losses upon each side.
What Buller had seen during the hour or two which he had
spent with his telescope upon Hussar Hill had evidently confi rmed
him in his views, for two days later (February 14th) the whole army
set forth for this point. By the morning of the 15th twenty thousand
men were concentrated upon the sides and spurs of this eminence.
On the 16th the heavy guns were in position, and all was ready for
the advance.
Facing them now were the formidable Boer lines of Hlangwane
Hill and Green Hill, which would certainly cost several thousands
of men if they were to take them by direct storm. Beyond them, upon
the Boer fl ank, were the hills of Monte Christo and Cingolo, which
appeared to be the extreme outside of the Boer position. The plan
was to engage the attention of the trenches in front by a terrifi c artillery fi re and the threat of an assault, while at the same time sending the true fl ank attack far round to carry the Cingolo ridge, which
must be taken before any other hill could be approached.
On the 17th, in the early morning, with the fi rst tinge of violet in
the east, the irregular cavalry and the second division (Lyttelton’s)
with Wynne’s Brigade started upon their widely curving fl anking
march. The country through which they passed was so broken that
the troopers led their horses in single fi le, and would have found
themselves helpless in face of any resistance. Fortunately, Cingolo
Hill was very weakly held, and by evening both our horsemen and
our infantry had a fi rm grip upon it, thus turning the extreme left
fl ank of the Boer position. For once their mountainous fortresses
were against them, for a mounted Boer force is so mobile that in an
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