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THE GREAT BOER WAR
and the sight of his wiry erect fi gure and mahogany face sent them
full of fi re and confi dence upon their way.
But the march of this second day (February 13th) was a military operation of some diffi culty. Thirty long waterless miles had
to be done before they could reach the Modder, and it was possible
that even then they might have to fi ght an action before winning
the drift. The weather was very hot, and through the long day the
sun beat down from an unclouded sky, while the soldiers were only
shaded by the dust-bank in which they rode. A broad arid plain,
swelling into stony hills, surrounded them on every side. Here and
there in the extreme distance, mounted fi gures moved over the vast
expanse – Boer scouts who marked in amazement the advance of
this great array. Once or twice these men gathered together, and
a sputter of rifl e fi re broke out upon our left fl ank, but the great tide
swept on and carried them with it. Often in this desolate land the
herds of mottled springbok and of grey rekbok could be seen sweeping over the plain, or stopping with that curiosity upon which the
hunter trades, to stare at the unwonted spectacle.
So all day they rode, hussars, dragoons, and lancers, over the
withered veld, until men and horses drooped with the heat and the
exertion. A front of nearly two miles was kept, the regiments moving
two abreast in open order; and the sight of this magnifi cent cloud
of horsemen sweeping over the great barren plain was a glorious
one. The veld had caught fi re upon the right, and a black cloud of
smoke with a lurid heart to it covered the fl ank. The beat of the sun
from above and the swelter of dust from below were overpowering.
Gun horses fell in the traces and died of pure exhaustion. The men,
parched and silent, but cheerful, strained their eyes to pierce the
continual mirage which played over the horizon, and to catch the
fi rst glimpse of the Modder. At last, as the sun began to slope down
to the west, a thin line of green was discerned, the bushes which
291
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
skirt the banks of that ill-favoured stream. With renewed heart the
cavalry pushed on and made for the drift, while Major Rimington,
to whom the onerous duty of guiding the force had been entrusted,
gave a sigh of relief as he saw that he had indeed struck the very
point at which he had aimed.
The essential thing in the movements had been speed – to reach
each point before the enemy could concentrate to oppose them. Upon
this it depended whether they would fi nd fi ve hundred or fi ve thousand waiting on the further bank. It must have been with anxious
eyes that French watched his fi rst regiment ride down to Klip Drift. If
the Boers should have had notice of his coming and have transferred
some of their 40-pounders, he might lose heavily before he forced
the stream. But this time, at last, he had completely outmanoeuvred
them. He came with the news of his coming, and Broadwood with
the 12th Lancers rushed the drift. The small Boer force saved itself by
fl ight, and the camp, the wagons, and the supplies remained with the
victors. On the night of the 13th he had secured the passage of the
Modder, and up to the early morning the horses and the guns were
splashing through its coffee-coloured waters.
French’s force had now come level to the main position of the
Boers, but had struck it upon the extreme left wing. The extreme
right wing, thanks to the Koodoosdrift demonstration, was fi fty
miles off, and this line was naturally very thinly held, save only at
the central position of Magersfontein. Cronje could not denude this
central position, for he saw Methuen still waiting in front of him,
and in any case Klip Drift is twenty-fi ve miles from Magersfontein.
But the Boer left wing, though scattered, gathered into some sort
of cohesion on Wednesday (February 14th), and made an effort to
check the victorious progress of the cavalry. It was necessary on this
day to rest at Klip Drift, until Kelly-Kenny should come up with the
infantry to hold what had been gained. All day the small bodies of
292
THE GREAT BOER WAR
Boers came riding in and taking up positions between the column
and its objective.
Next morning the advance was resumed, the column being still
forty miles from Kimberley with the enemy in unknown force between. Some four miles out French came upon their position, two
hills with a long low nek between, from which came a brisk rifl e fi re
supported by artillery. But French was not only not to be stopped,
but could not even be retarded. Disregarding the Boer fi re completely the cavalry swept in wave after wave over the low nek, and so
round the base of the hills. The Boer rifl emen upon the kopjes must
have seen a magnifi cent military spectacle as regiment after regiment, the 9th Lancers leading, all in very open order, swept across
the plain at a gallop, and so passed over the nek. A few score horses
and half as many men were left behind them, but forty or fi fty Boers
were cut down in the pursuit. It appears to have been one of the very
few occasions during the campaign when that obsolete and absurd
weapon the sword was anything but a dead weight to its bearer.
And now the force had a straight run in before it, for it had outpaced any further force of Boers which may have been advancing
from the direction of Magersfontein. The horses, which had come
a hundred miles in four days with insuffi cient food and water, were
so done that it was no uncommon sight to see the trooper not only
walking to ease his horse, but carrying part of his monstrous weight
of saddle gear. But in spite of fatigue the force pressed on until in the
afternoon a distant view was seen, across the reddish plain, of the
brick houses and corrugated roofs of Kimberley. The Boer besiegers
cleared off in front of it, and that night (February 15th) the relieving column camped on the plain two miles away, while French and
his staff rode in to the rescued city.
The war was a cruel one for the cavalry, who were handicapped
throughout by the nature of the country and by the tactics of the
293
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
enemy. They are certainly the branch of the service which had least
opportunity for distinction. The work of scouting and patrolling is
the most dangerous which a soldier can undertake, and yet from
its very nature it can fi nd no chronicler. The war correspondent,
like Providence, is always with the big battalions, and there never
was a campaign in which there was more unrecorded heroism, the
heroism of the picket and of the vedette which fi nds its way into no
newspaper paragraph. But in the larger operations of the war it is
diffi cult to say that cavalry, as cavalry, have justifi ed their existence.
In the opinion of many the tendency of the future will be to convert the whole force into mounted infantry. How little is required
to turn our troopers into excellent foot soldiers was shown at Magersfontein, where the 12th Lancers, dismounted by the command
of their colonel, Lord Airlie, held back the threatened fl ank attack
all the morning. A little training in taking cover, leggings instead
of boots, and a rifl e instead of a carbine would give us a formidable
force of twenty thousand men who could do all that our cavalry
does, and a great deal more besides. It is undoubtedly possible on
many occasions in this war, at Colesberg, at Diamond Hill, to say
‘Here our cavalry did well.’ They are brave men on good horses, and
they may be expected to do well. But the champion of the cavalry
cause must point out the occasions where the cavalry did something
which could not have been done by the same number of equally
brave and equally well-mounted infantry. Only then will the existence of the cavalry be justifi ed. The lesson both of the South African and of the American civil war is that the light horseman who is
trained to fi ght on foot is the type of the future.
A few more words as a sequel to this short sketch of the siege
and relief of Kimberley. Considerable surprise has been expressed
that the great gun at Kamfersdam, a piece which must have weighed
many tons and could not have been moved by bullock teams at
294
THE GREAT BOER WAR
a rate of more than two or three miles an hour, should have eluded
our cavalry. It is indeed a surprising circumstance, and yet it was
due to no inertia on the part of our leaders, but rather to one of the
fi nest examples of Boer tenacity in the whole course of the war. The
instant that Kekewich was sure of relief he mustered every available
man and sent him out to endeavour to get the gun. It had already
been removed, and its retreat was covered by the strong position
of Dronfi eld, which was held both by rifl emen and by light artillery. Finding himself unable to force it, Murray, the commander of
the detachment, remained in front of it. Next morning (Friday) at
three o’clock the weary men and horses of two of French’s brigades
were afoot with the same object. But still the Boers were obstinately
holding on to Dronfi eld, and still their position was too strong to
force, and too extended to get round with exhausted horses. It was
not until the night after that the Boers abandoned their excellent rearguard action, leaving one light gun in the hands of the
Cape Police, but having gained such a start for their heavy one that
French, who had other and more important objects in view, could
not attempt to follow it.
XIX.
PAARDEBERG
Lord Roberts’s operations, prepared with admirable secrecy and
carried out with extreme energy, aimed at two different results,
each of which he was fortunate enough to attain. The fi rst was that
an overpowering force of cavalry should ride round the Boer position and raise the siege of Kimberley: the fate of this expedition has
already been described. The second was that the infantry, following hard on the heels of the cavalry, and holding all that they had
gained, should establish itself upon Cronje’s left fl ank and cut his
connection with Bloemfontein. It is this portion of the operations
which has now to be described.
The infantry force which General Roberts had assembled was
a very formidable one. The Guards he had left under Methuen in
front of the lines of Magersfontein to contain the Boer force. With
them he had also left those regiments which had fought in the 9th
Brigade in all Methuen’s actions. These, as will be remembered, were
the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 2nd Northamptons, and one wing of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. These stayed to hold Cronje in his position.
There remained three divisions of infantry, one of which, the
ninth, was made up on the spot. These were constituted in this way:
Sixth Division (Kelly-Kenny). 12th Brigade (Knox). Oxford Light
Infantry. Gloucesters (2nd). West Riding. Buffs. 18th Brigade (Stephenson). Essex. Welsh. Warwicks. Yorks Seventh Division (Tucker).
296
THE GREAT BOER WAR
14th Brigade (Chermside). Scots Borderers. Lincolns. Hampshires.
Norfolks. 15th Brigade (Wavell). North Staffords. Cheshires. S. Wales
Borderers. East Lancashires Ninth Division (Colvile). Highland Brigade (Macdonald). Black Watch. Argyll and Sutherlands. Seaforths.
Highland Light Infantry. 19th Brigade (Smith-Dorrien). Gordons.
Canadians. Shropshire Light Infantry. Cornwall Light Infantry.
With these were two brigade divisions of artillery under General Marshall, the fi rst containing the 18th, 62nd, and 75th batteries
(Colonel Hall), the other the 76th, 81st, and 82nd (Colonel McDonnell). Besides these there were a howitzer battery, a naval contingent
of four 4.7 guns and four 12-pounders under Captain Bearcroft of
the ‘Philomel.’ The force was soon increased by the transfer of the
Guards and the arrival of more artillery; but the numbers which
started on Monday, February 12th, amounted roughly to twenty-fi ve
thousand foot and eight thousand horse with 98 guns – a considerable army to handle in a foodless and almost waterless country. Seven
hundred wagons drawn by eleven thousand mules and oxen, all collected by the genius for preparation and organisation which characterises Lord Kitchener, groaned and creaked behind the columns.
Both arms had concentrated at Ramdam, the cavalry going
down by road, and the infantry by rail as far as Belmont or Enslin.
On Monday, February 12th, the cavalry had started, and on Tuesday
the infantry were pressing hard after them. The fi rst thing was to
secure a position upon Cronje’s fl ank, and for that purpose the 6th
Division and the 9th (Kelly-Kenny’s and Colvile’s) pushed swiftly
on and arrived on Thursday, February 15th, at Klip Drift on the
Modder, which had only been left by the cavalry that same morning. It was obviously impossible to leave Jacobsdal in the hands of
the enemy on our left fl ank, so the 7th Division (Tucker’s) turned
aside to attack the town. Wavell’s brigade carried the place after
a sharp skirmish, chiefl y remarkable for the fact that the City Impe-
297
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
rial Volunteers found themselves under fi re for the fi rst time and
bore themselves with the gallantry of the old train-bands whose descendants they are. Our loss was two killed and twenty wounded,
and we found ourselves for the fi rst time fi rmly established in one
of the enemy’s towns. In the excellent German hospital were thirty
or forty of our wounded.
On the afternoon of Thursday, February 15th, our cavalry, having left Klip Drift in the morning, were pushing hard for Kimberley.
At Klip Drift was Kelly-Kenny’s 6th Division. South of Klip Drift
at WegdraaI was Colvile’s 9th Division, while the 7th Division was
approaching Jacobsdal. Altogether the British forces were extended
over a line of forty miles. The same evening saw the relief of Kimberley and the taking of Jacobsdal, but it also saw the capture of one
of our convoys by the Boers, a dashing exploit which struck us upon
what was undoubtedly our vulnerable point.
It has never been cleared up whence the force of Boers came
which appeared upon our rear on that occasion. It seems to have
been the same body which had already had a skirmish with Hannay’s Mounted Infantry as they went up from Orange River to join
the rendezvous at Ramdam. The balance of evidence is that they
had not come from Colesberg or any distant point, but that they
were a force under the command of Piet De Wet, the younger of
two famous brothers. Descending to Waterval Drift, the ford over
the Riet, they occupied a line of kopjes, which ought, one would
have imagined, to have been carefully guarded by us, and opened
a brisk fi re from rifl es and guns upon the convoy as it ascended the
northern bank of the river. Numbers of bullocks were soon shot
down, and the removal of the hundred and eighty wagons made impossible. The convoy, which contained forage and provisions, had
no guard of its own, but the drift was held by Colonel Ridley with
one company of Gordons and one hundred and fi fty mounted in-
298
THE GREAT BOER WAR
fantry without artillery, which certainly seems an inadequate force
to secure the most vital and vulnerable spot in the line of communications of an army of forty thousand men. The Boers numbered at
the fi rst some fi ve or six hundred men, but their position was such
that they could not be attacked. On the other hand they were not
strong enough to leave their shelter in order to drive in the British guard, who, lying in extended order between the wagons and
the assailants, were keeping up a steady and effective fi re. Captain
Head, of the East Lancashire Regiment, a fi ne natural soldier, commanded the British fi ring line, and neither he nor any of his men
doubted that they could hold off the enemy for an indefi nite time.
In the course of the afternoon reinforcements arrived for the Boers,
but Kitchener’s Horse and a fi eld battery came back and restored
the balance of power. In the evening the latter swayed altogether
in favour of the British, as Tucker appeared upon the scene with
the whole of the 14th Brigade; but as the question of an assault was
being debated a positive order arrived from Lord Roberts that the
convoy should be abandoned and the force return.
If Lord Roberts needed justifi cation for this decision, the future
course of events will furnish it. One of Napoleon’s maxims in war
was to concentrate all one’s energies upon one thing at one time.
Roberts’s aim was to outfl ank and possibly to capture Cronje’s army.
If he allowed a brigade to be involved in a rearguard action, his
whole swift-moving plan of campaign might be dislocated. It was
very annoying to lose a hundred and eighty wagons, but it only
meant a temporary inconvenience. The plan of campaign was the
essential thing. Therefore he sacrifi ced his convoy and hurried his
troops upon their original mission. It was with heavy hearts and
bitter words that those who had fought so long abandoned their
charge, but now at least there are probably few of them who do not
agree in the wisdom of the sacrifi ce. Our loss in this affair was be-
299
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
tween fi fty and sixty killed and wounded. The Boers were unable to
get rid of the stores, and they were eventually distributed among the
local farmers and recovered again as the British forces fl owed over
the country. Another small disaster occurred to us on the preceding
day in the loss of fi fty men of E company of Kitchener’s Horse, which
had been left as a guard to a well in the desert.
But great events were coming to obscure those small checks
which are incidental to a war carried out over immense distances
against a mobile and enterprising enemy. Cronje had suddenly become aware of the net which was closing round him. To the dark
fi erce man who had striven so hard to make his line of kopjes impregnable it must have been a bitter thing to abandon his trenches
and his rifl e pits. But he was crafty as well as tenacious, and he had
the Boer horror of being cut off – an hereditary instinct from fathers
who had fought on horseback against enemies on foot. If at any time
during the last ten weeks Methuen had contained him in front with
a thin line of rifl emen with machine guns, and had thrown the rest
of his force on Jacobsdal and the east, he would probably have attained the same result. Now at the rumour of English upon his fl ank
Cronje instantly abandoned his position and his plans, in order to
restore those communications with Bloemfontein upon which he depended for his supplies. With furious speed he drew in his right wing,
and then, one huge mass of horsemen, guns, and wagons, he swept
through the gap between the rear of the British cavalry bound for
Kimberley and the head of the British infantry at Klip Drift. There
was just room to pass, and at it he dashed with the furious energy
of a wild beast rushing from a trap. A portion of his force with his
heavy guns had gone north round Kimberley to Warrenton; many
of the Freestaters also had slipped away and returned to their farms.
The remainder, numbering about six thousand men, the majority of
whom were Transvaalers, swept through between the British forces.
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