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XXVI.
DIAMOND HILL – RUNDLE’S
OPERATIONS
The military situation at the time of the occupation of Pretoria was roughly as follows. Lord Roberts with some thirty thousand
men was in possession of the capital, but had left his long line of
communications very imperfectly guarded behind him. On the
fl ank of this line of communications, in the eastern and north-eastern corner of the Free State, was an energetic force of unconquered
Freestaters who had rallied round President Steyn. They were some
eight or ten thousand in number, well horsed, with a fair number
of guns, under the able leadership of De Wet, Prinsloo, and Olivier.
Above all, they had a splendid position, mountainous and broken,
from which, as from a fortress, they could make excursions to the
south or west. This army included the commandos of Ficksburg,
Senekal, and Harrismith, with all the broken and desperate men
from other districts who had left their farms and fl ed to the mountains. It was held in check as a united force by Rundle’s Division and
the Colonial Division on the south, while Colvile, and afterwards
Methuen, endeavoured to pen them in on the west. The task was
a hard one, however, and though Rundle succeeded in holding his
line intact, it appeared to be impossible in that wide country to coop
up altogether an enemy so mobile. A strange game of hide-and-seek
ensued, in which De Wet, who led the Boer raids, was able again and
411
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
again to strike our line of rails and to get back without serious loss.
The story of these instructive and humiliating episodes will be told
in their order. The energy and skill of the guerilla chief challenge
our admiration, and the score of his successes would be amusing
were it not that the points of the game are marked by the lives of
British soldiers.
General Buller had spent the latter half of May in making his
way from Ladysmith to Laing’s Nek, and the beginning of June
found him with twenty thousand men in front of that diffi cult position. Some talk of a surrender had arisen, and Christian Botha, who
commanded the Boers, succeeded in gaining several days’ armistice,
which ended in nothing. The Transvaal forces at this point were
not more than a few thousand in number, but their position was so
formidable that it was a serious task to turn them out. Van Wyk’s
Hill, however, had been left unguarded, and as its possession would
give the British the command of Botha’s Pass, its unopposed capture
by the South African Light Horse was an event of great importance.
With guns upon this eminence the infantry were able, on June 8th,
to attack and to carry with little loss the rest of the high ground,
and so to get the Pass into their complete possession. Botha fi red the
grass behind him, and withdrew sullenly to the north. On the 9th
and 10th the convoys were passed over the Pass, and on the 11th the
main body of the army followed them.
The operations were now being conducted in that extremely
acute angle of Natal which runs up between the Transvaal and the
Orange Free State. In crossing Botha’s Pass the army had really entered what was now the Orange River Colony. But it was only for
a very short time, as the object of the movement was to turn the Laing’s Nek position, and then come back into the Transvaal through
Alleman’s Pass. The gallant South African Light Horse led the way,
and fought hard at one point to clear a path for the army, losing
412
THE GREAT BOER WAR
six killed and eight wounded in a sharp skirmish. On the morning
of the 12th the fl anking movement was far advanced, and it only
remained for the army to force Alleman’s Nek, which would place
it to the rear of Laing’s Nek, and close to the Transvaal town of
Volksrust.
Had the Boers been the men of Colenso and of Spion Kop, this
storming of Alleman’s Nek would have been a bloody business.
The position was strong, the cover was slight, and there was no way
round. But the infantry came on with the old dash without the old
stubborn resolution being opposed to them. The guns prepared the
way, and then the Dorsets, the Dublins, the Middlesex, the Queen’s,
and the East Surrey did the rest. The door was open and the Transvaal lay before us. The next day Volksrust was in our hands.
The whole series of operations were excellently conceived and
carried out. Putting Colenso on one side, it cannot be denied that
General Buller showed considerable power of manoeuvring large
bodies of troops. The withdrawal of the compromised army after
Spion Kop, the change of the line of attack at Pieter’s Hill, and the
fl anking marches in this campaign of Northern Natal, were all very
workmanlike achievements. In this case a position which the Boers
had been preparing for months, scored with trenches and topped
by heavy artillery, had been rendered untenable by a clever fl ank
movement, the total casualties in the whole affair being less than
two hundred killed and wounded. Natal was cleared of the invader,
Buller’s foot was on the high plateau of the Transvaal, and Roberts
could count on twenty thousand good men coming up to him from
the south-east. More important than all, the Natal railway was being
brought up, and soon the central British Army would depend upon
Durban instead of Cape Town for its supplies – a saving of nearly
two-thirds of the distance. The fugitive Boers made northwards in the
Middelburg direction, while Buller advanced to Standerton, which
413
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
town he continued to occupy until Lord Roberts could send a force
down through Heidelberg to join hands with him. Such was the position of the Natal Field Force at the end of June. From the west and
the south-west British forces were also converging upon the capital.
The indomitable Baden-Powell sought for rest and change of scene
after his prolonged trial by harrying the Boers out of Zeerust and
Rustenburg. The forces of Hunter and of Mahon converged upon
Potchefstroom, from which, after settling that district, they could be
conveyed by rail to Krugersdorp and Johannesburg.
Before briefl y recounting the series of events which took place
upon the line of communications, the narrative must return to Lord
Roberts at Pretoria, and describe the operations which followed
his occupation of that city. In leaving the undefeated forces of the
Free State behind him, the British General had unquestionably run
a grave risk, and was well aware that his railway communication
was in danger of being cut. By the rapidity of his movements he succeeded in gaining the enemy’s capital before that which he had foreseen came to pass; but if Botha had held him at Pretoria while De
Wet struck at him behind, the situation would have been a serious
one. Having once attained his main object, Roberts could receive
with equanimity the expected news that De Wet with a mobile force
of less than two thousand men had, on June 7th, cut the line at
Roodeval to the north of Kroonstad. Both rail and telegraph were
destroyed, and for a few days the army was isolated. Fortunately
there were enough supplies to go on with, and immediate steps were
taken to drive away the intruder, though, like a mosquito, he was
brushed from one place only to settle upon another.
Leaving others to restore his broken communications, Lord
Roberts turned his attention once more to Botha, who still retained
ten or fi fteen thousand men under his command. The President had
fl ed from Pretoria with a large sum of money, estimated at over two
414
THE GREAT BOER WAR
millions sterling, and was known to be living in a saloon railway carriage, which had been transformed into a seat of government even
more mobile than that of President Steyn. From Waterval-Boven,
a point beyond Middelburg, he was in a position either to continue
his journey to Delagoa Bay, and so escape out of the country, or to
travel north into that wild Lydenburg country which had always
been proclaimed as the last ditch of the defence. Here he remained
with his gold-bags waiting the turn of events.
Botha and his stalwarts had not gone far from the capital. Fifteen miles out to the east the railway line runs through a gap in
the hills called Pienaars Poort, and here was such a position as the
Boer loves to hold. It was very strong in front, and it had widely
spread formidable fl anking hills to hamper those turning movements which had so often been fatal to the Boer generals. Behind
was the uncut railway line along which the guns could in case of
need be removed. The whole position was over fi fteen miles from
wing to wing, and it was well known to the Boer general that Lord
Roberts had no longer that preponderance of force which would
enable him to execute wide turning movements, as he had done in
his advance from the south. His army had decreased seriously in
numbers. The mounted men, the most essential branch of all, were
so ill horsed that brigades were not larger than regiments. One brigade of infantry (the 14th) had been left to garrison Johannesburg,
and another (the 18th) had been chosen for special duty in Pretoria. Smith-Dorrien’s Brigade had been detached for duty upon the
line of communications. With all these deductions and the wastage
caused by wounds and disease, the force was in no state to assume
a vigorous offensive. So hard pressed were they for men that the
three thousand released prisoners from Waterval were hurriedly
armed with Boer weapons and sent down the line to help to guard
the more vital points.
415
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
Had Botha withdrawn to a safe distance, Lord Roberts would
certainly have halted, as he had done at Bloemfontein, and waited
for remounts and reinforcements. But the war could not be allowed
to languish when an active enemy lay only fi fteen miles off, within
striking distance of two cities and of the line of rail. Taking all the
troops that he could muster, the British General moved out once
more on Monday, June 11th, to drive Botha from his position. He
had with him Pole-Carew’s 11th Division, which numbered about
six thousand men with twenty guns, Ian Hamilton’s force, which included one infantry brigade (Bruce Hamilton’s), one cavalry brigade,
and a corps of mounted infantry, say, six thousand in all, with thirty guns. There remained French’s Cavalry Division, with Hutton’s
Mounted Infantry, which could not have exceeded two thousand sabres and rifl es. The total force was, therefore, not more than sixteen
or seventeen thousand men, with about seventy guns. Their task was
to carry a carefully prepared position held by at least ten thousand
burghers with a strong artillery. Had the Boer of June been the Boer
of December, the odds would have been against the British.
There had been some negotiations for peace between Lord Roberts and Botha, but the news of De Wet’s success from the south had
hardened the Boer general’s heart, and on June 9th the cavalry had
their orders to advance. Hamilton was to work round the left wing of
the Boers, and French round their right, while the infantry came up
in the centre. So wide was the scene of action that the attack and the
resistance in each fl ank and in the centre constituted, on June 11th,
three separate actions. Of these the latter was of least importance, as
it merely entailed the advance of the infantry to a spot whence they
could take advantage of the success of the fl anking forces when they
had made their presence felt. The centre did not on this as on several other occasions in the campaign make the mistake of advancing
before the way had been prepared for it.
416
THE GREAT BOER WAR
French with his attenuated force found so vigorous a resistance
on Monday and Tuesday that he was hard put to it to hold his own.
Fortunately he had with him three excellent Horse Artillery batteries, G, O, and T, who worked until, at the end of the engagement,
they had only twenty rounds in their limbers. The country was an
impossible one for cavalry, and the troopers fought dismounted,
with intervals of twenty or thirty paces between the men. Exposed
all day to rifl e and shell fi re, unable to advance and unwilling to
retreat, it was only owing to their open formation that they escaped
with about thirty casualties. With Boers on his front, his fl ank, and
even on his rear, French held grimly on, realising that a retreat
upon his part would mean a greater pressure at all other points of
the British advance. At night his weary men slept upon the ground
which they had held. All Monday and all Tuesday French kept his
grip at Kameelsdrift, stolidly indifferent to the attempt of the enemy
to cut his line of communications. On Wednesday, Hamilton, upon
the other fl ank, had gained the upper hand, and the pressure was
relaxed. French then pushed forward, but the horses were so utterly
beaten that no effective pursuit was possible.
During the two days that French had been held up by the Boer
right wing Hamilton had also been seriously engaged upon the
left – so seriously that at one time the action appeared to have gone
against him. The fi ght presented some distinctive features, which
made it welcome to soldiers who were weary of the invisible man
with his smokeless gun upon the eternal kopje. It is true that man,
gun, and kopje were all present upon this occasion, but in the endeavours to drive him off some new developments took place, which
formed for one brisk hour a reversion to picturesque warfare. Perceiving a gap in the enemy’s line, Hamilton pushed up the famous
Q battery – the guns which had plucked glory out of disaster at Sanna’s Post. For the second time in one campaign they were exposed
417
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
and in imminent danger of capture. A body of mounted Boers with
great dash and hardihood galloped down within close range and
opened fi re. Instantly the 12th Lancers were let loose upon them.
How they must have longed for their big-boned long-striding English troop horses as they strove to raise a gallop out of their spiritless
overworked Argentines! For once, however, the lance meant more
than fi ve pounds dead weight and an encumbrance to the rider.
The guns were saved, the Boers fl ed, and a dozen were left upon the
ground. But a cavalry charge has to end in a re-formation, and that is
the instant of danger if any unbroken enemy remains within range.
Now a sleet of bullets hissed through their ranks as they retired,
and the gallant Lord Airlie, as modest and brave a soldier as ever
drew sword, was struck through the heart. ‘Pray moderate your language!’ was his last characteristic remark, made to a battle-drunken
sergeant. Two offi cers, seventeen men, and thirty horses went down
with their Colonel, the great majority only slightly injured. In the
meantime the increasing pressure upon his right caused Broadwood
to order a second charge, of the Life Guards this time, to drive off
the assailants. The appearance rather than the swords of the Guards
prevailed, and cavalry as cavalry had vindicated their existence
more than they had ever done during the campaign. The guns were
saved, the fl ank attack was rolled back, but one other danger had
still to be met, for the Heidelberg commando – a corps d’elite of the
Boers – had made its way outside Hamilton’s fl ank and threatened
to get past him. With cool judgment the British General detached
a battalion and a section of a battery, which pushed the Boers back
into a less menacing position. The rest of Bruce Hamilton’s Brigade were ordered to advance upon the hills in front, and, aided by
a heavy artillery fi re, they had succeeded, before the closing in of the
winter night, in getting possession of this fi rst line of the enemy’s
defences. Night fell upon an undecided fi ght, which, after swaying
418
THE GREAT BOER WAR
this way and that, had fi nally inclined to the side of the British. The
Sussex and the City Imperial Volunteers were clinging to the enemy’s left fl ank, while the 11th Division were holding them in front.
All promised well for the morrow.
By order of Lord Roberts the Guards were sent round early on
Tuesday, the 12th, to support the fl ank attack of Bruce Hamilton’s
infantry. It was afternoon before all was ready for the advance, and
then the Sussex, the London Volunteers, and the Derbyshires won
a position upon the ridge, followed later by the three regiments of
Guards. But the ridge was the edge of a considerable plateau, swept
by Boer fi re, and no advance could be made over its bare expanse
save at a considerable loss. The infantry clung in a long fringe to the
edge of the position, but for two hours no guns could be brought up
to their support, as the steepness of the slope was insurmountable. It
was all that the stormers could do to hold their ground, as they were
enfi laded by a Vickers-Maxim, and exposed to showers of shrapnel
as well as to an incessant rifl e fi re. Never were guns so welcome as
those of the 82nd battery, brought by Major Connolly into the fi ring line. The enemy’s rifl emen were only a thousand yards away,
and the action of the artillery might have seemed as foolhardy as
that of Long at Colenso. Ten horses went down on the instant, and
a quarter of the gunners were hit; but the guns roared one by one
into action, and their shrapnel soon decided the day. Undoubtedly
it is with Connolly and his men that the honours lie.
At four o’clock, as the sun sank towards the west, the tide of
fi ght had set in favour of the attack. Two more batteries had come
up, every rifl e was thrown into the fi ring line, and the Boer reply
was decreasing in volume. The temptation to an assault was great,
but even now it might mean heavy loss of life, and Hamilton shrank
from the sacrifi ce. In the morning his judgment was justifi ed, for
Botha had abandoned the position, and his army was in full retreat.
419
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
The mounted men followed as far as Elands River Station, which is
twenty-fi ve miles from Pretoria, but the enemy was not overtaken,
save by a small party of De Lisle’s Australians and Regular Mounted
Infantry. This force, less than a hundred in number, gained a kopje which overlooked a portion of the Boer army. Had they been
more numerous, the effect would have been incalculable. As it was,
the Australians fi red every cartridge which they possessed into the
throng, and killed many horses and men. It would bear examination
why it was that only this small corps was present at so vital a point,
and why, if they could push the pursuit to such purpose, others
should not be able to do the same. Time was bringing some curious
revenges. Already Paardeberg had come upon Majuba Day. Buller’s
victorious soldiers had taken Laing’s Nek. Now, the Spruit at which
the retreating Boers were so mishandled by the Australians was that
same Bronkers Spruit at which, nineteen years before, a regiment
had been shot down. Many might have prophesied that the deed
would be avenged; but who could ever have guessed the men who
would avenge it?
Such was the battle of Diamond Hill, as it was called from the
name of the ridge which was opposite to Hamilton’s attack. The
prolonged two days’ struggle showed that there was still plenty of
fi ght in the burghers. Lord Roberts had not routed them, nor had
he captured their guns; but he had cleared the vicinity of the capital, he had infl icted a loss upon them which was certainly as great
as his own, and he had again proved to them that it was vain for
them to attempt to stand. A long pause followed at Pretoria, broken by occasional small alarms and excursions, which served no end
save to keep the army from ennui. In spite of occasional breaks in
his line of communications, horses and supplies were coming up
rapidly, and, by the middle of July, Roberts was ready for the fi eld
again. At the same time Hunter had come up from Potchefstroom,
420
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